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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis examines the Namibian labour dispute resolution system by undertaking a 
comparative analysis of South African and international labour standards. It 
describes the legal provisions that exist for the effective and efficient resolution of 
labour disputes through an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) system, which is 
given recognition in national labour legislation, and in a number of international 
labour standards and regional labour instruments. It argues for the provision of a 
proactive and expeditious dispute resolution system that helps to resolve labour 
disputes in the most effective and efficient manner, without necessarily having to 
resort to the courts. 
 
The study examines the provisions of relevant international labour standards on 
labour dispute resolution to ascertain their adequacy as part frameworks that apply to 
Namibia and South Africa’s obligation to provide ADR systems that respond to the 
needs of the labour relations community. It is argued that ratifying particular ILO 
conventions creates obligations to comply with their provisions, and to apply them in 
national legislation and in practice. It is further argued that by having ratified those 
international labour standards that provide for ADR, Namibia assumes specific 
obligations under international law, enjoining the country to provide the required ADR 
system of conciliation and arbitration, which is credible and trusted by disputants and 
the general public. 
 
A comparative approach is adopted, which relies on primary and secondary sources 
of data, thereby undertaking an in-depth content analysis. The focus of the 
comparison is on whether the South African ADR system can inform Namibia’s 
application of its newly adopted ADR system. South Africa has a labour dispute 
resolution system that has influenced Namibian labour law, prompting Namibia to 
borrow its ADR system from South Africa’s advanced Commission for Conciliation 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). In this sense, it is submitted that there are 
fundamental similarities and differences in the two respective systems.  
 
vi 
Ideally, disputes should be resolved at conciliation level, resulting in the minority of 
disputes being referred to arbitration or the Labour Court. 
 
In terms of implementation, it is argued that despite the international obligation and 
commitment to provide and make available free and expeditious ADR services, there 
are gaps that exist between the legal framework regulating the ADR system and the 
application thereof in practice, making the attainment of effective and efficient labour 
dispute resolution difficult.  
 
Disputes should be resolved as quickly and informally as possible, with little or no 
procedural technicalities, and without allowing them to drag on indefinitely, offering 
immediate solutions instead. This is far from the reality of the situation. In contrast, 
the study found that although the Labour Act, 2007 and the South African Labour 
Relations Act (LRA) have brought statutory dispute resolution within the reach of the 
ordinary worker, these Acts may have compounded the problems relating to dispute 
resolution in the respective countries. The statutes in question have created 
sophisticated systems of dispute resolution in which most role players are seen as 
failing to operate as a result of the complex and technical processes of dealing with 
disputes. For this reason, the author proposes several remedial interventions that 
look to the future and the continued provision of fast, effective and user-friendly ADR 
services.  
 
Solving these problems and making effective and efficient labour dispute resolution a 
reality calls for renewed commitment from government and social partners and 
investment in appropriate human and financial resources. This requires a strong 
political will as well as concerted efforts from all role players in the labour relations 
community in the two respective countries.  
vii 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This study analyses the Namibian labour dispute resolution system, compliance with 
and enforcement of labour law and standards from a comparative perspective 
against international labour standards and South African labour legislation. The study 
surveys the topic from the onset of colonisation during the German era and South 
Africa’s occupancy over the territory. During these periods, the country had no 
comprehensive labour legislation in place, but relied heavily on the labour legislation 
of the colonial masters.1 The study focuses on the labour dispute resolution system 
in terms of the first comprehensive post-independence labour law, namely the Labour 
Act 6 of 1992, 2 and the current Labour Act No 11 of 2007, 3 which ushered in 
1 LaRRI Labour Rights in Namibia (2005) 4. 
2 Hereinafter referred to as the “1992 Act”. 
3 Hereinafter referred to as the “Labour Act of 2007”. 
1 
                                                             
significant changes to the Labour dispute resolution process and introduced the 
alternative dispute resolution4 processes of conciliation, mediation and arbitration. 
 
One of the objectives of the new schemes of labour dispute prevention and 
resolution5 is to give effect to the constitutional commitment6 to adhere to and act in 
accordance with international conventions and the recommendations of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). As a member state of the ILO and by virtue 
of the country’s obligation arising from article 22 of the ILO Constitution, Namibia has 
been subject to the ILO’s regular supervisory machinery for ratifying conventions. 
One of the objectives of this study is to determine the extent to which the country 
complies with its ILO obligations.7 In this respect, the study focuses on the relevant 
ILO conventions and recommendations that Namibia has ratified relative to labour 
dispute resolution. 
 
As the title of the study suggests, it seeks to explore the extent to which the 
Namibian labour dispute resolution system is relative to the South African system. 
The reason for this comparative analysis is that the South African labour dispute 
resolution system is the major source of Namibia’s new labour dispute resolution 
system. 8 The Labour Act of 2007 contemplates the provision of effective labour 
dispute prevention and resolution through compliance with and enforcement of the 
Act.9 However, the new labour dispute resolution system is seen as failing to bring 
about the desired results. 
 
Instead, it has created a sophisticated system of labour dispute resolution with a very 
legalistic approach that is coupled with long delays and declining settlement rates.10 
To address this situation, the ILO, as an international custodian of labour relations, 
4 Hereinafter referred to as the “ADR”. 
5 Chapter 8 of the Labour Act of 2007. 
6 Art 95(d) of The Namibian Constitution, provides for membership of the International Labour 
Organization and where possible, adherence to and action in accordance with international 
Conventions and Recommendations.    
7 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia: Towards an Indigenous Solution (2005) 14. 
8 Benjamin “The challenges of labour law reform in South Africa” in Brostein (ed.) International 
and Comparative Labour Law Current Challenges (2009) 240. 
9 Preamble to the Labour Act of 2007. 
10 Grogan Workplace Law (2004) 442. 
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urges member states to implement less complex and unsophisticated procedures for 
labour dispute resolution and to be the catalyst for workplace justice that is 
accessible to all.11 
 
This study therefore aims to provide policy makers in Namibia with a meaningful 
analysis of the labour dispute resolution system, including issues of compliance and 
enforcement. The ultimate goal is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
existing ADR system, and, as such, to be of use to policy makers, scholars, labour 
law practitioners, conciliators and arbitrators, but also be of equal interest to those 
with broader interest in Namibia’s labour dispute resolution system. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: the chapter starts with an outline of the ILO as a 
global organisation that prescribes international labour standards based on which 
compliance is measured in member states. This is followed by an analysis of the 
current Namibian labour dispute resolution process, and a comparison with the South 
African ADR system. The chapter further sets out the rationale of the study, the 
statement of the problem, research questions and objectives. The chapter also 
outlines its significance, the methodology that is used and the justification for 
comparison. The chapter concludes with an outline of the research chapters.   
 
2. CONTEXT AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION   
 
The ILO is a by-product of the 1919 Peace Conference that followed the First World 
War and its original constitution formed part of the Treaty of Versailles. The 
organisation was established on 11 April 1919 as an autonomous body associated 
with the League of Nations. The aims and objectives of the ILO are set out in its 
constitutional preamble, which declares that “universal and lasting peace can be 
established only if it is based upon social justice”. Thus, the primary objective of the 
ILO can be seen as an objective catalyst for the improvement of social conditions 
throughout the world.12 Since its inception, the mandate of the ILO includes the 
11 Zack Can Alternative Dispute Resolution Help Resolve Employment Disputes? (1997) 136. 
12 The Preamble of the ILO Constitution states as follows: “…whereas universal and lasting peace 
can be established only if it is based upon social justice; and whereas conditions of labour exist 
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adoption of international labour standards, promoting their ratification and application 
in member states,13 and supervising their application as the fundamental means of 
achieving its objectives. The application of these international labour standards in 
member states is monitored by the ILO using a supervisory mechanism that is unique 
at an international level.14 
 
Article 19 of the ILO Constitution creates a number of obligations for member states 
upon the adoption of international labour standards. These obligations include: firstly, 
the requirements to submit newly adopted standards to a nationally competent 
authority and, secondly, the obligation to report periodically on measures taken to 
give effect to the provisions of unratified conventions and recommendations. This is 
achieved by the ILO carrying out examinations of the standards-related obligations of 
member states derived from ratified conventions. In this regard, the ILO follows a 
process of regular monitoring procedures of annually submitted reports15, as well as 
special procedures based on complaints or representations to the Governing Body 
made by ILO constituents, 16  as provided for in articles 24 and 26 of the ILO 
Constitution. 
 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 
 
International labour standards are the conventions and recommendations drawn up 
and agreed upon by the ILO’s membership. 17  They result from debates or 
negotiations that take place during the annual International Labour Conference held 
involving such injustice hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest 
so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled; and an improvement of those 
conditions is urgently required…”. 
13 Art 1 of the ILO Constitution provides as follows “A permanent organization is hereby 
established for the promotion of the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution and 
in the Declaration concerning the aims and purpose of the ILO adopted at Philadelphia on 10 
May 1944”.      
14 ILO Application of the international labour standard. Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (2009) 10. 
15 Art 22 of  the ILO Constitution provides- “each Member agree to make an annual report to the 
International Labour Office on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provision of 
the convention to which it is party.”  
16 Art 3 of the ILO Constitution read as follows: the General Conference shall be attended by four 
representatives of each of the members, of whom two shall be government delegates and two 
others shall be delegates representing respectively the employers and the workpeople.  
17 Art (1) and (2) of the ILO Constitution provide for the membership of the ILO to include 
government, employers and workers.   
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each June.18 The labour standards are based on consensus developed to protect 
basic workers’ rights and aim to enhance worker job security by improving terms and 
conditions of employment on a global scale. The standards are created to serve as 
worldwide minimum levels of protection from inhumane labour practices.19 While it 
can be agreed that there are certain basic human rights that are universal to 
humanity, in an ever growing and changing global landscape international labour 
standards ensure the provision of these rights in the workplace.20 
 
International labour standards can either be conventions, which are legally binding 
international treaties that may be ratified by member states,21 or recommendations, 
which are non-binding guidelines.22 Upon ratification of the convention by a member 
state, the convention comes into force for that country one year after the date of 
ratification.23 By ratifying the convention, a member state commits itself to applying 
the convention to national laws and practices24 and to regularly report to the ILO on 
its application.  
 
International labour standards have grown into a comprehensive system of 
instruments on work and social policy, backed by a supervisory system that 
addresses a variety of problems in their application at a national level.25 Several of 
the adopted ILO instruments promote and protect the right to collective bargaining 
and contain provisions relating to labour dispute settlement mechanisms. These 
instruments include the eight fundamental conventions 26  designated by the 
18 Hereinafter referred to as the “ILC”. 
19 Interntional_labour_standards available on ILOLEX. Accessed on 11/01/2011. 
20 Brown, Deardorff and Stern International Labour Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis 
(1996) 227-272.  
21 Art 19(5) of the ILO Constitution.   
22 Art 19(6) of the ILO Constitution.   
23 Art 19(5)(b) of the ILO Constitution.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game: A Brief Introduction to International Labour Standards 
(2009) 9.   
26 These Conventions are: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention No. 87 of 1948; Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, No 98 of 
1949; Forced Labour Convention, No 29 of 1930; Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, No 
105 of 1957; Minimum Age Convention, No 138 of 1973; Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention, No 182 of 1999; Equal Remuneration Convention, No 100 of 1951; and, 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, No 111 of 1958.        
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Governing Body 27  of the ILO and a total of 190 conventions and 200 
recommendations adopted by the ILO since its inception.28 Amongst the fundamental 
conventions, two of them are central to the promotion of collective bargaining. These 
are: the Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organize 29  
Convention and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention. 30  
These conventions embrace the right of all employers and workers to form 
independent organisations of their own choosing, and to engage in collective 
bargaining with representatives of those organisations, with the aim to improving 
working conditions. 31  Collective bargaining is considered an effective tool for 
industrial democracy and social justice, and is therefore one of the most important 
aspects of the ILO’s strategic objectives concerning the promoting and strengthening 
of social justice. As a result, it plays a significant role in reducing conflict through the 
resolution of labour disputes.32 
 
2.3 THE REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN NAMIBIA 
 
Namibia recognises collective bargaining as the cornerstone of the country’s system 
of labour relations.33 On 2 September 1987, on the recommendation of the Cabinet,34 
a Commission of Inquiry into Labour Matters in Namibia was appointed by the 
Administrator General, Mr LA Pienaar.35 At the time, the country was experiencing 
significant labour development. It also became clear that the present labour law 
structure and system was no longer capable of resolving labour disputes, which were 
rapidly becoming part of the Namibian labour landscape.  
 
27 Art 14 of the ILO Constitution provide for the Governing Body and its composition of 56 persons:  
28 representing governments, 14 representing the employers and 14 representing the workers. 
28 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 14. 
29 C.87 of 1948. 
30 C.98 of 1949. 
31 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution – Is SADC Meeting the Challenge? 
(2008) 3. 
32 Fashoyin “The Role of Collective Bargaining” in Khabo (ed) Collective Bargaining and Labour 
Dispute Resolution - is SADC Meeting the Challenge? (2008) vii. 
33 Wiehahn Report of Commission of Inquiry into Labour Matters in Namibia (1989) 96 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Wiehahn Report-Namibia). 
34 This was the Cabinet in the colonial Namibia prior to Independence.  
35 In his capacity as Administrator General of the Territory of South West Africa. The appointment 
was made in terms of the GN AG 1 of 1987 read with Proclamation AG 32 of 1978.  
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In pursuance of the Wiehahn recommendations, collective bargaining was 
entrenched in the Namibian Constitution when independence was gained. The 
Constitution guarantees fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of association to 
form and join trade unions36 and to participate in their activities. In addition, article 
9537 of the Namibian Constitution provides for the adoption of policies aimed at active 
encouragement of the formation of independent trade unions to protect workers’ 
rights and interests, and the promotion of sound labour relations and fair employment 
practices. The Constitution further provides for membership to the ILO and 
commitment to adhere to its conventions and recommendations.38 
 
The enactment of the Labour Act, 2007, gives effect to Article 95 of the Namibian 
Constitution to produce a labour relations policy conducive to economic growth, 
stability and productivity. This particular piece of labour legislation hopes to achieve 
this through promoting an orderly system of free collective bargaining, and through 
providing for the systematic prevention and resolution of labour disputes.39 
 
2.4 RATIFICATION OF RELEVANT ILO INSTRUMENTS BY NAMIBIA  
 
As a member state of the ILO, Namibia has ratified conventions that are central to 
the promotion of collective bargaining, namely the Freedom of Association and the 
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention No. 87 of 194840 and the Right to 
Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention41 No. 98 of 1949.42 By virtue of the 
ratification, Namibia is bound to comply with the provisions of these conventions. 
Articles 3 and 4 of the Collective Bargaining Convention calls for the creation of 
36 Art 21(1)(e) of  the Namibian Constitution provides that “all persons shall have the right to: 
freedom of association, which shall include freedom to form and join associations or unions, 
including trade unions and political parties”.        
37 Art 95(c) and (d) of the Namibian Constitution provides:  The State shall actively promote and 
maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the following: (c) 
active encouragement of the formation of independent trade unions to protect workers’ rights 
and interests, and to promote sound labour relations and fair employment practices; (d) 
membership of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and where possible, adherence to 
and action in accordance with the international Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO.  
38 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia: Towards an Indigenous Solution 11. 
39 Preamble and purpose of the Labour Act, 2007. 
40 Hereinafter referred to as the “Right to Organize Convention”. 
41 Hereinafter referred to as the “Collective Bargaining Convention”. 
42 Namibia ratified these two Conventions on 3 March 1995 while South Africa, the comparator, 
ratified on 19th February 1996.  
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bodies and the establishment of procedures for the settlement of labour disputes that 
contribute to the promotion of collective bargaining. 
 
The Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation 43  (No. 92 of 1951) 
supplements the Collective Bargaining Convention in that it urges governments to 
make available expeditious voluntary conciliation mechanisms at no cost to the 
disputants in order to assist in the prevention and settlement of labour disputes.44 In 
addition, Namibia has ratified the Termination of Employment Convention.45 This 
convention urges workers whose employment has been unjustifiably terminated to 
appeal against such termination to an impartial body, such as a court, labour tribunal, 
arbitration committee or arbitrator.46 These bodies are the same dispute resolution 
mechanisms contemplated by the Collective Bargaining Convention that have now 
been embraced by Namibia.  
 
2.5 LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ADR SYSTEM IN NAMIBIA 
 
The ILO asserts that ADR bodies and procedures contribute to the success of 
collective bargaining. However, this success depends on the availability of an 
efficient labour dispute resolution system that is meaningful and dedicated to the 
collective bargaining process. 47  Moreover, the ILO suggests that the system’s 
43 Art 19 of the ILO Constitution states that on adoption of the Recommendation, the 
Recommendation will be communicated to all members for their considerations with a view to 
effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise.  Subsection (b) requires member 
States within 18 months to bring the Recommendation before the authority or authorities whose 
competence the matter lies for the enactment of legislation or other action. Subsection (c) 
relates to informing the Director General of the International Labour Office of the measures 
taken in accordance with this article to bring the Recommendation before the said competent 
authority or authorities regarded as competent, and of the actions taken by them.  Subsection 
(d) provides that no further obligation shall rest upon the Members, except that they shall report 
to the Director General of the International Labour Office, at appropriate intervals as requested 
by the Governing Body, the position of the law and practice in their country in regard to the 
matters dealt with in the Recommendation, showing the extent to which effect has been given, 
or proposed to be given.  
44 Art 1 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation of 1951, reads “Voluntary conciliation 
machinery, appropriate to national conditions, should be made available to assist in the 
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes between employers and workers”.  Article  3, 
calls for the procedure to be free of charge and expeditious; such time limits for the proceedings 
as may be prescribed by national laws or regulations should be fixed in advance and kept to a 
minimum”. 
45 No 158 of 1982. 
46 Art 8 of C.158 of 1982. 
47 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution 5. 
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methods of operation should be effective, autonomous, accessible, informal, 
expeditious and consensual, involving tripartite consultation so that the confidence of 
the parties to the dispute is ensured. 
 
Trollip (1991) 48 opines that to achieve success in labour dispute resolution, the 
general trend for countries is to move towards the adoption of an ADR system that 
has the elements of voluntarism, informality, accessibility and speedy resolution of 
labour disputes and which is informed by the provisions of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Recommendation. 
 
Although ADR is a new phenomenon in SADC member states, Namibia has 
embraced ADR by enacting the Labour Act of 2007, where the focus has moved from 
reliance on the District Labour Courts49 to the new concepts of conciliation and50 
arbitration,51 and the establishment of the labour inspectorate,52 which has statutory 
powers to enforce arbitration awards. Further, the Labour Act of 2007 contains 
provisions for the continuation of the Labour Court53 with exclusive jurisdiction54 to 
adjudicate appeals or review arbitration awards.55 To give effect to this new scheme 
of labour dispute resolution, the Labour Commissioner has been entrusted with the 
48 Trollip Alternative Dispute Resolution (1991)7-9. 
49 The District Labour Courts were applicable in terms of s78 the 1992 Act. 
50 S 82 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides for the resolution of disputes through conciliation by the 
Labour Commissioner.  
51 S 86 of the Labour Act, 2007 makes provision for the resolution of dispute through arbitration by 
the Labour Commissioner.  
52 The Labour Act, 2007 s124, provides for the appointment of labour inspectors to enforce the Act 
or any decision, award or order, made in terms of this Act.  Section 125(2)(g) on the other hand, 
empowers labour inspectors to enforce arbitration awards on application made by any party   in 
terms of s 90 to a labour inspector in the prescribed form requesting the inspector to enforce the 
award by taking such steps as are necessary to do so, including the institution of execution 
proceedings on behalf of that person. 
53 S 115 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
54 S 117 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides the continuation of the Labour Court  with exclusive 
jurisdiction to – 
(a) determine appeals from - Decisions of the Labour Commissioner made in terms of s 89; 
and  
(i) Arbitration tribunals’ awards, in terms of s 89; and compliance orders issued in 
terms of s 126. 
(b)  review – 
(i) arbitration tribunals’ award in terms of this Act; and (ii) decisions of the Minister, the 
Permanent Secretary, the Labour Commissioner or any other body or official in 
terms of this Act or any other Act relating to labour or employment for which the 
Minister is responsible. 
55 S 89 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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powers and functions to conciliate and arbitrate labour disputes. The Labour Act of 
200756 provides for the functions of the Labour Commissioner to include amongst 
others:  
 
“(a) to register disputes from employees and employers over contraventions, 
application, interpretation or enforcement of the Labour Act, 2007 and to take 
appropriate action; 
 
(b) to attempt, though conciliation or by giving advice, to prevent disputes from 
arising; 
 
(c) to attempt, through conciliation, to resolve disputes referred to the Labour 
Commissioner in terms of the Labour Act, 2007 or any other law;57 
 
(d) to arbitrate a dispute that has been referred to the Labour Commissioner if the 
dispute remains unresolved after conciliation and in terms of the Labour Act of 
2007 requires arbitration; or if the parties to the dispute have agreed to have the 
dispute resolved through arbitration.” 
 
The new scheme of labour dispute resolution is a hybrid system, which requires 
disputes to be conciliated before commencing arbitration (“con-arb”). 58 However, 
despite this provision, the Act permits any person who challenges an infringement of 
fundamental rights or protections under Chapter 2 of the Labour Act of 2007 to 
approach the Labour Court directly for enforcement of that right, for protection or 
other appropriate relief.  
 
As a member state of the ILO and by virtue of having ratified the Collective 
Bargaining Convention, Namibia is under an obligation59 to report to the Director-
General of the ILO to inform the office on the application in practice of the labour 
dispute resolution mechanisms established by the Labour Act of 2007. This gives 
effect to Articles 3 and 4 of the Collective Bargaining Convention.  
56 S 121 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
57 Disputes referred to the Labour Commissioner in terms of s 45 of the Affirmative Act 
(Employment) Act, 1998 (Act No 29 of 1998). This section  provide:(1) Any employee may bring 
to the attention of the Commission any dispute between such employee, or his or her 
representative. Further the section states,  (2) The Commission may, if necessary, refer a 
complaint referred  in s (1) to the Labour Commissioner for conciliation.         
58 S 86 of the Labour Act, 2007, provides that “unless the dispute has already been conciliated, 
the arbitrator must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation before beginning the 
arbitration”.   
59 The obligation arose from the provisions of Art 22 the ILO Constitution which requires – member 
states to report to the International Labour Office on measures which it has taken to give effect 
to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a party.  These reports shall be made in such 
form and shall contain such particulars as the Governing Body may request.  
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 Consequently, under the ambit of the Collective Bargaining Convention, Namibia has 
been subject to the ILO’s regular supervisory mechanisms to determine the level of 
compliance with international labour standards relative to collective bargaining that 
promotes labour dispute resolution. However, the ILO not only supervises 
compliance with standards, but provides technical assistance to members states to 
fulfil their obligations. To this end, the ILO has provided technical assistance to the 
Government of the Republic of Namibia on a range of issues, including assistance in 
the drafting of the Labour Act of 2007 and the training of conciliators and arbitrators 
for the labour dispute resolution system.60 
 
2.6  THE REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In South Africa, unlike in Namibia, the right to collective bargaining is explicitly 
enshrined in the Constitution,61 in section 23(5) of the Bill of Rights.62 To give effect 
to this provision, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 63  regulates collective 
bargaining and re-affirms the constitutional right of every trade union, employers’ 
organization and employee to engage in collective bargaining. 
 
In the above context, collective bargaining has been identified as one of the 
mechanisms intended to implement fair labour practices. Employers are required to 
endeavour to conclude collective agreements to regulate the manner in which trade 
unions are to exercise their statutory organisational rights.64 Further, there is a duty 
to consult and attempt to reach agreements with the representative trade unions 
60 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 13. 
61 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No 108 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as  
the South African Constitution”). 
62 S 23(5) the South African Constitution provides that “Every trade union, employers’ organization 
and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining. National legislation may be 
enacted to regulate collective bargaining.  To the extent that the legislation may limit a right in 
this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1)”.  Section 36(1) on the other hand 
provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equity and freedom, taking into account relevant 
factors listed herein in the section.    
63 Hereinafter referred to as the “LRA”. 
64 S 12, of the LRA. 
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concerning the drafting and implementation of an employment equity plan. 65  
Similarly, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act66 promotes collective bargaining, 
for example when contemplating the variation of statutory minimum conditions in 
terms of the BCEA. Essentially, the right to engage in collective bargaining is 
constitutionally entrenched.67 The subject matter of collective bargaining is widely 
defined to include terms and conditions of employment or any other matters of 
mutual interest.68 
 
Collective bargaining in South Africa is effected through a number of bargaining 
councils. Their primary function is to regulate employment relations between 
management and labour in various sectors of employment, over which they have 
jurisdiction, by concluding collective agreements and settling labour disputes.69 
 
Bargaining councils are accredited by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation 
and Arbitration (the “CCMA”) and are mandated to resolve labour disputes affecting 
parties falling within their council. These structures complement the CCMA to ease 
the workload and help promote efficiency on its part.70 
 
2.7 LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ADR SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In South African, the LRA creates two new institutions for labour dispute resolution 
and adjudication. The CCMA was established under section 112 of the LRA71 as an 
independent,72 although government sponsored,73 institution. The CCMA’s functions 
are provided for in section 115 of the LRA: 
 
65 Godfrey, Maree, Du Toit and Theron Collective Bargaining in South Africa (2010) 5.  See also 
the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.  
66 Act 75 of 1997, hereinafter referred to as the “BCEA”. 
67 S 23(5) the South African Constitution read with s 36.  
68 S 213, of the LRA. 
69 Grogan Workplace Law (2003) 271. 
70 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution 20. 
71 S 112 of the LRA established the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration as a 
juristic person.     
72 S 113 of the LRA reads – “The Commission is independent of the State, any political party, 
trade union, employer, employer’s organization, or federation of trade unions. 
73 Benjamin The Challenges of Labour Law Reform in South Africa 244. 
12 
                                                             
“(1) The Commission must – 
 
(a) attempt to resolve, through conciliation, any dispute referred to it in terms of 
the LRA;  
 
 (b) if a dispute that has been referred to it remains unresolved after 
conciliation, arbitrate the dispute if – 
 
(i) the LRA requires arbitration and any party to the dispute has 
requested that the dispute be resolved through arbitration; or  
 
(ii) all the parties to a dispute in respect of which the Labour Court has 
jurisdiction consent to arbitration under the auspices of the 
Commission; 
 
(c) assist in the establishment of workplace forums in the manner 
contemplated in Chapter V; and  
 
(d) compile and publish information and statistics about its activities.”  
 
The LRA also created a specialised system of Labour Courts with exclusive labour 
law jurisdiction. The Labour Court is established in terms of section 151: 
 
“(1) The Labour Court is hereby established as a Court of law and equity. 
 
(2) The Labour Court is a superior Court that has authority, inherent powers and 
standing in relation to matters under its jurisdiction, equal to that which a Court of 
provincial division of the Supreme Court has in relation to the matters under its 
jurisdiction. 
 
(3) The Labour Court is a Court of record.”  
 
The court hears, as court of first instance, cases about dismissals for operational 
requirements, strike dismissals and other cases in which the dismissal is alleged to 
have involved discrimination. 74  In addition, the LRA created the Labour Appeal 
Court75 as court of law and equity and to serve as the final court of appeal in respect 
of all judgments and orders made by the Labour Court in relation to matters within its 
exclusive jurisdiction. It is a superior court that has authority, inherent powers and 
standing in respect of matters under its jurisdiction, equal to that which the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has in respect of matters under its jurisdiction.  
 
74 Benjamin The Challenges of Labour Law Reform in South Africa 245.   
75 S 167 of the LRA. 
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Unlike in Namibia, the ADR system has not been fully embraced in South Africa. 
There is no mandatory, compelling requirement that all labour disputes must first go 
through con-arb by the CCMA. It is submitted that employees can effectively 
determine which forum has jurisdiction by the manner in which they formulate the 
dispute.76 However, such a route depends entirely on the nature of the dispute, which 
becomes the determining factor in respect of the institution the dispute may be 
referred to. 
 
The LRA identifies two categories of disputes that may be referred to the CCMA. 
These are disputes referred in terms of the LRA77 and disputes about matters of 
mutual interest.78 Moreover, the CCMA has jurisdiction over labour disputes referred 
to it in terms of other statutes. In respect of disputes “referred in terms of the Act”, 
which relate to disputes of interpretation or application of the LRA, the CCMA has 
jurisdiction to conciliate and arbitrate and, if not settled during conciliation, these 
disputes may be referred to the Labour Court. Notwithstanding this provision, where 
the LRA provides for adjudication the parties may confer jurisdiction on the CCMA by 
consenting in writing to arbitration rather than taking the route of the Labour Court.79 
In contrast, in Namibia, it is within the province of the Labour Court’s discretion to 
refer any dispute within its jurisdiction to the Labour Commissioner for conciliation, 
and no written consent is required from the parties to the dispute.80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 61. 
77 S 133(1)(b) of the LRA. 
78 S 133(1)(a) read with s 134 of the LRA. 
79 S 133(2)(b) of the LRA.  It has been Grogan argues that an employee should also be able to 
refer dismissal disputes that may be referred to the Labour Court  to arbitration without the 
consent of the employer if it is alleged that the reason for the dismissal is one listed in s 
191(5)(a).  Grogan submits that the right can be exercised within the meaning of “may” in s 
191(5)(b) and supported by the fact that the CCMA or a council must arbitrate dismissal 
disputes if the employee does not know the reason for dismissal [s 191(5) (a) (iii) the LRA]. 
Grogan “Jurisdictional jigsaw - which dispute fits where?”(2000) Employment law journal.  See 
also Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 93. 
80 S 117(1)(h)(i) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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 2.8 RATIONALE  
 
In the present study, a compliance analysis of the Namibian labour dispute resolution 
system with regard to international labour standards is undertaken and, further, a 
comparison with the South African labour dispute resolution system is conducted. 
The study investigates the provisions of the ADR system and adjudication as 
established mechanisms for labour dispute resolution and examines the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the Namibian labour dispute resolution system.81 
 
An examination of the factors contributing to the widespread enforcement and 
compliance failures experienced by Namibia‘s labour dispute resolution institutions is 
conducted. The study takes into account the nature of the existing legal procedures 
or legal rules required to refer and resolve labour disputes and the structural 
capacities of the institutions charged with resolving labour disputes by comparing the 
Namibian structures with the corresponding structures in South Africa.  
 
An in-depth analysis of international labour standards, the legislative framework 
regulating labour dispute resolution in Namibia and South Africa, is also completed 
and analysed in the context of the legal frameworks assuring the users of the ADR 
system of its credibility.82 These legal frameworks envisage labour dispute resolution 
systems that are non-adversarial, aimed at giving employers and workers an 
opportunity to break with the intense antagonism that previously characterised labour 
relations.83 The adoption of ADR systems sparked expectations that they would 
provide proactive and expeditious dispute resolutions that are available to all 
workers 84  and, ultimately, provide cost-effective services to the labour relations 
community.85 These anticipated outcomes are based on proponents’ views that the 
81 Ferreira “The CCMA: It’s Effectiveness in Dispute Resolution in Labour Relations”2004 23 
Politeia 73-85.   
82 Nupen and Cheadle Dispute resolution the Uses of ‘Soft Law’.  Paper presented at the 
thirteenth Annual Labour Law Conference – (2000) on Rethinking South Africa Labour Law. 
83 Du Toit, Woolfrey, Murphy, Godfrey, Bosch and Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995. A 
Comprehensive Guide (1999). 
84 Robertson “Dispute Resolution System in the Draft Labour Relations Bill” (1995) 19 South Africa 
Labour Bulletin, 67-70. 
85 Hobo, The Resolution of Labour Disputes in South Africa: A Study of the CCMA. Dissertation 
submitted for the M.Pub. Admin Degree, University of Western Cape (1999).   
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ADR process allows most labour disputes to be resolved at conciliation level, 
resulting in only a minority of disputes being referred to arbitration or the Labour 
Court.86 
 
Preliminary studies show that the existing legal framework and practices are wanting 
in several respects, making the attainment of effective and efficient labour dispute 
resolution difficult.87 
 
Based on the outcomes of this study, recommendations are made that look to the 
future, particularly at the continued work of the ADR system in Namibia, to provide a 
fast, effective and user-friendly service. This study also suggests future areas of 
reform that may increase efficiency, compliance and effective enforcement, as well 
as measures to adapt the ADR systems to comply with international labour standards 
in order to satisfy the labour relations community.    
 
3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
It is submitted that the outcomes of the ADR system are not uniformly accepted or 
properly understood by a significant percentage of employers and employees. This is 
evident from the increasing number of reviews and appeals launched and lodged 
with the Labour Court by employers, in most cases, dissatisfied with the outcome of 
arbitration. At the same time, there are indicators that officials responsible for the 
implementation of ADR processes and enforcement of arbitration awards do not fully 
comprehend the applicable statute and, therefore, misunderstanding of fairness and 
compliance influences their decision making at times, which leads to incorrect 
outcomes.88 
 
86 S 86(5) of the Labour Act, 2007 provides that, unless the dispute has already been conciliated, 
the arbitrator must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation before beginning the 
arbitration.  On the other hand, the LRA institutionalizes the process of “con-arb”.  In terms of s 
191(5A) of the LRA an arbitration hearing must immediately follow on conclusion of the 
conciliation proceedings once a certificate of non-resolution has been issued in disputes 
concerning dismissal or unfair labour practices relating to probation see also Bosch et al, (2004) 
77.  
87 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution 29. 
88 De Beer Comments and Interpretation on Conciliation and Arbitration (2010). 
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Based on the preliminary analysis it can be agreed that the Labour Act of 2007 in 
Namibia and the LRA in South Africa were enacted to provide, amongst other things, 
simple procedures for the resolution of labour disputes through ADR processes 
managed by the Labour Commissioner and the CCMA or bargaining councils 
respectively. These institutions replaced the previous system of statutory conciliation 
bodies89 that had proven to be ineffective, costly and complicated.90 However, in 
Namibia, the new ADR system seems to be developing bottlenecks. For instance, 
Minster Immanuel Ngatjizeko of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 91  
highlighted some of the bottlenecks in the ADR system and called for its immediate 
improvement to address the setbacks.92  Minister Ngatjizeko pointed out that-  
 
“[t]he current Labour Act has not only “revolutionised” the antiquated confrontational 
dispute resolution process that characterized its predecessor (the Labour Act 6 of 
1992) during the period of its operation, but it has effectively transformed the whole 
process into a modern ADR popularly known as conciliation/arbitration system 
(con/arb) ...   [thus] the idea for the revolution and transformation of labour relations 
and dispute resolution is to address specific concerns, namely:-  
 
 to have a time bound system that is responsive to both business and trade union 
(employee) needs and expectations; 
 
 to have an inexpensive and simple, yet effective system; 
 
 to achieve quicker, fairer and equitable results; and  
 
 a system that is accessible by all employers and employees regardless of their 
status and standing in our economic set up.” 
 
89 S 75 of the 1992 Act, provided for the establishment of conciliation boards.  Subsection (1) 
reads: subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3), the Commissioner shall, upon the 
receipt of a notice referred to in s 74(1), as soon as practicable after the date of such receipt, 
establish a conciliation board for such period as may from time to time be determined by the 
parties to the dispute by mutual agreement consisting of: (a) a person determined by the parties 
to the dispute by mutual agreement or, in the absence of any such agreement, the 
Commissioner or a person designated by him or her who is not a party to the dispute, who shall 
be the chairperson of the conciliation board; and (b) such equal number of other persons as 
may be determined by such parties by mutual agreement and nominated by each party to the 
dispute from amongst their number or otherwise , in the absence of any such agreement, three 
persons from amongst each one of such parties nominated by such parties or, in the absence of 
such nomination, by the Commissioner.  
90 Venter, Grossett and Hills Labour relations in South Africa (2003) 383. 
91 Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) Report of the Retreat of the office Labour 
Commissioner held on 4-8th July 2011.  
92 GRN, ministerial statement read at the operational retreat of the Labour Commissioner’s Office. 
Held in Ongwediva, July 2011. 
17 
                                                             
Given the prevailing situation, it is evident that there has merely been a change in 
emphasis, from the former judicial system or cumbersome93 process of conciliation 
boards under the Labour Commissioner to the new ADR system. The contention is 
that the fundamental objectives of ADR systems have not been met. Bendeman94 
points out that the aim of the new ADR system is to put a more friendly face on the 
processes that resolve labour disputes in the most effective manner without resorting 
to the courts. However, these aspirations are impeded by significant challenges to 
the institutions responsible for ADR. The challenges include the backlog of 
outstanding disputes that sometimes take months to resolve 95  and the late 
submission of cases by applicants 96 , followed by subsequent condonation 
procedures and other practical problems associated with set-down notifications.97 
Both the Office of the Government Attorney and the Judge President echoed these 
sentiments on the current challenges in the ADR system in Namibia. In their view the 
93 See fn 89 supra on the cumbersome process of conciliation boards. No time limits were 
determined, and the whole process was left entirely to the parties to decide who to appoint as 
chairperson and when to hold meetings.     
94 Bendeman “Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the Workplace: The South African 
Experience” 2006 African Journal of Conflict Resolution (1).       
95 In Namibia, for example there is no time limit set from the date of commencement of arbitration 
hearing to the date of conclusion.  After the party refers the dispute on Form LC21 to the Labour 
Commissioner, (s 86)(3) the Labour Act, 2007, the Labour Commissioner if satisfied, is required 
to give the parties at least 14 days notice of an arbitration hearing on Form LC28, unless the 
parties agree to a shorter period.  See Rule 15 of the Rules relating to the Conduct of 
Conciliation and Arbitration before the Labour Commissioner: Labour Act, 2007. GG the 
Republic of Namibia No 4151 dated 31 October 2008. Windhoek (hereinafter referred to as the 
Rules of the Labour Commissioner).  Thereafter it is incumbent on the arbitrator to conduct the 
arbitration in a manner that he/she considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly 
and quickly, without fixing any time limit.  This is open ended.  The duty only arises at the 
conclusion of the arbitration hearing for the arbitrator to issue his/her award within 30 days [s 
86)(18).  This is the cause of delays and backlog in concluding cases, as the Labour 
Commissioner continuously designates cases on referral while cases may be pilling-up with the 
arbitrators. Conciliation is time bound and clearly provides that the conciliator must attempt to 
resolve the dispute within 30 days of the date the Labour Commissioner received the referral of 
the dispute.  A similar provision should have been set for arbitration proceedings, to ensure 
speedy resolution of the disputes that go through to arbitration. 
96 S 86(2)(a) and (b) the Labour Act of 2007, provides that “a party may refer a dispute in terms of 
subsection (1) only (a) within six months after the date of dismissal if the dispute concerns 
dismissal, or (b) within one year after the dispute arising, in any other case.  The use of “may” 
suggests that late referral can be condoned as provided for in Rule 10 of the Rules Labour 
Commissioner.    
97 In South Africa, the time limit has not been prescribed in the majority of instances.  A dispute 
may be referred within a reasonable time from the date it arose. However, in terms of s 191(1) 
the LRA, a dismissal dispute must be referred within 30 days of the date of the dismissal or, if it 
is a late date, within 30 days of the employer making the final decision to dismiss or uphold the 
dismissal.  Unfair labour practice disputes must be referred within 90 days of the date of the act 
or omission which allegedly constitutes the unfair labour practice or, if it is a late date, within 90 
days of the date on which the employee became aware of the act or occurrence.  With good 
cause condonation for late referral may be granted.  See Bosch et al (2004) 72. 
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problems include, amongst others:98 delays while the Labour Court finalises appeal 
and review applications; the quality of arbitration awards, for example absurd awards 
which do not provide for ascertainable compensation; non-compliance with the time 
limits to issue arbitration awards on completion of arbitration; delays in submitting 
certified records to the Labour Court; challenges in the efforts of labour inspectors to 
enforce settlement agreements; and arbitration awards sanctioned by orders to stay, 
granted by the court to the detriment of the dismissed employees and applicants who 
cannot afford legal representation.99 Essentially, although the arbitration award is 
binding on the parties,100 it does not imply that the award is full and final or brings 
finality to the dispute. This is because the Labour Act of 2007101 makes provision for 
staying arbitration awards in that –  
 
“when an appeal is noted in terms of subsection (1), or any application for review made 
in terms of subsection (4), the appeal or application – 
 
(a) operates to suspend any party of the award that is adverse to the interest of an 
employee; and  
 
(b) does not operate to suspend any party of the award that is adverse to the interest 
of an employer”. 
 
However, although an appeal or review application does not stop the execution of the 
award if it is made in favour of the employee, the execution of the award may be 
stayed by the employer approaching the Labour Court for such an order, as provided 
for in section 89(7) of the Labour Act of 2007. This section allows an employer 
against whom an adverse award has been made to apply to the Labour Court for an 
order varying the effect of subsection (6) and the court may make an appropriate 
order.102 
98 GRN Report of the operational retreat of the Office of the Labour Commissioner 5. 
99 S 89 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides that – An employer against whom an adverse award has 
been made may apply to the Labour Court for an order varying the effect of s (6), and the Court 
may make an appropriate order. It is within this ambit that stay orders are granted to the 
adverse effect of employees.  Stay orders are secured by employers in most cases even while 
labour inspectors are busy ensuring enforcement through an internalized ‘Order to Comply with 
Arbitration Award’.  
100 S 87 of the Labour Act, 2007 read – (1) an arbitration award made in terms of this Part- (a) is 
binding unless is advisory; (b) becomes an order of the Labour Court on filling the award in the 
Court by any party affected by the award; or the Labour Commissioner.    
101 S 89(6) of  the Labour Act, 2007. 
102 Namibia Breweries v Kaeka (28 May 2010) Case No LCA 34/10, the court held that an 
application for staying must be brought duly and promptly after becoming aware of the order. 
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 Although the Labour Act of 2007 envisaged the quick resolution of labour disputes 
without necessarily resorting to the court, the Labour Court103 has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate appeals against arbitration awards in terms of the Namibian Constitution, 
which guarantees the right to a fair trial104 at the arbitration proceedings. In line with 
this provision, the court held that if the discretion at the arbitration proceedings has 
been exercised on judicial grounds and for sound reasons that are without bias or 
caprice or the application of a wrong principle, the Labour Court will be very slow to 
interfere and substitute its own decision. The court requires of the appellant to show 
that the arbitration award is wrong and that the decision ought to have been in his 
favour. Given this legal provision to appeal against awards, there is no finality to 
arbitration awards when issued by arbitrators. The only exception to this is when 
there is voluntary compliance by the party at fault, which is rarely the case in 
Namibia. The majority of arbitration awards are only finalised when court orders are 
made on finalisation of the appeal or review hearing. Furthermore, there is no time 
limit set to finalise cases. 
 
The South African position is different from the position in Namibia. The LRA 
provides that an arbitration award is final and binding and that there is no right of 
appeal against it.105 Once the award is certified by the CCMA director it immediately 
acquires the status of a judgment of the Labour Court106 and becomes enforceable 
as such.107 This means that an award may be executed in the same manner as an 
Further, the court held that, by the time the application for staying is filed the appeal should be 
noted as a requirement for the application to stay.  The prospects of success on appeal should 
also be considered during the application for condonation for late filing of appeal.     
103 Edgars Stores v Olivier & Another (18 June 2010) Case No.LCA 67/2009. 
104 Art 12(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution reads- In the determination of their civil rights and 
obligations or any criminal charges against them, all persons shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent, impartial and competent Court or Tribunal established by law: 
provided that such Court or Tribunal may exclude the press and/or the public from all or any 
part of the trial for reasons of moral, public order or national security, as is necessary in a 
democratic society.  See also s 85(1) which reads - There are established, as contemplated in 
Article 12(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution, arbitration tribunals for the purpose of resolving 
disputes.        
105 S 143(1) of the LRA.  There is one exception concerning disputes about agency shops and 
closed shop agreements.  See also s 24. 
106 S 143(3) of the LRA. 
107 S 143(1) was inserted after it was realized that the process of approaching the Labour Court in 
terms of s 158(1)(c ) of the LRA was cumbersome and potentially costly.  This was submitted 
and held in Gois t/a Shakespeare’s Pub v Van Zyl & others (2003) 24 ILJ 2302 (LC) at par 21. 
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order of court and it would therefore be unnecessary to approach the Labour Court to 
make the award an order of court as is the prevailing practice in Namibia. 108  
However, the LRA109 contemplates that the expression of “final and binding” does not 
exempt awards from review. Although the launching of a review application against 
an award does not suspend its operation,110 the Labour Court will invariably stay the 
execution of an award if a review application has been filed,111 provided the applicant 
proves reasonable prospects of success. The court has, however, held that the 
staying of awards requires a special application.112 Where the enforcement of an 
award is stayed pending review, the application for enforcement is normally set down 
with the review application, and where the review application fails the award is 
enforced.  
 
The process set out above does not lead to the speedy resolution of labour disputes. 
Given these challenges in the current ADR system, Bendeman113 is of the view that 
although the LRA has brought statutory dispute resolution within reach of the 
ordinary worker, it may in reality have compounded the difficulties relating to labour 
dispute resolution. The author submits that the LRA has created a sophisticated 
system of dispute resolution that many of the role players may not be familiar with. 
 
Grogan (2004),114 on the other hand, submits that the ADR system under the CCMA 
is under strain due to a very legalistic approach with long delays and declining 
settlement rates. He argues that the ADR system should have rather revolutionised 
the shortcomings and problems experienced with the old system of labour relations 
before the advent of democracy, which was characterized by high legal costs, 
108 S 87(1)(b) the Labour Act, 2007.  The award “only” becomes an order of Court on filing by any 
party affected by the award or the Labour Commissioner.  There is a big ongoing debate as to 
how such filing must be done and whether or not, there must be a motion hearing.  The Labour 
inspectors have been given various contradicting advice on the process.  At the time of writing, 
there has not been any single award made an order of court on mere filing of award.  
109 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 161. 
110 National Education Health & Allied Workers Union on behalf of Vermeulen v Director–General 
Department of Labour(2005) 26 ILJ 911 (LC). 
111 The court is empowered to do so by s 145(3) of the LRA. 
112 Olivier v University of Venda (2003) 24 ILJ 208 (LC). 
113 Bendenman  2006 African Journal of Conflict Resolution  81.  
114 Grogan Workplace Law (2004) 442. 
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prolonged legal actions and low settlement rates. Mischke115 suggests the adoption 
of new, enhanced ADR methods and the implementation of procedures and 
institutions that effectively deal with labour disputes in an economical and expeditious 
manner to mitigate the current challenges. 
 
The ILO calls for less complex and unsophisticated procedures for labour dispute 
resolution, accessible to more people, at lower cost116 and with greater speed than 
the conventional government channels.117 This situation accordingly calls for critical 
assessment or evaluation and requires a considerable amount of analytical work, 
which forms the basis of this study, in order to create new knowledge and to propose 
realistic and efficient solutions to the current problems. 
 
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
In order to address the main topic of the study the following main issues need to be 
investigated: 
 
• Is Namibia’s labour dispute resolution system compliant with international 
labour standards? 
 
• How does the new Namibian ADR system compare with South Africa’s ADR 
system? 
 
• What are the current legal challenges in the existing ADR system causing it 
to be ineffective and inefficient? 
 
• What can be done at the legislative level to improve enforcement of and 
compliance with international labour standards? 
 
115 Mischke “Beginnings, Conflicts, Grievances” in Brand (ed) Labour Dispute Resolution (1997) 3. 
116 In Namibia at present, there are no costs involved on referral of labour disputes to the Labour 
Commissioner.  
117 Zack ILO Can Alternative Dispute Resolution Help Resolve Employment Disputes? (1997) 136. 
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• What can Namibia learn from South Africa with a view to strengthening and 
improving the country’s labour dispute resolution systems?  
 
5. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The first aim of this study is to analyse the Namibian labour dispute resolution 
system, and compliance with and enforcement of labour standards in terms of the 
Labour Act 2007. 
 
Second, a comparison with the South African labour dispute resolution system is 
undertaken with a view to finding solutions to problems in the Namibian system. 
 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
 
• To examine Namibia’s application in practice of international labour 
standards, such as relevant conventions and recommendations on labour 
dispute resolution, including the ILO’s role in ensuring Namibia’s level of 
compliance and enforcement of the ADR. system; 
 
• To analyse the existing Namibian labour dispute resolution system and 
compare it with that of South Africa; and 
 
• To propose and make recommendations through which the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the labour dispute resolution system can be achieved.  
 
6. RESEARCH MOTIVATION / SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The workplace is changing rapidly due to the influence of globalisation, putting the 
labour dispute resolution systems in many countries, including Namibia and South 
Africa, under stress.118 The rising number of labour disputes has put pressure on 
dispute resolution machineries. Labour disputes and conflict are inherent in 
employment relations; they occur when collective bargaining has failed, often giving 
118 Http://itcilo.org/en/the-centre/areas-of-expertise/social-dialogue-and-tripartism/labour accessed  
on 30 January 2012. 
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rise to industrial action or recourse to third party interventions.119 An effective labour 
dispute settlement system helps to contain labour conflicts within economically and 
socially acceptable bounds and promotes industrial peace.120 
 
Given the above, many countries have taken to preventing or resolving labour 
disputes by adopting processes such as conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
because they help to relieve pressure on the court system. The court system is often 
overloaded with cases, leading to delays and raising costs for both workers and 
employers. The ILO standards provide useful guidance regarding ADR systems. This 
applies particularly to the ILO core standards, namely the Freedom of Association 
and the Right to Collective Bargaining Convention and Recommendation 92, which 
advocates setting up free mechanisms for voluntary conciliation and arbitration in 
labour disputes. 
 
Several years after the adoption of the Namibian labour dispute121 resolution system, 
it is necessary to reflect on the system and the institutions created to provide the 
ADR services, which include conciliation,122 arbitration123 and adjudication, in order to 
determine whether they are still relevant and provide effective and efficient service. 
 
From the evidence available no such academic comparative study has ever been 
conducted in Namibia. In the comparative jurisdiction of South Africa, Ferreira124 has 
investigated the effectiveness and efficiency of the CCMA as an institution mandated 
to provide the ADR service. However, these studies are not comparable to Namibia. 
Thus, this study is unique and of significance to scholars, labour law practitioners, 
119 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution 11.  
120 Preamble the Labour Act, 2007. 
121 Labour disputes take different forms and each is most susceptible to a particular type of dispute 
settlement procedure.  There are two general types of labour disputes, namely disputes about 
rights and disputes about interest (also known as economic rights disputes).     
122 Conciliation and mediation are avenues available to assist the parties to the disputes, through a 
neutral third party intervention, to reach a mutually agreed settlement. The Conciliator or 
mediator assists the parties to settle the dispute by themselves when negotiations have failed or 
reached an impasse.  The conciliator or mediator is not empowered to impose a settlement on 
the parties.  Bosch et al (2004) 47. 
123 Arbitration is a procedure for settling labour disputes by submitting them to an independent and 
neutral third party for a final and binding decision which is commonly called an award or 
decision.  Bosch et al 84.   
124 Ferreira 2004 Politeia 73. 
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conciliators and arbitrators and of equal importance to those with broader interest in 
the Namibian labour dispute resolution system. 
 
Moreover, this study provides policy makers in Namibia with a meaningful analysis of 
the labour dispute resolution system’s compliance and enforcement. The ultimate 
goal is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the existing ADR system. 
 
7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
In order to reach these conclusions, a literature study is carried out using both 
primary and secondary data sources. The primary data used includes: international 
labour standards, the Namibian Constitution, the Labour Act of 2007, the South 
African Constitution of 1996, the LRA and case law relevant to the topic. Secondary 
data includes: journal articles, labour law text books, government reports and other 
electronic sources on the topic under study. The primary data is subjected to a 
comparative and in-depth content analysis.  
 
8. JUSTIFICATION FOR COMPLIANCE AND COMPARATIVE STUDY  
8.1 THE NAMIBIAN LABOUR LAW AND ILO STANDARDS  
 
The ILO has been instrumental in labour law reform in Namibia and was critical of the 
colonial apartheid labour law regime of South Africa prior to independence.125 Under 
its mandate, the ILO played a significant role in shaping labour laws in Namibia and 
continues to do so. Such intervention includes, but is not limited to, the influence to 
appoint a Commission of Inquiry into labour matters in Namibia by the Apartheid 
government126, which recommended, amongst other things, that on independence 
Namibia should comply with international labour standards. 
 
The ILO played an equally pivotal role in the drafting and funding of both the 1992 
Labour Act 127  and the Labour Act of 2007. 128  In pursuance of the Wiehahn 
125 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia (1997) 58. 
126 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia (2005) 22. 
127 The ILO funded an expert advisor on labour law to the government in the person of an 
internationally renowned labour law academic Bob Hepple see Bauer Labour relations in 
occupied Namibia in Klerck et al (1998) 55-57.  
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recommendations, at independence the Namibian Government, undertook to be a 
member of the ILO and, where possible, adhere to and act in accordance with the 
international conventions and recommendations of the ILO. 129  Given this 
commitment, Namibia has ratified relevant conventions applicable to labour dispute 
resolution130 and is therefore bound to comply accordingly in terms of its obligations. 
 
In order to facilitate comparative analysis, international labour standard requirements 
and the South African experience forms the backdrop of the study’s analysis.   
 
8.2 COMPARISON WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN ADR SYSTEM  
 
History is said to be made up of the interaction of many forces, including social, 
economic, political, cultural and ideological forces. 131  In this context, Namibia’s 
political history is heavily influenced by South Africa’s colonial regime. In fact, 
Namibia was under South African administration from 1915 to 1990.132 During this 
era, the country had no comprehensive labour legislation in place aside from 
fragmented pieces of racially discriminatory labour law largely copied from South 
Africa, designed to suit the prevailing powers at the time. These labour laws were 
enacted to facilitate economic exploitation of the country by the colonisers.133 
 
After independence, South Africa’s labour dispute resolution system has continued to 
influence Namibian labour law, prompting Namibia to copy134 its ADR system from 
the advanced South African CCMA. 
 
128 The ILO funded the drafting of the Labour Act, 2007, in this case, Professor Halton Cheadle, 
University of Cape Town, was the expert who drafted the 2004 Labour Act which culminated 
into the Labour Act of 2007.  This Act was transmitted to the ILO Headquarters for technical 
comments on its compliance with international labour standards.   
129 Art 95(d) of the Namibian Constitution. 
130 Benjamin “The Challenges of labour law reform in South Africa” 253. 
131 Bronstein International and Comparative Labour Law (2009) 1. 
132 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia (2005) 5. 
133 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership (2006) 105.  
134 Musukubili A Comparison of the South African and Namibian Labour Dispute Resolution 
System. Treatise submitted for the degree of Magister Legum at the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University (2009) 92.    
26 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
The influence of South Africa’s ADR system on Namibia is apparent in the continued 
working relationship between the two countries. The CCMA continues to train 
conciliators and arbitrators and co-manage the case management system of the 
Labour Commissioner. To this end, the relationship has been formalised by the 
signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of the 
Republic of Namibia and the Government of the Republic of South Africa. This 
relates to cooperation and lending technical assistance and support with regard to 
labour dispute resolution systems.135 
 
From the explanation set out above, it is apparent that a study using South Africa as 
a comparison is justified. 
 
9. ASSUMPTION  
 
The study submits that, contrary to international labour standards on ADR systems 
that seek to provide simple procedures for the resolution of labour disputes that are 
within reach of ordinary workers, the present dispute resolution system has 
compounded the problems relating to labour dispute resolution. It has created a 
sophisticated, complex and technical legal process for dealing with labour disputes. It 
is assumed that there are practical, capacity building and legal measures that the 
Namibian government can take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
ADR system. 
 
10.  LIMITATION OF THE STUDY  
 
This study is limited to the Namibian and South African labour dispute resolution 
systems and compliance with international labour standards. This limitation 
contributes to the originality of the present study, since much of the commentary on 
the Namibian ADR system is not simply the restatement of the views of others.  
 
  
135 See the MoU corporation on ADR, (GRN) Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (2006).     
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11. PROPOSED CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter defines major concepts and provides a contextual background along 
with the rationale of the study. The chapter further outlines the statement of the 
problem, the research objectives and the methodology used in the study. 
 
CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS  
 
Chapter Two covers the general background leading to the formation of the ILO and 
the creation and application of international labour standards, such as the relevant 
conventions and recommendations on labour dispute resolution. The chapter 
continues to analyse the ILO’s enforcement and supervisory mechanisms with regard 
to ratified conventions by member states. Thereafter, the chapter provides a detailed 
explanation of ILO envisaged ADR concepts, systems and processes. The chapter 
concludes with outlining the suggested and acceptable functions, composition and 
operation of the labour dispute settlement institutions in member states as contained 
in the conventions and recommendations of the ILO.   
 
CHAPTER 3: NAMIBIA’S LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
This chapter provides the general introduction and historical background to the 
Namibian ADR system and a compliance analysis of the labour dispute resolution 
system in terms of the repealed 1992 Labour Act and the current Labour Act of 2007. 
Moreover, a closer examination of the institutions created to resolve labour disputes, 
such as the Labour Commissioner, Labour Inspectorate, industry bargaining forums 
and the Labour Courts, is undertaken. In addition, the provisions of other labour 
related statutes on labour dispute resolution are studied in the context of the wider 
scope of labour dispute resolution.  
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CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM   
 
Chapter Four provides a general introduction and historical exposition of the labour 
relations system in South Africa. After the introduction and historical section, an 
analysis of the labour dispute resolution system in terms of the LRA is delineated. 
The chapter also details the current ADR system, concepts, process and procedures 
for dispute resolution, which include enforcement and compliance mechanisms. The 
chapter then extends the discussion to include private and bargaining councils’ 
labour dispute resolution systems and the role of the Labour Court, Labour Appeal 
Court and the Constitutional Court in labour dispute resolution. Other relevant labour 
related statutes are included in the study to determine their extent in labour dispute 
settlement.    
 
CHAPTER 5: NAMIBIA’S COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS  
 
The chapter provides a general introduction and thereafter examines Namibia’s 
compliance level with and the enforcement of ratified international labour standards 
relative to the country’s labour dispute resolution systems. The chapter is subdivided 
into several parts based on specific issues or groups of issues.  
 
CHAPTER 6:  COMPARISON WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN ADR SYSTEM  
 
The chapter juxtaposes the two countries’ labour dispute resolution systems. It is 
subdivided into several parts based on specific issues or groups of issues to be 
compared.  
 
CHAPTER 7 : RECOMMENDATIONS AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter addresses the general recommendations for Namibia. It proposes ways 
to improve compliance with international labour standards and draw positive lessons 
from South Africa, which Namibia can learn with a view to strengthening and 
improving the country’s labour dispute resolution system.  
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2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) was established in 1919 as a 
consequence of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1946 it became the United Nations1 
Organization’s first specialist agency. The organization’s mandates include promoting 
universal and lasting peace based upon social justice, and to help improve, monitor 
and supervise social conditions throughout the world. The ILO continuously adopts 
international labour standards, promoting their ratification and application in member 
states. These standards are created during the annual ILO conference and are 
based on value judgments developed to protect workers’ rights, enhance job security 
and improve terms and conditions of employment on a global scale.  
 
Enforcement of and compliance with international labour standards is achieved 
through various supervisory mechanisms available to the ILO, such as the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations2 and 
the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards’ scrutinising of annual 
reports submitted in terms of article 22 of the ILO Constitution. The ILO not only 
supervises the application of ratified conventions, but also undertakes to provide 
technical assistance to member states and social partners in order to allow them to 
fulfil their functions and obligations in meeting international labour standards. 
 
This chapter analyses the ADR process in detail, which purports conciliation and 
arbitration as effective labour dispute settlement systems and as alternatives to 
litigation. The chapter concludes by giving an overview of the ILO’s proposed labour 
dispute settlement structures, the personnel requirements and the independence 
required of these structures.   
 
2.2 BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE ILO  
 
Robert Owen, an idealistic seventeenth-century British mill owner, campaigned for 
the protection of the working class from social and working conditions that 
perpetuated misery in society. He called on the whole world to protect the working 
1 Hereinafter referred to as the “UN”. 
2 Hereinafter referred to as the “CEACR”. 
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class. Owen's argument was based on humanitarian considerations and therefore  of 
the opinion that social problems required an international solution.3 In 1788, Jacques 
Necker, a Swiss banker, called for the extension of the Sunday rest period in other 
countries to ensure fair business competitiveness among countries, promoting 
improved conditions from a business competition point of view. Although he did not 
campaign for international labour standards to regulate rest days, he appreciated that 
the protection of workers was an international issue as advocated by Owen above.4 
 
Between 1840 and 1848, Daniel Legrand, an Alsatian factory owner,  also came 
onboard and repeatedly requested international labour regulations, which he 
considered the only way to overcome the dilemmas faced by industrialised countries’ 
exposure to destructive foreign labour competition. He did not support the idea of 
countries adopting humanitarian measures to protect their own workers.5 In fact, 
Legrand was one of the few early advocates of using international labour standards 
to forestall the social upheavals that occur once the working masses refuse to 
tolerate their degrading working conditions.6 
 
Before the First World War no international labour standards were in place. Labour 
laws were purely national and established by individual sovereign states. However, a 
number of attempts were made to achieve international labour standards through 
international agreements, particularly in Europe. In 1889, an International Conference 
on Labour was held in Berne, Switzerland. The conference called for a system of 
international agreements to regulate work in factories. This was followed by the 
formation of an International Association for Workers’ Statutory Protection in 1901 in 
Basle, Switzerland. The organization was aimed at disseminating information on the 
observance of workers’ rights.7 
 
3 Hepple Labour Law and Global Trade (2005) 26. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ghebali The ILO: A Case Study of a UN Specialized Agency (1989)3. 
7 Ramm “Laisser-faire and State Protection of Workers and Epilogue the New Ordering of Labour 
Law”(1918)in Hepple (ed)The Making of Labour Law in Europe: A Comparative Study of Nine 
Countries up to 1945 (1986)73277. 
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By 1914, no significant progress had been made to establish international labour 
standards. Agreements that prevailed were between industrialised countries, with 
significant disparities in their application.. The situation lacked mechanisms for 
effective supervision, compliance and enforcement.8 It was only after the effects of 
the First World War were felt that significant change took place in a general political 
and social context and various attempts were made to establish international labour 
standards. 9 After the First World War, all antagonists, including those favouring 
Germany, acknowledged the suffering and sacrifices of workers during the war and 
came to realise how much gratitude workers were owed by their countries. This led to 
both the British and French Prime Ministers vowing to include labour clauses in the 
World Peace Treaties and workers were promised improved conditions of 
employment once the hostilities ended. The situation of the millions of demobilised 
soldiers equally called for urgent international action.10 
 
In response to the British and French Prime Ministers' call for the inclusion of labour 
clauses in World Peace Treaties, the Treaty of Versailles, signed in the Hall of 
Mirrors at the Chateau of Versailles on 29 June 1919, included part XIII, which was 
devoted to labour and the establishment of a permanent labour organisation. This 
laid the foundation for the ILO Constitution and for the institution’s tripartite 
character.11 Influential labour leaders, such as George Barnes from Britain and Albert 
Thomas from France, were appointed as advisors to their governments and, together 
with their new colleagues in government circles, such as the prominent civil servants 
Edward Phelan and Harold Butler, they were instrumental to the setting up of the 
ILO. 12  Their influence was so apparent that it led to both Thomas and Butler 
becoming successive directors of the ILO during the inter-war years. Phelan, a 
prominent civil servant, became the “icon” of the ILO’s unique tripartite structure as 
director of the office during the Second World War. He was also co-draftsman of the 
1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, which redefined the ILO’s objectives.13 
 
8 Hepple The Making of Labour Law in Europe (1986) 29. 
9 Servais International Labour Law (2009) 24. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--eng/index.accessed  31October 2011.   
13 Ibid. 
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2.2.1 THE ILO  
 
The ILO was created in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First 
World War. The formation of the organization was based on the belief that universal 
and lasting peace can be accomplished only if it is based on social justice.14 The 
organization’s founders, such as Thomas and Phelan, were committed to spreading 
humane working conditions and combating injustice, hardship and poverty. In 1944, 
ILO members reinforced these aims by adopting the Declaration of Philadelphia. 
They spoke out against labour being viewed as a commodity. As such, the ILO 
agreed on basic human and economic rights on the principle that “poverty anywhere 
constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere”.15 
 
In 1946, the ILO became the United Nations Organization’s first specialist agency. 
Another milestone followed this in 1969, when the ILO was awarded the Noble Peace 
Prize.16 In 1998 the ILO distinguished itself further by adopting a declaration17 setting 
out principles and rights, such as the right to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, and the elimination of child labour, forced labour and discrimination linked 
to employment. This declaration is essential as it enables people or workers to claim, 
freely and based on equality of opportunities, their fair share of the wealth they have 
generated in order to achieve their full human potential.18 
 
At the time of writing, the ILO has 182 member states with a unique tripartite 
structure, comprising representatives of governments, employers’ and workers’ on an 
equal footing, to address issues related to labour and social policy.19 The ILO’s broad 
policies are set by the International Labour Conference20 (ILC), which meets once a 
year, and brings together all the ILO constituents.21 The ILC adopts new international 
14 See preamble to the ILO Constitution.   
15 Declaration of Philadelphia (1944) Clause 1. 
16 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game-A Brief Introduction to the International Labour Standards 
(1999)13.   
17 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998). 
18 Ibid. 
19 See ILOLEX.  
20 Hereinafter referred to as the “ILC”. 
21 Art 3 of the ILO Constitution reads – “[t]he meeting of the General Conference of 
representatives of the members shall be held from time to time as decision may require, and at 
least once in every year. It shall be composed of four representatives of each of the members of 
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labour standards and the ILO’s work plan and budget.22 At the beginning of February 
2012, there were 189 conventions and 200 recommendations of the ILO,23 with some 
of these instruments dating as far back as 1919. Many of them no longer correspond 
to today’s needs and it is on this basis that the ILO adopts conventions that replace 
and protocols that add new provisions to older conventions.24 
 
In between sessions of the ILC, the ILO is guided by the Governing Body,25 which is 
the organization’s executive council. The Governing Body meets several times a year 
to coordinate and shape the work of the ILO. It is responsible for, amongst other 
things, the drafting of the ILC agenda, which the conference has powers to change, 
although this rarely happens. The Governing Body appoints the Director General26 of 
the ILO and examines the proposed ILO budget for each financial year before it 
approves it for adoption by the conference. The ILO secretariat has its headquarters 
in Geneva, Switzerland, and maintains field offices in more than 40 countries.27 
 
2.2.2 ILO AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
The ILO's aims and objectives are set out in the preamble to its constitution.28 The 
preamble declares that “universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is 
based upon social justice”. The basic objectives of the ILO are to improve, monitor 
and supervise social conditions throughout the world. This is achieved through the 
creation of measures “urgently required” for the: 
whom two shall be government delegates, and two others shall be delegates representing 
respectively the employers and the workpeople of each of the members”.   
22 Art 13 of the ILO Constitution.  
23 http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/doc/declaworld.htm  accessed on 08 November 2011. 
24 http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards. accessed on 
31 October 2011 . 
25 Article 14 of the ILO Constitution provides for the Governing Body and its composition as 
follows: (1) the Governing Body shall consist of fifty–six persons, twenty-eight representing 
governments, fourteen representing the employers and fourteen representing the workers. (2) of 
the twenty eight persons representing government, ten shall be appointed by the members of 
the Chief Industrial Importance, and eight shall be appointed by the members selected for that 
purpose by the government delegates of the members mentioned above.     
26 Article 18(1)(d)(2) of the ILO Constitution provides for the appointment of the Director General 
of the ILO by the Governing Body. The Director General is to be responsible for the efficient 
conduct of the ILO and any other assigned duties. He /she is equally required to attend all 
meetings of the Governing Body.   
27 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 13. 
28 See Preamble of the ILO Constitution.  
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 • regulation of the hours of work and regulation of the labour supply; 
 
• prevention of unemployment and provision of an adequate living wage; 
 
• protection of workers against sickness, disease and injury arising out of their 
employment;  
 
• protection of children, young persons and women, and provision for old age 
and injury;  
 
• protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than 
their own;  
 
• recognition of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value; and  
 
• recognition of the principle of freedom of association.  
 
At the 1944 Philadelphia conference the ILC rephrased and broadened the aims and 
purpose of the ILO. The Philadelphia Declaration consequently amended the ILO 
constitution and re-affirmed the following principles:  
 
• that labour is not a commodity; 
 
• that freedom of expression and association are essential to sustained 
progress; 
 
• that poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; and 
 
• that the war against want must be carried on, not only with unrelenting 
vigour, but also with continuous and concerted international efforts in which 
the constituents enjoy equal status in free discussion and taking democratic 
decisions, with a view to promoting the common welfare.29 
 
29 Declaration of Philadelphia (10 May 1944) Clause I. 
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The ILO was entrusted with the solemn obligation to further these principles amongst 
member states.30 
 
2.3 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS   
 
International labour standards are the conventions and recommendations drawn up 
and agreed upon by the ILO’s constituents. 31  They result from debates or 
negotiations that take place during the ILC, which are based on value judgments 
developed to protect basic workers’ rights. They enhance workers’ job security and 
improve their terms and conditions of employment on a global scale. The standards 
are created to serve as worldwide minimum levels of protection from inhumane 
labour practices.32 Certain basic human rights are universal to humanity, therefore 
international labour standards are developed to ensure the provision of these rights 
in the workplace.33 
 
Conventions are legally binding international treaties that may be ratified by member 
states,34 while recommendations are non-binding guidelines.35 Conventions lay down 
the basic principles to be adhered to by ratifying member states, whereas 
recommendations supplement the conventions by providing detailed guidelines 
relating to the application of the convention. However, in some circumstances 
recommendations can be autonomous and not linked to any convention.36 
 
On adoption of standards by the ILC, member states are required under the ILO 
Constitution to submit them to their competent authorities,37 which in most cases is 
the country’s parliament. This is when a member state considers the ratification of the 
instrument. Upon ratification by a member state, the convention comes into force for 
30 Servais International Labour Law 28. 
31 Article (1) and (2) of the ILO Constitution provides for the membership of the ILO to include 
government, employers and workers (herein “ the constituents” and social partners).   
32 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/interntional_labour_standards.accessed on 1 November 2011.  
33 Brown, Deardorff and Stern International Labour Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis 
(1996) 227,272.  
34 Art 19(5) of the ILO Constitution.   
35 Art 19(6) of the ILO Constitution.   
36 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 14. 
37 Art 19(5)(c) of the ILO Constitution. 
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that country one year after the date of ratification.38 By ratifying the convention, a 
member state commits itself to applying the convention through national laws and 
practices39 and to report to the ILO regarding its application on a regular basis.  
 
Amongst all the ILO conventions thus far adopted, the Governing Body has identified 
eight of the 189 conventions and 200 recommendations as fundamental conventions. 
These are: 
 
• Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 
No. 87 of 1948. 
 
• Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, No. 98 of 1949. 
 
• Forced Labour Convention, No. 29 of 1930. 
 
• Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, No. 105 of 1957. 
 
• Minimum Age Convention, No. 138 of 1973. 
 
• Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, No. 182 of 1999. 
 
• Equal Remuneration Convention, No. 100 of 1951. 
 
• Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, No. 111 of 1958. 
 
The ILO launched a campaign in 1995 to ensure a universal ratification by all 
member states of these eight core conventions.40 In 2009, the ILO reported over 
1290 ratifications, representing about 88.5 percent of the member states.41 
 
38 Art 19(5)(b) of the ILO Constitution.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 14. 
41 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 15. 
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The Governing Body also designated four conventions as priority instruments and 
encouraged member states to ratify them because of their significance to the 
functioning of the international labour standards system. These are: 
 
• Labour Inspection Convention, No. 81 of 1947. 
• Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, No. 129 of 1969. 
• Tripartite Consultation Convention, No 144 of 1976. 
• Employment Policy Convention, No 122 of 1964.  
 
2.4 THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS     
 
International labour standards are created in response to growing international 
concern that action needs to be taken on issues.42 These issues are, for example, 
the provision of maternity protection to working women or setting safe working 
conditions for agricultural workers. The process involved is a unique international 
legislative development that fully takes into account the views of all ILO constituents 
worldwide.43 
 
The Governing Body puts the issue on the agenda of the next ILC. The ILO, in turn, 
prepares detailed reports that analyse the law and practices regarding the state of 
the issue at stake and forwards these to member states and social partners for their 
comments and discussion at the next ILC. After the first discussion, a second report 
is prepared by the office, with a draft instrument for further comments and for 
discussion at the coming ILC. At this second conference, the draft is amended as 
necessary and proposed for adoption. 44  The purpose of the double discussion, 
according to the ILO, is to give conference participants sufficient time to examine the 
draft instrument and make appropriate comments on it. There is a requirement for 
two-thirds majority votes cast by delegates present for a standard to be adopted.45 
42 http://www.ilo.org/global/standard/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/interna... 
accessed on 31October 2011.   
43 http://www.ilo.org/global/stanadrds/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/interna...   
Accessed on 31 October 2011. 
44 Rules for the Conference article 11  available on 
http://www.ilo.org/ilc/Rulesfortheconference/lang--en/index.htm accessed on 06 March 2012. 
45 Art 19(2) of the ILO Constitution.   
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 The delegates come from all ILO member states, with each delegation comprising of 
two government delegates, one employer delegate and one worker delegate and 
each delegate having only one vote. 46 The ILO Constitution provides that each 
delegate may be accompanied by no more than two advisers for each item on the 
conference's agenda. Committees are constituted in terms of the Rules of the 
Conference.47 The advisers are not permitted to speak during the discussions except 
on request made by the delegate whom they accompany and may not participate in 
the voting process.48 Although this may be a standing rule, from the author's personal 
experience gained while attending the ILC five times, three times as an employer 
delegate and twice as government adviser, government advisers are free to 
participate in group meetings. However, social partners are required to nominate a 
spokesperson for the group and only that person has the right to speak on behalf of 
the group. All conference participants are required to have credentials for the 
meetings.49 Voting is strictly limited to delegates who are allocated voting codes.  
 
Once the majority of the participants have voted in favour of the adoption of the 
standard, the instrument is adopted and communicated formally to member states by 
the Director-General. In turn, member states are required to bring the standard to the 
attention of their competent authorities for the enactment of the relevant legislation or 
other actions, including ratification if deemed appropriate.50 An adopted convention 
normally comes into force twelve months after ratification by two member states, it 
having been communicated it to all member states for ratification by the ILO. 51 
Ratification in itself entails a formal procedure where a member state, through its 
parliament, accepts the convention as a legally binding instrument and agrees to 
subject itself to the ILO’s regular supervisory system by ensuring that the convention 
is applied in practice.  
 
46 Art 3(2) of the ILO Constitution.  
47 Art 8 and 9 of the Rules of the Conference available 
onhttp://www.ilo.org/ilc/Rulesfortheconference/lang--en/index.htm. 
48 Art 3(6) of the ILO Constitution.  
49 Art 3(9) of the ILO Constitution. 
50 Art 19(5)(b) of the ILO Constitution.  
51 Art 19(5)(a) of the ILO Constitution.  
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Although industrialised countries were the forerunners in forming international labour 
standards, many developing countries, including Namibia and South Africa, have 
since subscribed to ILO membership.52 The standards are developed with flexibility 
that allows for their incorporation into national laws and practices, with due regard to 
the economic differences among member states. Examples include standards set on 
minimum wages, which do not require member states to set a specific minimum 
wage, but to establish a system and the necessary machinery to fix minimum wage 
rates appropriate to their economic development.53 
 
Some of these flexible clauses permit member states to introduce temporary 
standards that are lower than those normally prescribed, which may exclude certain 
categories of workers from the application of a convention, or to apply only certain 
parts of the instrument. Flexible usage, however, requires member states to make a 
declaration to the Director-General of the ILO after consultation with social 
partners.54 
 
2.5 THE USAGE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS  
 
On adoption of standards by the ILC, they automatically become conventions and 
recommendations, which must be communicated to member states by the ILO after 
the conference. 55  These conventions become part of the primary tools for 
governments, in consultation with social partners, when drafting and implementing 
their domestic labour laws and social policies to ensure conformity with international 
standards. When a country contemplates ratifying a convention, it first examines the 
necessary instrument and, if necessary, revises its domestic legislation and policies 
in order to achieve compliance with standards or instruments it wishes to ratify. 
International labour standards essentially serve as guidelines in harmonising national 
labour laws and practice in a given field.56 
 
52 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution2. 
53 Doumbia Henry Rules of the Game 18. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Art 19(5)(a) of the ILO Constitution reads- In the case of a Convention: (a) the Convention will 
be communicated to all Members for ratification.    
56 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 20. 
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Other than providing guidance for national labour laws and practices, international 
labour standards are used as terms of reference at national level. For example, 
labour courts in a number of countries are able to use international labour standards 
to decide cases where national labour law is inadequate or silent on a matter in 
question. In these cases, Namibian courts have repeatedly relied on international 
labour standards to decide cases where national labour law does not provide a 
solution. For example, in the matter between African Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Government of the Republic of Namibia,57 the Supreme Court took into account the 
provisions of the Private Employment Agencies Convention58 and the Employment 
Relationship Recommendation 59  to decide on the unbanning of labour hire in 
Namibia. Similarly, in the matter between Du Toit v the Office of the Prime Minister,60 
the court made specific reference to articles 3 and 10 of the Termination of 
Employment Convention61 in determining the meaning of dismissal, as well as the 
powers the court has to declare a dismissal invalid and order reinstatement in the 
absence of such provision in the national labour legislation. A similar approach was 
adopted in the case of Namibia Development Corporation v Visagie, 62  where 
reference was made to the Termination of Employment Convention in determining 
the meaning of consultation for the purpose of retrenchment. 
 
In South African jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court, in deciding the matter between 
SA National Defense Union v Minister of Defense,63 made specific reference to the 
Right to Organize Convention 64  to decide that workers and employers, without 
distinction, have the right to establish and join unions of their own choosing without 
prior authorisation and that these rights extend to the armed forces to the extent 
determined by national laws. Similarly, in NUMSA v Bader BOP (Pty) Ltd,65 the 
Constitutional Court referred to the Collective Bargaining Convention66 to determine 
57 Case No. SA 51/2008 date delivered 2009/12/14 reportable.   
58 No 181 of 1997. 
59 ILO Recommendation No198 of 2006. 
60 NLLP (1998) (1) 54 NLC, Case No LCA 6/94. 
61 No158 of 1982. 
62 NLLP (1998)(1) 166 NLC, Case No LCA8/96. 
63 1999 (20) ILJ 2265 (CC). 
64 No87 of 1948, art 2 and 9. 
65 [2003] 2 BLLR 103 (CC). 
66 No98 of 1949. 
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the right of a minority trade union to strike in support of a demand that the employer 
recognise the union’s shop steward.  
 
These references provide sufficient evidence in practice that demonstrates how 
international labour standards are used as terms of reference in the two countries’ 
judicial systems in instances where national laws were not sufficient in providing 
guidance on the matters at stake. 
 
International labour standards are further used to provide guidance for developing 
national labour policies, such as employment policies. For example, the Namibian 
National Labour Inspection Policy was developed based on the ILO requirements  
before it became operational. At the time of writing,  the Namibian National 
Employment Policy was under ILO scrutiny before it would be  put into force. The 
purpose of this scrutiny is to determine the country's level of compliance with 
international standards and norms.  
 
International labour standards play an important role in improving various 
administrative structures, such as labour administration, labour inspection, social 
security administration and employment services. In addition, they serve as 
benchmarks for good industrial relations applied by labour dispute resolution bodies 
for effective collective bargaining.67 Besides being instruments used by governments, 
international labour standards are used by multinational enterprises to adopt labour 
conditions that are consistent with these standards. Advocacy groups use these 
standards to influence changes in policy, law and practice, and various regional 
organisations are incorporating the standards in their bilateral, multilateral and 
regional trade agreements.68 
 
The ILO reports show that a number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, as 
well as regional economic-integration arrangements, contain social and labour 
provisions related to workers’ rights. A good example is in the European Union where 
special incentive arrangements for sustainable development and good governance 
67 http://www.ilo.org/global/stanadrds/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/interna... 
accessed on 31October 2001.    
68 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 22. 
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have been implemented, which provide for additional benefits for countries 
implementing certain international standards in respect of humane labour matters.69 
 
2.6 THE TERMINATION OF ILO CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS     
 
International treaties are terminated when they are abrogated, denounced or 
reviewed.70 In respect of international labour standards, they contain final provisions 
that authorise the ILC to close them to any new ratification.71 The ILO Constitution is, 
however, silent on the condition of abrogation. In 1997, the ILC adopted an 
amendment to the constitution to enable it to abrogate outdated conventions in 
accordance with the acte contraire procedures, such as similar methods of 
concluding conventions to be applied on termination. However, the amendment has 
not been effected due to  its failure to attract a sufficient number of ratifications. 
Therefore, there is nothing currently preventing the ILO from terminating outdated 
standards by following acte contraire procedures. The ILO has instead adopted a 
system of creating new relevant standards to meet with current realities.72 
 
2.7 ILO SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS  
 
Since the ILO’s establishment in 1919, the organization has been committed to 
adopting international labour standards and vigorously promoting their ratification and 
application in member states. The supervision of the application of ratified 
conventions is one way of achieving the organization’s objectives.73 
 
The ILO imposes obligations on member states that ratify conventions to report 
regularly on measures they have taken to implement relevant conventions.74 The 
obligations include the requirement to submit newly adopted standards to the 
69 Ibid . 
70 Servais International Labour Law 49. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid . 
73 ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (2009) 1. 
74 Art 20 the ILO Constitution. 
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national competent authority75 and the obligation to report at intervals on measures 
the country has taken to give effect to the provisions of unratified conventions and 
recommendations.76 Member states are required to submit reports every two years 
detailing the steps that the country has taken in law and practice in order to apply any 
of the eight fundamental and priority conventions it has ratified. In respect to all other 
conventions, the country must submit reports every five years, except for conventions 
that have been shelved, which are no longer supervised on a regular basis.77 
 
In submitting reports to the Director-General of the ILO, governments are required to 
communicate copies to social partners, employers’ and workers’ organizations. This 
allows these organizations the opportunity to comment on the reports and to provide 
comments to government or the ILO.78 
 
There are a number of established supervisory bodies that oversee the 
implementation and application of international labour standards. These bodies or 
machineries are tasked to examine the standard-related obligations of member 
states under the ILO Constitution. The available supervisory mechanisms include 
regulation through annual reports 79  and special procedures for complaints or 
representation to the Governing Body.80 
 
It is submitted that it is not the existence per se of conventions and recommendations 
that makes the ILO effective, but their implementation through regular and systematic 
monitoring.81 The supervision of standards is mainly carried out by two bodies. These 
are the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
75 Art 19(5)(b) the ILO Constitution.  
76 Art 19 par 5(e) the ILO Constitution provides that, A Member State undertakes, in respect of any 
Convention which it has ratified, to: Report to the Director General of the [ILO], at appropriate 
intervals as requested by the Governing Body, the position of its law and practice in regard to 
the matters dealt within the Convention, showing the extent to which effect has been given or is 
proposed to be given, to any  of the Convention by legislation, administrative action, collective 
agreement or otherwise and stating the difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification of such 
Convention.  
77 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 80. 
78 Art 23(2) the ILO Constitution. 
79 Art 22 the ILO Constitution. 
80 Art 24 and 26 the ILO Constitution.     
81 Swepston Supervisory Mechanisms of the ILO (2010)2.Available 
onhttp://www.leeswepston.net/supersys.htm.accessed on 20 November 2011.   
45 
                                                             
Recommendations 82 and the Committee on the Application of Standards of the 
International Labour Conference.83 
 
2.7.1 COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CEACR) 
 
This committee was set up in 1926 to examine government reports on ratified 
conventions.84 It is composed of 20 members with outstanding legal expertise and 
good knowledge of economics and social problems and comprises of members from 
national and international level. Members are appointed by the Governing Body on 
the recommendation of the Director-General of the ILO in his or her personal 
capacity for a period of three years. The committee’s fundamental principles include 
independence, impartiality and objectivity in noting the extent to which each member 
state conforms to the terms of the conventions and obligations accepted under the 
ILO Constitution.85 
 
The committee is mandated to examine:86 
 
- Annual reports under article 22 of the ILO Constitution on the measures 
taken to give effect to the provisions of conventions. 
 
- The information and reports concerning conventions and recommendations 
communicated by member states in accordance with article 19 of the ILO 
Constitution. 
 
- Information and reports on the measures taken by member states in 
accordance with article 35 of the ILO Constitution.87 
82 CEACR. 
83 Hereinafter referred to as the “Conference Committee on the Application of Standards”. 
84 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 80. 
85 ILO Handbook on Procedure Relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations (2006) 35. 
86 These terms of reference are as revised by the Governing Body at its 103rd Session of 1947.  
87 The fundamental principles and terms of reference and working methods of the CEACR are 
resonated in the Committee’s report to the 73rd Session of the ILC 1987 Report iii Part 4A Parr 
37-49.   
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The CEACR meets annually in November and December to review reports submitted 
by member states in terms of article 22 of the ILO Constitution. The committee 
determines to what extent the member states' legislation and practice conform to the 
ratified conventions and the extent to which the member states have fulfilled their 
obligations under the ILO Constitution in respect of the standards being examined. In 
fulfilling its mandate, the committee has two methods of conducting its business: it 
may choose to adopt either observations or direct requests. Direct requests usually 
relate to less important matters or may be mere requests for information.88 Direct 
requests are sent directly to governments and workers’ and employers’ organizations 
in the countries concerned. If the particular government furnishes the requested 
information to the aforementioned entities or takes the measures requested; the 
matter goes no further.89 
 
In cases of serious or persistent failure by a member state to implement the identified 
measures the committee makes observations on fundamental questions raised by 
the application of a particular convention by a member state. These observations are 
sent to governments for their reaction and are reproduced in the committee’s annual 
reports, which are submitted to the ILC’s Conference Committee on the Application 
of Standards in June every year.90 
 
2.7.2 CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE APPLICATION OF STANDARDS  
 
The Conference Committee on the Application of Standards is the next highest level 
of supervision.91 This is one of the two standing committees of the ILC, which meets 
annually in June. It is composed of the ILO’s tripartite structures of governments, 
workers’ and employers’ representatives.92 In terms of Article 7 of the Rules of the 
Conference, the committee’s mandate is to consider the following:  
 
88 ILO Application of International Labour Standards Report iii  (2009) 2. 
89 ILO Handbook of Procedure Relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 36 par 56.  
90 Elliot “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards”(2000) 6 Institute for International 
Economics 2. 
91 Elliot “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards” 3. 
92 Art 7 of the Rules for the Conference. Available on http:// 
www.ilo.org/ilc/rulesfortheconference/lang…en/index.htp.   
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- measures taken to give effect to ratified conventions in terms of article 22 of 
the ILO Constitution; 
 
- reports communicated in accordance with article 19 of the ILO Constitution 
(general survey); and 
 
- measures taken in accordance with article 35 of the ILO Constitution (non-
metropolitan territories). 
 
The committee’s discussion is based on reports submitted by the CEACR. The 
committee selects a number of important or persistent cases from governments. The 
government concerned is asked to appear before the committee to explain the 
reasons for the situation noted by the CEACR.93 This forum provides an opportunity 
for governments, employers and workers to review the manner in which governments 
are satisfying their standards-related obligations arising out of ratified conventions. At 
the session the governments in question are given the opportunity to elaborate on 
information previously supplied and to indicate any progress or corrective measures 
taken or proposed since the previous session of the CEACR. In the same vein, the 
particular government shares the difficulties encountered in the fulfilment of 
obligations with and seeks guidance on how to achieve their obligations from 
committee members.94 
 
The committee would normally conclude with drawing up conclusions recommending 
that the governments in question must take specific steps to remedy the identified 
problems, or invite the ILO mission to assist, or call for technical assistance.95 
 
The committee concludes its session with the production of a full report that is 
submitted to the ILC. The report contains problems governments are encountering in 
fulfilling their obligations under the ILO Constitution or in complying with the 
93 ILO Handbook of Procedures Relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 35 para60 (iii).   
94 ILO Application of International Labour Standards Report iii 3. 
95 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 81. 
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conventions they have ratified. This report is incorporated in the published ILC 
report.96 
 
Besides the supervisory process employed by the ILO described above, the 
organisation uses other mechanisms, such as direct contacts, to supervise the 
application of ratified conventions. This process is utilised either at the request of 
governments or at the initiation of the ILO itself, on condition that the government in 
question adheres thereto. The ILO would normally send an official or an individual 
expert to discuss the particular problem with the government and help it to arrive at a 
desired solution. During this process, the usual supervisory authorities are 
suspended for that country to allow the non-compliance  to be resolved.97 
 
2.7.3 REPRESENTATION PROCEDURES 
 
Representation procedures before the ILO are articulated in articles 2498 and 2599 of 
the ILO Constitution. Trade union organisations and employers’ associations have 
the right under Article 24 to file a representation with the Governing Body if, in their 
view, a country has failed to secure, in any respect, the effective observance within 
its jurisdiction of any convention to which it is a party.100 This representation can only 
be filed against a government that has ratified the convention concerned while it is 
still a member of the ILO or, if it has withdrawn its membership, it must still be bound 
by a convention it had ratified.101 
 
96 The ILC Reports are made available on the ILOLEX.  
97 Swepston Supervisory Mechanism of the ILO 4. 
98 Art 24 the ILO Constitution reads – in the event of any representation being made to the ILO by 
an industrial association of employers or of workers that any of the members has failed to 
secure in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any convention to which 
it is a party, the Governing Body may communicate this representation to the government 
against which it is made and may invite that government to make such statement on the subject 
as it may think fit.     
99 Art 25 the ILO Constitution provides  that, if no statement is received within a reasonable time 
from the government in question, or if the statement when received is not deemed to be 
satisfactory by the Governing Body, the latter shall have the right to publish the representation 
and the statement, if any made, in reply to it.         
100 Swepston Supervisory Mechanisms of the ILO 4. 
101 ILO Handbook on Procedures Relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 48 par 77.   
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The Governing Body, if satisfied with the merits of the representation and after 
having declared it receivable, appoints a three-member committee of a tripartite 
nature to examine or investigate the representation and the government response 
received.102 The Governing Body also has the opportunity to study the investigation 
report and its outcome. 
 
The committee then investigates the legal and practical aspects of the case by 
examining the information submitted by the party that made the representation. On 
its conclusion of the investigation the committee makes recommendations to the 
Governing Body. If the government response is found to be unsatisfactory, the 
Governing Body invites the government concerned to make a representation before it 
and, depending on the outcome, the Governing Body may opt to publish the original 
representation and the response received. All the parties are informed of the 
intention to publish.103 However, Swepston104 points out that the Governing Body’s 
ultimate decision does not in itself rest the matter. This is because all questions 
raised by the investigation team may be followed up on by the ILO’s supervisory 
bodies, such as the CEACR and the Conference Committee on the Application of 
Standards, which may raise questions on any matter that they may feel requires 
further examination.105 
 
2.7.4 COMPLAINTS MADE IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE ILO 
CONSTITUTION  
 
Article 26 of the ILO Constitution provides as follows:  
 
(1) Any Member shall have the right to file a complaint with the [ILO] if it is not 
satisfied that any other Member is securing the effective observance of any 
convention which both have ratified in accordance with the foregoing articles. 
 
(2) The Governing Body may, if it thinks fit, before referring such complaint to a 
Commission of Inquiry, as hereinafter provided for, communicate with the 
government in question in the manner described in article 24. 
 
102 Ibid. 
103 Blanpain Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (1982) 61. 
104 Swepston Supervisory Mechanisms of the ILO(2010)4. 
105 Swepston Supervisory Mechanism of the ILO 6. 
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(3) If the Governing Body does not think it necessary to communicate the complaint 
to the government in question, or if, when it has made such communication, no 
statement in reply has been received within a reasonable time which the 
Governing Body considers to be satisfactory, the Governing Body may appoint a 
Commission of Inquiry to consider the complaint and to report thereon. 
 
(4) The Governing Body may adopt the same procedures either of its own motion or 
on receipt of a complaint from a delegate to the Conference. 
 
(5) When any matter arising out of article 25 or 26 is being considered by the 
Governing Body, the government in question shall, if not already represented 
thereon, be entitled to send a representative to take part in the proceedings of 
the Governing Body while the matter is under consideration. Adequate notice of 
the date on which the matter will be considered shall be given to the government 
in question.   
 
Subject to Article 26 of the ILO Constitution illustrated above, a complaint must be 
brought against a member state for not complying with a ratified convention by 
another member state that has ratified the same convention, or by a delegate to the 
ILC, or by the Governing Body in its own capacity. There are no formal requirements 
as to the form and language of the complaint, except for the requirements set out in 
Article 26. To be subjected to scrutiny, the country in question must still be a member 
of the ILO or, if it has withdrawn its membership, it must still be bound by the 
convention it ratified while a member.106 
 
Upon receipt of the complaint, the Governing Body must consider the complaint and 
forward it to the government concerned for its comments. If this direct contact is not 
sufficient, a commission of inquiry may be instituted to investigate the charges. The 
commission is free to set out its own rules and practices. However, it must carry out a 
full investigation of the allegations to ascertain all the facts of the case. Depending on 
the findings, it should make recommendations on the measures107 to be taken to 
address the non-compliance and for the country to align its laws and practices to be 
consistent with the relevant convention.108 
 
In this respect, a commission of inquiry is regarded as the ILO’s highest-level 
investigation procedure, instituted when a member state is accused of committing 
persistent and serious violation(s) and when it has resisted addressing the 
106 Ibid . 
107 Art 28 the ILO Constitution. 
108 Elliot “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards”5. 
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violation(s).109 The ILO’s records indicate that, to date, only twelve commissions of 
inquiry have been established. The latest was in Zimbabwe, where an investigation 
was conducted on the premise of a complaint filed against the government in 
2008.110 At the one hundredth session of the ILC, which the author attended as a 
government delegate for the Republic of Namibia, Zimbabwe appeared before the 
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards to explain its non-
compliance. 
 
Where the government concerned disputes the recommendations of the commission 
of inquiry, it has the right to refer the complaint to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).111 The decision of the ICJ is final 112 and may either be an affirmation, a 
variation or a reversal of the findings of the commission of inquiry.113 Swepston114 
submits that although the ILO Constitution has this recourse provision to 
governments or the ILO itself, it has never been utilised. However, it remains a 
possibility available to aggrieved parties. 
 
In 2000, the ILO relied on the provisions of Article 33115 of its Constitution for the first 
time in its history. The Governing Body requested the ILC to take measures to 
compel Myanmar to end the use of forced labour. In 1996, a complaint to this end, in 
terms of Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, was filed against Myanmar for the 
continued violation of the Forced Labour Convention.116 A commission of inquiry was 
established and found widespread and systematic use of forced labour in the 
country.117 It was against this background that the Governing Body recommended 
the ILC call upon all member states and employers’, workers’ and other international 
109 ILO Handbook of Procedures Relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 50 par 80. 
110 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 86. 
111 Hereinafter referred to as the “ICJ”. 
112 Art 31 the ILO Constitution. 
113 Art 32 the ILO Constitution. 
114 Swepston Supervisory Mechanisms of the ILO 7. 
115 Art 33 the ILO Constitution provides – In the event of any member failing to carry-out the 
measures within the time specified in the recommendations, if any, contained in the report of 
the Commission of Inquiry, or in the decision of the [ICJ], as the case may be, the Governing 
Body may recommend to the conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to 
secure compliance therewith. 
116 No.29 of 1930. 
117 Doumbia-Henry Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 86. 
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organisations to review their relations with Myanmar in order to ensure that they do 
not support forced labour in that country. It was only after this measure was taken 
that Myanmar responded positively by allowing the ILO to investigate the complaint 
and to help the country eliminate forced labour.118 
 
Although this decision was taken by the ILO in the case of Myanmar, Elliot (2000)119 
submits that Article 26 of the ILO Constitution was carefully constructed in order to 
avoid the imposition of penalties and the organisation uses this only as a last resort. 
He suggests that these provisions be applied in situations where a member state has 
flagrantly and persistently refused to carry out its obligations under a convention.  
 
2.8 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING 
 
The ILO's Constitution confers a special mandate upon the organization to provide 
advice in relation to labour legislation. 120  Pursuant to this mandate, Article 10, 
paragraph 2, of the Constitution calls upon the Office to accord to governments, at 
their request, all appropriate assistance within its powers in connection with the 
drafting of laws and regulations based on the decisions of the ILC. Given the 
constitutional obligation of the ILO to provide assistance, the Office does not only 
supervise the application of ratified conventions, but also undertakes various forms of 
technical assistance designed to assist governments, employers’ and workers’ 
organisations in order to fulfil their functions and their roles in the standard-setting 
and supervisory systems. This involves working closely with all three constituents 
and other relevant institutions in various countries in order to identify the countries’ 
priorities in terms of both labour standards and technical cooperation.121 
 
ILO officials and experts are sent to countries to help address problems in legislation 
and practices so that they are aligned to ratified instruments. During these missions, 
the ILO officials or experts conduct discussion sessions with governments to identify 
problems in the application of standards and conduct promotional activities, including 
118 Swepston Supervisory Mechanisms of the ILO 7. 
119 Elliot “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards” 5. 
120 http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/dialogue/ifpdia/llg/intro/index.htm accessed on 05 March 2012. 
121 ILO Handbook of Procedures Relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 52 par 86.   
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seminars and national workshops, to raise awareness and to develop the capacity to 
comply with standards.122 It is within this mandate that the ILO continues to render 
technical assistance to countries such as Namibia, having developed both the 1992 
and 2007 Labour Acts, and to provide continued technical assistance in terms of the 
Decent Work Country Programme.  
 
2.9 DO THE ILO SUPERVISORY MACHINERIES WORK? 
 
It is submitted that for the ILO supervisory machineries to be credible, there must be 
a legal supervisory system that ensures that the methods of evaluation are applicable 
and enforceable with regard to every member state. Having such systems in place 
ensures complete impartiality.123 It is therefore on this premise that the scope of the 
CEACR is restricted to the provisions of the instrument before it, which must be 
verified. In doing so, the committee does not take into consideration factors such as 
the economic and social conditions of a given country that are not mentioned in the 
instrument’s test under analysis.124 
 
In contrast, the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards has pointed 
out that although economic and social disparities may have led to flexible wording of 
the standards, the same attitude is not adopted in the monitoring of their application. 
The purpose of this exclusion is to minimise subjective appraisals.125 On adopting 
international labour standards, flexibility is taken into account, bearing in mind 
different countries’ historical backgrounds, cultures, the respective powers of their 
main social partners, the political and philosophical contexts, the economic substrata 
and the role of the law in social organisation.126 
 
It is within this ambit that the ILO supervisory bodies assess the extent to which each 
individual country implements each convention. The assessment is aimed at verifying 
effective application of the standard. The role of the supervisory bodies is to 
122 Doumbia-Henry Rules of the Game 91. 
123 Servais “Flexibility and Rigidity in International Labour Standards” 125(2) March- April (1986)ILR 
193-208. 
124 Servais International Labour Law (2009) 303. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Servais International Labour Law (2009) 84. 
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ascertain whether the provisions of an instrument are fully applied. The ILO 
supervisory bodies are inflexible when it comes to pinpointing anomalies between a 
country’s law and practices and compliance with the relevant convention that a 
particular country has freely and autonomously undertaken to apply.127 
 
Although the CEACR comprises of independent persons, judges, university 
professors and other reputable legal scholars whose opinions are valued and 
respected, the conclusions and recommendations of this committee are not 
binding.128 This is because the ILO conventions provide for no sanctions in the event 
of the infringement of standards and recommendations.129 Comments, although they 
may be critical, are purely intended to initiate actions and foster dialogue and are not 
aimed at condemning a particular government. 
 
Having no power to impose sanctions, the ILO supervisory bodies have been 
frequently criticised for their dependence on goodwill from member states, which is 
lacking on the part of the worst offenders.130 There is, however, significant evidence 
in many cases that goodwill is prevalent and produces the desired results.131 The 
dependence on goodwill does not mean that the supervisory machineries are not 
working at all, but rather suggests that diplomatic measures require patience and 
persistence. The Myanmar case, for example, took 30 years of persistent CEACR 
observations before a commission of inquiry was initiated. It was continuous threats 
of undefined sanctions, coupled with sensitive and difficulty negotiations, which 
ultimately pressured the dictatorial government to respond.132 
 
Besides reliance on the combination of diplomacy and moral urgings, the ILO 
supervisory bodies have other means of exhorting a member state to comply fully 
with the labour standards. Actions, such as the publication of conclusions of the 
supervisory bodies and discussion of non-compliance in international forums, could 
influence member states to comply accordingly in their endeavour to avoid being 
127 Ibid. 
128 Servais International Labour Law 303 par 1019. 
129 Servais International Labour Law 303 par 1020. 
130 Hepple Labour Law and International Trade 54. 
131 CEACR Report III Part 1A (2003) 1 parr 107-10. 
132 Hepple Labour Law and International Trade 54. 
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cited before the international community, where they may wish to enjoy universal 
friendship.133 
 
Hepple134 points out the legal ambiguities in the scope of the “actions” contemplated 
under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution. His arguments are based on the fact that 
Article 33 refers only to “such actions” as may be deemed wise and expeditious to 
secure compliance. This provision leaves wide discretion to member states and 
international organisations to implement measures they consider appropriate. To 
address such ambiguity, Manpain135 suggests that appropriate measures considering 
the alignment with trade sanctions be imposed on member states by virtue of their 
commitments to the World Trade Organisation.136 
 
O’Higgins,137 on the other hand, suggests the establishment of a special international 
labour tribunal to provide authoritative interpretation of conventions. He points out 
that the jurisdiction of the ICJ has not been invoked since the 1930s and that the 
forum lacks specialist knowledge of and experience with labour matters, thus 
requiring the establishment of a special international labour tribunal to give 
authoritative interpretations.  
 
Although the CEACR conclusions and recommendations may not be legally binding 
on member states, their interpretations are nevertheless regarded as valid and 
generally recognised unless they are contradicted by ICJ decisions.138 With the lack 
of authoritative decisions, Hepple 139 suggests putting into effect the provisions of 
Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution, which provides for the appointment of a tribunal 
for the expeditious determination of any dispute or question relating to the 
interpretation of a convention. He submits that the establishment of a specialist 
133 Weisband “Discursive Multilateralism Global Benchmarks, Shame and Learning in the ILO 
Labour Standards Monitoring Regime” (2000) 643-666. 
134 Hepple Labour Law and International Trade(2005)55. 
135 Manpain Protection International des travailleira et la liberalization due commerce Mondiale 
(1996)45. 
136 Hereinafter referred to as the “WTO”. 
137 O’Higgins “The interaction of the ILO, the Council of Europe and European Union Labour 
Standards” in Hepple (ed) Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context (2002) 68. 
138 CEACR Report, (1990) parr 7and 8. 
139 Hepple Labour Law and International Trade (2005) 56. 
56 
                                                             
labour tribunal could help resolve disputes between member states and the 
supervisory bodies and clarify the meaning of ILO instruments. All things considered, 
the author strongly advocates the establishment of an international conciliation and 
arbitration service in order to resolve labour disputes involving governments and 
workers’ and employers’ organisations over alleged rights violations under ILO 
conventions, bilateral treaties, corporate codes and international collective 
agreements.  
 
At the time of writing none of the suggested alternatives to existing ILO supervisory 
mechanisms are being contemplated or implemented and the organisation continues 
to rely on the goodwill of member states in complying with their constitutional 
obligations.   
 
2.10 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS ON LABOUR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION  
 
Several ILO conventions and recommendations address labour dispute prevention 
and resolution. The main principles contained in these instruments include:  
 
• Convention No. 154 of 1981 concerning the Promotion of Collective 
Bargaining, which provides that bodies and procedures for the prevention 
and settlement of labour disputes be designed to contribute to the promotion 
of collective bargaining.140 Although Convention 154 focuses on collective 
bargaining, it does not exclude the use of conciliation and arbitration as part 
of the bargaining process where these processes are voluntary.141 One of the 
objectives of labour dispute resolution is to promote the mutual resolution of 
the differences between workers and employers, essentially promoting 
collective bargaining.142 
 
• The Labour Relations Convention No. 151 of 1978, which provides for the 
settlement of disputes regarding the terms and conditions of employment to 
be sought through independent and impartial mechanisms, such as 
140 Art 5 par 2(e) of Convention No 154 of 1981. 
141 Art 6 of Convention No 154 of 1981. 
142 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution Through Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (2007) 7. 
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mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Settlement is to be established in a 
manner that ensures the confidence of the parties involved.143 
 
• The Right to Organize and Collective bargaining Convention No. 98 of 1949, 
a fundamental convention, which provides that measures appropriate to 
national conditions are taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote 
the full development and utilisation of mechanisms for voluntary negotiations 
between employers or employers’ organisations or workers’ organisations, 
with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by 
means of collective bargaining. 144  Mechanisms include the use of the 
conciliation and arbitration process to resolve labour disputes between social 
partners. 
 
• The Termination of Employment Convention No. 158 of 1982, which provides 
that a worker who considers his employment to have been unjustifiably 
terminated shall be entitled to appeal against such termination to a tribunal, 
arbitration court or arbitrator. The convention further empowers these bodies 
to examine the reasons given for the termination and the circumstances 
relating to the case.  
 
• The Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation145 is the main 
ILO instrument that deals with labour dispute prevention and resolution. It 
recommends that voluntary conciliation be made available to assist in the 
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes between employers and 
workers. It further recommends equal representation of employers and 
workers in these proceedings. Moreover, the instrument demands that 
conciliation services be expeditious and free of charge to the disputants. 
Further, that it should allow the parties to enter into conciliation voluntarily or 
upon the initiative of the conciliation authority. This instrument calls on the 
parties to refrain from strikes or lockouts while engaged in conciliation or 
arbitration procedures. This, however, does not limit the right to strike.  
143 Art 8 of Convention 151 of 1978. 
144 Art 5 of the Collective Bargaining Convention No 98 of 1949 . 
145 No 92 of 1952.  
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• The Examination of Grievance Recommendation,146 which addresses the 
resolution of disputes at an enterprise level. The instrument suggests a 
number of recommendations on the development and implementation of 
workplace dispute mechanisms. It emphasises the importance of 
preventative measures, such as the adoption of sound personnel policies and 
co-operation between social partners on decisions that affect the workers. 
The instrument goes on to recommend that where efforts to resolve the 
dispute fails, the parties should have the opportunity for final settlement of 
the dispute. The final settlement may be through the procedures set out by 
collective agreements, such as conciliation and/or arbitration by the 
competent public authorities, and parties should have recourse to a labour 
court or other judicial authority.  
 
• The Labour Administration Recommendation, 147  an instrument which 
provides that competent bodies within the system of labour administration be 
in a position to provide conciliation and arbitration appropriate to national 
laws, in agreement with social partners.148 
 
These ILO instruments create ample room for member states to develop their own 
system for labour dispute prevention and resolution. However, these systems must 
be consistent with the following principles:149 
 
• Voluntary conciliation machineries appropriate to national circumstances 
should be made available, which are free of charge and expeditious, to assist 
in the prevention and resolution of labour disputes. Time limits for the 
proceedings should be prescribed by national laws or regulations, be fixed in 
advance, and kept to a minimum.150 
 
146 No 130 of 1967. 
147 No 158 of 1978.  
148 Para 10 of the Recommendation. 
149 Labour Legislation Guidelines available at 
http://www.ilo/org/public/emglish/dialogue/ifpdial/idex.htn.accessed on 20 February 2012.    
150 Recommendation No 92 of 1951 concerning Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration par 1 and 3. 
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• The parties to the dispute should be encouraged to abstain from strikes and 
lockouts while conciliation and arbitration is in progress.151 
 
• Agreements reached during or because of conciliation should be drawn up in 
writing and accorded the same status as agreements concluded in the usual 
manner.152 
 
Given the proposed labour dispute settlement mechanisms, many countries have 
adopted conciliation, arbitration and adjudication as processes, as promoted by the 
ILO, to resolve labour disputes.153 These procedures are, in the main, established on 
a statutory basis. They involve independent third parties to assist in the resolution of 
labour disputes or could be established under the terms of collective agreements.154 
 
2.11 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) 
 
The manner in which labour disputes are resolved between employers and 
employees has changed and evolved over the last few decades. This has, in part, 
been due to the influence of globalisation and competition for goods and services on 
the global market. This influence has led many countries to improve their labour 
relations environment and to enhance the industrial peace essential for economic 
achievement. Ultimately, such an environment brings about attraction and retention 
of foreign and domestic investments.155 
 
Steadman 156 describes ADR as processes of dispute resolution mechanisms that 
are short of, or alternatives to, full-scale court processes. It refers to all means 
available to the parties, including facilitated negotiations during which parties are 
encouraged to negotiate directly with each other prior to some other legal process. 
151 Parr  4 and 5 of Recommendation No 92 of 1951. 
152 Par 5 of Recommendation No 92 of 1951. 
153 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution 29. 
154 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/iig/index.htn accessed on 20 February 2012. 
155 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution (2005)7. 
156 Ibid. 
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ADR is also seen as a means for disagreeing parties to come to an agreement 
without litigation and is an alternative process to a formal court hearing or litigation.157 
 
Trollip158 submits that ADR is a process that involves the use of a neutral third party 
to make the settlement of the dispute outside formal court proceedings easier. He 
points out that these processes vary from voluntary and non-binding settlement 
procedures such as mediation, to compulsory and binding arbitration. Steadman159 
equally stresses that ADR processes include negotiations, conciliation, mediation 
and several types of arbitration. These processes are all intended to resolve disputes 
in a faster, cheaper and less adversarial manner. The purpose, according to 
Steadman, is to achieve better outcomes for disputants than those they can achieve 
through the process of litigation. ADR processes, such as conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration, are regarded as extra-judicial, which are solutions that do not involve 
going to court or appearing before a labour tribunal.160 
 
2.11.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADR AND ITS APPLICATION 
 
The use of the ADR process is not a new phenomenon, but dates back many 
years.161 Brown162 submits that the extensive promotion and proliferation of ADR 
models are the result of recent focus.  
 
In the United States, for example, ADR was developed in the 1960s following the 
political and civil conflicts of that era.163 In the 1970s, the United States launched 
ADR as a social movement to resolve community-wide civil rights disputes through 
mediation. It became a legal movement used to address the expenses and delays 
involved in litigation arising from an over-crowded court system. ADR in America has 
since grown to be the most efficient and effective alternative to litigation.164 
157 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/alternative-dispute resolution accessed on 01 February 2012. 
158 Trollip Alternative Dispute Resolution (1991) 7. 
159 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 9. 
160 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution Through Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (2007) 2. 
161 Fiadjoe Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Developing World Perspective (2004) 3-4. 
162 Brown et al International Labour Standards and Trade(1996) 5. 
163 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 10. 
164 Ibid. 
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 Giana165 explains that the popularity of ADR comes as a result of the high caseloads 
in traditional courts. He established that ADR imposes less costs than litigation and 
that confidentiality is preserved, which allows parties to have greater control over the 
selection, in some cases, of the individual or individuals to decide their dispute. On 
an international scale, ADR has expanded in both developing and developed 
countries. ADR processes are being implemented in a number of countries to meet a 
wide range of social, legal, commercial and political goals.166 In South Africa, for 
example, ADR was introduced by the government to address the social patterns of 
the apartheid era and to move away from the adversarialism that characterised the 
labour relations system. 167  In Namibia, ADR processes were introduced by the 
Namibian government to address the antiquated, confrontational dispute resolution 
process that existed before the advent of the Labour Act, 2007.168 
 
ADR was introduced to deliver dispute resolutions as the courts were becoming 
overloaded with cases, thereby failing to provide quick and easy access to justice. 
The court system of labour dispute resolution is seen as frustrating and no longer 
functioning effectively.169 Against such shortcomings, an alternative non-legal system 
of ADR was developed with the following goals:  
 
• relieving court congestion and reducing undue costs and delays; 
• enhancing community involvement in the dispute resolution process; 
• facilitating access to justice; and 
• providing more effective dispute resolution.   
 
Brown 170  points out that, within the context of the rule of law initiatives, ADR 
processes can:  
 
165 Giana “Avoid Court at all Cost” The Australian Financial Review Nov 14 (2000) available 
onhttp://wikipedia.org/wiki/alternative_dispute_resolution accessed on 01 February 2012.   
166 Brown et al International Labour Standards and Trade 5. 
167 Trollip Alternative Dispute Resolution 9. 
168 GRN Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. Ministerial Report: Office of the Labour 
Commissioner (2011)4-8. 
169 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 10. 
170 Brown et al International Labour Standards and Trade 5. 
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• support and compliment court reforms; 
• by-pass ineffective and discredited courts; 
• increase popular satisfaction with dispute resolution systems; 
• increase access to justice for disadvantaged groups; 
• reduce delays in the resolution of disputes; and  
• reduce the cost of resolving disputes.  
 
2.11.2 ADR AND CONFIDENTIALITY  
 
ADR is a confidential process where the parties agree and commit themselves 
before, during and after ADR proceedings to act as advised or agreed. 
Communication during the ADR process is not subject to disclosure and may not be 
used as evidence against any participant or the neutral third party in any ensuing 
judicial or administrative proceedings.171 None of the parties to the dispute or the 
neutral third party may be required to testify or be subjected to a process requiring 
disclosure of confidential information. This non-disclosure applies even during the 
ADR process, where the third party is not required to disclose to either party 
information given in confidence by the other party unless expressly authorised to do 
so.172 
 
2.11.3 ADR AND ITS SUCCESS RATE  
 
Trollip173 submits that ADR settlement rates vary depending on the type of ADR 
process the parties choose. He is of the view that the outcome depends on various 
factors, such as the time of referral, commitment and skills brought to bear by the 
parties, and the ADR facilitator. He, however, notes that success is not measured 
only by the number of formal settlements reached, but also where written 
agreements are not reached. The ADR process often clarifies and narrows the issues 
in dispute for the next stage of resolution.    
 
171 Labour legislation guidelines available 
onhttp://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/dialogue/ifpdial/llg/intro/index.htm accessed on 06 March 
2012. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Trollip Alternative Dispute Resolution 10. 
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Trollip 174 further points out that the ADR process should not be regarded as a 
panacea for all ills as settlements reached through the ADR process lack the 
legitimacy of authoritative judicial decisions. He therefore suggests that the outcomes 
of ADR processes should be in the form of binding precedents like those of a court of 
law to guide future disputes. Moreover, he opines that the handing down and 
publication of ADR decisions could constitute valuable public good by disseminating 
information about what can and cannot lawfully be done.  
 
2.12 LABOUR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES   
2.12.1 DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF LABOUR DISPUTES      
 
The ILO175 asserts that labour disputes take different forms, each of which is subject 
to a particular type of dispute settlement procedure at a final stage. The ILO reports 
that many countries distinguish between several types of labour disputes and have 
established several procedures for dealing with them. This distinction and the 
procedures established in various countries reflect on the historical development of 
that country’s  labour relations system.176 
 
The ILO classifies labour disputes in the following categories:  
 
• individual and collective disputes; and  
• disputes about rights and interests (also known as economic disputes).  
 
The latter distinction characterises the dispute settlement mechanisms of many 
countries, Namibia and South Africa included.  
 
A dispute of rights concerns the violation of or interpretation of an existing right or 
obligation embodied in law, a collective agreement or an individual contract of 
employment. At its core is the allegation that individual workers, or groups of workers, 
have not been afforded their proper entitlement.177 The basic principle underlying 
174 Trollip Alternative Dispute Resolution 10. 
175 ILO Settlement of Collective Labour Disputes 113. 
176 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution – ILO (1999) 3. 
177 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution Through Conciliation and Arbitration 3. 
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procedures for the settlement of disputes over rights is that they should be resolved 
by arbitration. However, in some countries it is a function of either a court of law or a 
labour tribunal. Such disputes cannot be settled by industrial actions because they 
entail the determination of existing rights, duties or obligations, which both parties are 
bound to respect.178 
 
Disputes of interest differ from rights disputes. They arise from differences over the 
determination of future rights and obligations and are usually a result of the failure of 
collective bargaining. The dispute does not have its origin in an existing right, but in 
the interest of one of the parties to create such a right through its embodiment in a 
collective agreement and the opposition of the other party to doing so. 179  The 
principle here is that parties must resolve the dispute themselves through 
negotiations. During this process the parties may threaten or, if necessary, take 
industrial action. Third parties are only involved in the event of a breakdown in 
negotiations. The third party’s role would be only to assist parties to find a mutually 
acceptable solution to their differences. Essentially, this is the first method of labour 
dispute settlement, before recourse is taken in other processes.180 
 
Individual and collective disputes are simple to distinguish from one another. 
Individual disputes can easily develop into collective disputes. This is common, for 
example, where a point of principle is involved and is taken up by a trade union. The 
general distinction is that an individual dispute involves a single worker, or a number 
of workers as individuals. The dispute becomes collective if it involves a number of 
workers collectively.181 
 
The ILO states that collective disputes often have important legal and strategic 
consequences when determining the methods for resolving them. For example, in 
rights disputes where a valid collective agreement is in force, the agreement may 
178 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution Through Conciliation and Arbitration 4. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 18. 
181 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 3. 
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include provisions setting out the mechanisms that the parties should follow in the 
event of a dispute arising.182 
 
2.12.2 REPORTING OF DISPUTES AND INITIATING PROCEDURES 
 
Many countries’ labour legislation requires or makes provisions for the reporting of 
labour disputes to the competent authorities or structures created for that purpose. 
This report becomes the catalyst for the commencement of labour dispute settlement 
procedures. The process is coupled with the requirement to report labour disputes 
within a certain period of occurrence and to provide sufficient details of the dispute.183 
 
The reporting of the labour dispute by one party should be sufficient to necessitate 
the conciliation or mediation process. However, in some cases both parties are 
required to agree to the submission of the dispute for the procedure to be set in 
motion. This is more often applicable in interest disputes where the reason for 
requiring one party to refer the dispute is to avoid an industrial dispute. The rationale 
for requiring both parties to consent to submission of the dispute to conciliation or 
mediation is that the procedure is hardly likely to succeed unless both parties are 
amenable to it.184 
 
2.13 CONSENSUS-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 
2.13.1 CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION  
 
Conciliation and mediation are labour dispute resolution processes that involve the 
use of a neutral third party, who is called upon to assist the disputants to reach a 
settlement by guiding them through a structured process, much like negotiations or 
collective bargaining. This process comes into play where negotiations have failed or 
reached an impasse. The process is conducted with due consideration to 
confidentiality and on a without prejudice basis.185 
 
182 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution Through Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 3. 
183 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution Through Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 5. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 19. 
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Conciliation and mediation is differentiated from each other based on the role of the 
conciliator in each process. The conciliator does not suggest solutions but tries to 
help the parties settle their differences on their own terms. The mediator, on the other 
hand, makes formal recommendations as the basis for settlement, provided both 
parties are willing, but unable, to reach their own settlement. However, this distinction 
differs from country to country. In some countries, mediators do not make 
recommendations, but play an active facilitative role. 186  In some instances, the 
distinction is provided for in legislation, although not often. In Namibia, for example, 
section 1 of the Labour Act, 2007 defines conciliation to include mediating a dispute. 
Despite this inclusion, the Act explicitly differentiates between the two processes.  
 
Simpson187 illustrates that the difference between a conciliator and a mediator is an 
academic debate. He points out that a good conciliator or mediator makes various 
suggestions or proposals to solve a problem and is able to break a deadlock. In fact, 
a good conciliator or mediator does not impose a solution, but leaves it upon the 
parties to reach an agreement. 
 
2.13.2 VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION 
 
Conciliation and mediation may be voluntary or compulsory. It is voluntary in the 
sense that parties are free to have recourse to it or not. Further, it is voluntary where 
undertaken by a mutually chosen private third party outside the machineries 
established by government or by law.188 Simpson189 states that the goal of voluntary 
conciliation is to attempt to conciliate the dispute where the parties are not convinced 
that it is the appropriate way to resolve their dispute.  
 
In respect to compulsory conciliation and mediation, the parties to a labour dispute 
are required to have recourse to these processes. Of course, this does not 
presuppose that the conciliation process must result in an agreement. It simply 
suggests that some steps of the process are compulsory, such as the obligation to 
186 Brand, Lotter, Steadman and Ngcukaitobi Labour Dispute Resolution (2011)115. 
187 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 22. 
188 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 20. 
189 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 24. 
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attend a conciliation meeting when invited.190 Compulsory conciliation and mediation 
are means to compel hostile parties to a labour dispute to come to the negotiating 
table. It is preferred in a situation where labour relations systems are not well 
developed or in cases where parties have reached a deadlock in their 
negotiations.191 Compulsory conciliation and mediation are beneficial to the parties 
as this educates them about the advantages of a co-operative, rather than 
confrontational, approach to labour dispute resolution.  
 
The ILO outlines the following requirements to engage in conciliation and/or 
mediation:192 
 
• an obligation to notify the competent authority of a labour dispute; 
 
• a requirement to report labour disputes to the authorities, who may then be 
empowered to initiate conciliation and mediation proceedings, and to require 
the attendance of the parties to such proceedings; 
 
• a restriction on the choice of the third party called upon to conduct the 
conciliation and mediation; 
 
• a requirement to participate in conciliation and mediation; 
 
• the prohibition of strikes and lockouts before conciliation and mediation 
procedures have been exhausted and completed; 
 
• an obligation to adhere to an agreement concluded during conciliation and 
mediation; and  
 
• in cases of rights disputes, the requirement to have undergone conciliation 
before the dispute can be referred to a court or a labour tribunal.  
 
Brand193 submits that conciliation is helpful in the following circumstances:  
190 Ibid. 
191 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 20. 
192 Ibid. 
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 • when relationships are important; 
• when the parties want control of the outcome; 
• if there is not great disparity in power; 
• when speed is important; 
• when confidentiality is important; 
• when both parties need the opportunity to “let off steam”; 
• when neither side really wants to litigate; 
• when the parties are unable to talk to each other directly; 
• when the parties have neither skills nor the desire to talk to each other; and 
• when the parties cannot find a solution themselves. 
 
Simpson 194 furthermore enumerates the following advantages of conciliation and 
mediation: 
 
• the parties remain in control of the outcome of the process; 
• it is a flexible process; 
• it is a private process; 
• it is a peace-making process; 
• it avoids the uncertainties of a judicial or arbitral decision; 
• it leaves room for the innovative, imaginative resolution of a dispute; and 
• it can safeguard the ongoing relationship between the parties. 
 
In addition to the above attributes, the ILO notes that conciliation is useful as a 
means to address an underlying collective disagreement before it transforms into a 
fully-fledged labour dispute. 195 Essentially, conciliation is not concerned with law 
enforcement, but regarded as a process of assisted bargaining in which the third 
party conciliator or mediator attempts to bring the parties closer together, encourages 
193 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 115. 
194 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 28. 
195 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution Through Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 15. 
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them to reach a solution that will satisfy both parties and is consistent with legal 
requirements.196 
 
The ILO suggests that systems that compel participation in conciliation should have 
provisions that sanction failure to comply with the requirement to attend. Sanctions 
may include a party being held liable to a fine for failing to appear without good 
cause. Further, a party which does not attend a conciliation meeting may risk the 
dispute being declared unresolved, leaving the other party in a position to embark on 
industrial action. In some cases or countries, dispute settlement bodies have the 
power to award costs against a party which has failed to appear.197 
 
The ILO recommendation concerning conciliation198 promotes the following principles 
of conciliation: 
 
• that voluntary conciliation machineries be made available to assist in the 
prevention and settlement of labour disputes between employers and 
employees; 
 
• that where voluntary conciliation is constituted by the social partners, it 
should include equal representation of employers and employees; 
 
• that conciliation be free of charge and be expeditious; 
 
• that it should be possible for conciliation to be initiated by any of the parties 
to a labour dispute or by a conciliation authority; 
 
• that if a dispute has been submitted to conciliation with the consent of all the 
parties concerned, the parties should be encouraged to abstain from strikes 
and lockouts while conciliation is in progress; and 
 
196 Heron and Van Nord National Strategy on Labour Dispute Prevention and Settlement in 
Cambodia (2004)ILO 24. 
197 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 20. 
198 Recommendation No.92 of 1951. 
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• that agreements reached during conciliation should be reduced to writing and 
be legally binding.     
 
However, conciliation is not easy. There are several obstacles that may impede a 
successful conciliation process. These include:199 
 
- the conciliator may be seen as being biased; 
 
- the conciliator may not have prepared well enough for the case; 
 
- the conciliator may have a possible solution to the dispute in mind and as 
such may impose it on the parties; 
 
- one or both parties to the dispute may not really want to conciliate and may 
accept an agreement and refuse to comply with it later on; 
 
- the conciliator may have a heavy workload and therefore may force an 
agreement upon the parties; 
 
- one of the parties to the dispute is normally much stronger than the other and 
may therefore dominate the proceedings; and 
 
- one or both parties may be represented by lawyers who may concentrate on 
a legal argument rather than the real issues.200 
 
Given the above, the conciliation process has three major steps: preparing for the 
conciliation, conducting the conciliation and the outcome, which includes the follow-
up.201 In brief, these steps involve the following: 
 
In preparation for conciliation, the conciliator is required to: 
 
199 Bosch, Molahlehi and Everett The Conciliation and Arbitration Handbook: A Comprehensive 
Guide to Labour Dispute Resolution Procedures (2004)54. 
200 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 29. 
201 Bosch et al The Conciliation and Arbitration Handbook 55-58. 
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• make initial contact with the parties to the dispute; 
• collect and analyse the background information; 
• decide how to guide conciliation; and  
• design a conciliation plan. 
 
In conducting the conciliation, the conciliator should: 
 
• open the conciliation; 
• define the issues and agree on the agenda with the parties; 
• interact with the parties; 
• suggest options for the settlement; and 
• assist the parties in the final bargaining without imposing a solution. 
 
At the end of the conciliation, the conciliator has to: 
 
• draft the agreement; 
• make a conciliation report; and  
• follow up if no agreement between the parties is reached. 
 
2.14 FACILITATION  
 
Facilitation, another form of labour dispute resolution, is described as a process in 
which people who are involved in or about to enter into negotiations over complex 
issues use an independent third party to assist them. The third party designs the 
process for the parties and guides them through it. In some countries, either the 
employer or the employees may compel the other to submit to a facilitation process 
during consultation on retrenchment. It is voluntary in nature and paid for by the 
parties.202 
 
  
202 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 21. 
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2.15  RIGHT-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS IN EMPLOYMENT 
LABOUR DISPUTES  
2.15.1 ARBITRATION  
 
Arbitration is defined by the ILO as a process in which an independent third party 
hears the parties’ respective cases, determines the dispute for them and issues an 
award or decision. The award or decision is typically final and binding. However, 
while it may be subject to review, it is not subject to appeal.203 In the arbitration 
process, the independent third party hears evidence from both sides, thus his role is 
to arbitrate and not to advocate. This means that the arbitrator should not help either 
party to make or present its case, but should simply make an award on the basis of 
the evidence presented.204 
 
Arbitration is a quasi-judicial process in which a neutral third party renders a 
decision.205 It is considered a last resort in cases where disputants cannot otherwise 
resolve their differences. It typically follows after all attempts at conciliation and/or 
mediation between the parties have proved unsuccessful.206 
 
Like conciliation, the referral of a dispute to arbitration may be voluntary or 
compulsory. It is voluntary where it is set in motion by the agreement of the 
parties.207 Compulsory arbitration is considered as one of the most radical forms of 
intervention by authorities in collective bargaining, directly in terms of the law or as a 
result of an administrative decision. Compulsory arbitration is undertaken when 
parties do not reach an agreement at conciliation. 208  However, it is seen as 
conflicting with the voluntary nature of negotiations, as the outcome imposed does 
not derive from the will of both parties, but from a third party whom they may not have 
chosen jointly.209 
 
203 Ibid. 
204 Heron et al National Strategy on Labour Dispute Prevention and Settlement in Cambodia 28.  
205 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution Through Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 17. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 22. 
208 Gernigon, Odero and Guido ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining (2000) 44. 
209 Ibid. 
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In an arbitration process, the parties relinquish their power to the arbitrator to make 
the decision on their behalf. Arbitration, therefore, does not promote the continuation 
of the negotiation process, but the award that is given is intended to finally dispose of 
the dispute.210 
 
Some countries promote compulsory arbitration on the grounds that trade unions are 
not powerful enough to engage in successful collective bargaining. The purpose of 
this is to avert industrial actions, which may have an economic impact on the 
country.211 The ILO is of the view that interest arbitration may sometimes be used to 
determine the terms of a collective agreement between bargaining parties, contrary 
to having recourse to industrial action through strikes or lockouts.212 
 
Compulsory arbitration is commonly used in collective disputes regarding essential 
services, where the government assumes public policy interest in preventing 
industrial action. In these situations, the ILO states that interest arbitration is usually 
imposed upon the parties by legislation and the arbitrator or the arbitration panel 
attempts to replicate the outcome as though the parties had been able to resolve the 
dispute themselves. 213 This position is set out in the Voluntary Conciliation and 
Arbitration Recommendation,214 which stipulates that if a dispute has been submitted 
to arbitration for final settlement with the consent of all parties concerned, the parties 
should be encouraged to abstain from strikes and lockouts while the arbitration is in 
progress and should accept the arbitration award.   
 
Arbitration has numerous advantages, including:215 
 
• It is less time-consuming than the usual bargaining through conciliation and 
mediation. 
 
210 Maseko Comparison of the Labour Dispute Resolution System of South Africa and Swaziland 
(2007) 11. 
211 Olotu A Comparative Study of Dispute Settlement and Resolution in South Africa and Tanzania 
(2005)55. 
212 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution Through Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 17. 
213 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 36. 
214 No 92 of 1951. 
215 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 62. 
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• It ends the deadlock between the parties. 
 
• In some cases, the parties choose the arbitrator. This gives them a feeling of 
ownership of the dispute and a commitment to its outcome. 
 
• It requires the parties to prepare for the hearing, at which their arguments are 
subjected to independent scrutiny. This enables the parties to focus on key 
issues. 
 
• The hearing does not follow formal courtroom procedures, creating a less 
confrontational approach to the problem. 
 
There are obstacles that may impede successful arbitration. These include:  
 
• The arbitrator may be perceived as biased by the parties. The arbitrator may 
tend to advocate, instead of arbitrate, the dispute. 
 
• The hearing may be dominated by legal arguments by legal counsels at the 
expense of substantive issues. 
 
• The hearing may take longer than expected due to delay tactics employed by 
one or both parties. 
 
• The decision may not be acceptable to either party, thereby raising the 
possibility of further conflict and disputation. 
 
• The arbitrator’s award may be ambiguous and confusing.216 
 
Brand217 summarises the arbitration process to three major steps – preparing for 
arbitration, conducting arbitration and writing the award.  
 
In preparation for arbitration, the arbitrator is required to:  
 
216 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 36. 
217 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 145-146. 
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• Contact the parties to inform them about the arbitration process and the time 
and place of the hearing. The arbitrator should not discuss the case with any 
of the parties. 
 
• Summon witnesses and experts where necessary. 
 
During the hearing: 
 
• the arbitrator opens the proceedings; 
• gives each party the opportunity to present its case; 
• the arbitrator may ask questions (inquisitorial in nature) to seek clarification; 
• witnesses and experts may be invited to clarify certain issues; and  
• on-site visits may be required. 
 
At the end of the arbitration hearing the arbitrator is required to write an arbitration 
award embodying his or her decision. The decision must be free of ambiguities to 
prevent new problems from arising from the interpretation of the award.218 Most 
national labour legislations and practices stipulate that the award must simply set out 
the decision taken by the arbitrator or set out the decision as well as the reasons for 
that decision.219 
 
The arbitration award is binding on both parties. However, one party to the award 
may refuse to execute one or all of the provisions of the award, leaving the other 
party to approach the Labour Court to have the decision enforced. Various countries’ 
labour legislation includes provisions to appeal an arbitration award to a court on 
various legal grounds that may be provided in such legislation. However, this 
prolongs the final resolution of the dispute.220 
 
 
 
 
218 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 34. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 35. 
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2.16 THE HYBRID PROCESS 
 
The ILO proposes the use of mixed processes for both interest-based and rights-
based processes of conciliation and mediation.221 The organization defines “med-arb” 
or “con-arb” as a process in which the parties to a labour dispute go through a single 
third party who first mediates and conciliates. When mediation or conciliation efforts 
fail, the third party determines the dispute by final and binding arbitration. However, 
this process may pose challenges to the third party, who may not rely on 
confidentially obtained information from one party during mediation when acting as 
an arbitrator. Therefore, it is suggested that when using this method, mediators and 
conciliators should not meet the parties separately at the mediation stages.222 
 
2.16.1 CONCILIATION –THEN ARBITRATION 
 
“Conciliation – then arbitration” is a process whereby the parties to a labour dispute 
first go to a single third party for conciliation and, if settlement fails, immediately to 
another third party who determines the dispute by final and binding arbitration.223 The 
rationale for this approach is that one third party conducts the conciliation and 
another third party performs the arbitration function in order to maintain 
confidentiality. 
 
2.17 ADJUDICATION 
 
Adjudication is described as the settlement of a labour dispute through a formal court 
system. It is used to: 
 
• settle industrial rights disputes; 
• as a form of appeal against the decision made by an arbitrator; or 
• as a last resort, if all other means of labour dispute resolution have failed.224 
 
221 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 35. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 29. 
224 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 39. 
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The adjudication process involves parties presenting their arguments and evidence 
to an independent judge, who makes a determination or judgment that is enforceable 
by the authority of the adjudicator. 225  Maseko 226  submits that under judicial 
settlement, the parties to the labour dispute incur cost and experience delays 
normally associated with the judicial process, as litigation involves stringent 
procedures and is highly institutionalised. There are typically detailed rules and 
numerous compliance mechanisms to be adhered to. It is for this reason that many 
disputants prefer the ADR system of conciliation and arbitration to litigation.227 
 
2.18 LABOUR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT INSTITUTIONS  
 
The ILO urges member states to establish bodies and procedures for the prevention 
and settlement of labour disputes, which should be designed in such a manner as to 
promote collective bargaining. 228  In addition, the Voluntary Conciliation and 
Arbitration Recommendation No, 92 of 1951 encourages member states and their 
governments to design their own dispute settlement systems and to make voluntary 
conciliation machineries available. The recommendation provides that these systems 
must be free of charge and expeditious in order to assist in the prevention and 
settlement of industrial disputes.  
 
Pursuant to this recommendation, the Committee on Freedom of Association calls on 
governments to appoint bodies or establish bodies for the settlement of labour 
disputes between the parties to collective bargaining, and that these suggested 
bodies be independent and recourse to them be on a voluntary basis.229 Steadman 
suggests that statutory labour dispute services must function independently of the 
state, but that they should largely financed by the state through the departments or 
ministries of labour. The writer submits that this helps to deal with challenges of 
legitimacy and resources.230 These bodies are required to settle several types of 
225 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 31. 
226 Maseko Comparison of the Labour Dispute Resolution System in South Africa and Swaziland 
13. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Collective Bargaining Convention No 154 of 1981art 5 par 2(e). 
229 Gernigon et al ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining 44. 
230 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 52. 
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labour disputes and can further be assigned broader educational and advisory 
roles.231 
 
In countries where independent labour dispute settlement bodies have been 
established, the ILO notes that these institutions have centralised the functions of 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration. However, the parties must remain free to have 
recourse to conciliators and arbitrators of their own choice. In some countries, 
though, conciliation is done by officers of the ministries of labour, while arbitration 
and adjudication of labour disputes are assigned to industrial relations institutions, 
arbitration tribunals or the court system.232 
 
2.18.1 STATUS OF LABOUR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PERSONNEL 
 
While the ILO provides that conciliation and arbitration services can be provided by 
government officials or private persons, the impartiality of these personnel is 
essential. Conciliation and arbitration can be undertaken on a full-time or part-time 
basis; in some countries government officials are appointed as full-time, dedicated 
conciliators and arbitrators who have no other responsibilities. In some cases, other 
government officials, such as labour inspectors, undertake conciliation and arbitration 
work on a part-time basis.233 This is potentially problematic for labour inspectors who 
may be involved in dual, and sometimes incompatible, functions of labour inspection 
and labour relations.234 
 
Private persons may also work as conciliators and arbitrators, operating on a fee-for-
services basis. Their fees are paid either by the disputants or by labour dispute 
settlement institutions. Other private persons, such as university labour law 
professors or retired labour-relations officers, may be occasional conciliators and 
arbitrators providing services on an ad hoc basis.235 
 
231 Ibid. 
232 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 53. 
233 Heron et al National Strategy on Labour Dispute Prevention and Settlement in Cambodia 25. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Labour legislation guidelines available onhttp://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/dialogue/ 
ifpdial/llg/intro/index.htm accessed 06 March 2012.   
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The ILO suggests that it is not mandatory for a conciliator and arbitrator to hold 
formal qualifications in law, economics, psychology, finance or any particular 
academic field. However, it is important that conciliators and arbitrators be trained in 
the actual process of conciliation and arbitration. In addition, they must possess good 
knowledge of the legal and economic framework within which the dispute takes 
place; the industry situation; detailed background information of disputes; and 
personal qualities such as impartiality, integrity, sincerity and patience.236 
 
Besides ordinary conciliators and arbitrators, the ILO recommends the creation of 
senior positions to run and manage institutions established in order to settle labour 
disputes. These positions may include a president or vice-president in some 
countries, or directors, labour commissioners or senior commissioners in others. 
Their responsibilities may include the allocation of disputes among members of staff 
or consultants and monitoring the overall performance of conciliators and arbitrators 
in significant or difficult disputes.237 
 
In order to re-enforce the independence and authority of labour dispute settlement 
institutions, senior staff, such as the head of the institution, must possess the 
required qualifications, such as those of judges, to be eligible for appointment. In 
some countries, the heads or senior members of compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration bodies are commonly accorded a status similar to that of judges. This aids 
the institution in possessing moral authority.238 
 
2.19 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter demonstrated how the ILO was established to promote social justice, 
improving and supervising social conditions globally. The chapter further outlined the 
organisation’s fundamental role in creating international labour standards, which are 
either conventions that are binding on member states upon ratification or 
recommendations that serve as guidelines for implementing conventions. Member 
states that ratify these instruments are obliged, under article 22 of the ILO 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid.  
238 Ibid. 
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Constitution, to report regularly on measures they have taken to implement the 
conventions. Persistent non-compliance or violation is met with high-level exposure 
by the CEACR and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards and 
includes discussion of failure to comply during the ILC.  
 
The ILO has powers to recommend the imposition of international sanctions on 
member states that persistently refuse to comply with conventions they have ratified, 
as was the case in the Myanmar. However, there is an obligation on the ILO to 
provide technical assistance to member states to comply with their obligations 
through training and other means of support.  
 
Conventions that are applicable to the labour dispute resolution system have been 
analysed. They have been found to encourage member states to make mechanisms 
for the voluntary and compulsory resolution of labour disputes available. These 
mechanisms include conciliation and arbitration, and litigation as a last resort, in 
labour dispute resolution. Many countries have thus far ratified these conventions 
and introduced ADR systems in their labour legislation. The ADR system has proved 
to be effective and efficient in labour dispute resolution and provides easier access to 
justice than traditional litigious methods of labour dispute resolution.  
 
For these systems to be credible, the institutions created to resolve labour disputes 
must be independent, although largely state-funded. Its personnel must be persons 
of appropriate standing and with the moral authority to guarantee users' confidence.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The history of Namibian labour legislation can be traced back to 1879 when the 
country was under British rule. In 1885, the country become a German Protectorate1 
and thereafter, in 1919, was entrusted to the Union of South Africa as a C mandate 
after South African forces defeated the German forces.2 This mandate perpetuated 
despite international pressure for South Africa to relinquish its control over the 
territory.3 On 21 March 1990, after several years of sustained efforts and an armed 
struggle led by the South West Africa People's Organisation, 4  Namibia gained 
independence under the leadership of Sam Shafishuna Nujoma, who became the 
first democratically elected President of the Republic of Namibia.5 
 
During the apartheid era, the country had no comprehensive labour legislation in 
place. However, there was a series of fragmented labour laws fundamentally based 
on racial discrimination against black workers, who were largely excluded from the 
application of many of these laws.6 With mounting local and international pressure, 
the regime appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Labour Matters in South West 
Africa. The Commission recommended, amongst other things, that at independence 
Namibia should: 
 
• become a member of the ILO; 
 
• ratify and adopt relevant international labour standards; and  
 
• consolidate all the fragmented labour legislation into one single Namibian 
Labour Code.7 
 
1 Fenwick “Labour law reform in Namibia: Transplant or implant” in Lindsay Labour reform in 
developing and transitional States (2007) 319.  
2 Wiehahn Commission  – Namibia 3.  
3 Fenwick Labour law in Namibia 5. 
4 Hereinafter referred to as “SWAPO”. 
5 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 8.  
6 LaRRi Labour Rights in Namibia: Promoting Workers Rights and Labour Standards(2003) 4. 
7 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 104. 
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This was realised by the adoption of the first post-independence Namibian Labour 
Act of 1992, which was followed by another progressive Labour Act in 2007, 
effectively introducing the ADR system and attempted to position Namibia in line with 
international standards.  
 
Given the above, this chapter analyses the Namibian labour dispute resolution 
system from the colonial era to the enactment of the 1992 Act. The conciliation 
boards and the District Labour Courts created under the 1992 Act are discussed 
extensively as mechanisms intended for the resolution of labour disputes. Thereafter, 
the chapter details the labour law reform that led to the current Labour Act, 2007, 
which introduced conciliation and arbitration processes under the office of the Labour 
Commissioner, and the role of the Labour Court in labour dispute resolution. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of other labour related legislation in relation to their 
effects on labour dispute resolution.   
 
3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND IN THE CONTEXT OF LABOUR 
RELATIONS 
 
To understand the present Namibian labour dispute resolution system, it is important 
to first understand the country’s labour law history.8 It is submitted that labour matters 
can only be properly analysed and understood by referring to all factors that influence 
the labour relations systems in a given country. 9  The Wiehahn Commission of 
Namibia points to factors such as political, economic, legal and social dynamics.10 
However, for the purpose of this study, only political, economic and legal factors that 
played major roles in Namibian labour law reform are discussed.11 
 
Namibian was colonised by Britain in 1879, when the country annexed the Port of 
Walvis Bay, attaching it to its Cape Colony. This was followed by the declaration of 
the Territory as a German Protectorate12 in 1885.13 Germany ruled the territory for 30 
8 LaRRi Labour Rights In Namibia (2003)4. 
9 The Wiehahn Commission - Namibia 3. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The Wiehahn Commission – Namibia 1-3. 
12 This was after Germany defeated Britain. 
13 Fenwick “Labour Law Reform in Namibia” 319. 
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years, until 1915, when the country was defeated by South African and British 
forces.14 After the end of the First World War, the country’s political status was 
decided by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, 15 which allowed the Allied Powers to 
expropriate all former German colonies.16 Namibia thus acquired its colonial name, 
South West Africa, at the establishment of South Africa’s trusteeship over the 
territory.17 South West Africa was entrusted to the Union of South Africa as a C 
mandate on 17 December 1920,18 in terms of the Peace Treaty of Versailles and 
article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 22 of the mandate states 
as follows:  
 
“The mandatory shall have full powers of administration and legislation over the 
territory subject to the present mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South 
Africa and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory subject to 
such local modification as circumstances may require. The Mandatory shall promote to 
the utmost the material and moral wellbeing and the social progress of the inhabitants 
of the territory subject to the present Mandate.” 
 
This mandate remained in force until 21 March 199019 when the Black Nationalist 
Government came to power and declared the Republic of Namibia a sovereign 
state.20 
 
Meanwhile, various political forces continued to influence the colonial occupancy in 
Namibia. After the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946,21 it was succeeded by 
the United Nations Organization, formed in October 1945.22 With the United Nations 
coming into existence after the Second World War, all the mandatory holding powers 
under the League of Nations were expected to transfer their mandate to the 
Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.23 However, South Africa refused to place 
South West Africa under the United Nations Trusteeship system. It disputed the 
14 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 1971-1996 (1998) 19. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Wiehahn Commission – Namibia 2. 
18 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 19. 
19 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia (2005) 5. 
20 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 8. 
21 Wiehahn Commission – Namibia 3 par 4.8. 
22 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 20. 
23 Ibid. 
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United Nations’ jurisdiction over the former League of Nations’ mandate territories.24 
With this refusal to transfer its mandate over the territory, South Africa continued to 
subject the territory and its people to apartheid.25 
 
Having refused to transfer its powers, the colonial government favoured the direct 
incorporation of South West Africa into South Africa. The referendum of 1946 
showed that the white electorate26 supported this incorporation, amid reports that 
native commissioners were also in support.27 The apartheid situation was further 
aggravated when the National Party came to power in South Africa on 31 August 
1950. The National Party government employed a new strategy that transformed 
South West Africa into a de facto but not de jure fifth province of South Africa.28 
Having made the territory the fifth province, the territory’s white population was given 
the right to representation in the South African Parliament. This recognition placed 
the territory on par with the South African provinces for legislative purposes. 
However, although judicial structures were established in Namibia, there was little 
scope for input from the indigenous population.29 
 
In 1949, in an effort to sustain colonial oppression over the territory, the government 
extended South African citizenship to all persons born in South West Africa. 
Subsequently, in 1955, Native Affairs were transferred from the territorial 
administrator to the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development.30 
 
There were waves of pressure from the international community for South Africa to 
relinquish its control over Namibia. The South African government defied the 
advisory opinion of the ICJ31 to formally revoke its mandate over the territory and 
24 Naldi Constitutional Rights in Namibia: A Comparative Analysis with International Human Rights 
(1995)3. 
25 Fenwick Labour Law Reform in Namibia 319. 
26 White electorate of Namibia and South Africa. 
27 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 21. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Erasmus “The Namibian Constitution and the Application of International Law” (1990) 15 The 
South African Yearbook of International Law 81-110. 
30 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 21. 
31 International Court of Justice. 
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ignored the resolution32 of the United Nations Security Council to transfer South West 
Africa.33 There was continued resistance from all angles, including the liberation 
struggle waged by SWAPO, which was established in 1960 from the Ovambo 
People’s Organisation.34 The OPO was formed in 1957, initially to fight the draconian 
working conditions imposed on Namibian workers by the colonial government.35 
 
Consequently, that Namibia was South Africa’s fifth province meant that whatever 
laws were enacted in South Africa were applicable in the territory, with modification 
as prescribed in the mandate.    
 
A possible reason why South Africa was loathe to lose Namibia to the United Nations 
was the strength of Namibia’s economy. While Namibia had been predominately 
dependant on primary sectors, such as mining, fishing and commercial agriculture,36 
the country also had abundant natural resources that made it one of the richest 
countries in Africa.37 In 1977, the ILO described the country’s economy as having 
“substantial natural resources both mineral and agricultural; rapid growth; uneven 
distribution as between different sectors of the economy; a dualistic policy of 
development; [and] heavy reliance on the export of primary commodities”.38 
 
Given the country’s rich economy, the colonial regime enacted various types of 
labour legislation to facilitate the economic exploitation of the territory by its colonial 
masters.39 Like many other Southern African countries, Namibia was regarded by the 
colonial powers mainly as a source of primary commodities for exports in which black 
workers provided cheap labour to the primary sectors of the economy. 40 South 
African companies largely controlled the territory’s economy, while Namibians 
32 The Security Council Resolution to transfer South West Africa under the United Nations.   
33 Johnstone “The Namibian Dispute: The Transitional Government of National Unity and the 
Problems of Enforcing Resolution” 435 (1985) Melbourne University Law Review 342. 
34 Hereinafter referred to as “OPO”. 
35 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 22. 
36 Ibid, see also Bank of Namibia Annual Report (2011)206-209.  
37 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia (1977) 21. 
38 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 22. 
39 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 9. 
40 Fenwick, Kalula and Landau “Labour Law: A Southern African Perspective” in Tekle Labour Law 
and Worker Protection in Developing Countries (2010)177. 
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consumed little of their produce.41 The country’s economy was segmented into two 
divisions, namely the productive areas of the country, which were designated as the 
Police Zone for white commercial farms and mines, and Ovamboland and other 
northern areas as reserves for supplying migrant labour.42 The Bank of Namibia 
records that Namibia had, and continues to have, a relatively high per capita income, 
but has the worst income inequality in the world.43 
 
3.3 SIGNIFICANT DISCRIMINATORY LABOUR LAWS 
 
Prior to independence, Namibia had no comprehensive labour statute in place.44 
However, by virtue of being the fifth province of the Union of South Africa, most laws 
passed in South Africa were either immediately duplicated in Namibia45 or at least 
resembled those of South African origin. 46  The labour laws that prevailed, 
particularly, were intended exclusively for the administration and control of black 
employees and their dependants.47 
 
3.3.1 MASTER AND SERVANTS PROCLAMATION 24 OF 1920 
 
Historically, the Master and Servants Proclamation of 1920 was the first significant 
labour legislation to be promulgated in colonial Namibia48 during the German era. 
The proclamation was derived from the Cape Colony, where slavery was abolished 
by the enactment of a similar statute in 1841.49 It was the Master and Servants 
Proclamation that amended and consolidated the earlier versions of the 1907, 1916 
and 1918 Proclamations.50 The Proclamation was considered to be the first piece of 
industrial legislation regulating conditions of employment in Namibia51 and remained 
41 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 23. See also Fenwick Labour Law Reform in Namibia 
329. 
42 LaRRi  Labour Rights Report in Namibia 4. 
43 Bank of Namibia Report (2002) 7. 
44 LaRRi  Labour Rights Report in Namibia 4. 
45 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 5. 
46 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 71. 
47 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 132. 
48 Proclamation 1907. 
49 Wiehahn Commission-Namibia 28. 
50 Fenwick Labour Law Reform in Namibia 320. 
51 Wiehahn Commission-Namibia 28. 
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in force until 1975.52 It was developed to regulate the relative rights and duties of 
masters, servants and apprentices in the Protectorate.53 It defined a servant as any 
person employed for remuneration to perform physical labour or various types of 
handcraft, as well as any black worker in any capacity in the employ of the state. 
“Master”, on the other hand, was defined as anybody employing any person falling 
within the definition of servant or apprentice.  
 
Although the Master and Servants Proclamation was one of the few statutes that 
applied to the type of work that was made available to the black African workforce, it 
had its own shortcomings. The proclamation made it a criminal offence, punishable 
by fines or imprisonment or both, for workers in the agricultural or domestic service or 
those engaged in manual tasks to fail to comply with any condition of their 
employment.54 The statute failed to provide forums for dispute resolution in respect of 
allegations relating to either under-performance or deviation from contractual 
obligations. Instead, the available courts were the avenues for the resolution for all 
labour related contraventions, sanctioning non-compliance of contractual obligations 
with criminal penalties.  
 
3.3.2 VAGRANCY PROCLAMATION, 1920 (PROCLAMATION 25 OF 1920) 
 
The Vagrancy Proclamation55 was enacted to supplement the Master and Servants 
Proclamation and to secure indigenous workers for settlers’ enterprises by legalising 
and facilitating forced-labour mechanisms in the Police Zones. This proclamation’s 
overall purpose was to curb and suppress trespass, idleness and vagrancy. 56  
Essentially, the Proclamation restricted indigenous black people to homelands and 
excluded them from the Police Zone unless they could establish that they had 
employment or other means of support while in these demarcated areas.57 
 
52 Wiehahn Commission–Namibia 29.  
53 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 135. 
54 Fenwick Labour Law Reform in Namibia 320. 
55 Proclamation 25 of 1920. 
56 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 135. 
57 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 6. 
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Trespassing on designated land constituted a criminal offence and any person so 
convicted was liable to imprisonment with or without hard labour, with spare diet or 
with solitary confinement.58 The available court had optional powers to sentence 
convicted persons to terms of service in public works or to employment in any 
municipality or private enterprise to substitute regular penalty.59 
 
This practice was rebuked by the United Nations-ILO Ad Hoc Committee on Forced 
Labour, convened in 1953. The Committee found that the state, through the 
operation of this Proclamation, was pressurising the native population to engage in 
conditions of indirect compulsion similar to that of forced labour for economic 
purpose.60 The Committee further considered the question of sanctions imposed 
upon Africans for breaches of contracts of employment and arrived at the following:61 
 
“There can, however, be no doubt …that the fact that it is impossible for the worker to 
terminate his contract unilaterally before the expiration of its term, without running the 
risk of heavy penalties, constitutes a serious restriction of his personal liberty.”62 
 
Consequently, the Committee held that given the total number of Africans working 
under such contracts of employment being very large, this legislation, if abused or 
vigorously implemented, could lead to a system of forced labour for economic 
purpose.63 
 
Although the Vagrancy Proclamation was not explicitly limited to indigenous 
inhabitants of the territory, Van Rooyen (1996)64 points out that it was obvious from 
its provisions or objectives that it was intended to coerce black workers to place their 
labour at the disposal of white employers or public enterprises.  
 
58 Ss 1-4 of the Proclamation 25 of 1920. 
59 S 14 of the Proclamation 25 of 1920. 
60 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 83. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Report of the United Nation-ILO ad hoc Committee on forced labour (1953) 77 par 320.   
63 Ibid. 
64 Van Rooyen. Portfolio of Partnership 135. 
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Meanwhile, other legislation was promulgated that provided slightly better working 
conditions, namely the Shop Hours and Shop Assistant Ordinance.65 However, this 
ordinance explicitly limited its application to European persons employed by other 
persons in or about a shop.  
 
Other statutes, such as the Factory, Machinery and Building Works Ordinance66 and 
the Mines and Minerals Ordinance,67 regulated the conditions of employment of a 
very small number of employees.68 The rest of the workforce, such as those in 
hotels, offices, transport, agriculture and domestic services, remained covered by the 
Master and Servants Proclamation of 1920.69 
 
3.3.3 NATIVE PROCLAMATION, 1952 (PROCLAMATION 56 OF 1951) AND 
REGULATIONS MADE THEREUNDER 
 
The Native Proclamation Act 1952 is considered to be the first major piece of 
legislation passed by the colonial National Party government when it assumed power 
in Namibia.70 The Proclamation typified the extensive segregation approach of the 
new rulers and had a significant impact on the employment circumstances of black 
workers. The preamble of the statute declares that it envisaged better control of 
contracts of employment of natives in certain areas and better regulation of the 
ingress into and residence of natives in such areas.71 
 
The Proclamation applied to all areas of Namibia, except the homelands. 72 The 
statute empowered Native Commissioners, by warrant addressed to the South 
African Police, to order the repatriation of an African worker with his family from 
urban areas to his homeland unless the African could prove that he was entitled to 
65 Ordinance 15 of 1939. 
66 Ordinance 34 of 1952. 
67 Ordinance 26 of 1954. 
68 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 6. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 153. 
71 Ibid. 
72 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 58. 
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remain in the proclaimed area.73 Section 10 of the Proclamation provided reasons for 
which an African would be repatriated. These include that: 
 
• an African cannot be offered suitable employment; 
 
• an African is refused employment by the employment officer; 
 
• an African’s contract of service has been cancelled by the employment 
officer; 
 
• an African is deemed to be in the area concerned unlawfully; 
 
• an African has unlawfully broken an employment agreement; 
 
• on three consecutive occasions an African has refused or failed without 
lawful cause to take up suitable employment which has been offered to him. 
 
The associated removal costs were ordered to be recovered from the money owed to 
the worker concerned. 74  The statute was supplemented with regulations that 
established complaints procedures.75 In terms thereof, a worker who was dissatisfied 
with his employment could lay a complaint with an employment officer, who in turn 
would refer the matter to the Native Commissioner for investigation. Where the 
complaint was found to be legitimate, the Native Commissioner would ordinarily 
cancel the employment agreement and allow the African to apply to the bureau for 
other employment.76 
 
Employers too had recourse to the Native Commissioner to lodge complaints against 
African employees on various grounds including 77  misconduct, unsatisfactory 
service, refusal or failure to obey a lawful order, and conduct prejudicial to the 
interest of the employer. The Native Commissioner had a reciprocal duty to 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 58-59. 
76 Regulation 3(5) and 4(4), 5 and 6. 
77 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 58-59. 
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investigate the complaint of the employer and, if well founded, he had the power to 
declare the employment agreement void and issue a removal order against the 
African worker in terms of the regulation.78 
 
Breach of the regulations or principal statute was a criminal offence punishable by 
payment of a R100 fine or by imprisonment for six months. First (1988)79 argues that 
such fines were not in proportion to African income. Thus many innocent men found 
themselves behind bars or forced to join the convict gangs on public works.80 
 
3.3.4 WAGES AND INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ORDINANCE, 1952 
(ORDINANCE 35 OF 1952) 
 
This was the first statute that constituted the major source of collective labour 
relations law in Namibia and remained so until 31 October 1992. 81 The statute 
contemplated the following labour relations processes:82 
 
• registration of trade unions and employers’ organisations;83 
 
• establishment, function, composition and proceedings of conciliation 
boards;84 
 
• mediation;85 
 
• voluntary arbitration and compulsory arbitration (in essential services);86 
 
• putting into operation the effect of conciliation boards’ agreements and 
arbitration awards.87 
78 Regulation 3(5). 
79 First “The Dignity of Labour” in Wood (ed) Namibia 1884-1984 Readings on Namibia’s History 
and Society(1988) 329. 
80 Ibid. 
81 The Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance 1952, was repealed by the Labour Act, 1992 
(Act No1992) which came into operation on 1 November 1992. 
82 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 154. 
83 Ss 21 and 22 of the Ordinance. 
84 Ss 33-77 of the Ordinance. 
85 S 42 of the Ordinance. 
86 Ss 43-45 of the Ordinance. 
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 Fenwick 88  notes that although the statute was significant in Namibia’s labour 
relations, it was mainly about labour relations amongst white workers. Thus, from the 
outset, it was internationally declared discriminatory legislation against Africans89 as 
it excluded from its application farm workers and domestic servants, who were mainly 
black.90 
 
Chapter Two of the Ordinance provided for the settlement of industrial disputes. 
However, the procedure did not distinguish between disputes of interest and disputes 
of rights, nor did it make provision for referring labour disputes to a labour tribunal.91 
Although the statute made provision for arbitration, disputes relating to the 
interpretation and application of the Ordinance were submitted to the Supreme Court 
for determination.92 Also, although the Ordinance provided for the registration of 
trade unions and employers’ organizations,93 African workers were not allowed to 
register a trade union in terms of the Ordinance.94 
 
Inasmuch as African workers were free under the law to form trade unions, they 
operated as unregistered bodies and hence were excluded from making use of the 
dispute settlement machineries and statutory rights and protection provided for in the 
Ordinance.95 This situation meant that unregistered (black workers’) trade unions 
could not enter into legally binding collective agreements on behalf of their members 
and were thus not allowed to participate in lawful industrial actions.96 This situation 
lasted until 1978 when the Ordinance was amended and black workers were allowed 
to register trade unions and enjoy the full protection of the Ordinance.97 
87 Ss 46-47 of the Ordinance. 
88 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 7.See also s2(2) which excluded persons employed by the 
South African Government or the territorial government, volunteer workers for charitable 
organizations and certain employees at educational institutions.    
89 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 71. 
90 S 2(2) of the Ordinance. 
91 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 155. 
92 Ibid. 
93 S 20(1) of the Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance 35 of 1952. 
94 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 7. 
95 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 155. 
96 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 7. 
97 Ibid. 
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 Registered trade unions had access to statutory conciliation procedures provided for 
in the Ordinance. The statute permitted any party to an industrial dispute to apply to 
the administrator for the establishment of a conciliation board. On approval and the 
establishment of the conciliation board, the other party was obliged to participate in 
the negotiations, which were chaired by a person from either side agreed upon by the 
parties.98 The parties were obliged to reach an agreement, failing which recourse 
could be had to mediation, arbitration, lockout or strikes.99 On reaching agreement 
over the dispute, a representative party in the industry concerned could request that 
the terms of the collective agreement be extended to all other employers and 
employees in the industry.100 
 
Van Rooyen101 claims that it took almost a year for the first application to be received 
after the Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance came into effect on 1 August 
1953. In most cases, authorities declined to grant approval and instead dispatched 
an official to settle the dispute by informal mediation. 102  Although the colonial 
authorities were hesitant to approve the establishment of conciliation boards, where 
they were approved the handling of the dispute was usually rapid and highly 
successful (11 out of 14 instances). These situations were attributed to the fact that 
all registered trade unions were for the limited white minority groups and therefore 
the conciliation machinery was generally only accessible to white employees.103 
 
3.3.5 CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ACT, 1986 (ACT 12 OF 1986) 
 
The Namibian Basic Conditions of Employment Act104 was modelled on the South 
African Basic Conditions of Employment Act. 105  The Act introduced significant 
98 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 169. 
99 Ss 42,43-45 and 58 of the Ordinance. 
100 S 46(2) of the Wages and Wages and Industrial Ordinance 35 of 1952. 
101 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 169. 
102 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 170.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Act 12 of 1986. 
105 Act 3 of 1983. 
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protective changes with respect to conditions of employment.106 Although the statute 
resembled that of South Africa, it departed significantly from its counterpart in a 
number of respects. These include, amongst other important provisions, the 
provisions of basic working conditions related to aspects such as annual leave, sick 
leave, public holidays and payment of remuneration, a minimum employment age 
and termination of employment.107 
 
The statute was significant in that it was the very first law regulating basic conditions 
applying to agricultural and domestic services.108 However, not all the conditions of 
employment applied to these sectors. The two sectors were still excluded with regard 
to a fixed maximum of working hours and overtime payment.109 Moreover, the Act did 
not cover employees in managerial positions, professionals, administrative and public 
servants from its application, making it discriminatory.110 
 
Given the limitation of the Master and Servants Proclamation of 1920 and the limited 
participation in the statutory industrial-conciliation system made available by the 
Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act was enacted as an urgent remedial measure to ameliorate the prevailing 
situation.111 In a similar vein, the Act amended or repealed most of the other former 
conditions of employment legislation limited and applicable to homelands, such as 
the Ovambo Labour Act, 112 Kavango Labour Act, 113  and Labour Enactment for 
Eastern Caprivi.114 
 
  
106 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 8. 
107 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 188. 
108 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 8. 
109 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 188-189.  
110 Ibid. 
111 Wiehahn Commission – Namibia 29. 
112 Enactment 6 of 1972. 
113 Act 2 of 1974. 
114 Enactment 3 of 1973. 
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3.4 WIEHAHN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO LABOUR MATTERS IN 
NAMIBIA 
 
A Commission of Inquiry into labour matters in Namibia was appointed115 on the 
recommendation of the Cabinet of the Administrator General of Namibia. The 
appointment was occasioned by developments on the labour front that the 
government of the day was confronted with.116 The apartheid government came to 
the realisation that the time had come for an in-depth inquiry into existing labour 
laws, policies and practices in Namibia.117 This was further necessitated by the fact 
that the existing structures and systems were no longer capable of handling and 
resolving new labour issues and disputes, which were rapidly becoming part of the 
Namibian system.118 
 
Van Rooyen119 outlines the terms of reference of the Commission in a broader 
context to include an inquiry, report and recommendations on all aspects of labour in 
Namibia, with special reference to existing legislation, and to adjust the existing 
system for the regulation of labour relations to meet the needs of changing times. 
 
These terms of reference were later re-defined and demarcated by the Commission 
itself before it adopted its modus operandus and included its operational methods. 
The Commission decided to limit the investigation to the basic principles or points of 
departure that would underlie the Commission’s investigation and upon which the 
report was to be based.120 The redefined terms of reference included: 
 
• That the existing system should be de-South Africanised to accommodate 
the country’s needs and culture. 
 
115 The Commission was appointed on 2 September 1987 by the Administrator General. The 
appointment of which was made known by Government Notice AG 1 of 1987, read with 
Proclamation AG 32 of 1987which was published in official Gazette Extra-ordinary No 5432 of 
15 September 1987. 
116 Wiehahn Commission–Namibia ii. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Wiehahn Commission–Namibia ii. 
119 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 216. 
120 Wiehahn Commission–Namibia ii. 
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• That the new system should in the greatest degree comply with and conform 
to international labour standards and practices. 
 
• That the new system should be flexible and allow for maximum future growth 
and development.       
 
Van Rooyen121 points out that the Wiehahn Report of Namibia constitutes one of the 
most exhaustive and in-depth research documents to have been published on 
Namibia’s labour relations. The report (extensively cited in this research) represents 
a comprehensive portrayal and analysis of labour relations’ status in the interim 
administration era. 122  The report foreshadowed numerous post-independence 
developments on the labour front; thus the report will benefit the country and its 
people for years to come.123 
 
The Commission’s work culminated over a period of two years,124 during which it was 
established that Namibia’s existing system of industrial relations was underdeveloped 
and unsophisticated. It was discovered that the system lagged behind that of South 
Africa on whose legislation most, if not all, of Namibia’s labour system was based. 
The Commission submitted that Namibia’s dire situation could be attributed to the 
uncertainty that surrounded the country’s political and constitutional positions since 
the Second World War.125 
 
Bauer126 summarises the Commission’s recommendations as follows: 
 
121 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 217. Take note that Dr J WF van Rooyen was himself a 
member of the Wiehahn Commission in his official capacity as the Director of Labour Services 
in the then Ministry of Manpower.   
122 This period extends from late 1977 when an Administrator General, Mr Justice M.T. Steyn, was 
appointed to govern Namibia and includes the tenure of Mr Louis A. Pienaar, the subsequent 
Administrator General for the territory of South West Africa up to 1990.   
123 Van Rooyen Portfolio of partnership 217. 
124 The Commission was appointed on 2 September 1987 and completed its report, which was 
published on 2 February 1989. See Wiehahn Commission – Namibia (ii) and (v).   
125 Bauer Labour and democracy in Namibia 103. 
126 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 104. 
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• That Namibia become a member of the ILO, ratify and adopt the relevant ILO 
conventions and recommendations and conform to international labour 
standards; 
 
• that in terms of the need for protective conditions of employment legislation, 
improvements to the existing 1986 legislation be made; 
 
• that a Wage Commission to set minimum wages in certain sectors be 
established; 
 
• that a further system of collective bargaining as the cornerstone of labour 
relations in Namibia be developed and the principle of Freedom of 
Association be adhered to for all categories of employees; 
 
• that workers have the right to strike and the notion of an unfair labour 
practice be adopted; 
 
• that an Industrial Council, a Labour Court and an Office of the Labour 
Commissioner be established; 
 
• that all labour-related legislations be consolidated into a single Namibian 
Labour Code; and 
 
• that the prohibition on trade unions’ affiliation to political parties be repealed.  
 
The second volume of the report dealt with employment, the development of human 
resources, social security and labour administration.127 
 
The Commission’s report emphasised the importance of the resolution of labour 
disputes.128 In this respect, the report points to the five internationally recognised 
dispute resolution mechanisms that have been developed over years, namely 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, conciliation and adjudication. 129  These 
127 See Part 2 of the Wiehahn Commission - Namibia 1-60. 
128 Wiehahn Commission Namibia 111. 
129 Ibid. 
99 
                                                             
mechanisms were discussed extensively in Chapter Two. For the purposes of this 
section the discussion is not repeated, but, instead, the study considers the 
Commission’s findings and recommendations in respect of the labour dispute 
resolution system.  
 
The Commission recommended the following:130 
 
• that the five labour dispute procedures of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, 
conciliation and adjudication be afforded full recognition in the new labour 
relations system in Namibia; 
 
• that negotiation as a labour dispute resolution procedure be vigorously 
promoted between employers and employees through training; 
 
• that mediation be retained as a distinct dispute resolution mechanism based 
on voluntarism and be utilised at all bargaining levels; 
 
• that arbitration be retained in legislation as one of the important procedures 
to settle labour disputes. Furthermore, that there should be a distinction 
between voluntary and compulsory arbitration; 
 
• that arbitration awards be binding upon parties, where failure to comply with 
an award no longer constitutes a criminal offence, but rather be determined 
or adjudicated by the proposed Labour Court; 
 
• notice of arbitration awards be published in the Official Gazette;  
 
• that parties to voluntary arbitration be required to bear their own expense, 
whereas expense incurred through compulsory arbitration be redeemed out 
of public funds; and 
 
• that the provisions in the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance 1952, 
relating to conciliation boards be retained on the following conditions: 
130 Ibid. 
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- notice of conciliation board agreements be published in the Official 
Gazette; 
 
- the competent minister be empowered to approve the establishment of 
a conciliation board on the advice of the proposed Labour 
Commissioner; 
 
- the criteria for the establishment of a conciliation board include 
principles such as: 
o the existence of a bona fide labour related dispute; and  
o greater flexibility regarding the competent authority’s discretion to 
establish conciliation boards. 
 
In respect of the Labour Court, the Commission made the following 
recommendations: 
 
• that a specialised judicial body for the adjudication and determination of 
labour-related matters be created by statute and be designated “Labour 
Court of Namibia”; 
 
• that the Labour Court be autonomous, but form part of the establishment of 
the Department of Labour for administrative purposes; 
 
• that the presiding officer of the Labour Court bear the title of President of the 
Labour Court of Namibia and be a person of sound knowledge and 
experience in the application and practice of labour law and labour relations; 
 
• that various judicial functions be assigned to the Court, of which the following 
were considered most important: 
o the adjudication of rights disputes and the determination of disputes of 
interests by means of voluntary and compulsory arbitration; 
 
101 
o the interpretation of the provisions of labour legislation, industry 
agreements, wage determinations, awards, exemptions, order and 
other such instruments; 
 
o the hearing and deciding of urgent applications; 
 
o the adjudication of alleged cases of unfair labour practices on the part 
of employers and employees and their organisations; and  
 
o the adjudication of other labour related disputes as may arise from the 
employer/employee relationship. 
• that the Labour Court should have no jurisdiction to decide criminal cases; 
 
• that the Labour Court be empowered to award compensatory damages, to 
issue orders or interdict, to order reinstatement or restoration of terms or 
conditions of employment, and to award costs in exceptional matters; 
 
• that there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court against a decision 
of the Labour Court, which can also order execution of its order in 
appropriate cases, pending appeal; 
 
• that the procedures of and processes before the Labour Court be kept as 
informal and uncomplicated as possible, with the rules of natural justice 
constituting the main guidelines; 
 
• that the Labour Court be a refuge of last resort and parties to disputes be 
required to negotiate other conciliatory machineries for the settlement of their 
differences before permitted recourse to the Labour Court; 
 
• that parties be permitted to be represented in the Labour Court by legal 
representatives, representatives of employers’ organisations and trade 
unions, persons who have knowledge of labour relations matters, or by 
parties themselves.   
 
102 
3.5 NAMIBIA, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND THE ROLE OF 
THE ILO  
 
The relationship between Namibia and international labour standards is associated 
with the precarious labour situation that existed since the Second World War. 131 
There were numerous uncertainties that clouded Namibia’s position. The conflict 
between the United Nations and South Africa had a direct influence on the labour 
situation in the country.132 Given Namibia’s trusteeship as mandated by the League 
of Nations, 133  the labour laws, policies and practices that applied to and were 
developed in Namibia were largely South African in letter, spirit and character.134 This 
situation was sanctioned by Article 22 of the mandate that provided that the Union of 
South Africa had full mandate or authority to administer, legislate or apply its own 
laws in the territory as if it were an integral part of the mandatory power.135 
 
Given the above situation, the question that arises is whether the different ILO 
conventions and recommendations, including the codes of labour standards that 
South Africa ratified while a member of the ILO up to 1964, could become applicable 
in Namibia. In attempting to answer the question, Van Rooyen 136 submits that in the 
context of the mandate that South Africa had over Namibia, it would be automatic 
that such conventions applied in the territory. This certainly seems to be the case as 
the authority of Article 35 of the ILO Constitution stipulates that a member state that 
ratifies conventions undertakes to apply them to its colonies, protectorates and 
possessions that are not fully self-governing, except where local conditions made 
them inapplicable. 
 
Moreover, under the same trusteeship mandate, South Africa had the obligation to 
promote the utmost material and moral well-being and social progress of the people 
of the territory. Therefore, the ratifications and any adoptions that South Africa 
effected on its own behalf were automatically effected in Namibia.137 The Wiehahn 
131 Wiehahn Commission - Namibia 20. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 78. 
134 Wiehahn Commission - Namibia 20. 
135 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 78. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Wiehahn Commission – Namibia 21. 
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Commission of Namibia accepted this view and arrived at a similar conclusive 
position that all eleven of the conventions of the ILO that South Africa had ratified 
from 1921 to 1963 were also ratified on behalf of Namibia and applicable up to 
1966.138 
 
The Wiehahn Report of Namibia details the full relationship that Namibia had with the 
ILO prior to independence. Based on that background, the Commission 
recommended the following:139 
 
• that after independence Namibia apply to become a member state of the ILO, 
as well as other relevant international (particularly African) labour bodies; 
 
• that an in-depth analysis be made of the ILO conventions and 
recommendations, with a view to ratifying and adopting those that are most 
appropriate to and accommodative of the economic, social and industrial 
climate of the country; and 
 
• that employers, employees and their respective organisations in both the 
public and private sectors be informed of and educated in international labour 
standards and be encouraged to implement them and comply with them as 
far as possible, within the parameters of national law, policies and practices.  
 
The ILO carried out a study that analysed Namibia’s labour law position140 and, 
consequent to the findings, the ILO recommended significant changes to the 
prevailing labour law system. These included:141 
 
• that considering the entrenchment of injustice through the policy of separate 
development, profound administrative, social and economic reorganisation 
take place for a fairer and more equitable enjoyment of territory resources; 
 
138 Ibid. 
139 Wiehahn Commission – Namibia 24. 
140 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 90. 
141 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 90-92. 
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• that for the above recommendation to be achieved, the policy of apartheid as 
practiced in Namibia be replaced by policies that embraced international 
labour standards objectives and machineries; 
 
• the study noted that Namibia was a territory for which the international 
community was charged with responsibility, thus observance of international 
labour-standards would contribute to the successful overcoming of past 
wrongs and the welfare of its people as members of a free and independent 
nation. 
 
In the latter years of South Africa’s occupancy of Namibia, the ILO accepted SWAPO 
representation for Namibia at its Annual Conference and deliberated on the Namibian 
situation during its deliberations on the status of workers under apartheid.142 It was 
during these international forums that the ILO repeatedly condemned the apartheid 
regime in Namibia, calling for a new industrial relations system based on a process of 
independent collective bargaining and for the embracement of the principle of 
tripartism in labour relations.143 
 
The ILO was further involved in the vocational training of exiled Namibians in 
preparation for independence. This involved the promotion of workers’ education and 
trade unions and the compilation of relevant documentary materials.144 Similarly, 
since independence, the ILO has provided technical assistance to the Namibian 
Government on a range of issues. These include work on labour market policy, 
analysis of labour-market statistics, and training conciliators and arbitrators for the 
labour dispute resolution system.145 
 
The ILO also played an instrumental role in the realisation of the following 
interventions: 
 
142 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 13. 
143 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 14. 
144 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 79. 
145 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 14. 
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• Improving labour standards in Southern Africa146 from 2004 to 2008. This 
project was launched in Namibia during October 2004 to achieve the 
following objectives:  
- to increase compliance with national labour laws and improve labour 
management relations achieved through a strategy of better knowledge 
among employers and workers of their rights, obligations and services 
under national labour laws; and 
 
- to promote more effective use of the labour administration and 
inspection system and increased use of the labour dispute prevention 
and resolution processes. 
 
Other assistance includes:147 
 
• the elimination of child labour TECL Phase 1 (2004 to 2008) and TECL 
Phase 2 (2009 to 2011); 
 
• the Youth Employment Network; 
 
• technical support for the Labour Advisory Council; 
 
• the San development programme (2009 to 2011); 
 
• the HIV/AIDS workplace policy for public service; and 
 
• labour market information systems. 
 
Other significant assistance rendered by the ILO included the drafting of the 1992, 
2004 and 2007 Labour Acts.148 
 
 
146 Hereinafter referred to as “ILSSA”. 
147 Government Republic of Namibia (GRN) Namibia Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) 
2010-2014 – ILO Country programme for Namibia (2010)32-24. 
148 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 14. 
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3.6 THE NAMIBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR PROVISIONS 
 
At independence in 1990, Namibian workers expected the SWAPO-led government 
to introduce or adopt a constitution and a Labour Act that replaced the oppressive 
colonial legislation and labour practices.149 Government responded by enacting the 
post-independence labour legislation espoused in the country’s new democratic 
constitution.150 The adoption of the democratic constitution brought about significant 
changes to the country’s labour system.151 
 
The Constitution contains provisions that seek to protect basic labour rights, as well 
as others that are significant to government policy in regulating labour rights.152 It 
guarantees fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of association to form and 
join trade unions.153 This proclaimed freedom includes the right to withhold labour 
without being exposed to criminal penalties. 154  However, these fundamental 
freedoms are not absolute, but subject to the law of Namibia. Government may 
impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights and freedoms as are 
required in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of Namibia.155 
 
In addition to the aforementioned fundamental freedoms, Chapter 11 of the 
Constitution provides for the principles of state policy. Fenwick 156  posits that 
although these principles are not legally enforceable by the courts, they guide 
government in its law-making methods and, as such, the courts have recourse to 
them in interpreting the applicable law. In terms of Article 95 of the Constitution, the 
state is obliged to promote the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, policies 
aimed at the following: 
 
149 LaRRi  Labour Rights Report in Namibia 5. 
150 The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia art 95. 
151 Daniels, Katjiuanja, Ndauedapo, Kerck and Murray “Dispute Resolution in Namibia: Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration” in Kerck, Murray and Sycholt (eds) Continuity and Change- Labour 
Relations in Independent Namibia (1997) 323.    
152 Fenwick “Labour Law Reform in Namibia” 327. 
153 Art 21(1)(e) of the Namibian Constitution.  
154 Art 21(1)(f) of the Namibian Constitution. 
155 Art 21(2) of the Namibian Constitution.   
156 Fenwick “Labour Law Reform in Namibia” 326. 
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“(a)  enactment of legislation to ensure equality of opportunity for women, to enable 
them to participate fully in all spheres of Namibian society; in particular, 
government shall ensure the implementation of the principle of non-discrimination 
in remuneration of men and women; further, the Government shall seek, through 
appropriate legislation, to provide maternity and related benefits for women;  
 
(b) enactment of legislation to ensure that the health and strength of the workers, 
men and women and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens 
are not forced by economic necessity to enter vocations unsuited to their age and 
strength; 
 
(c) active encouragement of the formation of independent trade unions to protect 
workers’ rights and interest and to promote sound labour relations and fair 
employment practices; 
 
(d) membership of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and, where possible, 
adherence to and action in accordance with International Conventions and 
Recommendations of the ILO.” 
 
These principles, together with the fundamental freedoms, serve as part of the set of 
responses introduced by the Government to address Namibia’s previous colonial and 
apartheid labour practices, which were discriminatory and repressive of black 
workers.157 
 
3.7 THE 1992 LABOUR ACT  
 
In terms of Article 95 of the Namibian Constitution, the Government of the Republic 
of Namibia enacted the 1992 Labour Act, which was described as the most important 
achievement in the history of the workplace in Namibia.158 The Act was passed by 
the National Assembly in mid-March 1992, signed into law by the President on 26 
March 1992 and thereafter promulgated as the Labour Act, 1992.159 However, it only 
came into operation on 1 November 1992. LaRRi160 points out that the delay in 
bringing the 1992 Act into force was occasioned by the government’s efforts to 
balance the interests of workers and employers. Unfortunately, this delay led to the 
interim perpetuation of the colonial labour legislation and practices and thereby set a 
regrettable tone for the nature of labour dispute resolution in the new state.  
 
157 Ibid. 
158 Government Republic of Namibia (GRN) Ministry of Labour Annual Report (1997) 57. 
159 Act No 6 of 1992.  
160 LaRRi Labour Rights Report in Namibia 5. 
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The extensive negotiations and consultations between major interest groups, labour 
lawyers in Namibia and experts from South Africa delayed the implementation of the 
1992 Act. A range of procedures and mechanisms had to be put in place to bring 
about the desired resolution of labour disputes.161 Although the enactment of this 
statute was prolonged, it was still considered to have broken new ground in its quest 
to provide basic labour rights to all Namibians regardless of race.162 According to Van 
Rooyen163 the 1992 Act represented a major step for all workers in Namibia and 
provided an important stage in the development of Namibian labour law.  
 
The Preamble of the 1992 Act declares, amongst other things, the following: the 
furtherance of labour relations conducive to economic growth, stability and 
productivity through the promotion of an orderly system of collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, the Preamble mirrored some of the Constitution’s principles of state 
policy. 164  These principles include, inter alia, the formation of trade unions and 
employers’ organisations and, where possible, the adherence to and implementation 
of ILO conventions and recommendations.165 
 
3.8 LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN TERMS OF THE 1992 LABOUR ACT 
 
The 1992 Act provided the mechanisms to resolve labour disputes in the workplace. 
These mechanisms include conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and adjudication 
in the District Labour Court.166 Similarly, the Act provided for the regulated use of 
strikes and lock-outs as invaluable methods of labour dispute resolution in interest 
disputes.167 
 
The establishment of these formal labour dispute resolution procedures formed an 
integral part of the process of collective bargaining, envisaging the inevitability of 
disagreement and the resultant disputes in workplaces. However, although a 
161 Daniels et al “Dispute Resolution in Namibia” 323.   
162 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 229. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 15. 
165 Preamble to the 1992 Act. 
166 Part IX of the 1992 Act. 
167 S 81 of the 1992 Act. 
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workplace disagreement does not constitute a labour dispute, a dispute manifests 
once negotiation on a disagreement (conflict) has broken down. Therefore, the 
declaration and the resolution of the dispute was seen as an integral part of collective 
bargaining.168 
 
Access to a labour dispute resolution system made available by the 1992 Act was 
often dependent on the nature of the dispute in question. 169 The Act defined a 
dispute as follows:170 
 
“for the purpose of Part IX, means any dispute in an industry in relation to any labour 
matter between: 
 
(a) on one hand: 
(i) one or more registered trade unions; 
(ii) one or more employers; 
(iii) one or more registered trade unions and one or more employers, and  
(b) on the other hand: 
(i) one or more registered employers; 
(ii) one or more employers; 
(iii) one or more registered employers’ organization and one or more employers 
and included any dispute relating to: 
(aa) the application or the interpretation of any provision of the Act or of 
any term and conditions of a contract of employment or a collective 
agreement, including the denial or infringement of any right conferred 
by or under any provision of the Act or any right conferred by any 
term and condition of a contract of employment or a collective 
agreement, or the recognition of a registered trade union as an 
exclusive bargaining agent or the refusal to so recognize any such 
trade union. 
(bb) the existence or the non-existence of a contract of employment or a 
collective agreement.” 
 
The Act classified labour disputes into two categories, namely disputes of interest 
and disputes of rights.171 A dispute of interest was defined to mean any dispute in 
relation to any labour matter other than a matter referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs (aa) and (bb) of the definition of dispute. Daniels et al 172 expand this 
definition to include demands for wage increase, a medical aid scheme and 
involvement in decision-making in the workplace. This infers that the subject matter 
168 Daniels et al “Dispute Resolution in Namibia” 324.  
169 Ibid. 
170 S 1 of the 1992 Act. 
171 S 1 of the 1992 Act. 
172 Daniels et al “Dispute Resolution in Namibia” 324.    
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of a dispute of interest is not regulated by any law, contract, wage determination, 
arbitration award or collective agreement. 
 
On the other hand, a dispute of right was defined to mean any dispute in relation to a 
matter referred to in paragraphs (aa) and (bb) of the definition of dispute. Such a 
dispute was usually not subject to negotiations, but rather to adjudication or 
arbitration.173 
 
Dispute resolution under the 1992 Act was contextualised within specific socio-
economic and political conditions.174 The reasons for this approach included the 
following: first, the maintenance of industrial peace and prevention of undue or 
excessive damage to the economy by industrial actions was crucial for the political 
success of the new democratic Government. Second, the Government directly 
shaped the climate of labour relations in the country through legislation. This was 
achieved by preventing industrial actions that arise from disputes of rights and by 
compelling the use of conciliation before industrial action was taken in disputes of 
interests. 175  Third, Government always has a direct and indirect interest in the 
outcome of negotiations. This is because wage negotiations raise a number of fiscal, 
inflationary and other concerns for Government. Thus, inadequate dispute resolution 
procedures can seriously undermine Government’s fiscal and income policies.176 
 
During the existence of the 1992 Act, the Namibian Government allowed the parties 
to labour disputes to embark on various options available to resolve their disputes. 
These included voluntary machineries and compulsory procedures and 
simultaneously provided criminal and civil sanctions for non-implementation of the 
settlements.177 The following prevailed: 
 
- The Office of the Labour Commissioner, 178  a ministerial appointee was 
central to the administration of the 1992 Act. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 S 79 of the 1992 Act. 
176 Daniels et al “Dispute Resolution in Namibia”. 
177 Ibid. 
178 S 3 of the 1992 Act. 
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 - The Labour Commissioner received notices of labour disputes 179  and 
determined or categorised the disputes as either of right or interest. 
 
- The notice had to contain full details of the parties, grounds of the alleged 
dispute and all steps taken by the parties to try to resolve the dispute.180 
 
- The Labour Commissioner was empowered to establish the conciliation 
board181 once he was satisfied that the disputants had taken all reasonable 
steps to resolve or settle the dispute in question.182 
 
- The conciliation board was chaired by a chairperson mutually agreed on by 
the disputants or appointed by the Labour Commissioner in the absence of 
such nomination.183 Moreover, the conciliation board was constituted of an 
equal number of people chosen by the disputing parties.184 
 
- The Labour Commissioner, in consultation with the disputants, determined 
the terms of reference of conciliation boards185 and thereafter all subsequent 
meetings were determined by the whole board.186 
 
- If the dispute was one of right, any party to the dispute could approach the 
District Labour Court or Labour Court. However, failure by the party to 
participate in conciliation without good cause disqualified such a party from 
referring the dispute to the Labour Court.187 Besides the Court, parties were 
at liberty to refer their dispute to arbitration at any given time by mutual 
agreement.188 
 
179 S 74 of the 1992 Act. 
180 S 74(2) of the 1992 Act. 
181 S 75 of the 1992 Act. 
182 S 75(3) of the 1992 Act. 
183 S 75(1)(a) of the 1992 Act. 
184 S 75(1)(b) of the 1992 Act.  
185 S 76 of the 1992 Act. 
186 S 76 of the 1992 Act. 
187 S 79 of the 1992 Act. 
188 S 79(4) of the 1992 Act which was conducted in term of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.   
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- Unresolved disputes of interests gave parties various options. They could 
refer the dispute to voluntary mediation or arbitration,189 embark on industrial 
action or let the status quo remain.190 However, if it was a dispute of right a 
party could not embark on industrial action. The matter had to be referred to 
the Labour Court. 
 
3.8.1 CONCILIATION BOARDS  
 
Conciliation boards primarily dealt with disputes of interest. The 1992 Act required 
that after a deadlock was reached between the disputing parties, the matter must be 
referred to the Labour Commissioner who had statutory powers to establish a 
conciliation board to attempt to settle the dispute.191 The Labour Commissioner had 
the flexibility to decide whether to establish a conciliation board or to refer the matter 
to the disputing parties to continue negotiations.192 There were no prescribed time 
limits within which the conciliation board should be concluded. It was left to the 
parties to make rules in relation to the holding of and procedure at conciliation board 
meetings.193 The proceedings of the conciliation board were confidential; therefore, 
the outcome could not be used as admissible evidence in any subsequent court 
proceeding instituted in terms of the Act, except with written consent of the person 
who made the communication in question.194 
 
Following the meetings of the conciliation board, where the parties resolved the 
dispute, the board was required to prepare a memorandum of agreement in which 
the terms and conditions agreed upon were set out. A copy of such an agreement 
could be submitted to the Labour Commissioner for registration as if it was a 
collective agreement.195 Settlement agreements originating from conciliation boards 
were treated in the same manner as collective agreements for the purpose of 
compliance and enforcement. The Act provided that collective agreements deposited 
189 S 79(c)(i) of the 1992 Act. 
190 S 79(c)(ii) of the 1992 Act. 
191 Ss 74, 75 and 76 of the 1992 Act. 
192 S 75(b) of the 1992 Act. 
193 S 77(1) and (2) of the 1992 Act. 
194 S 77(3) of the 1992 Act. 
195 S 78 of the 1992 Act. 
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with the Labour Commissioner for registration, which included settlement agreements 
between the parties, were binding upon the parties thereto.196 
 
In this respect, the Labour Court held in the Golin t/a Golin Engineering v Cloete197  
that where it was satisfied that the settlement agreement was voluntary, without 
duress or coercion, unequivocal and with full knowledge of its terms and implications, 
the Court would accept that a full and final settlement was reached, thus disposing of 
the dispute. Similarly, in Mbome and Another v Foodcon Fishing Product198 the court 
held that in the absence of any arguments before it that the agreement had been 
induced by fraud, duress or misrepresentation, the settlement agreement was 
conclusive, consequently constituting full and final settlement of the dispute.  
 
3.8.2 ARBITRATION IN TERMS OF THE 1992 ACT 
 
The 1992 Act made provision for voluntary resolution of labour disputes by 
arbitration. However, for this to happen it required the mutual agreement of the 
disputing parties. 199 The parties to the dispute, whether there was a dispute of 
interest or right, could at any time before or after the institution of the proceedings in 
the Labour Court refer the dispute to arbitration by mutual agreement. The process 
was voluntary and conducted in terms of the Arbitration Act. 200  The Labour 
Commissioner had powers to appoint an arbitrator, upon any application in writing by 
a party to a dispute, to arbitrate the dispute. His powers included the authority to 
determine the terms and conditions of arbitration.201 
 
The award emanating from the arbitration process was final and binding on all parties 
to the arbitration agreement.202 However, this was not conclusive of the dispute, as 
any of the parties dissatisfied with the arbitration award had recourse to the Labour 
Court to seek to set aside the award and substitute it with an order couched in 
196 See s 68 read with s 72 of the 1992 Act. 
197 NLLP (1) 1998 121 NLC – Case No 7/94.   
198 NLLP (2002) (2) 202 NLC – Case No 7/99. 
199 S 79(1)(b) of the 1992 Act. 
200 Act No 42 of 1965.  
201 S 79(4)(b) of the 1992 Act. 
202 S 79(4)(c ) of the 1992 Act. 
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different terms. This position was accepted in Erongo Mining and Exploration 
Company Ltd t/a Navachab Gold Mine v Mineworkers Union of Namibia and 
Another.203 
 
Daniels et al 204 submits that conciliation and arbitration in terms of the 1992 Act 
undoubtedly assisted the parties to resolve their disputes. This was evident in the 
character of parties who had always abided by the terms of the agreements that were 
reached and the few challenges of arbitration awards in court. A possible challenge 
to this might be that the utilisation of the arbitration process in Namibia was rare. 
 
3.8.3 RULE 6 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE BY LABOUR INSPECTORS 
 
Labour inspectors205 not only dealt with the general enforcement and administration 
of the 1992 Act, but played a vital role in the settlement of labour disputes. They 
investigated complaints and served as mediators or conciliators in the process of 
labour dispute resolution. 206  Labour inspectors were tasked to investigate and 
endeavour to resolve all labour complaints lodged with the Ministry of Labour. In 
addition, they were required in terms of the Rules of the District Labour Court to 
convene a conference before the trial started in the District Labour Court.207 The 
purpose of such a conference was to endeavour to narrow the issues in dispute or to 
agree on certain issues in dispute to resolve the matter. They had powers to assist 
an employee in presenting an application or appeal to the Labour Court or complaint 
to the District Labour Court.208 
 
  
203 NLLP (1) 12 NLC – Case No 2/93. 
204 Daniels et al “ Dispute Resolution in Namibia” 332.  
205 Labour Inspectors appointed in terms of s 3 of the 1992 Act. 
206 S 104 of the 1992 Act. 
207 Daniels et al “ Dispute Resolution in Namibia” 330.   
208 S 104(2)(J) of the 1992 Act. 
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3.8.4 DISTRICT LABOUR COURTS  
 
The 1992 Act established the District Labour Courts as courts of first instance in 
labour matters on a magisterial level209 in various magisterial districts of Namibia. 
The Court had broader jurisdiction and powers, which included amongst others:210 
 
“to hear all complaints lodged with such District Labour Court by an employee or 
employer (referred to as the complainant) against an employer or employee (referred to 
as respondent) for an alleged contravention of or alleged failure to comply with, any 
provision of the Act or any terms and conditions of a contract of employment or a 
collective agreement; 
 
to make any order against, or in respect of the respondent or the complainant as the 
case may be, which it is empowered to make under any such provision of the Act”. 
 
Appeals against the decisions of the District Labour Court were allowed on the 
question of law to the Labour Court, established at the same level as the High 
Court.211 The Labour Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any 
appeal from any District Labour Court. Moreover, the Court had to consider and give 
a decision on:  
 
- any application made to the Labour Court in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act; 
 
- any application to review and set aside or correct any decision taken by the 
Minister212 or the Permanent Secretary,213 the Commissioner, any inspector 
or any officer involved in the administration of the provisions of the Act; and 
 
- to review the proceedings of any District Labour Court brought under review. 
 
In Northern Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Tsuseb214 the Labour Court delineated  its powers and 
jurisdiction from that of the District Labour Court. The systems of litigation in the 
209 S 15 of the 1992 Act. 
210 S 19 of the 1992 Act. 
211 Ss 15 and 16 of the 1992 Act. 
212 Minister of Labour as defined in s 1 of the 1992 Act. 
213 Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Labour. 
214 NLLP 2002 (2) 253 NLC – Case LCA 9/99. 
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Labour Court were to a certain extent seen as user friendly.215 This view is supported 
by the fact that litigants were allowed to appear in person or be represented by a 
legal practitioner.216 Moreover, both the District Labour Courts and the Labour Court 
itself allowed assessors appointed by the Minister of Labour on the basis of their 
knowledge and experience in the field of labour law and in the interest of justice to 
participate in the proceedings.217 Costs in the District Labour Court and the Labour 
Court were minimal. In the District Labour Court, for instance, the only cost involved 
for lodging a complaint was N$25.00 in the form of a revenue stamp.218 Neither the 
District Labour Court nor the Labour Court was empowered by statute to make any 
cost order against any party in relation to any proceeding instituted in these courts, 
except for frivolous and vexatious conduct by a party. 219  This proposition was 
reaffirmed in Kaumbi v Tax Free Warehouse 220  where the court ordered costs 
against the complainant’s representative for failing to withdraw the case after having 
been advised that the appellant case had no merits, notwithstanding his failure to 
appear in court. Similarly, in Anguwo and Others v Northern Fishing Company221 the 
Court ordered costs for both proceedings in the Court a quo and in the superior court 
against the respondent for failure to appear without good cause.  
 
The 1992 Act treated contravention or failure to comply with an order of the Labour 
Court or District Labour Court as an offence and a person guilty of such an offence, 
on conviction, was liable to the penalties imposed by law for contempt of court.  
 
Despite the daunting task of both the District Labour Court and the Labour Court, the 
court system was confronted by major challenges relating to:222 
 
- the application of the rules and procedures in the District Labour Court; 
 
215 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 17. 
216 S 18(2) of the 1992 Act. 
217 Ss 15(2), (3) and 4 of the 1992 Act. 
218 Daniels et al “ Dispute Resolution in Namibia”332. 
219 S 20 of the 1992 Act. 
220 NLLP 2002 (2) 273 NLC – Case No 26/99. 
221 NLLP 1998 (1) 196 NLC – Case No 1/97. 
222 Daniels et al “ Dispute Resolution in Namibia” 332. 
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- the ineffectiveness and lack of competencies of the presiding officers; 
 
- inexperience and lack of understanding of the dynamics in labour disputes 
and principles, such as fairness in labour disputes, by presiding officers; 
 
- the process was seen as time-consuming in that insufficient facilities were 
allocated to the Court; 
 
- cases were not allocated sufficient court days, coupled with unnecessary 
delays due to postponements and non-appearance. 
 
- presiding officers were magistrates entrusted with other cases.  
 
3.9  CHALLENGES OF THE 1992 ACT 
 
A few years after the implementation of the 1992 Act it became the subject of debate 
by social partners in the country. The Namibian Employers’ Federation223 argued that 
the 1992 Act failed to address the problems of the labour market. The NEF submitted 
that the 1992 Act had stifling effects on the labour market in that it failed to create an 
environment for job creation and lacked international competitiveness.224 Premised 
on the above shortfalls, the NEF called for a labour legislative reform that places 
attention on job creation and economic growth. 
 
Likewise, organised labour, under the umbrella of the National Union of Namibian 
Workers (NUNW), 225  pointed out that the existing labour legislation provided 
ineffective labour dispute resolution systems and that the whole Act was ineffective, 
requiring an overhaul. The NUNW advanced the following reasons to back their 
position: 
 
• that the labour dispute resolution process took too long to resolve disputes; 
 
223 Hereinafter referred to as “NEF”. 
224 Musukubili A Comparative Namibian Labour Dispute Resolution 5. 
225 Hereinafter referred to as “NUNW”. 
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• that the system was costly and was not accessible to those who do not have 
the resources to bring their complaints to the Labour Court (workers were not 
an exception); 
 
• interdicts were granted by the Labour Court without affording the other party 
an opportunity to be heard and state its case; 
 
• that the process was frustrating rather than promoting finality of the dispute; 
 
• that the labour dispute system was adversarial and not user-friendly to the 
majority of workers; and  
 
• that the labour dispute resolution system was full of loopholes that were 
abused by the parties to achieve their individual goals. 
 
Government acknowledged the need to improve the 1992 Act, agreeing to allow for 
amendments to provisions relating to labour dispute resolution and other aspects that 
needed improvement. The Government conceded that the 1992 Act was drafted in a 
legal language that made it comprehensible only for lawyers. Furthermore, the 
Government agreed that the existing labour dispute prevention and resolution 
processes were cumbersome for users and thus accepted that, in drafting a new 
system, it was obliged to take into account the suggestions and proposals of social 
partners. However, these suggestions and proposals had nothing to do with dispute 
prevention and resolution.226 
 
LaRRi 227 points out various weaknesses in the labour dispute resolution system 
under the 1992 Act. This author contends that the 1992 Act: 
 
- was adversarial and fuelled confrontation instead of conciliation; 
 
- was too bureaucratic and legalistic with very slow reaction times; 
 
226 LaRRi Labour Rights Report in Namibia 9. 
227 Ibid. 
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- was not equally accessible to employers and employees, and appeared to 
disadvantage less well-off employees; 
 
- undermined the process of collective bargaining in good faith through its 
adversarial nature and perpetuated a winner/loser concept; 
 
- resulted in the District Labour Courts losing credibility due to severe 
backlogs, compounded by the difficulties in implementing orders and 
decisions of the District Labour Courts; 
 
- revealed a lack of division of responsibility between court officials and labour 
inspectors in implementing and enforcing court orders; 
 
- through the early involvement of third parties, such as lawyers, labour 
consultants and the police, complicated procedures, delaying the resolution 
of conflicts and provoking violence; and  
 
- lacked the continued presence of mediators and conciliators. 
 
Despite the above shortfalls, the 1992 Act was described as the “best compromise 
achievable” 228  resulting from the lengthy process of consultation. However, 
Thompson 229 offers it less praise. He submits that although the new law represented 
a significant advance, creating a break with the past and providing a framework of 
clear rights and duties coupled with a viable model of labour dispute resolution, there 
was not sufficient consultation with social partners; hence it was “superimposed”. He 
suggests that it was later necessary for Namibia to return to the drawing board for a 
less ambitious, but possibly more indigenous solution.230 
 
For the reasons above and pursuant to the ILO sponsored Wiehahn Namibia 
Report,231 the Cabinet instructed the Minister of Labour to redraft the whole Act in 
228 Bauer “The Namibian Labour Act best Compromise Achievable” (1992) 1 Namibia Review 18.    
229 Thompson “Namibia New Labour Code” (1991) Vol. 7 Employment law 98 at 101.  
230 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 3 and 20. 
231 The Wiehahn Commission Namibia recommended that the new labour system when put in 
place, be flexible and allow maximum growth and development. (ii). 
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plain language, accommodating the new labour dispute prevention and resolution 
system and other agreed amendments by social partners.  
 
3.10 DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW LABOUR-POLICY FRAMEWORK  
 
Given numerous submissions by social partners on the state of the 1992 Act, the 
Namibian Government accepted that the Act needed to be revised. The reason for 
such a revision was to simplify the labour dispute resolution system and thereby limit 
the role of the Labour Courts in regulating harmful industrial actions.232 The revision 
process took several years of intensive negotiations between social partners. It was 
only after the devastating strike at Tsumeb Corporation Limited, including Tsumeb, 
Kombat and Otjihase Mines,233 that all stakeholders234 in labour relations came to full 
realisation that the 1992 Act required an urgent and complete overhaul.235 
 
The revision process started in January 1998.236 Government approached the ILO for 
assistance and secured funding from the ILO Swiss-Project.237 A taskforce team was 
appointed, comprising of social partners with strong inputs or influence from outside, 
essentially in the form of South African-based labour-law experts with excellent 
knowledge of the CCMA.238 
 
The taskforce was given the requirements that the proposed labour dispute 
resolution system be efficient yet simple, impartial with high-quality outcomes, and 
user-friendly and cost-effective. 239  Fenwick 240  points out that the taskforce 
exhaustively deliberated the development of the new labour dispute prevention and 
resolution system that culminated in the agreement that the envisaged system should 
retain basic features, such as the Labour Court, the Labour Commissioner and the 
232 Fenwick “Labour Law Reform in Namibia” 336. 
233 The Copper mine is situated in Tsumeb, in Oshikoto Region of Namibia.   
234 The Ministry of Labour’s stakeholders includes: Employers’ group, Trade unions, International 
Organisations(ILO) private sectors, and other Ministries. See GRN Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare Strategic Plan 2011/12- 2015-2016. 29.     
235 Musukubili A Comparative Namibia Labour Dispute Resolution 6. 
236 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 21. 
237 Musukubili A Comparative Namibia Labour Dispute Resolution 6. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 22. 
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compulsory conciliation and arbitration of disputes. The author further states that the 
taskforce agreed on other aspects that required analysis, such as the operation of 
the District Labour Court, the prospects for arbitration-of-rights disputes, the 
insufficient use of conciliation procedures, and the concern that the dispute resolution 
mechanism that prevailed was primarily reactive in nature and adversarial. 
 
Collectively, Government and social partners agreed on a new system with the 
following characteristics:241 easily accessible by ordinary workers; simple, quick and 
user-friendly; sufficiently flexible to deal with the different nature of labour disputes; 
independent, legitimate and impartial; and a system that is free from technical 
problems,242 which promotes representation by trade unions and employers as well 
as the involvement of other interest groups. 
 
Ultimately, the taskforce agreed on a number of principles that underpinned changes 
to the 1992 Act. These principles include:243 first, that the Minister should play a 
greater role in respect of the power to issue codes of good practice to guide the 
parties in exercising their rights and duties. LaRRi 244 submits that these proposed 
codes should not be merely informative, but that conciliators, arbitrators and the 
Labour Court take them into account in determining any labour dispute. Moreover, 
that the Minister shall have power to intervene in “pathological situations”.245 Second, 
that the role of the Labour Advisory Council be expanded to include drafting the 
codes of good practice, a consultative role in relation to the appointment of members 
of the Labour Court, and to conciliation and arbitration in the office of the Labour 
Commissioner.  
 
Third, that the role of the Labour Commissioner be expanded to include the 
suggestion that rights disputes must first be referred to the Labour Commissioner for 
conciliation together with all interest disputes. The process envisaged was that, 
241 LaRRi  Labour Rights Report in Namibia 10. 
242 My emphasis, this is one of the bases of the study.  
243 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 22. 
244 LaRRi Labour Rights Report in Namibia 10. 
245 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 22. The author argues that “pathological situation” is undefined. 
My assumption would be that these are the situations contemplated under section 80 of the 
Labour Act, 2007in respect of disputes that affect national interests.  
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where conciliation was unsuccessful, the dispute had to proceed to arbitration or 
parties had to resort to industrial action. The taskforce suggested that conciliation 
and arbitration be within the domain of the Labour Commissioner who will coordinate 
and centralise the process. It was contemplated that by doing so a high proportion of 
disputes would be resolved at conciliation level before or without resorting to 
adversarial procedures, such as industrial action or litigation in courts.246 Lastly, the 
task team proposed a dedicated team of Labour Court judges and that the Labour 
Court primarily hears appeals, reviews and cases of urgent interdicts. 
 
The activities of the taskforce team were coordinated by the ILO, with the technical 
drafting assisted by Professor Halton Cheadle and Mr Charles Nupen.247 The draft 
Labour Bill was transmitted to ILO headquarters for technical comments on its 
compliance with international labour standards.248 Ultimately, the process gave birth 
to the 2004 Labour Act, which laid the foundation for the new system of labour 
dispute resolution through conciliation and arbitration by the Labour 
Commissioner.249 
 
The 2004 Act was, however, not put into full operation. Social partners submitted that 
the Act was coupled with typographical flaws that could cause ambiguity in its 
interpretation and application.250 This led to the redrafting the Act into a simplified 
version, acceptable to all social partners. The result was the Labour Act of 2007.251 
 
3.11 THE NEW SCHEME OF LABOUR DISPUTE PREVENTION AND 
RESOLUTION IN TERMS OF THE LABOUR ACT, 2007 
 
The Labour Act, 2007, was signed into law on 31 December 2007,252 but only came 
into operation on 1 November 2008, 253  a year after its promulgation. The Act 
proclaims in its preamble,254 among other things, to:  
246 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 22. 
247 Professor Halton Cheadle is a Labour-Law Expert from the University of Cape Town. 
248 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 22. 
249 Musukubili A Comparative Namibian Labour Dispute Resolution 7. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia No 3971 Notice No 236. 
253 Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia No 4151 Notice No 260. 
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 • envisage consolidation of and amend the labour laws;  
 
• establish a comprehensive labour law for all employers and employees;  
 
• entrench fundamental labour rights and protection;  
 
• regulate basic terms and conditions of employment; 
 
• regulate collective labour relations;  
 
• provide for the systematic prevention and resolution of labour disputes;255 
 
• establish the LAC, the Labour Court, the Wages Commission and the Labour 
Inspectorate; and  
 
• provide for the appointment of the Labour Commissioner.  
 
The new scheme of labour dispute prevention and resolution is central to the Labour 
Act, 2007.256 Labour disputes are no longer resolved through the District Labour 
Courts, 257  but through compulsory conciliation and arbitration by the Labour 
Commissioner. The Act classifies labour disputes into two categories. The first, a 
dispute of interest, is defined to mean any dispute concerning a proposal for or 
changes to conditions of employment, but does not include a dispute that the Act or 
any other Act requires to be resolved by adjudication in the Labour Court or other 
court of law or arbitration.258 
 
A dispute of right, on the other hand, is defined to include a complaint relating to the 
breach of a contract of employment or a collective agreement; a dispute referred to 
254 Preamble to the Labour Act, 2007. 
255 My emphasis. 
256 See chapter 8 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
257 Labour Research Services and LaRRi Namibia Country Review of Collective Bargaining (2010) 
10. 
258 S 1 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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the Labour Commissioner in terms of section 46 of the Affirmative Action Act;259 any 
dispute referred in terms of section 82(16) of the Act; or any dispute that is required 
to be referred to arbitration in terms of the Act.260 
 
The Act requires all labour disputes to be conciliated before resorting to arbitration.261 
The conciliation process must attempt to resolve the dispute within 30 days from the 
date of referral,262 however the parties may agree to a longer period.263 Where 
conciliation does not resolve the dispute and where it is a dispute of right, such a 
dispute is subject to arbitration.264 Conversely, disputes of interests are pursued 
further by embarking on industrial action or referred to arbitration by agreement.265 
The Labour Commissioner is central to the new process of labour dispute prevention 
and resolution, and is the officer to whom notices of disputes must be referred.266 He 
or she is required to oversee the process of conciliation and arbitration as provided 
for in the Act. 
 
3.12  POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LABOUR COMMISSIONER  
 
The Labour Act, 2007 provides for the appointment of the Labour Commissioner and 
the Deputy Labour Commissioner, each of whom must be a person who is competent 
to perform the functions of a conciliator and arbitrator.267 Although the social partners 
had recommended that the Labour Commissioner and the Deputy Labour 
Commissioner be appointed outside of the Public Service, the Minister of Labour 
appoints the Labour Commissioner and the Deputy Labour Commissioner in terms of 
the laws governing the Public Service.268 Hence the Labour Commissioner and his 
deputy are not independent of the State. 
259 Act No 29 of 1998. 
260 S 84 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
261 S86(5) of the Labour Act, 2007 provides that …[u]nless the dispute has already been 
conciliated, the arbitrator must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation before 
beginning the arbitration.  
262 S 82(10)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007.  
263 S 82(10)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
264 S 86 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
265 S 74 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
266 S 82(8) and section 86(3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
267 S 120(1) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
268 See Public Service Act No 13 of 1995.  
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 Despite their appointment as civil servants, the Labour Commissioner and all 
conciliators and arbitrators under the office are required to be independent of any 
influence and be impartial in the performance of their duties. 269  The Labour 
Commissioner has national jurisdiction and maintains offices in all 13 political regions 
of Namibia and other proclaimed towns.270 A dispute must be referred to the Labour 
Commissioner in any of the regional labour offices.271 However, the dispute must be 
conciliated or arbitrated in the region in which the cause of action arose unless the 
Labour Commissioner directs otherwise.272 
 
Conciliators and arbitrators are appointed by the Minister,273 either on a full-time or 
part-time basis, and the Labour Commissioner may designate them to conciliate or 
arbitrate a dispute.274 The Labour Commissioner is the head of the Office and is 
responsible for its day-to-day running and overseeing the process of conciliation and 
arbitration.275 
 
Section 121 of the Labour Act, 2007 outlines the statutory functions of the Labour 
Commissioner, including various prescribed forms for referring different types of 
disputes for either conciliation or arbitration.  
 
These functions include: 
(a) to register disputes from employees and employers over contraventions, the 
application, interpretation or enforcement of this Act and to take appropriate 
action; 
 
(b) to attempt, through conciliation or by giving advice, to prevent disputes from 
arising; 
269 S 85(6) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
270 Rules relating to the Conduct of Conciliation and Arbitration before the Labour Commissioner 
Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia No 4151 Notice No 262(hereinafter referred to 
as the “Rules of the Labour Commissioner”) See Annexure 1. 
271 S 86(1)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act, 2007.  
272 Rule 24 of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner. 
273 Ss 82(1)and (2) and 85(3)and(4) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
274 Ss 82(3) and 85(5) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
275 GRN –Office of the Labour Commissioner: Annual Report (2011/12) 10. 
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(c) to attempt, through conciliation, to resolve disputes referred to the Labour 
Commissioner in terms of this Act or any other law; 
 
(d) to arbitrate a dispute that has been referred to the Labour Commissioner if 
the dispute remains unresolved after conciliation, because 
(i) this Act requires arbitration; or  
 
(ii) the parties to the dispute have agreed to have the dispute resolved 
through arbitration; and  
 
(e) to compile and publish information and statistics of the Labour 
Commissioner’s activities and report to the Minister. 
 
Moreover, the Labour Commissioner may- 
 
(a) if asked, advise any party to a dispute about the procedure to follow; 
 
(b) offer to resolve a dispute that has not been referred to the Labour 
Commissioner through conciliation; 
 
(c) intervene in any application made to the Labour Court in terms of section 79; 
or  
 
(d) apply on the Labour Commissioner’s own initiative, to the Labour Court for a 
declaratory order in respect of any question concerning the interpretation or 
application of any provision of this Act. 
 
In the pursuance of these functions, the Labour Commissioner, conciliators and 
arbitrators do not incur any personal civil liabilities for acts or omissions in good 
faith.276 
 
  
276 S 134 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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3.13 COMMITTEE FOR DISPUTE PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION 
 
The Labour Act, 2007277 creates a tripartite Committee for Dispute Prevention and 
Resolution as a subordinate structure of the LAC. The overall functions of this 
Committee include recommending to the LAC:  
 
• the rules for conducting conciliation and arbitration;  
 
• policy and guidelines on dispute prevention and resolution for application by 
the Labour Commissioner;  
 
• the code of ethics for conciliators and arbitrators;  
 
• the qualification and appointment of conciliators and arbitrators; and  
 
• to review the overall performance of the dispute prevention and resolution 
performed by the Labour Commissioner on a regular basis and report to the 
LAC. 
 
13.14 CONCILIATION BY THE LABOUR COMMISSIONER 
 
Section 86 of the Labour Act, 2007 extensively regulates the resolution of labour 
disputes through conciliation. The Act defines “conciliation” to include mediating a 
dispute; conducting a fact-finding exercise; and making an advisory award if it will 
enhance the prospect of settlement or if the parties to the dispute agree.278 In an 
elaborative context, “conciliation” is defined to mean to reconcile or bring together, 
especially opposing sides in a labour dispute.279 It is intended to allow the parties to 
arrive at their own solution with the assistance of the conciliator rather than through 
enforcement of the law.280 
 
277 S 101 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
278 S 1 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
279 Du Toit, Bosch, Woolfrey, Cooper, Giles, Bosch and Rossouw Labour Relations Law – A 
Comparative Guide(2006) 110. 
280 Ibid. 
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The Court held that conciliation is not a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 
12(1)(a) of the Constitution. Consequently, conciliation proceedings lack the 
trappings of a court or tribunal and are rather an informal avenue for resolving labour 
disputes. Moreover, the Court held that a conciliator has no competence to make a 
legally binding award against a party against whom a dispute has been referred and 
who fails to attend a conciliation meeting.281 
 
The rules of the Labour Commissioner prescribe conciliation proceedings to be 
private and confidential and to be conducted without prejudice on any party to the 
dispute.282 In terms of the new scheme of dispute prevention and resolution, the 
following disputes go through the conciliation process: 
 
- disputes that allege discrimination;283 
 
- disputes regarding the non-compliance with, contravention, application or 
interpretation of Part A, B, or C 284  of the Labour Act, 2007, except for 
disputes relating to the recognition of trade unions as exclusive bargaining 
agents that proceed to arbitration; 
 
- disputes provided for in section 80, 285  namely those affecting national 
interests; 
 
- disputes of interest;286 
 
- disputes referred in terms of section 45 of the Affirmative Action Act;287 
 
- disputes referred to the Minister;288 and 
 
281 Purity Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao and Other Case No LC 80/2010 at par 29,  
delivered on 11July 2011 “reportable”.  
282 Rule 13 of the Labour Commissioner’s Rules.   
283 S 7(4)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
284 S 69(1) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
285 Labour Act, 2007. 
286 S 81(a) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
287 S 81(b) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
288 S 81(c)(i)  of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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- disputes referred to the Labour Court.289 
 
3.14.1 THE CONCILIATION PROCESS  
 
The Labour Act, 2007290 requires that a dispute must be referred to the Labour 
Commissioner for conciliation on a prescribed Form LC 21291 and that copies of the 
referral be served on the other parties to the dispute using the prescribed Form 
LG36. 292 The Labour Commissioner designates conciliators using the prescribed 
Form LC 22,293 set out in Annexure 2,294 to attempt to resolve the dispute and issues 
a notice295 of conciliation meeting on the prescribed Form LC23.296 
 
The conciliator has a 30-day period from the date of referral, unless the parties agree 
to a longer period, within which to resolve the dispute.297 At the end of the conciliation 
meeting, the conciliator must issue a certificate of outcome on Form LC 24298 for 
resolved disputes and Form LC 25299 for unresolved disputes. The certificate must 
state whether the dispute has been resolved.300 If the dispute is not resolved, the 
conciliator remains bound to the dispute until it is settled or disposed of on expiration 
of the prescribed time period allotted.301 The conciliator is required to call several 
meetings within the 30-day period if he entertains the prospect of settlement.302 The 
289 S 81(c)(ii) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
290 S 82(7) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
291 Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia No 4181 Notice No261: Labour General 
regulations(hereinafter referred to as the “Labour Regulations”) No18. 
292 Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia No 4181 Notice No262 – Rules relating to the 
Conduct of Conciliation and Arbitration before the Labour Commissioner (hereinafter referred to 
as the “Rules of the Labour Commissioner”). 
293 Labour Regulations 18(2). 
294 Of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner. 
295 The Labour Commissioner is required to give at least seven days’ written notice of the 
conciliation meeting or unless the parties agree to a shorter period. Rule 12 of the Rules of the 
Labour Commissioner. 
296 Labour Regulation 18(2). 
297 S 82(10)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
298 Labour Regulations 18(3). 
299 Labour Regulations 18(4). 
300 S 82(15) and (16) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
301 S 82(a) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
302 Purity Manganese (Pty)Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao and Others L/C 80/2010 dated 11 July 2011 at par 
27.  
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Labour Act, 2007303 requires that where the conciliator considers no prospect of 
settlement at the end of the 30-day period, he must refer the matter to arbitration with 
the agreement of the parties. It is submitted that the expiration of the 30-day period 
or an agreed longer period automatically terminates the conciliator’s jurisdiction.304 
 
During conciliation, the conciliator has wider statutory powers, which include, 
amongst others, to subpoena any person to give evidence, administer an oath, and 
to question the witnesses.305 Failure to comply therewith is an offence, making the 
person failing to do so liable to a fine not exceeding N$10,000 or to imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding two years or to both a fine and imprisonment.306 In Purity 
Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao and Others, 307  Damaseb JP held that 
conciliation procedures produce no binding legal effect. It is therefore unnecessary 
for the conciliator to administer an oath and receive evidence. This decision has led 
to the alteration of section 82(18) of the Labour Act, 2007, by the introduction of a 
new amendment to the Act.308 
 
Neither the labour regulations nor the Act make any provision for the enforcement of 
a settlement agreement, except for the wording appearing on Form LC 24 that the 
“parties reached a full and final settlement”.309 In the event of breach by either party it 
is unclear whether the aggrieved party may cancel the agreement and revive the 
dispute and which forum has the jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. 
Section 90 of the Labour Act does not apply to settlement agreements, but only to 
the enforcement of arbitration awards.310 
 
In the absence of any directive provision in the Act, the appropriate forum appears to 
be the Labour Court. Parties can approach the Labour Court with an application to 
303 S 82(16) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
304 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 111. 
305 S 82(18) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
306 S 82(19) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
307 Purity Manganese (Pty)Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao par 11. 
308 Labour Act, 2007, relating to the powers of the conciliator.  
309 See preface of Form LC 24. 
310 Purity Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao at par 22. 
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pronounce the settlement an order of court 311  under the provision of sections 
117(1)(d) or (h) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
 
3.14.2 FAILURE TO ATTEND CONCILIATION  
 
Section 83 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides for the consequences for failing to 
attend conciliation meetings. The Act empowers the conciliator to dismiss the matter 
if the party who referred it fails to attend the conciliation meeting,312 or that the 
conciliator may determine the matter if a party to the dispute fails to attend the 
conciliation meeting. 313  However, dismissal or unqualified determination may be 
reversed on application made to the Labour Commissioner by an affected party, only 
if he is satisfied that there were good grounds for failure to attend the conciliation 
meeting.314 
 
In Purity Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao315 the Court held that conciliation is 
not a tribunal, and, consequently, that any determination made by a conciliator shall 
have no legal binding effect. Moreover, the Court stated that the exclusion from the 
definition of conciliation of any punitive or coercive measure is further proof that no 
binding effect is contemplated in respect of a determination under Part B section 
83(2)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007. 316  The Court inferred that the determination 
contemplated in section 83(2)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007 includes that the conciliator 
remains bound to the matter and can call further meetings if there is a prospect of 
settlement before the expiry of the 30-day period. Further that if the conciliator 
considers that there are no prospects of settlement or the 30-day period has expired, 
the matter must be referred for arbitration. Therefore, no other determination is 
contemplated in the section.317 
 
311 In this case, Afrideca Construction (Pty) Ltd v Alfons Iiyambo and another Case No 89/2010 
delivered on24 February 2012 (reportable). The settlement agreement between the parties was 
made an order of court.  
312 S 83(3)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
313 S 83(3)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007.  
314 S 83(3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
315 Par 22. 
316 Purity Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao par 24. 
317 Purity Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Tjeripo Katzaopar 27. 
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3.15 ARBITRATION OF LABOUR DISPUTES BY THE LABOUR 
COMMISSIONER  
 
Chapter 8, Part C of the Labour Act, 2007 provides for the arbitration procedure and 
establishes arbitration tribunals for the purpose of resolving labour disputes as 
contemplated in the Namibian Constitution.318 The Constitution states the following:  
 
“in the determination of their civil rights and obligations… against them, all persons 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent, impartial and 
competent court or tribunal established by law…” 
 
The Labour Court has since affirmed that the arbitration procedure envisaged in Part 
C of Chapter 8 of the Labour Act, 2007 is a tribunal and is accorded the trappings of 
a judicial forum. Further, that as a constitutionally established tribunal, decisions 
emanating from these forums are given binding effect and made enforceable.319 
 
To this end, the Act defines “arbitration” to mean arbitration proceedings conducted 
before an arbitration tribunal established in terms of section 85 of the Labour Act, 
2007.320 Bosch et al 321 describes arbitration as a process whereby a dispute is 
referred by one or all of the disputing parties to a neutral third party, the arbitrator, 
who hears the respective cases fairly by receiving and considering evidence and 
submissions from the parties before making a final and binding decision.  
 
Du Toit et al 322  submit that arbitration is similar to litigation, but less formal. 
Arbitration originated as a consensual and often expedited process to finally resolve 
factual disputes. Given the nature of arbitration, processes are either compulsory or 
voluntary, with compulsory arbitration being a key feature of the Labour Act, 2007.323 
The purpose of arbitration is to dispose of a dispute finally through an award, 324 
which is, however, subject to appeal or review on the question of law or its merits.325 
318 Article 12(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution.  
319 Purity Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao par 21. 
320 S 1 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
321 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 83. 
322 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 117. 
323 S 86 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
324 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 117. 
325 S 89 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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Besides compulsory arbitration, the Act also provides for private or voluntary 
arbitration.326 Arbitration is usually a hearing de novo of all disputed issues and, 
although resembling adjudication, it remains a quasi-judicial process rather than 
adjudication.327 
 
Arbitration under the Labour Act, 2007 provides the framework for easily accessible, 
public-funded and efficacious means to deal with labour disputes of rights, 
irrespective of whether of a collective or individual nature.328 Arbitration takes over 
the functions of the former District Labour Courts and seeks to remove the 
shortcomings of the previous system, thereby resolving labour disputes as soon as 
possible in the best interest of all parties.329 
 
The following disputes are referred to arbitration in terms the Labour Act, 2007:  
 
- disputes about the application of fundamental rights as described in Chapter 
2 of the Labour Act, 2007,330 except for discrimination disputes that are 
referred for conciliation;331 
 
- disputes about the application of the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Labour 
Act, 2007, which prescribes basic conditions of employment;332 
 
- disputes about the application of Chapter 4 of the Labour Act, which provides 
the obligation relating to occupational health and safety;333 
 
- disputes about unfair labour practices;334 
 
326 S 90 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
327 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 117.  
328 Van Rooyen Namibian Labour Lexicon (2011)12. 
329 Ibid. 
330 S 7(3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
331 S 7(4) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
332 S 38(1) and (3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
333 S 47(1) and (3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
334 S 51(1) and (3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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- disputes about recognition of a registered trade union as an exclusive 
bargaining agent;335 
 
- disputes arising from designated essential-services sectors;336 
 
- disputes referred to in section 84 of the Labour Act, 2007 relating to disputes 
about contracts of employment, or collective-agreement disputes referred in 
terms of section 46 of the Employment Equity Act, 1998; and  
 
- disputes referred under section 82(16) by agreement after unsuccessful 
conciliation. 
 
3.16 ARBITRATION PROCEDURE AND MAIN FORMS 
 
The Labour Act, 2007 prescribes that a dispute must be referred to the Labour 
Commissioner or any labour office of the Ministry, in writing337 on Form LC 21338. The 
Act further requires that a dispute be referred for arbitration within six months in 
disputes arising from dismissals from employment,339 or within one year in other 
cases.340 Although the Rules of the Labour Commissioner provide for condonation 
(failure to comply with the rules), the Court has held that if a dispute is referred to the 
Labour Commissioner after the expiration of six months, the referral is out of time and 
in fact prescribed in terms of section 86(2) of the Labour Act, 2007. At such a point 
the Labour Commissioner has no jurisdiction and if the dispute continues to be 
entertained, the Commissioner acts ultra vires.341 
 
335 S 69(4) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
336 S 78(3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
337 S 86(1) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
338 Rule 14(1)(b) of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner. Form LC 21 contains information on the 
nature of the dispute and the particulars of the applicant and respondent. Further, it requires a 
summary of the dispute to be attached giving the facts and circumstances that gave rise to the 
dispute and the steps that have been taken by the parties to resolve the dispute.    
339 S 86(1)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007.  
340 S 86(1)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
341 Standard Bank Namibia v Romeo Mouton Case No LCA 04/2011 delivered on 29 July 2011 par 
9. 
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Similarly, in Nedbank Namibia Limited v Jaqueline Wandi342 the Court held that a 
dismissal claim launched out of the prescribed time limit in terms of section 86(2)(a) 
of the Labour Act, 2007 could not be considered. Furthermore, that the arbitrator was 
not authorised to consider the issue at all, as doing so constitutes acting ultra vires of 
the arbitrator’s authority and the results are consequently a nullity.  
 
Once the Labour Commissioner is satisfied with the requirements set out above, he 
must give the parties at least 14 days’ notice of the arbitration hearing on Form LC 
28.343 The Labour Commissioner must appoint an arbitrator344 who will attempt to 
resolve the dispute by conciliation, unless that process was already exhausted and 
the dispute remained unresolved.345 It is clear that the Labour Act, 2007 does not 
provide a specific right to a party to object to an arbitrator continuing to deal with a 
matter after unsuccessful conciliation.346 In this respect, the court has held that the 
ADR mechanism provided by the Labour Act, 2007 requires the same arbitrator to 
attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation before embarking on arbitration, 
should conciliation be unsuccessful in resolving the dispute. The Court further held 
that any arguments against such system held no merits and that it had to be 
rejected. 347 Rule 20348 provides the purpose of such a conciliation-arbitration 349 
process as to assist the parties to reach consensus on issues in order to shorten the 
proceeding. These include: 
 
(a) facts that are agreed to between the parties; 
 
(b) facts that are in dispute; 
 
(c) the issues that the arbitrator is required to decide; 
 
342 LCA 66/2010. 
343 Rule 15 of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner. 
344 S 86(4)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
345 S 86(5) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
346 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 33. 
347 Old Mutual Life Assurance Company Namibia Limited v Linda Schultz Case No 84 /2010 
delivered on 27May 2011 parr 15 & 16.  
348 Rules of the Labour Commissioner. 
349 Hereinafter referred to as “Con-Arb”. 
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(d) the precise relief claimed and, if compensation is claimed, the amount of the 
compensation and how it is calculated; 
 
(e) the sharing and exchange of relevant documents; 
 
(f) whether an on-site visit is needed; 
 
(g) whether evidence on affidavit will be admitted with or without the right of any 
party to cross-examine the person who made the affidavit; 
 
(h) which party must present its case first; 
 
(i) the resolution of any preliminary points that are intended to be taken; and  
 
(j) any other means by which the proceedings may be shortened.  
 
3.16.1 ARBITRATION PROCESS  
 
The Labour Act, 2007350 gives the arbitrator discretion to conduct the arbitration in a 
manner that he or she considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly 
and quickly and to deal with the substantial merits of the dispute with minimal legal 
formalities. 351 The Labour Court held that this provision allows much latitude to 
arbitrators with regard to the conduct of the arbitration proceedings before them.352 
The Court further stated that arbitrators had to take into account Rule 18 of the 
Labour Commissioner’s rules stated above. The Court further encouraged arbitrators, 
where appropriate, to rely on common sense and personal experience in arbitration 
proceedings, particularly in order to accept the truth of facts that are so well known 
that to prove them would be completely unnecessary or even absurd.353 
 
350 S 86(7)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
351 Rule 18 of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner. 
352 Namibia Power Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Gerald Nantinda Case No38/2008 delivered on 22 
March 2012 par 33.  
353 Atlantic Chicken Company (Pty)Ltd v Philip Mwandingi(Arbitrator) and Another Case No LC 
105/2011delivered on 25 April 2012. 
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Similarly, the Court354 held that the aim of a labour tribunal hearing was not to require 
the strict procedure of a court of law, but rather to make it more flexible. However, in 
doing so, the Labour Act has placed specific responsibility on the arbitrator, which 
includes impartiality and independence.355 In this respect, Miller J points out that the 
manner in which the proceedings of the arbitration were conducted should never 
create any perception of partiality or doubt of neutrality on the side of the arbitrator.356 
The Court went on to emphasise that an arbitration hearing remained a tribunal that 
had to comply with the requirements of the Namibian Constitution in respect of fair 
hearings and that this had to remain paramount. The court thus outlined the following 
guidelines for conducting a fair arbitration hearing in the absence of statutory 
guidelines:357 
 
“(a)  the arbitrator must abreast himself with what the dispute(s) of the complainant is; 
(b)  the arbitrator has to be aware on whom the onus rests and determine who should 
commence; 
(c) the arbitrator should ensure that the parties are properly informed and 
understand how the proceedings will be conducted; 
(d)  the arbitrator should always remain independent and impartial and he/she cannot 
allow that any party gain the perception that he/she is not a neutral and impartial 
adjudicator. In this regard the arbitrator: 
(i) does not descend into the arena; 
(ii) does not cross-examine any witness; 
(iii) only asks questions for clarification or to provide guidance; 
(iv) does not interrupt or stop cross-examination, unless it is clear that the 
question being asked in cross-examination is repetitive, has already been 
answered, or does not have any relevance; 
(v) never gives any indication how he/she may decide; 
(vi) allows closing arguments by all the parties. 
(e) the arbitrator should never refer to his/her personal circumstances or experience 
and thereby give an indication that he/she may be influenced by that in the 
decision he/she has to make; 
(f) although the arbitrator sometimes is obliged to make rulings in respect of the 
conduct of witness, or specific matters during the hearing, he/she should always 
be cautious that no perception of partiality should be created that the parties, or 
any of them, will not receive a fair hearing; 
(g) in his/her award the arbitrator should deal with the evidence and his or her 
interpretation thereof. At that stage the arbitrator has the opportunity to decide 
and adjudicate; 
h) the arbitrator should have a thorough knowledge of the provisions of the Labour 
Act and its Rules and the parties appearing before him should feel comfortable in 
this regard.” 
354 Roads Constractor Company v Victoria Nambahu and Others Case No 97/2009 delivered on 12 
August 2011 par 30. 
355 S 85(6) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
356 Roads Contractors Company v Nambahu par 31. 
357 Roads Contractors Company v Nambahu par 32.  
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 During arbitration, arbitrators are given powers by the Labour Act, 2007 to: subpoena 
any person to attend an arbitration hearing358 if the person’s attendance will assist in 
the resolution of the dispute, to administer an oath, to accept an affirmation and to 
question the witnesses.359 Any person failing to comply with a subpoena issued by an 
arbitrator or who refuses to answer any question from the arbitrator commits an 
offence and may be liable on conviction to a maximum fine of N$10,000 or two years’ 
imprisonment.  
 
The question that arises from this criminal provision of the Labour Act is how such a 
conviction can be secured by the arbitrator. This question relates equally to all other 
provisions in the Labour Act, 2007 that provide for criminal offences and the implied 
convictions. There are no guidelines in either the Labour Act, 2007 or in the Labour 
Regulations and the Rules of the Labour Commissioner providing for such a 
procedure. Given this predicament, the author is inclined to make reference to cases 
decided during the reign of the District Labour Court, which has since been replaced 
by arbitration.  
 
The District Labour Court convicted an employer based on section 50(b) of the 1992 
Act, which reads: 
 
“Any employer who contravenes or fails to comply with the provisions of subsection (1) 
shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding R4000 
or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or to both such fine and 
imprisonment”. 
 
On appeal, the Labour Court360 took into account the jurisdiction and powers of the 
District Labour Court in relation to the 1992 Act, and inferred that the District Labour 
Court had no criminal jurisdiction. The Court further examined the criminal offence 
and conviction created by the 1992 Act in relation to the Criminal Procedure Act,361 
which provides: 
358 S 86(a) of the Labour Act, 2007 read with Rule 35 of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner. 
Witness summons are done on Form LC 43. 
359 S 86(8) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
360 HS Contractors v Vihanga NLLP 2002 (2) 138 NLC Case No LCA 18/98.  
361 Act 51 of 1977 s 84(1). 
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 “S 84(1) subject to the provisions of this Act and any other law362 relating to any 
particular offence, a charge shall set forth the relevant offence in such manner and 
with such particulars as to the time and place which the offence is alleged to have 
been committed… as may be reasonably sufficient to inform the accused of the 
nature of the crime.” 
 
Premised on the above provision, the Court held that there was no charge 
whatsoever preferred against the appellant and that the provisions of section 84(1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act were not complied with. Moreover, the Court held that the 
District Labour Court was faced with a labour matter that called for the ordinary 
standard of proof applicable in civil matters, namely the proof of preponderance, and 
not the proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal cases. 363  In the 
circumstance, the Court found that the appellant’s conviction was not competent; 
hence it was set aside with its accompanying sentence. 
 
Applying this judgment to the present provision that permits the arbitrator to convict 
any person for failing to satisfy those aspects mentioned in section 86(8) of the 
Labour Act, 2007, arbitrators are not competent to convict persons during arbitration 
hearings. The appropriate approach would be that of the recent Court judgment in 
Maureen Brown and Others v Pep Stores Namibia (Pty) Ltd,364 wherein Van Niekerk 
J ordered, after it appeared to the judge from the available evidence placed before 
the Court that possible offences were committed, that copies of the judgment be 
forwarded to the relevant authorities, including the Inspector-General of the Namibian 
Police, for consideration and for the taking of any further steps that appear to be 
necessary, which include the filing of criminal charges against the party at fault.  
 
3.16.2 THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES  
 
Parties in the arbitration proceedings have the right to give evidence, call witnesses, 
question witnesses of the other side and address concluding arguments.365 These 
rights were reinforced in Namibia Power Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Gerald 
362 My emphasis. 
363 HS Constractor v Vihanga Case No LCA 18/98. 
364 Case No LCA 97/2010 delivered 30 March 2012 par 17. 
365 S 86(10) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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Nathinda, 366 where the Court held that the arbitrator had to consider opening 
statements, any documentary evidence and concluding submissions in determining 
whether a dismissal was procedurally and substantively unfair. Similarly, the Court 
held that the arbitrator had to take into account closing arguments addressed to him 
before arriving at a given decision.367 
 
3.16.3 REPRESENTATION  
 
Compulsory arbitration is intended to be user-friendly and relatively informal in that 
parties generally represent themselves.368 The Labour Act, 2007 provides that in an 
arbitration proceeding, a party may appear in person if the party is an individual or be 
represented only by369-  
 
(i) an office-bearer or official of that party’s registered trade union or of a 
registered employers’ organisation; 
 
(ii) if a party is an employee, a co-employee; or  
 
(iii) if the party is a juristic person,  any employee of that person. 
 
Legal presentation is also permitted, but with leave of the arbitrator or on agreement 
by the parties. 370  The arbitrator must be satisfied that the dispute is of such 
complexity that it is appropriate for a party to be represented by a legal practitioner; 
however, such representation should not prejudice the other party to the dispute.371 
Representation requests must be made on the prescribed Form LC 29. 372 This 
includes representation of any individual stated in the Labour Act, 2007.373 These 
individuals may be permitted by the arbitrator on agreement by the parties and only if 
the arbitrator considers that representation will facilitate the effective resolution of the 
366 Case No LC 38/ 2008 par 38. 
367 Roads Contractors Company v Victoria Nambhahu par 23. 
368 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 33. 
369 S 86(12) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
370 S 86(13) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
371 S 86(14) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
372 Labour Regulations No 22, read with Rule 25 of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner.  
373 S 13(b) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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dispute, without prejudice to the other party and provided the individual meets the 
prescribed requirements. However, these requirements are yet to be developed and 
published and were not available at the time of writing.  
 
3.16.4 ARBITRATION AWARD 
 
The arbitrator is required to issue a written award, signed and giving concise reasons 
for the decision arrived at within 30 days after concluding the arbitration 
proceeding. 374 There is, however, no time limit prescribed from the date of the 
referral to the date of concluding the arbitration proceeding. Thus, delays may be 
experienced before the conclusion of the proceedings that lead to the issuing of the 
written award within 30 days. In formulating the award, the arbitrator must take into 
account the code of good practice or guidelines as published by the Minister of 
Labour.375 However, at the time of writing, no such code of good practice were 
promulgated and published by the Ministry of Labour. Irrespective thereof, the award 
must specify the date by which it must be complied with and the arbitrator must allow 
such time as may be deemed reasonable in the circumstance of the case. 376  
Ultimately, the award is binding 377 and, where possible, final 378  unless it is an 
advisory award. In addition to its binding nature, either party to an award or the 
Labour Commissioner may file it in the Labour Court, thereby allowing it to become a 
court order.379 
 
The Labour Act, 2007 provides the scope for appropriate awards to be made by 
arbitrators. This includes the following:380 
 
(a) an interdict; 
 
(b) an order directing the performance of any act that will remedy a wrong; 
374 S 86(18) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
375 S 86(17) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
376 Rule 21(2) of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner. 
377 S 87(1)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007.  
378 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 33. 
379 S 87(1)(b)(i)and (ii) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
380 S 86(15) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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(c) a declaratory order; 
 
(d) an order of reinstatement; 
 
(e) an award of compensation; and  
 
(f) an order of cost only if a party or the person who represented that party in the 
arbitration proceedings acted in a frivolous or vexatious manner.  
 
All monetary awards earn interest automatically from the date of the award, unless 
the arbitration award provides otherwise,381 at the same rate prescribed from time to 
time in respect of a judgment debt in terms of the Prescribed Rates of Interest Act.382 
The Labour Court has reinforced this provision in JB Cooling and Refrigeration CC v 
Kasho Kavendjua,383 where the Court ordered payment of a specified interest rate at 
20 percent per annum, the prevailing rate at the time, calculated from the date of 
judgment to the date of payment. 
 
The Rules of the Labour Commissioner require every award to be sent out to the 
parties with an accompanying notice informing the parties of their right to appeal the 
award or apply to the Labour Court for review of the arbitration award.384 Generally, 
an appeal with regard to an award is limited only to a question of law. Review, on the 
other hand, must be based on allegations of defect in the arbitration proceedings.385 
Appeals and reviews of arbitration awards are exhaustively discussed under the role 
of the Labour Court in labour dispute resolution in section 3.19 below. 
 
  
381 S 87(2) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
382 Act No 55 of 1975. 
383 Case No LCA 15/2010 delivered on 3 April 2012 par 32.  
384 Rule 21(4) of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner read with s 89 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
385 S 89(4) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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3.16.5 VARIATION AND RESCISSION OF AWARDS  
 
An arbitrator is permitted under the Labour Act, 2007386 to vary or rescind an award 
at his or her own instance or upon an application387 by any of the parties made within 
30 days of service of the award. The following are grounds for such action: 
 
- it was erroneously sought or made in the absence of any party affected by 
that award; 
 
- it is ambiguous or contains an obvious error or omission; or 
 
- it was made as a result of a mistake common to the parties to the 
proceedings.  
 
In this respect, the Labour Court has set aside an award erroneously sought and 
made by the Labour Commissioner in terms of section 86(2) of the Act. The Court 
found that the Labour Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter, 
although the Labour Commissioner dismissed the rescission application.388 
 
3.17 PRIVATE ARBITRATION  
 
The Labour Act, 2007389 provides for the use of private arbitration in labour disputes 
as an alternative to compulsory arbitration by the Labour Commissioner.390 Section 3 
of the Arbitration Act391 is another statutory authority that applies to private arbitration 
contemplated in the Labour Act, 2007 and governs private arbitration in Namibia.  
 
386 S 88 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
387 Rule 32 of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner provides that – An application for variation or 
rescission of an arbitration award or ruling must be made on Form LC 38 within 30 days after 
service of the award or within 30 days after the applicant has become aware of a mistake 
common to the parties to the proceedings.    
388 Standard Bank Namibia v Romeo Mouton parr 5 & 9. 
389 S 91 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
390 Van Rooyen Namibian Labour Lexicon 18. 
391 Act 42 of 1965. 
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In terms thereof, parties to the dispute may agree in writing to refer the dispute to 
private arbitration. 392  The agreement also provides for the appointment of the 
arbitrator or, where the parties are not at ad idem on the arbitrator, the Act provides 
that the parties may apply to the Labour Court to designate an arbitrator on their 
behalf.393 Once the arbitrator is appointed, his service can only be terminated or set 
aside by the Labour Court on good cause shown by the parties.394 
 
An arbitrator conducting private arbitration has similar powers to an arbitrator in 
compulsory arbitration to subpoena any person to appear at an arbitration hearing, 
administer an oath or accept an affirmation.395 In respect to the representation of the 
parties, the representation provision applicable in compulsory arbitration equally 
applies in private arbitration.396 The award of the arbitrator is subject to the provisions 
in the agreement and may include any relief listed in section 86(15)(a)-(e) of the 
Labour Act, as well as an order of cost where appropriate.397 
 
In Erongo Mining and Exploration Company Ltd t/a Navachab Gold Mine v Mine 
Workers Union of Namibia and Another,398 the Labour Court held that the arbitrator’s 
award in a private arbitration must not exceed the terms of reference envisaged in 
the agreement. Consequently, the award was remitted to the arbitrator to reconsider 
the extent of his award and to correct it accordingly as per his terms of reference.   
 
The award of an arbitrator in private arbitration has effects largely identical to the 
award of an arbitrator in compulsory arbitration. 399  These include the effect of 
award 400  variation and rescission 401  and appeal provisions. 402  The Act equally 
392 S 91(2) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
393 S 91(4) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
394 S 91(5) and (6) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
395 S 91(7)(a),(b)and (c) of the Labour Act, 2007.  
396 Ss 86(9)-(11) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
397 S 91(9)(a)and (b) of the Labour Act, 2007.  
398 NLLP (1) (12) NLC- Case No 2/93. 
399 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 34. 
400 S 87 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
401 S 88 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
402 S 89 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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permits review applications of arbitration agreements403 on the grounds listed under 
sections 89(4) and (5) of the Labour Act, 2007. The Labour Commissioner has the 
power to refer disputes erroneously referred to his office to compulsory arbitration 
where an arbitration agreement provides as such.404 
 
An arbitrator’s agreement terminates only by the consent of all parties to the 
agreement or by an order of the Labour Court. It does not terminate through the 
death, sequestration or winding up of any party. However, in these circumstances 
and where arbitration has commenced it must be kept in abeyance until an executor, 
administrator, curator, trustee, liquidator or judicial manager has been appointed.405 
 
Undoubtedly, private arbitration has been introduced to encourage the parties to take 
responsibility for the resolution of their own disputes in order to limit the possibility of 
industrial action or recourse to the courts.406 An arbitration agreement is a fairly 
simple and straightforward document of intent. It encompasses terms of reference of 
the arbitrator in making an award, time limit, discovery and other procedural aspects 
to be complied with or allowed, choice of venue, confidentiality, possibility of appeal, 
and duration. By virtue of the agreement, the parties accept to be bound by the 
award. 407  However, private arbitration does not follow the prescribed Labour 
Regulations, the Rules of the Labour Commissioner or the official forms prescribed 
for that purpose. The process must simply comply with the dictates of section 91 of 
the Labour Act, 2007.408 
 
Although it may be seen as a simple and straight forward process, private arbitration 
is unattractive for a number of reasons. These include that the parties pay for it, while 
public conciliation and arbitration is free of charge; 409  and the award is kept 
confidential and may not become known to the public even if it is a precedent that 
403 S 91(12) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
404 S 91(13) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
405 S 91(4) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
406 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 34. 
407 Van Rooyen Namibian Labour Lexicon 23. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 34. 
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others may benefit from.410 However, one significant advantage of private arbitration 
is the possibility of streamlining the labour dispute resolution process in certain 
cases, such as where parties may consider it more appropriate and efficient to refer 
disputes to private arbitration instead of taking recourse to industrial action. 411 
 
3.18  THE ROLE OF LABOUR INSPECTORATE IN LABOUR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
 
Chapter 9, Part F of the Labour Act, 2007 established the labour inspectorate. 
Labour inspectors are appointed by the Minister of Labour, in terms of the Public 
Service Act,412 to enforce the Act or any decision, award or order made in terms of 
the Labour Act, 2007.413 On appointment by the Minister, labour inspectors are 
issued with certificates of appointment by the Permanent Secretary. Although the Act 
does not specify grounds, the Minister has discretion to withdraw the appointment of 
any labour inspector.414 
 
The Labour Act, 2007 gives labour inspectors wider powers,415 which are to some 
extent seen as duplication of authority with the office of the Labour Commissioner.416 
The most significant powers of the labour inspectorate relevant to labour dispute 
resolution include a number of factors. First, where a complaint has been lodged with 
the labour inspectorate, the labour inspector has the power to order, using the 
prescribed Form LS21,417 any individual to appear before him at a specified date and 
time in order to question that individual in relation to the alleged complaint.418 Failure 
to comply with such an order constitutes an offence and the person may be liable to 
conviction.419 
 
410 Van Rooyen Namibian Labour Lexicon 22. 
411 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 35. 
412 Act No 13 of 1995. 
413 S 124 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
414 S 124(3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
415 S 125 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
416 De Beer Comments, Interpretation and Manuals on the Labour Act, 2007. Available on 
http//www.namibia-law.com accessed on 01 June 2012.    
417 The Labour Regulation 22 provide for Form LS 31 set out in the annexure thereto as an order to 
appear before a labour inspector.  
418 S 125(2)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
419 S 127(1)(b) and (2) of the Labour Act, 2007  
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Second, labour inspectors are empowered to assist any person in any application, 
referral or complaint arising under the Labour Act, 2007 and to settle any such 
application, referral or complaint.420 The power to assist in any application includes 
all those applications listed under Rules 10, 17, 28, 30 and 32 of the Labour 
Commissioner. 421  Referral, on the other hand, includes situations where labour 
inspectors attempt to resolve the complaint, but fail to do so. They may opt to refer 
the dispute to the Labour Commissioner by assisting the complainant to complete 
Form LC 21 and providing a summary of the dispute with his report for the attempted 
resolution of the dispute. Such intervention includes filing in the Proof of Service 
Document422 and having had it certified by the Namibian Police before referral is 
made to the Labour Commissioner.423 
 
Settling applications and complaints includes complaints of alleged non-compliance 
with the basic conditions of employment, for example non-payment of remuneration, 
which labour inspectors are empowered to enforce.424 Labour inspectors normally 
issue an order to defaulting employers to pay remuneration owed. However, there 
are no punitive measures425 for non-compliance. It is in these circumstances that the 
labour inspectorate would assist with the referral of the dispute to the Labour 
Commissioner in terms of section 38 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
 
Another mechanism available to labour inspectors is the power to issue a compliance 
order426 to compel employers to comply with any provision of the Labour Act, 2007. 
However, an appeal against a compliance order automatically suspends its operation 
pending the outcome of the appeal, thus leaving the dispute or complaint in 
abeyance subject to the finalisation of the compliance order appeal in the Labour 
420 S 125(2)(i) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
421 Rule 10 refers to any referral or application for condonation for late delivery of documents to be 
made on Form LC 38, Rule 17 relates to the application for class certification, Rule 28 relates to 
the manner in which applications may be brought, Rule 30 relates to applications for joinder of 
parties while Rule 32relates to application for variation and rescission. In all these applications, 
it appears that labour inspectors have the power to assist the applicants.      
422 Form LG 36. 
423 Ss 82(8) and (86)(3) of the Labour Act, 2007 read with Rules 7, 23 and 35 of the 
Commissioner’s Rules.   
424 S 11 read with s 125(2)(f) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
425 As at the time of writing, The order to pay remuneration owed was is the process of Gazetting. 
426 S 126 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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Court.427  Referral of disputes to arbitration is therefore preferred on the basis that an 
appeal or review application of an award made in favour of the employee does not 
stop the execution of the award428 unless a stay order is granted by the Labour 
Court, suspending its operation.429 
 
The Labour Act, 2007 has created a new responsibility for labour inspectors to 
enforce arbitration awards.430 Section 90 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides: 
 
“A party to an arbitration award made in terms of this part may apply to a labour 
inspector in a prescribed form requesting the inspector to enforce the award by taking 
such steps as are necessary to do so, including the institution of execution proceedings 
on behalf of that person”. 
 
The applicant must apply to the labour inspector on Form LS30, as stipulated in 
Regulation 22 of the Labour Regulations. Although there are currently no clear 
regulations or guidelines for this purpose, it has proven to be successful, particularly 
where respondents are willing to comply with the award without necessarily 
challenging it in the Labour Court. The dilemma exists where parties appeal against 
awards or awards are reviewed in the Labour Court, making enforcement 
unachievable. It is hoped that enforcement guidelines will be developed in future in 
terms of section 137 of the Labour Act, 2007431 to guide labour inspectors in fulfilling 
this function successfully.  
 
3.19 THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR COURT IN LABOUR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
 
Section 115 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides for the continuation of the Labour 
Court, which was established by section 15 of the repealed 1992 Act. Part D, 
Chapter 9 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides for the establishment, composition, 
427 S 126(2) and (3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
428 S 89(6)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
429 S 89(7) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
430 S 125(2)(g) of the Labour Act, 2007.   
431 S 137(1) of the Labour Act, 2007 – empowers the Minister to issue guidelines for the proper 
administration of the Act, including but not limited to, guidelines on dispute prevention and 
resolution for application by the Labour Commissioner and the users of the Labour 
Commissioner’s services.   
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jurisdiction and rules of the Court.432 The Labour Court, under the 1992 Act, was 
presided over by judges of the High Court, who were called “presidents”, and was 
primarily a Labour Appeal Court, which heard appeals from the District Labour Courts 
that were presided over by magistrates.433 The Judge President assigns suitable 
judges to the Labour Court, each of whom must be a judge or an acting judge of the 
High Court.434 Parker (2012)435 submits that this assignment of judges or acting 
judges of the High Court is done within the meaning of Article 78, read with Articles 
80 and 82 of the Namibian Constitution. Section 117 of the Labour Act, 2007 vests 
the Labour Court with exclusive review and appellate jurisdiction. 
 
3.19.1 JURISDICTION OF THE LABOUR COURT 
 
Section 117 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Labour Court to: 
 
(a) determine appeals from –  
(i) decisions of the Labour Commissioner made in terms of this Act; 
(ii) arbitration tribunals’ awards, in terms of section 89; and  
(iii) compliance orders issued in terms of section 126; 
(b) review- 
(i) arbitration tribunals’ awards in terms of this Act; and  
(ii) decisions of the Minister, the Permanent Secretary, the Labour 
Commissioner or any other body or official in terms of –  
(aa) this Act; or  
(bb) any other Act relating to labour or employment for which the Minister 
is responsible; 
(c) review, despite any other provision of any Act, any decision of any body or official 
provided for in terms of any other Act, if the decision concerns a matter within the 
scope of this Act; 
(d) grant a declaratory order in respect of any provision of this Act, a collective 
agreement, contract of employment or wage order, provided that the declaratory 
order is the only relief sought; 
(e) to grant urgent relief including an urgent interdict pending resolution of a dispute 
in terms of Chapter 8; 
(f) to grant an order to enforce an arbitration agreement; 
(g) to determine any other matter which it is empowered to hear and determine in 
terms of this Act; 
(h) make an order which the circumstances may require in order to give effect to the 
objects of this Act; 
432 S 115 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
433 Parker Labour Law in Namibia (2012) 205. 
434 S 116 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
435 Parker Labour Law in Namibia 206. 
150 
                                                             
(i) generally deal with all matters necessary or incidental to its functions under this 
Act concerning any labour matter, whether or not governed by the provisions of 
this Act, any law or the common law. 
 
(2) The Labour Court may – 
 
(a) refer any dispute contemplated in subsection (1)(c ) or (d) to the Labour 
Commissioner for conciliation in terms of Part C of Chapter 8; or 
(b) request the Inspector General of the Namibian Police to give a situation 
report on any danger to life, health or safety of persons arising from any 
strike or lockout.  
 
Section 118 of the Labour Act, 2007 further provides that the Labour Court must not 
make an order for costs against a party unless that party has acted in a frivolous or 
vexatious manner by instituting proceedings or defending those proceedings. 
 
3.19.2 APPEAL OF ARBITRATION AWARDS   
 
Section 89 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides the right of appeal and review of 
arbitration awards. The section provides:   
 
“89(1) A party to a dispute may appeal to the Labour Court against an arbitrator’s 
award made in terms of section 86: 
(a) on any question of law alone; or  
(b) in the case of an award in a dispute initially referred to the Labour 
Commissioner in terms of section 7(1)(a), on a question of fact, law or 
mixed fact and law”. 
 
The Labour Court Rules436 require an appellant to note the appeal by delivering the 
notice of appeal on Form 11, thereby setting out concisely and distinctively which 
part of the decision or order is being appealed against, the grounds for appeal and 
setting out the relief sought. The notice must be delivered to the Labour Court within 
30 days of the award being served on the parties.437 This rule is, however, not trite, in 
that the Court may condone the late noting of an appeal on good cause shown.438 
 
436 Rules of the Labour Court published in the Government Republic of Namibia Gazette No 4175 
Notice No.279 dated 2 December 2008 (“hereinafter referred to as the Rules of the Labour 
Court”) Rule 17. 
437 S 89(2) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
438 S 89(2) of the Labour Act, 2007 read with Rule 17(4) of the Rules of the Labour Court. 
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Appeals against arbitration awards are provided for statutorily to meet with the 
constitutional requirement that arbitration tribunals be conducted in a fair manner439 
to ensure fairness. However, the Court has held that if discretion has been exercised 
at the arbitration proceedings on judicial grounds and for sound reasons that are 
without bias or caprice or the application of a wrong principle, the Labour Court will 
be very slow to interfere and substitute its own decision. The Court pointed out that it 
requires the applicant to show that the arbitration award was wrong and that the 
decision ought to have been in his favour.440 
 
The Labour Court has extensively addressed what should constitute grounds of 
appeal, for example “the question of law alone”.441 In Shoprite Namibia (Pty) Ltd v 
Faustino Moses Paulo and Others442 the Court held that the phrase “question of law 
alone” means a question of law alone without anything else present, for example, 
opinion or fact. Consequently, it was held that it is a requirement that a notice of 
appeal specify the grounds of the appeal and that the notice had to be carefully 
framed as an appellant had no right in the hearing of an appeal to rely on any 
grounds not specified in the notice of appeal. Therefore, specifying grounds of appeal 
was not a matter of form, but a matter of substance necessary to enable the appeal 
to be justly disposed of. In the case mentioned, the Court established that the 
appellant’s notice of appeal contained grounds other than questions of law alone. 
Accordingly, the Court found that there was no proper appeal before it and duly 
dismissed the appeal.  
 
In a related matter, JB Cooling and Refrigeration CC v Kastro Kavendjaa and 
Another,443 the Court found the appeal to be defective because it contained other 
grounds than the “predicative adjective” question of law alone without others present. 
Similarly, in Patrick Geilop v Commercial Investments Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Emma 
N. Nikanor (Arbitrator) NO,444 Hoff J distinguished between the questions of facts 
capable of proof and for which the subject of evidence is adduced. The judge 
439 Art 12(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution.  
440 Edgars Stores v Olivier &Another Case No LCA 67/2009 delivered 18 June 2009. 
441 S 89(1)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
442 Case No LCA 12/2010 delivered on 7 March 2011 par 3.  
443 Case No LCA 15/2010 delivered on 3 April 2012 paras7 & 8. 
444 Case No LCA 45/2011 delivered 18 November 2011 parr 12,13,14 and 16.  
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emphasised that a question of law means a question in which the true rule of law is 
to be determined. Moreover, Smut J accepted that a question of law amounts to one 
where a finding of fact made by a lower court (arbitration tribunal in this case) is one 
which no other court could reasonably have made.445 It follows that for an appeal 
application to succeed it has to meet the requirements stated above. 
 
3.19.3 REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS  
 
Section 89(4) provides that: 
 
“A party to a dispute who alleges a defect in any arbitration proceedings in terms of this 
part may apply to the Labour Court for an order reviewing and setting aside the award 
–  
(a) within 30 days after the award was served on the party, unless the alleged defect 
involves corruption; or  
(b) if the alleged defect involve corruption, within six weeks after the date that the 
applicant discovers the corruption. 
(5) A defect referred to in subsection (4) means –  
(a)  that the arbitrator – 
(i) committed misconduct in relation to the duties of an arbitrator; 
(ii)  committed gross irregularities in the conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings; or  
(iii) exceeded the arbitrator’s powers; or  
(c) that the award has been improperly obtained”.  
 
The Court446 has held that judicial review is not concerned with the decision, but with 
the decision-making process. It was required that the applicant’s grievance had to be 
against the procedure followed in the arbitration. Therefore, the onus does not rest 
on the respondent whose conduct was the subject of review (arbitrator) to justify his 
or her conduct; the onus rests on the applicant to satisfy the Court that good grounds 
exist to review the award made by the respondent. The Court stated further that a 
ground for review had to find support in section 89(4) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
Accordingly, in order to succeed with a review application, each ground raised had to 
establish a defect in the sense that a ground had to be proven on the basis of one or 
more of the items outlined in section 89(5) of the Labour Act, 2007.447 
 
445 Namibia Power Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Gerald Nantinda par 28 
446 Atlantic Chicken Company (Pty) Ltd v Philip Mwandingi and Another par5. 
447 Ibid. 
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Notwithstanding the appeal and review provisions discussed above, section 89(6) of 
the Labour Act, 2007 provides that –  
 
(6) When an appeal is noted in terms of subsection (1) or an application for review is 
made in terms of subsection (4) the appeal or review application –  
(a) operates to suspend any part of the award that is adverse to the interest of 
an employee; and 
(b) does not operate to suspend any part of the award that is adverse to the 
interest of an employee. 
 
However, section 89(7) of the Labour Act, 2007, provides relief to the employers 
against whom adverse awards have been made in that they can apply to the Labour 
Court for orders varying the effects of subsection 6. The court may, if satisfied after 
having considered various factors, make an appropriate order. The following are 
factors that the court will regard:448 
 
(a) irreparable harm that would result to the employee and employer respectively 
if the award, or any part of it, is suspended or is not suspended; 
 
(b) if the balance of irreparable harm favours neither the employer nor employee 
conclusively, determine the matter in favour of the employee.  
 
Having arrived at the appropriate decision, the court will regard section 89(9), which 
provides for it to order all or any part of the award to be suspended and to attach 
conditions to its order, including but not limited to: 
 
(i) conditions requiring the payment of a monetary award into court; or  
(j) the continuation of the employer’s obligation to pay remuneration to the 
employee pending the determination of the appeal or review, even if the 
employee is not working during that time. 
 
Section 89(10) of the Labour Act, 2007 states that if the award is set aside, the 
Labour Court may: 
 
(a) in the case of an appeal, determine the dispute in the manner it considers 
appropriate; 
(b) refer it back to the arbitrator or direct that a new arbitrator be assigned; or  
448 S 89(8)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act, 2007.  
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(c) make any order it considers appropriate about the procedure to be followed to 
determine the dispute. 
 
Parker J exhaustively describes the provision set out above in Hardap Regional 
Council v Sankwasa James Sankwasa and Another449 where the Court pointed out 
that an application for stay of an arbitration award contemplated in section 89(7) of 
the Act by its very nature qualifies as an urgent matter to be brought and heard on an 
urgent basis, unless the execution is not reasonably imminent or unless blameable 
conduct of the applicant renders it otherwise. However, in doing so, the Court will 
require that a stay application must be brought duly and promptly after becoming 
aware of the order (award). Further, that by the time the application for staying is 
filed, the appeal should be noted as a requirement for the application to stay and for 
the Court to examine the prospect of success of such an appeal.450 
 
Moreover, the Court has held that in exercising the discretion as to whether to grant 
or refuse the application for stay, relevant factors must be considered. These include 
whether the appeal is frivolous or vexatious, or that the appeal has been noted 
without genuine intentions of seeking to reverse the judgment/order/award, but for 
some indirect purpose, such as delaying tactics or as means of delaying action 
regarding the judgment/order/award. Therefore, the Court should ensure that the 
appeal, if successful, is not invalid.451 However, where the Court is satisfied that the 
appeal has been brought with bona fide intentions to seek reversal of the award, the 
court will examine the potentiality of irreparable harm to the applicant and respondent 
respectively and find where the balance lies. The Court held that such a decision 
does not replace the common law position, but embraces it.452 
 
3.20 DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN TERMS OF OTHER LABOUR RELATED 
STATUTES  
 
Section 4 of the Labour Act, 2007 provides:  
 
449 Case No LC 15/2009 delivered 28 May 2009 par 7. 
450 Namibia Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Kaeka Case No LCA 34/10 delivered 28 May 2010. 
451 Hardap Regional Council v Sankwasa J Sankwasa par 11.  
452 Ibid. 
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“if there is a conflict between a provision of this Act and a provision of a law listed In 
subsection (5), in respect of which the Minister has not made a declaration 
contemplated in subsection (3) – 
(a) the provision of that other law prevails to the extent of the conflict, if it is more 
favourable to the employee; or  
(b) the provision of this Act prevails to the extent of the conflict, in any other case. 
(5) The laws referred to in subsection (3) and (4) are – 
(a) the Apprenticeship Ordinance, 1938 (Ordinance No 12 of 1938); 
(b) the Merchant Shipping Act, 1951 (Act No57 of 1951); or  
(c) any law on the employment of persons in the service of the State”. 
 
Moreover, the Labour Act, 2007453 asserts that should a conflict arise between the 
provision of Chapter 3, relating to the basic conditions of employment, and the 
provisions of any other law, the law that provides the more favourable terms and 
conditions for the employee prevails. It is in this context that other labour-related 
legislation is discussed below in terms of its application in labour dispute resolution.  
 
3.20.1 THE MERCHANTS SHIPPING ACT, 1951 (ACT NO. 57 OF 1951) 
 
This Act applies to the owners, masters, seamen and apprentice-officers of ships.454 
Section 102 of the Act provides for entering into an employment agreement with crew 
members by the Master. The Master has the power to discharge a seaman, but 
where the seaman does not consent to his discharge, it has to be done before a 
proper officer.455 The discharged seaman must be issued with a certificate of his 
discharge and be given his certificate of competency or qualification belonging to 
him, which may have been in the custody of the Master. In the event of a wage 
dispute, the seaman is entitled to be paid his wages or the balance thereof in the 
manner directed by the proper officer.456 
 
In terms of section 355 of the Act, seamen enjoy the protection accorded by the 
Labour Act, 2007. This relates to, in particular, the right to the labour dispute 
resolution system provided in section 82 and 86 of the Labour Act, 2007.  
 
  
453 S 9(3) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
454 S 1 of the Merchants Shipping Act 57 of 1951.  
455 S 113(1) of the Merchants Shipping Act 57 of 1951.  
456 S 120 of the Merchants Shipping Act 57 of 1951. 
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3.20.2 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, 1994 (ACT NO. 34 OF 1994) 
 
The Social Security Act457 was enacted to provide for the establishment, constitution 
and powers, duties and functions of the Social Security Commission, and to provide 
for the payment of maternity-leave benefits, sick leave benefits and death benefits to 
employees. Moreover, this Act provides for the establishment of the Maternity Leave, 
Sick Leave and Death Benefits Fund to provide for the payment of medical benefits 
to employees. It also established the National Medical Benefit Fund to provide for the 
funding of training schemes for disadvantaged, unemployed persons and to establish 
for the above purpose, the Development Fund to provide for incidental matters.458 
 
Part V, section 29 of the Social Security Act of 1994 stipulates the structuring of the 
Maternity Leave, Sick Leave and Death Benefit Fund. The Fund provides maternity-
leave benefits to every female employee; sick-leave benefits to every employee; and 
death benefits to the dependants of every employee who is a member of the Fund by 
virtue of section 21 of the Act and who has complied with the provisions of that 
section.459 Employers are absolved from paying employees for sick leave to the 
extent that the employee is entitled to payment in terms of this Act if the employee is 
absent from work during any period of incapacity arising from an accident or a 
scheduled disease.460 Any dispute thereto is referred to the Labour Commissioner in 
terms of sections 84(d) and 86 of the Labour Act, 2007.  
 
Section 45 provides for appeals against any decision of the Social Security 
Commission. In terms thereof:  
 
- aggrieved persons (employees) may appeal against decisions of the 
Commission taken in the performance of their functions in terms of this Act, 
within a period of 60 days from the date he or she was notified of such 
457 Act No 34 of 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the “Social Security Act of 1994”)  
458 Preamble to the Social Security Act of 1994. 
459 S 28(4) of the Social Security Act of 1994. 
460 S 24(4) (b) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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decision, to the Labour Court established by section 117 of the Labour Act, 
2007;461 
 
- the Labour Court may, on good cause shown, condone an appeal noted 
outside the prescribed 60 days period;462 
 
- appeals herein are subject to the provisions of the Labour Act, 2007 and its 
regulations and will be deemed to be appeals from arbitration tribunals in 
terms of section 85 of the Labour Act, 2007.463 
 
3.20.3 PUBLIC SERVICE ACT, 1995 (ACT NO. 13 OF 1995)  
 
The Public Service Act464 provides for the establishment, management and efficiency 
of the Public Service, the regulation of the employment, conditions of service, 
discipline, retirement and discharge of staff members in the Public Service, and other 
incidental matters.465 Section 22 provides for the appointment of staff members to the 
Public Service on a 12-calendar- months’ probation,466 unless otherwise approved by 
the Prime Minister.467 A staff member on probation may be appointed if he or she 
successfully completes his or her probation period.468 However, the Act provides that 
a staff member serving on probation may be discharged from the Public Service 
during, on or after the expiry of the period of probation by giving him or her a month’s 
notice; or if his or her conduct is unsatisfactory, without any prior notice, but by giving 
him or her one month’s salary in lieu of such notice.469 
 
461 S 45(1) of the Social Security Act of 1994. 
462 S 45(2) of the Social Security Act of 1994. 
463 S 45(3) of the Social Security Act of 1994. 
464 Act No 13 of 1995 Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia No1121 Notice No 135. 
465 Preamble to the Public Service Act No 13 of 1995.  
466 S 22 (1) and (2) of the Public Service Act No 13 of 1995. 
467 Prime Minister of the Republic of Namibia provided for in s 5 of the Public Service Act, No 13 
of1995.  
468 S 22(3) of the Public Service Act No 13 of 1995.  
469 S 22(4) of the Public Service Act No 13 of 1995. 
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In practice, the Court470 has held that a Public Service employee on probation’s 
employment can be terminated by a notice informing him that he would not receive 
permanent appointment. In this case, the employee drove a vehicle of the employer 
under the influence of alcohol and caused an accident, resulting in damages and 
several other charges related to the driving of the vehicle without permission. The 
Public Service Act provides that if an employee on probation is guilty of serious 
misconduct, the employment can be terminated without a hearing. However, it is 
stipulated that the employee must be given the opportunity to reflect on what 
happened through completing a performance report and be advised that the 
employer is contemplating to terminate the employment. Moreover, that a valid and 
fair reason for dismissal is founded on facts, conduct and circumstances that are 
independently raised from the procedure followed, making the continuation of the 
employment relationship impossible. Consequently, the Court found that it would be 
a travesty of justice to compel the employer to reinstate or re-employ the employee. 
 
Section 25 of the Act details conduct that constitutes misconduct, followed by taking 
such disciplinary measures deemed necessary and appropriate in the circumstance 
by the permanent secretary of a particular ministry.471 All amendments to the Public 
Service Act are subject to a process of negotiation and collective bargaining with the 
representative trade unions, except for matters outside of the labour relations 
scope.472 
 
The Public Service Act No. 13 of 1995 provides recourse to legal action regarding 
anything done or omitted in terms of the Act. Such legal action against the 
Government must, however, be brought within 12 calendar months from the date on 
which the claimant had knowledge or might reasonably have been expected to have 
knowledge of what is alleged to have been done or omitted.473 This includes taking 
the Public Service (Government) to an arbitration tribunal in disputes of non-
compliance with the Public Service Act.474 
 
470 HS Limbo v Ministry of Labour Case No LCA 01/08. 
471 S 26 of the Public Service Act No 13 of 1995.  
472 S 32 of the Public Service Act No 13 of 1995.  
473 S 33 of the Public Service Act No 13 of 1995. 
474 Act No 13 of 1995.  
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The Act475 makes provision for regulations relating to: 
 
(a) the manner of and conditions, including contracts of employment, for the 
appointment, promotion and transfer of staff members; 
 
(b) the discipline, powers and duties, and hours of attendance of staff members; 
 
(c) conditions of service and entitlement, including the occupation of official 
quarters, of staff members and members of the services; 
 
(d) the establishment and management of and control over a medical-aid 
scheme for the Public Service; 
 
(e) the circumstances under which medical examination shall be required for the 
purpose of this Act, and the form of medical report and certificates so 
required; 
 
(f) the procedure to be observed in the process of negotiations and collective 
bargaining with recognised trade unions; 
 
(g) the procedure to be observed in investigating and dealing with grievance of 
staff members; 
 
(h) a code of conduct with which staff members shall comply; 
 
(i) any matter which in terms of this Act is required or permitted to be 
prescribed; 
 
(j) generally, any matter in respect of which the Prime Minister, on 
recommendation of the Commission, considers it necessary or expedient to 
make regulations in order to achieve the object of this Act.  
 
  
475 S 34(1) of the Public Service Act No 13 of 1995.  
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3.20.4 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (EMPLOYMENT) ACT, 1998 (ACT NO. 29 OF 
1998)  
 
This Act was promulgated476 to ensure the achievement of equal opportunities in 
employment in the pursuance of Articles 10 and 23 of the Namibian Constitution. The 
Act provides for the establishment of the Employment Equity Commission; to redress, 
through appropriate affirmative-action plans, the conditions of disadvantages in 
employment experienced by persons in designated groups arising from past 
discriminatory laws and practices; and to institute procedures to contribute towards 
the elimination of discrimination in employment and to provide for matters incidental 
thereto.477 
 
Disputes between employees, their representatives and relevant employers arising 
from non-compliance with the Affirmative Action Act, 1998 are to be brought to the 
attention of the Employment Equity Commission 478  by the allegedly aggrieved 
party.479 The Equity Commission will, if deemed necessary, refer the complaint or 
dispute to the Labour Commissioner for conciliation480 or arbitration481 as provided 
for in sections 45 and 46 of the Affirmative Action Act, 1998.  
 
3.21 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter extensively discussed the labour dispute resolution reforms that exited  
from colonial South West Africa to the present practices. It become crystal clear that 
before independence, Namibia was under various colonial rulers with fragmented 
labour legislations deployed to discriminate against and exploit black workers. 
Moreover, the prevailing legislation provided no machineries for labour dispute 
resolution to black workers except for criminal sanctions for breach of contracts of 
employment.  
 
476 Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia No1962 Notice 242. 
477 Preamble to the Affirmative Action Act, 1998(hereinafter referred to as the “Affirmative Action 
Act,1998).   
478 Hereinafter referred to as the “Equity Commission”. 
479 S 45(1) of the Affirmative Action Act, 1998. 
480 Ss 81(b) and 82 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
481 Ss 84(b) and 86 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
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It was the findings of the Wiehahn Commission Namibia that resulted in the adoption 
of the all inclusive post-independence 1992 Labour Act. This Act made conciliation 
boards and District Labour Courts available as machineries for labour dispute 
resolution. However, the system could not stand the demands of the labour market; 
hence its overhaul, leading to the introduction of the ADR system of conciliation and 
arbitration under the Labour Commissioner and adjudication in the Labour Courts. 
Conciliation and arbitration have been widely embraced in Namibia; however, it is 
complicated by legal technicalities leading to appeals or reviews by the Labour Court. 
 
The provisions of other labour-related statutes were discussed to show their 
relevance and reach in relation to labour-dispute resolution. Essentially, where these 
statutes provide for better conditions of employment they will prevail, otherwise the 
conditions set out in the Labour Act, 2007 prevail in all labour matters. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
South Africa’s labour relations system has evolved over time. Its origin can be traced 
to the discovery of diamonds and gold, which later developed as the mining sector.1 
The development of the mining sector led to rapid urbanisation, industrialisation and 
uncontrolled labour unrest that required some sort of regulation. 
 
The turmoil created labour unrest in the mining sector, leading to the enactment of 
the first comprehensive piece of legislation, the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924. 
The Act provided for the regulation of labour relations and for dispute resolution 
between trade unions and employers, who were predominately white. 2  African 
workers were excluded from its application.3 Various other acts were promulgated in 
an attempt to stabilise the ongoing discontent, but to no avail. As a result, the 
Government enacted the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956, which repealed most 
of the prevailing statutes. This statute further entrenched the racial division of 
workers by prohibiting the registration of black and mixed trade unions.4 
 
With the growth of a dualistic labour relations system and the inevitable socio-political 
turbulence, the Wiehahn Commission was appointed to rationalise the existing labour 
legislation, which led to significant reforms that are considered a watershed in the 
history of the South African labour relations system.5 
 
Before November 1996, labour litigation took place in the erstwhile Industrial Court 
and in the Labour Appeal Court, established as a result of the Wiehahn 
Commission’s recommendations. The resolution of labour disputes under the LRA 
1956 was complex, inefficient, protracted, expensive and highly legalistic. 6  This 
system was eliminated with the demise of these tribunals in 1995.7 The democratic, 
rational and all inclusive LRA 66 of 1995 was enacted and this Act contemplated the 
1 Venter and Levy Labour Relations in South Africa 4th ed (2011) 34. 
2 Grogan Collective Labour Law (2010) 3. 
3 Grogan Collective Labour Law 4. 
4 S 4(6) of the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. 
5 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 10thed (2010) 35. 
6 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 1. 
7 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 2. 
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introduction of inexpensive, accessible, expeditious and simple dispute resolution 
mechanisms.8 The LRA established a tailor-made dispute resolution institution that 
operates separately from the ordinary courts. This institution, the CCMA, is described 
as an administrative tribunal and was conceived to resolve some, but not all, labour 
disputes. 9  The CCMA performs its functions by way of conciliation and when 
conciliation fails, by arbitration.10 Arbitration awards made pursuant to the arbitration 
process under the LRA are final and binding11 and may be enforced as if they were 
orders of the Labour Court.12 Besides the CCMA, the LRA established specialised 
Labour Courts to adjudicate labour disputes.13 
 
The LRA does not provide for appeal rights against an arbitration award issued by 
the CCMA. However, the LRA permits review to the Labour Court based on 
allegations of “defect”, thereby setting aside the award.14 The LRA operates within 
the dictates of the Constitution of the Republic of South Arica and was enacted to 
give effect to and regulate the constitutional rights pertaining to fair labour 
practices.15 
 
In the framework of the aforementioned, this chapter analyses and discusses the 
historical development of the South African labour dispute resolution system leading 
up to the end of the dualistic system that operated during the apartheid era. 
Thereafter, an analysis of the constitutional labour provisions is provided, followed by 
a further detailed analysis of the dispute resolution system under the auspices of the 
CCMA and the Labour Court. The chapter concludes with an overview of other labour 
related statutes. 
 
 
 
8 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 1. See also s 1(d)(iv) of the LRA 66 of 1995.  
9 Ss 112 and 115 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
10 Ibid. 
11 S143 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
12 S 145 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
13 Ss 151 and 167 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
14 S 145(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
15 S 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Arica. 
165 
                                                             
4. 2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR
 RELATIONS SYSTEM 
 
South Africa’s labour relations system has its origin in the discovery of diamonds and 
gold, which consequently developed as the mining sector.16 The development of the 
mining sector led to rapid urbanisation and industrialisation.17 There were two types 
of labour available at the mines: the unskilled and inexperienced, mainly black 
Africans and the skilled mine workforce brought in from countries abroad, such as 
Britain and Australia, due to the unavailability of their skills in the country.18 
 
As the mining sector started growing it caused an acute demand for unskilled labour, 
which the black population was hesitant to engage in because of their dependency 
on subsistence farming. This was addressed by the Kruger Government’s formation 
of the Chamber of Mines, which aimed to force black African workers to the mines in 
an attempt to alleviate the acute shortage of unskilled labour, thereby creating a 
ready labour supply.19 The black African workers gradually became skilled and were 
reinforced with Chinese labourers after the Anglo-Boer War. This created fear among 
the skilled white workforce. The result was a violent strike by the skilled white 
workforce in fear of competition, increased poverty among whites and the erosion of 
the colour bar.20 
 
This situation led to the turmoil of labour unrest, with white workers calling on 
Government to actively protect their interests. Government responded by passing the 
Mines and Works Act,21 which provided for the exclusion of non-Europeans from 
certain kinds of work. Although the Act brought about greater safety and working 
conditions on the mines, it was highly discriminatory in its creation due to job-
16 Venter and Levy Labour Relations in South Africa 34. 
17 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 23. 
18 Cunningham and Slabbert “The Historical Development of South African Industrial Relations” in 
Slabbert, Prinsloo and Becker (eds) Managing Industrial Relation in South Africa (1990) 4. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Williams South Africa’s War against Capitalism (1989) 51. 
21 Act 12 of 1911. 
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reservation for skilled white workers only and its exclusion of skilled African workers 
from these jobs.22 
 
Meanwhile, the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 was passed, which made it a 
crime for African workers to break their contracts of employment on the mines or 
refuse to obey any lawful command from their employer or his representative. The 
statute further prohibited strikes on the mines.23 However, despite this prohibition, 
labour unrest intensified. The situation highlighted the need for a conciliatory 
framework to regulate the increasing conflict.24 Subsequently, the Industrial Dispute 
Prevention Act25 was passed to assist in the prevention of strikes and lockouts. The 
Act provided for the settlement of any disputes by conciliation after investigation of 
these disputes.26 
 
The Industrial Dispute Prevention Act required the parties in an employment 
relationship to give a month’s notice for any change in working conditions. However, 
in the event of deadlock, no strike or lockout was permitted until the dispute was 
thoroughly investigated by a government-appointed conciliation board and then only 
after a month had elapsed after the publication of the board’s report. The Act did not 
regard a labour dispute involving fewer than 10 workers as a ground to appoint a 
conciliation board. Where a conciliation board was constituted, its finding was binding 
only if both parties agreed to the settlement.27 
 
Given the inadequacy of the Industrial Dispute Prevention Act, a Mining Capital 
Policy was introduced to supplement it. The Policy provided for the substitution of 
unskilled black labour for white labour and, equally, white unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour by black labour on the basis that it was cheap. A decrease in the price of gold 
led to the introduction of drastic measures to cut costs. These measures included 
replacing costly white workers with cheap black labour, wage cuts, changing working 
22 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 26. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 36. 
25 Act 20 of 1909. 
26 Davies “From Contract to Administrative Law- The Changing Face of South African law” in 
Visser (ed) Essays on the History of Law (1989) 82. 
27 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 36. 
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conditions and included massive retrenchments.28 The white workforce responded by 
embarking on the Rand Revolt of 1922. This resulted in an unsuccessful armed 
insurrection staged in support of their demands to maintain racial job reservations 
and to protest against dismissals.29 Grogan30 submits that the participants of that riot 
were put down with some vigour by the Prime Minister, General Smuts. Grogan 
argues that even at that early stage, Government acknowledged that labour 
discontent could not be controlled by using extreme force.31 
 
4.2.1 THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT 11 OF 1924 
 
The tumult of the Rand Revolt led to the first comprehensive piece of labour 
legislation of national application,32 the Industrial Conciliation Act,33 introduced by 
General Smuts’ government. The Act provided for the registration of employers’ 
organisations and trade unions, which excluded pass-bearing Africans and 
indentured Indian workers.34 The Act established a collective bargaining framework 
through industrial councils and conciliation boards, which were utilised by agreement 
between employers and trade unions.35 Industrial councils were envisaged as being 
self-governing.  
 
The Minister of Labour was empowered to gazette the agreement reached by the 
parties, making it legally binding. Where it was deemed appropriate, the Minister had 
the power to extend the agreement to all employers and employees within the 
jurisdiction of the council. 36  Non-compliance thereto was enforced by criminal 
sanction,37 thus compelling parties to settle disputes between them.38 
 
28 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 37. 
29 Benjamin “The Challenge of Labour Law Reform in South Africa” (2009) 240. 
30 Grogan Collective Labour Law 3. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Benjamin “The Challenge of Labour Law Reform in South Africa” 240. 
33 Act 11 of 1924. 
34 Grogan Collective Labour Law 4. 
35 S 2(1) of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924. 
36 S 9(1)(b) of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924. 
37 S 9(3) of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924. 
38 Ss 9(1)(a) and 2(1) of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924. 
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The Industrial Conciliation Act also created an ad hoc conciliation board for 
bargaining and dispute resolution. However, the Minister had to be satisfied that the 
parties were sufficiently representative before appointing a conciliation board. 39  
Agreements arising from conciliation boards had the same effects as Industrial 
Council agreements.40 
 
The other significant feature of the Industrial Conciliation Act was its focus on 
collective labour rights or disputes rather than individual disputes.41 The resolution of 
individual rights or disputes was only provided for in the Wages Act 42 that was 
enacted and promulgated in the following year.  
 
The Wages Act provided for the unilateral determination of wages and working 
conditions in the absence of agreements under the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. The key feature of the Act was its support for voluntary centralised 
collective bargaining between the parties and organised labour (mainly white 
workers).43 Black African workers were excluded from the definition of employee and 
hence the Act’s application. Consequently, they were excluded from membership of 
registered trade unions, representation on industrial councils and from using 
conciliation boards.44 
 
Racial segregation was entrenched in the Wages Act, thereby perpetuating the 
exclusion of black workers from the mainstream of industrial relations. The exclusion 
was accompanied by racially-based job reservations that prevented black African 
workers from obtaining key qualifications, notably “blasting certificates” that were an 
essential requirement for a supervisory position in the mine.45 This situation meant 
that African workers could only be employed on terms inferior to those set by 
39 S 4 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924. 
40 S 9(3) of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924. See also Du Toit et al Labour Relation Law 
6. 
41 S 2(1) of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924, restricted the dispute settlement function of 
industrial councils to the parties. While in certain circumstances conciliation boards could be 
appointed for certain disputes involving individual employees (s 4(1). 
42 Wages Act 27 of 1925. 
43 Grogan Collective Labour Law 4. 
44 Grogan Collective Labour Law 7. 
45 Benjamin “The Challenge of Labour Law Reform in South Africa” 240. 
169 
                                                             
industrial councils or conciliation boards.46 This state of affairs47 ultimately created a 
dualistic industrial relations system that entrenched racial separation as a dominant 
feature of South Africa’s labour relations for decades and remained largely intact until 
the end of the apartheid era.48 
 
4.2.2 VAN REENEN AND BOTHA COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, labour unrest and persistent disruptive 
strikes49 led to the appointment of both the Van Reenen Commission of 1935 and the 
Botha Commission of 1948 to 1950.50 
 
The Van Reenen Commission highlighted a number of concerns. First, that the 
Industrial Conciliation Act did not provide for National Councils, therefore the 
commission proposed the establishment of National Councils with national scope. 
Second, the commission observed the wider wage gap between skilled (mainly 
white) and unskilled (mainly African) workers. The Commission noted that these 
wage gaps were entrenched in council agreements, while in others the agreements 
excluded workers in the lower grades.51 Third, the commission noted the widespread 
non-compliance with agreements, although without any deterrent sanctions. 
 
In response to the Van Reenen report, Government enacted a consolidated statute, 
the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937.52 Although this statute repealed the 1924 Act, 
it did not make major changes and had very little impact on the labour relations 
system.53 Therefore, it did not solve the major problems inherent in the dual industrial 
relations caused by its predecessor. The new Act created a provision for a labour 
inspector from the Department of Labour to attend industrial councils meetings to 
46 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 7. 
47 Godfrey, Maree, Du Toit and Theron Collective Bargaining in South Africa- Past, Present and 
Future (2010)44. 
48 Benjamin “The Challenge of Labour Law Reform in South Africa” 241. 
49 Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck Principles of Labour Law 3rded (2005) 7.  
50 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 46. 
51 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 47. 
52 Act No 36 of 1937. 
53 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 48. 
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represent unorganised and African workers,54 thus watching over the interest of the 
“pass-bearing” workers.55 
 
The National Party government assumed power in South Africa in 1948 on an 
unashamedly racist platform, which included the complete separation of the race 
groups and the relegation of Africans to political dependency. 56  Soon after the 
National Party government came to power, it appointed the Botha Commission to 
examine existing labour legislation in order to bring it in line with its policy of 
apartheid.57 The Commission noted the continued wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers remained a problem and pointed out that the attendance of labour 
inspectors at industrial councils’ negotiations had been ineffectual.58 
 
Based on the Commission’s findings, it recommended the establishment of a 
coordinating body as an alternative, to which all industrial councils’ agreements 
would be submitted for scrutiny prior to their referral to the Minister59 for ratification 
and extension in the industry.60 The intention was to take into account the interest of 
all the parties concerned, namely the employer and employees party to the draft 
agreement, including non-parties directly affected by the draft agreement and 
including the general public. It was envisaged that doing so would achieve 
coordinated wages and improved conditions of employment.61 
 
Government did not immediately act on the Commission’s report. Its priority was 
rather to enforce the apartheid system, which led to a number of legislative changes 
that had a bearing on the industrial relations system.62 This included the enactment 
of the Native Law Amendment Act,63 which extended influx control to African women, 
thereby closing the loophole that allowed them the status of employees in terms of 
54 Ibid. 
55 Grogan et al Collective Labour Law 4. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 50. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 51. 
60 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 8. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 51. 
63 Act 54 of 1952. 
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the Industrial Conciliation Act.64 Consequently, African women were forced to resign 
from registered trade unions and their right to direct representation on Industrial 
Councils was taken away.65 
 
Another statute that the Government immediately enacted was the Native Labour 
Settlement of Disputes Act.66 The Act introduced a very circumscribed system of 
consultative committees, namely plant-based workers’ committees, regional native 
labour committees and central native labour boards.67 This separate dispensation for 
African workers was created as an alternative to collective bargaining in Industrial 
Councils.68 The ultimate aim was to ensure that trade unions for African workers 
would die a natural death.69 
 
4.2.3 THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT 28 OF 1956 
 
Although the enactment of the Industrial Conciliation Act repealed the 1937 Act, it 
failed to provide for the proposed coordinating body recommended by the Botha 
Commission. 70  The National Party government largely ignored the problems 
identified by the Botha Commission, including the aberration the Industrial Council 
system was causing in the labour market. Instead, Government refined its system of 
apartheid.71 Apart from the statute’s racial divide, it established an Industrial Tribunal 
with powers to investigate and arbitrate disputes referred to it by the Industrial 
Council or conciliation boards. The Tribunal had powers to hear appeals from 
decisions of the registrar, arbitrate disputes emanating from essential service and 
determine disputes.72 It further had jurisdiction to make recommendations on the 
desirability of “job reservation” determinations.73 Grogan74 submits that it was this 
64 Act 36 of 1937. 
65 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 51. 
66 Act 48 of 1953. 
67 Ss 3,4 and 7 of the Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act 48 of 1953. 
68 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 8. 
69 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 52. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 53. 
72 Grogan Collective Labour Law 4. 
73 S 17 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. 
74 Grogan Collective Labour Law 4. 
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modest beginning that later developed into the Industrial Court, the CCMA, Labour 
Court and the Labour Appeal Court. 
 
The entrenchment of apartheid did not go unopposed. In the 1950s there was a 
considerable increase in political militancy on the part of the black population and a 
small but active minority of white people associated with the African National 
Congress.75 The increased state repression culminated in the Sharpeville massacre 
of 1960, where at least 69 innocent people were killed.76 More actions were taken by 
the state, which led to the banning of the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress.77 
The ANC responded by turning to an armed struggle with the launch of Umkhoto-we-
Sizwe (MK) in 1961. This was followed by mass arrests and increased repressive 
measures, thus this is described as the darkest decade in the history of South 
Africa.78 
 
4.2.4 THE WIEHAHN COMMISSION REFORMS 
 
The years 1973 to 1977 signalled the growth of a dualistic labour relations system, 
during which black workers, because of their lack of power base, were restricted to 
mainly employer-initiated committees without any bargaining power. This situation 
continued despite the amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1977. Although 
the amended Act recognised agreements negotiated by committees, it was still 
impossible to enforce the resultant agreement in the event of a dispute with the 
employer. 79  By the late 1970s, the dual system of labour relations had proved 
unworkable.80 It became obvious that the provisions of the Black Labour Relations 
Regulation of 1973 had not addressed the problem of black workers’ militancy.  
 
As a result, South Africa’s image created investment doubts with its major trading 
partners, who became concerned about the position of black workers. Various 
75 Hereinafter referred to as the “ANC”. 
76 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 43. 
77 Hereinafter referred to as the “PAC”. 
78 Godfrey et al Labour Relations in South Africa 43. 
79 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 34. 
80 Du Toit Labour Relations Law 10. 
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representations were made to overseas bodies by local trade unions.81 There were 
international calls for sanctions and disinvestment in South Africa82 and Government 
recognised the need to improve the climate and its image in the eyes of the 
international community.83 The backdrop of the socio-political turbulence proved to 
be a key turning point for South African labour relations.84 It led to the appointment of 
a Commission of Inquiry, headed by Professor Nicholas Wiehahn, to investigate the 
status of black workers within the labour relations legislation system.85 
 
Bendix86 submits that the Commission’s original brief was to “rationalise the existing 
labour legislation; to seek where possible means of adapting the industrial relations 
system to changing needs and to… eliminate bottlenecks and other problems 
experienced in the labour sphere”. Bendix argues, however, that although the 
aforesaid may have been the framework of reference, in retrospect, it appeared 
highly probable that the Commission was specifically instructed to consider a method 
that will control black trade unions and to incorporate them into the industrial relations 
system without creating great disruption.87 
 
The Commission reported its findings in early 1979 and made significant proposals 
including, inter alia, that: 
 
• full freedom of association be granted to all employees regardless of race, 
sex and creed; 
 
• trade unions, irrespective of composition in terms of colour, race or sex, be 
allowed to register; 
 
• stricter criteria be adopted for trade unions’ registration; 
 
81 Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 5thed (2010) 77. 
82 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 34. 
83 Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 77. 
84 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 44. 
85 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 34. 
86 Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 77. 
87 Ibid. 
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• a system of financial inspection of trade unions be introduced; 
 
• prohibition of political activities by trade unions be extended; 
 
• liaison committees be renamed as workers councils; 
 
• where no industrial councils had jurisdiction, workers’ councils and workers’ 
committees be granted full collective bargaining rights; 
 
• statutory job reservation be phased out; 
 
• safeguards be introduced to protect minorities previously protected by job 
reservations; 
 
• the Industrial Tribunal be replaced by the Industrial Court; 
 
• fair employment practices be developed by the Industrial Court; and 
 
• a tripartite National Manpower Commission be established. 
 
The Wiehahn Commission was considered to be a watershed in the history of the 
South African labour relations system.88 Government was hesitant to consider all the 
recommendations of the Commission and responded with caution.89 The result was 
the introduction of a number of amendments taking into account some of the 
Commission’s recommendations, while rejecting or diluting others.90 
 
The most significant feature of the amendments included the following: 
 
• All migrants and commuters were excluded from the new definition of 
“employee”, thus denying a large number of workers access to the Industrial 
Conciliation machinery. 
 
88 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 57. 
89 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 35. 
90 The amendments includes: The Industrial Conciliation Amendments Acts 94 of 1979 and 95 of 
1980, and the Labour Relations Amendments Acts 57 of 1981, 51 of 1982 and 2 of 1983. 
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• Provisional registration of trade unions was at the discretion of the registrar, 
who also had the power to withdraw registration without giving reasons. 
 
• Registration of mixed trade unions was still forbidden, except in specific 
cases allowed by the Minister, which only happened during the 1980s.91 
 
The amendments also heralded the launch of the Industrial Court, which commenced 
functioning in 1980. The Court was empowered to arbitrate matters referred to it by 
Conciliation Boards under the guideline of unfair labour practice.92 The Industrial 
Court was granted a remarkably wide discretion in interpreting the concept of “unfair 
labour practice”. Unfair labour practice was first defined as93 “any labour practice 
which in the opinion of the Industrial Court is an unfair labour practice”. 
 
In terms of its “unfair labour practice” jurisdiction, the Industrial Court began eroding 
the past discriminatory practices that were regarded as part of the national order in 
South Africa. In the same manner, it lay down and developed the principle of fair 
collective bargaining and protected collective rights.94 The Industrial Court premised 
its functioning on a distinction between “disputes of rights” and “disputes of interest”. 
Disputes of interest were considered unsuitable for adjudication and were thus left to 
the parties to resolve by negotiation and, ultimately, through the exercise of power.95 
However, as for justiciable or arbitrable disputes commonly accepted as “disputes of 
rights”, the Industrial Court used the “unfair labour practice” concept to fashion and 
develop an extensive body of law on individual employment rights as well as 
collective labour law. A coherent system of labour law was developed in South Africa, 
leading to freedom.96 
 
 
 
 
91 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 57. 
92 Grogan Collective Labour Law 5. 
93 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979. 
94 Grogan Collective Labour Law 5. 
95 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 11. 
96 Ibid. 
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 4.2.5 THE LABOUR RELATIONS AMENDMENT ACT 83 OF 1988 
 
The Labour Relations Amendment Act codified the concept of “unfair labour practice” 
and included unprocedural strikes and lockouts in the definition of unfair labour 
practice. The Act permitted the Industrial Court to grant interdicts to prohibit actions 
that constituted unfair labour practices. The Act further introduced a presumption of 
liability on the part of trade unions, office bearers and officials for damages caused 
by unlawful industrial action. A Labour Appeal Court was also introduced by the 
statute, presided over by Supreme Court Judges.97 
 
The amendment had serious implications for workers’ and trade unions. Employers, 
on the other hand, took advantage of utilising interdicts against unlawful strikes held 
to be unfair, while the Labour Court prolonged the finalisation of disputes to the 
detriment of workers.98 This caused massive opposition, stay-aways and political 
protests from organised labour mobilised by the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions99 and other political organisations. As a result, organised labour and the 
Employers’ Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs agreed to meet with 
Government to discuss the crisis.100 The discussion led to the withdrawal of the 
presumed liability of trade unions for unlawful strikes and the codification of the 
“unfair labour practice” concept.101 This historic meeting paved the way for all future 
negotiations as it was resolved that any future changes to the labour legislation 
should be negotiated collectively by social partners. 
 
These progressive developments in the labour arena and other political influences 
were followed by the unbanning of the African National Congress.102 Nelson Mandela 
and other political leaders were released from prison and emergency restrictions 
were lifted, leading to the dawn of a new political era. 103  Government finally 
97 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 14. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Hereinafter referred to as “COSATU”. 
100 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 15. 
101 Grogan Collective Labour Law 6. 
102 The ANC. 
103 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 15. 
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recognised the agreement reached between COSATU, the National Council of Trade 
Unions104 and the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs,105 which 
was officially named the “Laboria Minutes of 14 September 1990”.106 
 
4.2.6 THE OLD DUALISTIC SYSTEM’S SHORTCOMINGS  
 
The dispute settlement agencies under the old dispensation, namely the Industrial 
Council, Conciliation Board and Industrial Court, proved to be unequal to their task. 
Industrial Councils and Conciliation Boards had miserable records, with a 20 percent 
success rate for conciliation boards and a 30 percent success rate for Industrial 
Councils.107 These poor success rates were accompanied by a number of negative 
consequences. First, the failure of the statutory machineries to make headway in 
reducing adversarialism in industrial relations; similarly, the cumbersome procedures 
for settling disputes contributed to a high rate of strikes and lockouts. Second, the 
poor performance of Conciliation Boards and Industrial Councils added to the case-
load of the poorly resourced and inadequately staffed Industrial Courts, which 
resulted in an enormous backlog of cases.108 
 
The Industrial Court was therefore not the ideal institution for settling disputes quickly 
and inexpensively. This was because its focus was more on adjudication and rule-
making after the manifestation of the dispute than proactive intervention.109 Disputes 
often got bogged down in technicalities and the associated costs of litigation made 
the Court relatively inaccessible to individuals and small businesses. In addition, the 
cumbersome process of appeal, the two levels of appeal of the Labour Appeal Court 
and the Appellate Division, caused several years of waiting for the outcome of 
litigation.110 
 
104  Hereinafter referred to as “NACTU”. 
105  Herein after referred to as “ SACCOLA”. 
106 Finnemore et al Contemporary Labour Relations 34.  
107 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 22. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
178 
                                                             
The above was the state of labour law up to 1994, when South Africa’s apartheid 
regime became a fully democratic constitutional order.111 Given the role played by 
trade unions in bringing down apartheid and the rapid and large-scale movement 
from trade unions’ leaders into politics and government, it is not surprising that trade 
unions contributed immensely to giving full attention to labour rights in the new 
dispensation.112 
 
4.3 CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR LAW PROVISIONS 
 
Following the 1994 elections, the Government of National Unity undertook a 
comprehensive reformation of South Africa’s labour policy, which historically reflected 
the racial disparities and inequalities of the apartheid era.113 Government envisaged 
a comprehensive legal framework that would give effect to various constitutionally 
entrenched labour rights and regulate all facets of labour relationships. The intention 
was to create an environment free from conflict that is conducive to and promotes 
harmonious labour relations.114 
 
To this end, section 23 of the South African Constitution is titled “Labour Relations” 
and establishes a set of broad labour rights that accrue to a variety of parties in 
employment, including, but not limited to, employers and workers and their 
representative organisations.115 
 
Section 23 provides as follows: 
 
“labour relations: 
(1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
(2) Every worker has the right –  
(a) to form and join a trade union; 
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union and  
(c) to strike. 
(3) Every employer has the right – 
(a) to form and join an employers’ organisation; and  
111 Grogan Collective Labour Law 6. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 179. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor, Smit and Van Eck 2nded (2012) Law@Work 35. 
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(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers’ 
organisation. 
(4) Every trade union and every employers’ organisation has the right – 
(a) to determine its own administration, programmes and activities; 
(b) to organize; and  
(c) to form and join a federation. 
(5) Every trade union, employers’ organisation and employers has the right to 
engage in collective bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate 
collective bargaining. To the extent that legislation may limit a right in this 
Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36 (1). 
(6) National legislation may recognize union security arrangements contained in 
collective agreements. To the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this 
chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1)”. 
 
Section 23 of the Constitution guarantees labour rights and the rights to fair 
labour practices. This section is regarded as the most important for the 
application of law in the workplace.116 However, there are other sections of the 
Constitution that have an impact on labour relations, including the right to freedom 
of association guaranteed by section 18. In the National Union of Metal Workers 
of SA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd117 the Constitutional Court118 held that freedom of 
association will be impaired or negatively affected where workers are not 
permitted to have their own trade union representing them in workplace discipline 
and grievance issues, but are instead required to be represented by a rival union 
that they have not chosen to join. 
 
Section 22 enshrines the right of all citizens to choose their trade, occupation and 
profession freely. Another provision is found in section 9 of the Constitution, which 
provides for equality and freedom from discrimination. This provision creates a 
framework for any discussion of employment equity, discrimination in employment 
and even affirmative action.119 
 
Besides these fundamental rights, section 33 of the Constitution provides for fair 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair as has been 
116 Van der Walt, Le Roux and Govindjee Labour Law in Context (2012) 5. 
117 NUMSA V Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) BCLR 182 (CC); 2003 (3) SA 513 (CC). 
118 Hereinafter referred to as the “CC”. 
119 Basson, Christianson, Dekker, Garbes, Le Roux, Mischke and Strydom Essential Labour Law 
5thed (2009) 11. 
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highlighted in a number of cases120 that have examined the relationship between 
labour law and administrative law.121 
 
Section 8 of the Constitution, on the other hand, provides ways in which 
fundamental rights that are protected by the Constitution are to be applied: 
 
“Application 
(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or a juristic person in 
terms of subsection (2) a court – 
(a) In order to give effect to a right in the Bill of Rights, must apply, or if 
necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not 
give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right provided that the 
limitation is in accordance with section 36(1). 
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required 
by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person”. 
 
The fundamental rights provided for in the Bill of Rights are not absolute and may be 
limited. However, this limitation must comply with the provisions of section 36 of the 
Constitution, which sets out the conditions that must be complied with before a 
fundamental right can be limited.  
 
Section 36 reads:  
 
“Limitation of rights: 
(1) The right in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors including-  
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”. 
 
120 Such cases includes but not limited to: Sidumo& Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & 
Others[2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC); Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Other [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) and 
Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security and Others [2009] 12 BLLR 1145 (CC). 
121 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 35. 
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Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no 
law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
 
Premised on the above, constitutional rights have the potential to affect labour law in 
three ways.122 They can be used to: 
 
• test the validity of legislation that seeks to give effect to fundamental 
rights;123 
• interpret legislation enacted to give effect to fundamental rights;124 
• develop the common law.125 
 
4.4 SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS   
 
Article 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that customary 
international law is law in the Republic, unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution 
or an Act of Parliament. Further, Article 233 requires that “when interpreting any 
legislation, every Court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation 
that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law”. 
 
Moreover, Article 39 of the Constitution places a premium on the value of 
international law in relation to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Given this 
provision, the Constitutional Court (CC) continues to make specific reference to ILO 
standards, for example, in SA National Defense Union v Minister of Defense & 
Another126 the Court made specific reference to Article 2 of Convention 87127 and, in 
122 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 36. 
123 In SA National Defense Union v Minister of Defense& Another (1999) 29 ILJ 2265 (CC), the 
Constitutional Court considered whether the absence of a justiciable duty to bargain in the LRA 
infringed the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining.    
124 In Sidumo& Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others, the Constitutional Court relied 
on the constitutional right to fair labour practices to define the role of the CCMA Commissioners 
when they make decisions on fair sanctions for misconduct.  
125 In Old Mutual Life Assurance Co-SA Ltd v Gambi [2007] 8BLLR 699 (SCA)the Supreme Court 
of Appeal held that the common-law contract of employment has been developed in accordance 
with the Constitution to include the right to a pre-dismissal hearing.  
126 (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC). 
127 The Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No 87). 
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particular, its provision that workers and employers without distinction have the right 
to establish and join organisations of their own choosing without prior authorisation. 
The Court further referred to Article 9 of the same Convention, which extends these 
rights to the armed forces and the police to the extent determined by national laws 
and regulations. 
 
In the above case, the Court concluded that the convention, which South Africa has 
ratified and is binding on it, included armed forces within its scope. It further pointed 
out that the ILO has specifically considered members of the armed forces to be 
workers for the purpose of the Convention. Consequently, the Court struck down the 
statutory prohibition on union activity and membership contained in Defence Force 
legislation as unconstitutional.  
 
In another related case, NUMSA & Others v Bader BOP (Pty) Ltd & Another,128 the 
CC had to consider the right of a minority trade union to strike in support of a demand 
that the employer recognises the union’s shop steward. The Court upheld the appeal 
and affirmed the union’s right to strike. The decision was based largely on the 
interpretation of Conventions 87 and 98,129 both relating to the right of minority 
unions and the right to strike.  
 
In the recent case of Minister of Defence & Others v SA National Defence Force 
Union & Others,130 the Supreme Court of Appeal131 considered the provisions of ILO 
Conventions 87, 98 and 154 to decide on the duty to bargain with reference to the 
obligation to promote voluntary collective bargaining. The Court concluded that the 
LRA did not infringe the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining by 
failing to incorporate a compulsion to bargain.  
 
The LRA extends specific recognition to the international law obligation incurred by 
South Africa by virtue of its membership of the ILO. Section 1 of the LRA provides: 
128 [2003] 2 BLLR 103 (CC). 
129 The Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (C98).   
130 (2006) 27 ILJ 2276 (SCA). 
131 Hereinafter referred to as the “SCA”. 
183 
                                                             
“The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour 
peace and the democratization of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of this 
Act, which are 
… 
(b)  to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the 
International Labour Organization;…” 
 
Section 3 of the LRA further states: 
 
Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions - 
(a) to give effect to its primary objects; 
(b) in compliance with the Constitution; and  
(c) in compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic.  
 
The Labour Court has not only limited itself to conventions and recommendations as 
its only ILO frames of references. In Modemany v Unilevar PLC & Another,132 the 
Labour Court held that it was obliged to consider the ILO Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprise and Social Policy although it is not binding on 
member states. The Court relied on this declaration to determine a jurisdictional 
issue in a dismissal dispute where the employer was a multinational enterprise.  
 
Since becoming a member of the ILO, South Arica has ratified a number of ILO 
conventions.    
 
4.4.1 RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS  
 
Fundamental 
Convention Date Status 
C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) 05 Mar 1997  In Force  
C087 - Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) 
19 Feb 1996  In Force  
C098 - Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) 
19 Feb 1996  In Force  
C100 - Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 
(No. 100) 
30 Mar 2000  In Force  
C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 05 Mar 1997  In Force  
132 [2006] 12 BLLR 1167(LC). 
184 
                                                             
Convention Date Status 
1957 (No. 105) 
C111 - Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) 
05 Mar 1997  In Force  
C138 - Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 
138)Minimum age specified: 15 years 
30 Mar 2000  In Force  
C182 - Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 
1999 (No. 182) 
07 Jun 2000  In Force  
Governance (Priority) 
Convention Date Status 
C144 - Tripartite Consultation (International 
Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144) 
18 Feb 2003  In Force  
Technical 
Convention Date Status 
C002 - Unemployment Convention, 1919 (No. 2) 20 Feb 1924  In Force  
C004 - Night Work (Women) Convention, 1919 
(No. 4) 
01 Nov 1921  Denunciation 
20 Oct 1935  
C019 - Equality of Treatment (Accident 
Compensation) Convention, 1925 (No. 19) 
30 Mar 1926  In Force  
C026 - Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery 
Convention, 1928 (No. 26) 
28 Dec 1932  In Force  
C027 - Marking of Weight (Packages Transported 
by Vessels) Convention, 1929 (No. 27) 
21 Feb 1933  Conditional ratification  
C041 - Night Work (Women) Convention 
(Revised), 1934 (No. 41) 
28 May 1935  Automatic Denunciation 
02 Mar 1950 
by C089  
C042 - Workmen's Compensation (Occupational 
Diseases) Convention (Revised), 1934 (No. 42) 
26 Feb 1952  In Force  
C045 - Underground Work (Women) Convention, 
1935 (No. 45) 
25 Jun 1936  In Force  
C063 - Convention concerning Statistics of Wages 
and Hours of Work, 1938 (No. 63) Excluding Parts 
II and IV 
08 Aug 1939  In Force  
C080 - Final Articles Revision Convention, 1946 19 Jun 1947  In Force  
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Convention Date Status 
(No. 80) 
C089 - Night Work (Women) Convention 
(Revised), 1948 (No. 89) 
02 Mar 1950  In Force  
C116 - Final Articles Revision Convention, 1961 
(No. 116) 
09 Aug 1963  In Force  
C155 - Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention, 1981 (No. 155) 
18 Feb 2003  In Force  
C176 - Safety and Health in Mines Convention, 
1995 (No. 176) 
09 Jun 2000  In Force  
 
4.5 LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN TERMS OF THE LABOUR 
RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
 
The LRA’s new approach to labour dispute resolution must be seen in the context of 
the failures of the old system of Industrial Councils and the Industrial Court. The old 
dispensation was characterised by its failure to provide fast and efficient relief to 
parties involved in labour disputes. 133  Moreover, the old system was complex, 
technical and not user-friendly. It relied heavily on formal and technical knowledge 
and compliance with procedures, coupled with long delays in the appeal process.134 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, the LRA is a substitute designed to provide 
simplified procedures for the resolution of labour disputes by means of statutory 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration. However, these processes are not as simple 
and straightforward in practice as they were intended.135 The LRA was enacted to 
provide a new system of labour dispute resolution that is meant to be fast, efficient, 
relatively informal, accessible, easy for the parties to use and inexpensive.136 
 
The LRA came into full operation on 11 November 1995, 137  after successful 
development and deliberation by a task team comprising of social partners, led by 
133 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 358. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 359.  
137 Botha The Guide to the New Labour Relations Act 1. 
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Professor Halton Cheadle.138 The LRA was enacted to give effect to section 23 of the 
South African Constitution. 
 
One of the central purposes of the LRA is to promote the effective resolution of 
labour disputes.139 In keeping with its primary objective of promoting constructive and 
harmonious labour relations, the LRA creates a comprehensive framework for the 
resolution of labour disputes in the workplace.140 In this respect, the LRA introduces 
a two-phase procedure to resolve labour disputes. In phase one all disputes must be 
conciliated, and in phase two, if conciliation fails, the dispute must be referred to 
arbitration by the CCMA or a bargaining council. Ultimately, adjudication on rights 
disputes must take place in the Labour Court.141 
 
The LRA assigns the CCMA to resolve labour disputes and replaces many of the 
functions of the old Industrial Court system. The emphasis is placed on ADR through 
conciliation and arbitration instead of adjudication. Parties are encouraged to settle 
their disputes through dialogue and consensus-seeking.142 In addition to the CCMA, 
the LRA creates and mandates bargaining and statutory councils 143  to resolve 
disputes in order to complement the functions of the CCMA. This approach is 
consistent with the philosophy of autonomy and self-regulation within organised 
sectors. 144  Moreover, the Act accords significant recognition to privately agreed 
dispute resolution procedures and gives support to dispute resolution by accredited 
private agencies.145 The LRA also establishes specialist Labour Courts to adjudicate 
various disputes within their jurisdiction and empowers them to award damages and 
interim relief, as well as any specific performance that may be sought.146 
 
138 Van Niekerk Law@Work 12. 
139 S 1(d)(iv) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
140 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 423. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 245. 
143 Part C ss 27 and 28, Part E ss 39 and 43 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
144 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 429. 
145 S 24(1) of the LRA provides that each collective agreement, except an agency-shop agreement 
and a closed-shop agreement, must provide for a procedure to settle any dispute regarding the 
interpretation or application of the collective agreement.    
146 Part E Ss 167-183 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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Helga and Grossett (2005)147 summarise the aims of the LRA’s dispute resolution as 
follows:  
 
• to create a legal framework in which the employer and trade-union parties will 
be able to regulate conflict and resolve their disputes; 
 
• to establish a simple, non-technical and non-jurisdictional approach to 
dispute resolution; 
 
• to avoid lengthy delays in resolution; and 
 
• to reduce the level of strike actions.   
 
4.6  DISPUTES AND THEIR PROCESSES  
 
To understand and appreciate the functioning of the statutory dispute resolution 
mechanism, it is important to understand the manner in which labour disputes are 
differentiated.148 The LRA does not define dispute in detail. It only states that a 
“dispute” includes “an alleged dispute”149 and does not provide any further details. A 
dispute has its origin in the existence of a grievance, which is distinguished from a 
dispute, although sometimes these terms are used interchangeably.150 A grievance 
could be a formalised expression of individual or collective conflict, usually 
dissatisfaction in respect of a workplace-related matter, while a dispute is a highly 
formalised manifestation of conflict in relation to workplace-related matters, which 
may include the failure to address a grievance.151 
 
A dispute arises where conflict has come into the open by the formulation of an issue 
on which there is disagreement and occurs when an underlying conflict has become 
obvious. Therefore, once a dispute arises parties should consider resolving that 
147 Helga and Grossett Employment Law 2nded (2005) 396.   
148 Ibid. 
149 S 213 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
150 Bosch et al The Conciliation and Arbitration Handbook 5. 
151 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 10.  
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dispute to avoid the dispute aggravating the conflict.152 Further, for a dispute to exist 
there should be a demand communicated to another party and that party should be 
given the opportunity to comply.153 To this end, the Court has held that a dispute had 
to, at a minimum, postulate the notion of the expression by the parties, opposing 
each other in controversy, of conflicting views, claims or contentions.154 Moreover, in 
Edgars Stores (Pty) Ltd v SACCAWU155 the Court held that “an alleged dispute” 
defined in section 213 of the LRA means that an actual impasse was not necessary 
for there to be a dispute. The Court concluded that it was sufficient that there was a 
demand made on a party that, given an opportunity to comply with it, did not comply. 
 
Given the failure of the LRA to distinguish between disputes of rights and disputes of 
interest156 the Court suggested that such a distinction was necessary.157 Against this 
shortfall, Bosch158 provides a meaningful differentiation. The author provides that a 
dispute of right relates to those disputes in which the parties assert rights that they 
may be entitled to through statutory law, common law or agreement, and that they 
include: 
 
• a dismissal, where a party relies on rights established in the LRA; 
• an unfair labour practice, where a party also relies on the LRA; 
• non-compliance with terms of a contract. 
 
Although the LRA does not use the term “dispute of right”, it generally uses the term 
dispute about a matter of mutual interest159 to mean a dispute of interest.160 The LRA 
distinguishes three sub-categories of disputes of mutual interest and categorises 
152 Ibid. 
153 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 100. 
154 Durban City Council v Minister of Labour 1953 (3) SA 708 (D). 
155 [1998] 5 BLLR 447 (LAC) see also Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 430.   
156 Eskon v Marshall [2003] 1 BLLR 12 (LC) at par 20. 
157 Department of Justice & Constitutional Development v Van de Merwe NO & others (2010) 31 
ILJ 1184 (LC) at par 23. 
158 Bosch et al The Conciliation and Arbitration Handbook 6. 
159 S 134 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
160 Ibid. 
189 
                                                             
them based on the dispute resolution mechanisms by which they must ultimately be 
resolved. These are:161 
 
• disputes that are arbitrable, which must be arbitrated by the CCMA or a 
bargaining council having jurisdiction; 
 
• disputes that are justiciable, which must be adjudicated by the Labour Court; 
and  
 
• disputes that must be resolved by the exercise of economic power where 
parties can either strike or institute a lockout in support of their demand. 
 
The LRA provides the process involved to resolve each dispute in detail. Below is an 
overview of the most important dispute resolution processes and reference to the 
relevant sections in the LRA.162 
 
 
Disputes that are resolved by arbitration at the CCMA or a bargaining / statutory council 
 
Nature of dispute  
Statutory 
provision  
 
Dispute about the disclosure of information  
 
Section 16 
Exercise of organisational rights (except if the union has elected to strike in terms of 
section 65 (2) 
Sections 21 
and 22 
 
Disputes about the interpretation and application of collective agreements  
 
Section 24 
 
Mutual interest disputes in essential services  
 
Section 74 
 
Dispute about workplace forums  
 
Section 94 
Disputes agreed upon by the parties in writing to be referred to a council or the 
CCMA if the Labour Court would normally have jurisdiction 
Section 141 
Disputes about alleged unfair dismissal for misconduct or incapacity  Section 191 
(5) (a) 
Dispute about constructive dismissal  Section 191 
(5) (a) 
 
Disputes over dismissals if the employee does not know the reason for the dismissal  
Section 191 
(5) (a) 
Dispute about the dismissal if the employer provided the employee with substantively 
less favourable terms and conditions of employment after transfer in terms of section 
197 or 197A 
Section 191 
(5) (a) 
 
Dispute about alleged unfair labour practices   
Section 
191(5) (a) 
161 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 430. 
162 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 379. 
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A single employee disputes the fairness of a dismissal for operational requirements 
(may elect to refer the dispute either to the Labour Court or arbitration)   
Section 191 
(12) 
 
Disputes that are referred to the Labour Court for adjudication 
 
Dispute about freedom of association 
 
Section 9 
 
Refusal to admit a party to a bargaining council  
 
Section 56 
 
Disputes about the right to picket  
 
Section 69 
 
Disputes about alleged automatically unfair dismissals  
Section 191 
(5)(b) 
Disputes about dismissals if the reason for the dismissal is the employees’ 
participation in an unprotected strike 
Section 191 
(5)(b) 
Disputes about dismissals – the employee was dismissed because he or she refused 
to join, was refused membership or was expelled from a trade union party to a closed 
shop 
 
Section 191 
(5)(b) 
Dispute arising from an allegation by an employee that he or she has been subjected 
to an occupational detriment by the employer in contravention of the Protected 
Disclosure Act 26 OF 2000. 
 
Section 191 
(13) 
Disputes about dismissal for operational requirements(a trade union may also 
embark on a strike in respect of substantive fairness) 
Section 191 
and 189 A 
A single employee disputes the fairness of a dismissal for operational requirements( 
the employee may also refer the dispute to arbitration)   
Section 191 
(12) 
 
Disputes that are resolved by means of economic power (Strike or lockout) 
 
Matters of mutual interest  
Section 64 
and 134 
 
Refusal to bargain  
 
Section 64 (2) 
 
Unilateral change to terms and conditions of employment by the employer  
 
Section 64 (4) 
Disputes over organisational rights (Except  where the union has elected to refer to 
arbitration in terms of section 21 and 22 
 
Section 65 (2)  
Disputes over dismissal for operational reasons – the trade union has a right, in 
terms of section 189 A, to resort to a strike about the substantive fairness of a large-
scale dismissal     
 
 
Section 189 
A. 
 
 
4.7 DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE CCMA   
 
The LRA creates the CCMA as the “centrepiece”163 for the labour dispute resolution 
system.164 It is the institution on which the LRA pivots.165 The CCMA came into effect 
by Government Proclamation in December 1995.166 Unlike the Labour Court, the 
163 Landis and Grossett Employment and the Law- A Practical Guide for the Workplace (2005) 396. 
164 S 112 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
165 Van Rensburg Participation and Progress: Labour Relations in South Africa (1998) 10-8. See 
also Deutsch v Pinto & Another (1997) 18 ILJ 1008 (LC) par 10111, in which the Labour Court 
asserted the pivotal role of the CCMA in the LRA.  See also Brassey Employment and Labour 
Law- Commentary on the Labour Relations Act (1999) A7-1. 
166 Proclamation R112 in GG16880 of 22 December 1995. 
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CCMA has no status of a court of law and has no judicial authority within the 
contemplation of the South African Constitution. It has been held that the CCMA is an 
administrative tribunal and an organ of state under section 239 of the Constitution.167 
Thus, it is directly bound by the Bill of Rights and subject to the basic values and 
principles governing public administration.168 
 
Moreover, the CCMA is an autonomous statutory body169 with legal personality170 or 
is established as a juristic person.171 Although largely funded by the state, it is 
independent of the state, political parties, trade unions, employers, employers’ 
organisations, and federations of employers’ organisations. 172  Ultimately, the 
Constitution obliges the CCMA to act in an impartial, equitable and unbiased 
manner.173 
 
Structurally, the CCMA has national jurisdiction and maintains offices in all nine 
provinces of the Republic of South Africa.174 Despite national jurisdiction, the CCMA 
rules require that a dispute must be conciliated or arbitrated in the province where 
the cause of action arose, 175 unless a senior commissioner in the CCMA head 
office176 directs otherwise. 
 
The CCMA is governed by a governing body.177 It is this body that appoints the 
director of the CCMA, who is required to be skilled and experienced in labour 
relations and dispute resolution.178 He or she automatically holds the office of a 
167 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & Others (1998) 19 ILJ 1425 LAC par 1430 F-G. 
168 S 195(2)(b) of the South African Constitution . 
169 S 113 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
170 S 112 of the LRA 66 of 1995 
171 A juristic person is translated to mean as body treated by law as a person and, as a result, it 
can acquire its own rights and duties. See Brassey Employment and Labour Law A7-2. See 
also in SACCAWU v Specialty Stores Ltd (1998) 18 ILJ 557 (LAC) par 560B in which case 
juristic person was determined.    
172 S 113 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
173 Brassey Employment and Labour law A7-2. 
174 S 114 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
175 CCMA Rule 24(1). 
176 The CCMA’s head office is located in Johannesburg, Gauteng Province.   
177 The Governing Body consists of a chairperson, a director and nine other members who 
represent the interest of organized business, organized labour and the State. See s 116 of the 
LRA 66 of 1995. 
178 S 118(1)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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senior commissioner.179 The director is charged with the overall responsibility to 
manage the activities of the CCMA and to appoint and supervise the organisation’s 
staff.180 The CCMA has a National Registry component, which is responsible for the 
administration of the institution. The Registry provides a number of support services 
to the CCMA, such as the Case Management System and Information Services.181 A 
Provincial Registrars oversees the administration of the CCMA in each province.182 
 
Besides the registry, an equally important component of the CCMA is the 
commissioners. The dispute resolution work of the CCMA is performed by 
commissioners who are appointed either on a full-time or part-time basis by the 
Governing Body. 183  The more qualified and experienced commissioners are 
appointed as senior commissioners.184 The LRA does not prescribe the qualifications 
of the commissioners, except that they should be adequately qualified. 185  Most 
commissioners are persons with tertiary qualifications in disciplines such as law, 
psychology and industrial relations, coupled with practical experience in labour 
dispute resolution and industrials relations.186 CCMA commissioners do not enjoy the 
security of tenure 187  as they are appointed for a fixed term determined by the 
Governing Body.188 
 
Commissioners are subject to a code of conduct, 189 which places emphasis on 
integrity and independence. Any deviation from the code of conduct may constitute 
serious misconduct and be sufficient reason to remove a commissioner from his or 
her office.190 Commissioners are represented at the head office by three National 
Senior Commissioners, who are responsible for overseeing all conciliation, mediation 
and arbitration that the CCMA undertakes as well as planning and development 
179 S 118(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
180 S 118(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
181 Van Rensburg Participating and Progress 10-10. 
182 Ibid. 
183 S 117(1) and (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
184 S 117(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
185 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution (2011) 45. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 90. 
188 S 117(2)(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
189 S 117(6) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
190 S 117(7) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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functions. Besides National Senior Commissioners, there are Convening Senior 
Commissioners in each province. Their role is to monitor the professional standards 
of the CCMA and, in collaboration with the Registrars, to assist in the allocation of 
cases to commissioners.191 
 
Section 115 of the LRA describes the obligatory function of the CCMA to include: 
 
• to conciliate workplace disputes; 
 
• to arbitrate disputes that remain unresolved after conciliation; 
 
• to facilitate the establishment of Workplace Forums and Statutory Councils; 
 
• to compile and publish information and statistics about its activities; and  
 
• to consider applications for accreditation and subsidy by bargaining councils 
and private agencies. 
 
The CCMA may also:  
 
• supervise ballots for unions and employers’ organisations; and  
• provide training and advice on: 
- the establishment of collective bargaining structures; 
- workplace restructuring; 
- the consultation process; 
- termination of employment; 
- employment equity programmes; and  
- dispute prevention.  
 
4.7.1 CCMA JURISDICTION  
 
A dispute that arises in a sector or area where an accredited bargaining council has 
jurisdiction must be referred to that council for conciliation and arbitration. In the 
191 Van Rensburg Participation and Progress 10-10. 
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absence of a council having jurisdiction over the matter, the dispute must be referred 
to the CCMA. 192 In some instances the CCMA has exclusive jurisdiction and a 
council is not authorised to conciliate and arbitrate those disputes.193 
 
A number of factors determine whether the CCMA has jurisdiction.194 Although the 
list below is not exhaustive, it is submitted that these jurisdictional facts must be 
present:195 
 
(i) there must be a dispute or an alleged dispute;196 
 
(ii) the dispute must result from an employer-employee relationship, given the 
exclusion of independent contractors from the definition of employee; 
 
(iii) the dispute must fall within the area of the CCMA, in that the CCMA has no 
international jurisdiction over disputes emanating outside the borders of 
South Africa;197 
 
(iv) the dispute must fall within one of the specified categories of labour disputes 
over which the CCMA has jurisdiction. In other words, the dispute is not 
subject to collective agreement; 
 
(v) the dispute must not be subject to a bargaining council with jurisdiction198 or 
privately agreed upon dispute resolution procedures;199 
 
192 Bosch et al The Conciliation and Arbitration 23. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Van Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 347. 
195 Ibid. 
196 In this respect, s 213 of the LRA defines the terms “dispute” to include an alleged dispute.  
197 S 114 of the LRA provides that a labour dispute must be conciliated and arbitrated in the 
province in which the cause of action arose, unless the Senior Commissioner in head office 
directs otherwise. See also Rule 24(1) for the Conduct of Proceedings before the CCMA 
(GNR1448 in GG 25515 dated 10 October 2003) as corrected by GNR 1512 in GG25607 dated 
17 October 2003. Hereinafter referred to as “the CCMA Rules”. 
198 S 28(1)(c)-(d), of the LRA provides that the Bargaining Councils also have the functions of 
preventing and resolving labour disputes. Secondly, s 30(1)(I) of the LRA provides that the 
Constitution of every Bargaining Council must at least contain procedures to be followed if a 
dispute arises between the parties in the Bargaining Council.    
199 S 191(1)((b)(i) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
195 
                                                             
(vi) the referral to the CCMA must be made within the prescribed time limit;200 
 
Generally the CCMA has jurisdiction in disputes listed below despite the existence of 
a council:201 
 
• disputes concerning organisational rights; 
 
• disputes concerning workplace forums; 
 
• disputes concerning Ministerial determinations; 
 
• disputes about the interpretation or application of agency-shop or closed-
shop agreements; 
 
• disputes concerning the demarcation of sectors and areas of councils; 
 
• disputes about the interpretation or application of collective agreements 
where the agreement does not contain a dispute procedure, where the 
procedure is inoperative or where the procedure is frustrated by a party; 
 
• disputes about collective agreements of a council whose registration has 
been cancelled; 
 
• disputes about the interpretation or application of Parts A and C-F of Chapter 
3 of the LRA; and  
 
• disputes about picket rules during strikes and lockout. 
 
To this end, the Court has inferred that it would be “over-technical” to find that the 
CCMA lacked jurisdiction to conciliate and arbitrate a dispute that was subject to a 
Bargaining Council’s jurisdiction.202 In addition, the Court held that jurisdictional facts 
200 S 191(1)(b)(ii) of the LRA 66 of 1995. See also ss 10(2) and 10(4) of the Employment Equity Act 
55 of 1998(hereinafter referred to as the “EEA”). 
201 Bosch et al The Conciliation and Arbitration 23. 
202 Spilhaus & Co Ltd v CCMA [1997] 8 BLLR 116 (LC) at 1119. 
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must actually exist and not be created by the consent of the parties. It becomes 
obligatory on the CCMA to decide whether it has jurisdiction to determine the dispute 
without having to rely on a ruling made in a different forum.203 
 
However, despite the aforementioned jurisdictional considerations, a party can object 
to the CCMA’s jurisdiction based on the grounds listed below:204 
 
• the party referring the dispute is not a party to the dispute, or is not 
empowered by statute to refer the dispute; 
 
• there is no employer-employee relationship; 
 
• there is no dispute; 
 
• there is no valid referral, by reason of not complying with the referral 
requirements or the referral has not been properly signed; 
 
• the dispute is referred to an incorrect forum; 
 
• the referral was late and condonation has not been granted; 
 
• the dispute arose before the commencement of the LRA; 
 
• the dispute is subject to a collective agreement, requiring its own procedure 
to be followed; and 
 
• the dispute has already been determined. 
 
  
203 Zeuna-Starker Bop (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA [1998] 11 BLLR 1110 (LAC) in this case, the court went 
further to find that where the jurisdiction of a tribunal was dependent on the existence of a 
particular condition, it might not give itself jurisdiction by incorrectly determining that those 
conditions existed. See also Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 100. 
204 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 248. 
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4.7.2 CONCILIATION PROCESS BY THE CCMA  
 
The LRA does not define conciliation. However, the Act gives the commissioner 
latitude and a framework within which to determine the process to be used in terms 
of section 135 of the LRA. This may include mediation, conducting a fact-finding 
exercise and making a recommendation to the parties, including an advisory 
award.205 
 
In the absence of a statutory definition, Van Niekerk206 provides a useful definition of 
conciliation:  
 
“an intervention by an independent third party, who assists parties to a dispute to arrive 
at a mutually agreed outcome”. 
 
As per the definition, the conciliator’s role is to assist parties to reach their own 
agreement and makes no binding determination on them.207 It is therefore submitted 
that conciliation and mediation have no mechanisms to resolve disputes other than 
through agreements. Subsequently, the conciliator has no adjudicative or decision-
making power or power to make a final and binding award. 208  Conciliating 
commissioners have no prescriptive powers209 other than the power to subpoena 
persons for questioning, to seize and inspect documents and enter premises.210 Their 
functions are limited solely to assisting the parties to settle on their own without 
exerting force on them.211 
 
Overall, the values of conciliation are twofold:212 first, it is beneficial to the employer 
and employee involved in an employment relationship to settle their disputes through 
agreement rather than resolving it by means of a final decision with a winner-loser 
205 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 435. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Govindjee “ Labour Dispute Resolution” in Van der Walt, Le Roux and Govindjee (eds) Labour 
Law in Context (2012) 223.  
209 Grogan Workplace Law 8thed (2004) 444. 
210 Ss 142(1) and (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
211 Grogan Workplace Law 444. 
212 Ibid. 
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outcome. Second, the filtering out of disputes has the advantage of lessening the 
burden on the CCMA and other dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
4.7.3 REFERRAL OF DISPUTES  
 
A party 213 to a dispute contemplating referral to the CCMA for conciliation 214 is 
required to complete and sign215 LRA Form 7:1.216 The referral document requires 
the referring party to state the names of the parties to the dispute, the nature of the 
dispute, the date of the dispute and the result of arbitration. On providing these 
particulars, the referral document must be served on all parties to the dispute by 
hand-delivery, registered post, telegram, telex or telefax.217 After service, the referral 
document must be served on the CCMA bearing proof of service on the other party to 
the dispute. 
 
The LRA dictates the time limits for referring labour disputes to the CCMA. For 
instance, unfair dismissal disputes must be referred to the CCMA within 30 days of 
the dismissal or within 30 days of the employer making the final decision about 
dismissal.218 Unfair labour practice disputes must be referred within 90 days of the 
act or omission that allegedly constituted the unfair labour practice.219 As for unfair 
discrimination disputes in terms of the EEA, disputes must be referred within 6 
months after the act or omission constituting unfair discrimination.220 
 
213 Dismissal disputes and unfair labour practices disputes can be referred for conciliation or 
arbitration only by an employee and not by an employer. See s 191(5) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
See also, Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 249.  
214 S 134(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
215 CCMA Rule 4(1) provides that the referral from may be signed by a party to the dispute or by a 
person who may represent the party in terms of the LRA or the CCMA rules. 
216 Hereinafter referred to as “the referral document”. CCMA Rule 10(1). 
217 S 191(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995, uses the term “serve” and defines it in s 213 to mean to send 
by registered post, telegram, telex, telefax or to deliver by hand. Moreover, CCMA rules 5-6 set 
out in details the various options for service by hand. Rule 5 provide for proof of service to 
include a written statement or receipt, proof of mailing, a copy of the telegram or telex or fax 
report indicating successful transmission.  
218 S 191(1)(b)(i) of the LRA 66 of 1995 includes instances where there is an appeal pending. For 
example, where the employee has appealed against the employer’s decision. The date for the 
referral would be the date of the decision of the appeal. 
219 S 191(1)(b)(ii) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
220 S 10(2) of the EEA 55 of 1998. 
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Notwithstanding the above prescribed time limits, the LRA permits late referral of the 
dispute on good cause shown.221 However, late referral must be accompanied by an 
application for condonation or the CCMA will lack jurisdiction.222 The application for 
condonation must set out grounds for seeking condonation including:223 
 
• the degree of lateness; 
• the reason for lateness;224 
• the referring party’s prospect of succeeding with the referral and obtaining 
the relief sought against the other party;225 
• any prejudice to the other party; and  
• any other relevant factors.226 
 
Govindjee227 demonstrates that there is no requirement that the application be heard 
orally. Therefore, the application can be considered through written submission. In 
these instances, it is required that the application for condonation be comprehensive, 
as the CCMA is not obliged to convene a hearing to enable an applicant for 
condonation to make a submission not included in the affidavit. 228  There is no 
requirement either in the LRA or in the CCMA rules for parties to agree to 
condonation for late referral. It is left to the CCMA or the commissioner to be satisfied 
that good cause for late referral has been proven.229 Therefore, if one party intends to 
221 S 191(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
222 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 224. See also with the authority in Van Rooy v Nedcor 
Bank (Ltd) [1998] 5 BLLR 540 (LC) wherein the Court held that “the fatality of a late referral is 
cured by condonation if granted and only then will the CCMA have jurisdiction to conciliate the 
dispute. Seemingly, the Court will equally have jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. Otherwise, 
the Court held further, that where the CCMA lacked the necessary jurisdiction, so will be the 
Court.   
223 CCMA Rule 9. 
224 In NUMSA v Diro Pressing (Pty) Ltd [2002] 11 BLLR 1087 (LC),Tsebeza AJ, held that, where 
the applicant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for delay, no inquiry into the prospects 
of success was necessary.   
225 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 261 point out that the prospect of success refers to the 
referring party’s prospects of succeeding with the referral and obtaining the relief sought against 
the other party and must provides reasons why the case will likely succeed.   
226 Ibid – points out that other relevant factors could include the importance of the matter and the 
number of employees affected. 
227 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 224. 
228 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 261. 
229 Ibid. 
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challenge the ruling on condonation it should apply to the Labour Court for review of 
the decision to condone.230 
 
4.7.4 SET-DOWN AND CONCILIATION PROCESS  
 
Once the dispute has been properly referred to the CCMA, a commissioner must be 
appointed to attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. This must happen 
within 30 days of the date the CCMA received the referral.231 Alternatively, the parties 
can agree to extend this period.232 The CCMA rules prescribe that the parties must 
be given 14 days’ notice of the conciliation hearing. 233  Once the parties have 
received this notice they are required to attend in person and not to merely send a 
representative.234 If a party to a dispute fails to attend or appear, the commissioner 
has the discretion to dismiss the matter, postpone it or continue in the absence of 
that party.235 
 
The primary role of the commissioner during conciliation is to assist the parties to 
resolve the dispute themselves by devising a process that the commissioner deems 
appropriate. As stated earlier, under the definition set out in the LRA this may include 
mediation, fact-finding or making an advisory award. 236 To that end, conciliation 
proceedings are private and confidential and are conducted on a “without-prejudice” 
basis.237 It is for this reason that conciliation proceedings are regarded as informal 
and off the record. Nothing that was revealed or said during conciliation can be used 
as evidence in a later process where conciliation failed.238 
 
In respect to representation during conciliation proceedings, the LRA places 
restrictions on the right to representation at conciliation and arbitration.239 It has been 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ss 133(1) and 135(1)-(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
232 S 135(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
233 CCMA rule 11. 
234 CCMA rule 13.   
235 CCMA rule 30. 
236 S 135(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
237 CCMA rule 16(1) and (2). 
238 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 224. 
239 Van Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 353. 
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argued that allowing legal representation at this forum will cause the proceedings to 
become legalistic and expensive. 240  Thus parties have no right to legal 
representation during conciliation. Their right to representation is limited to directors 
or employees of the employer party to a dispute or a member of a close corporation, 
and a member, office bearer, official of a trade union representing the employee 
party or an employers’ organisation representing the employer party. 241  The 
restriction is not only limited to legal practitioners as defined in section 213 of the 
LRA, but extends to include labour consultants, paralegals and officials of an 
unregistered trade union who wish to act in a representative capacity during 
conciliation.242 
 
During the conciliation and arbitration process, conciliators have wider powers. 
Although seldom utilised,243 these powers include the power to:244 
 
• subpoena any person for questioning;  
• subpoena a person who is believed to be in possession of books, documents 
or objects which might be required for the resolution of a dispute; 
• call an expert witness; 
• administer and oath; 
• enter premises and retain for a reasonable period, any book, document or 
object after obtaining the necessary written authorisation.  
 
The LRA provides that a person is in contempt of the CCMA if, for instance, the 
person disregards the subpoena, if the commissioner is belittled or if the conciliation 
or arbitration procedure is disrupted.245 Although the LRA makes provision for the 
offence of contempt of the Commission, commissioners themselves lack the 
240 Ibid. 
241 See the repealed s 135(4) Schedule 7 Item 27 of the LRA read with the CCMA rule 25. 
242 Van Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 353. See also Som Garment (Pty) Ltd v Van 
Dokkum [1997] 9 BLLR 1234 (LC) wherein the Labour Court held that the CCMA has no 
jurisdiction to permit persons not designated in the LRA to represent parties. Moreover, the 
Court in Netherbern Engineering CC v Mudau (2003) ILJ 1712 (LC) held that it was not 
unconstitutional to deny legal representation before an administrative tribunal.    
243 Van Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 353.  
244 S 142(1)(a)-(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
245 S 142(8) of the LRA 66 of 1995 provides a complete list of acts that may constitute contempt.  
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jurisdiction to convict and punish persons for this offence.246 The only appropriate 
way to secure conviction is to make a finding of contempt of the CCMA, and refer the 
finding, together with the record of the proceeding, by way of application to the 
Labour Court to have the order confirmed, varied or set aside. 247  Contempt is 
traditionally treated as a criminal offence; thus it is assumed that before convicting 
the offender, the Labour Court will hold a hearing similar to a criminal trial.248 
 
This assumption is based on the premise that the Labour Court has criminal 
jurisdiction as it appears from section 151(2) of the LRA, in that it has the authority, 
inherent powers and standing equal to those which a court of a provincial division of 
the High Court possesses. The reason for an order to be preceded by a criminal trial 
is based on the fundamental right to a fair trial before conviction.249 The courts 
generally have the power to summarily convict and sentence a person committing 
contempt.250 This power has not been retained for the CCMA, and quite rightly so as 
the Commission would be complainant, prosecutor and judge in the case. 251  
Moreover, the accused may be unrepresented and may have committed contempt in 
an emotionally charged state.252 
 
4.7.5 CERTIFICATE OF OUTCOME     
 
At the end of a conciliation meeting, the commissioner who conciliated the dispute is 
required to issue a certificate of outcome,253 using Form LRA 7.13. If conciliation was 
successful, the conciliating commissioner must record that the dispute has been 
resolved.254 Where the dispute remains unresolved, the commissioner must issue a 
certificate of outcome recording that conciliation has failed.255 The commissioner is 
246 Grogan Workplace Law 444. 
247 S 143(9)(a)and(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
248 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 158. 
249 S 35(3) of the South African Constitution. 
250 Brand et al labour Dispute Resolution 158. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ss 64(1)(a)(i), 135(5)(a), 136(1)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
254 Grogan Workplace Law 444. 
255 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 437. 
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required to file the original certificate with the CCMA and the CCMA in turn serves 
copies on all parties.256 
 
The effect of a certificate of non-resolution is to establish that the conciliation has 
failed.257 It does not determine the dispute or the nature of the dispute.258 However, 
the commissioner is cautioned as to how he or she describes the dispute in the 
certificate as the parties have the right to examine it and verify that their dispute has 
been correctly formulated.259 In a settled dispute, the conciliator drafts a settlement 
agreement that should be signed by both parties. A settlement agreement is a written 
agreement in settlement of a dispute that a party had the right to refer to arbitration or 
the Labour Court.260 It should be signed by both parties as evidence of full and final 
settlement of a dispute that has been properly referred to the CCMA.261 Once the 
agreement has been signed it becomes binding on both parties.262 
 
Finally, a settlement agreement between the parties may, on application by any of 
the parties, be made an arbitration award by the CCMA and becomes enforceable in 
terms of section 143 of the LRA.  
 
4.8 ARBITRATION BY THE CCMA    
 
Arbitration is described as a process in which a neutral person makes a decision on a 
specified range of disputed issues.263 It is the direct intervention264 of a third party, 
the arbitrator, who plays a decisive role by listening to the evidence of the parties or 
their representatives to a dispute, weighing arguments and evidence presented and 
256 S 135(5)(a)-(c ) of the LRA 66 of 1995. See also Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 114. 
257 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 437. 
258 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 114. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 225. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 117. 
264 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 427. 
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thereby making a final and binding decision.265 Arbitration is a hearing de novo, 
where evidence presented is repeated or re-presented to the arbitrator.266 
 
It is submitted that arbitration is an expedited process to resolve factual labour 
disputes once and for all. The ultimate object, whether compulsory under the LRA or 
private, is to dispose of the dispute finally, through an award, which is subject to 
review only and not an appeal as provided for by the LRA.267 Arbitration under the 
LRA is compulsory, in that once an employee or, in some instances, an employer has 
referred a dispute to the CCMA or a bargaining council with jurisdiction, the other 
party must attend if it wishes to defend the matter. It is necessary to do so even if the 
party has not consented to arbitration.268 Similarly, it becomes compulsory in terms of 
a collective agreement that mandates arbitration as part of the collective bargaining 
process269 or in terms of section 136 of the LRA. 
 
Arbitration proceedings before the CCMA are regulated by sections 136 to 144 of the 
LRA, read with the CCMA rules issued as part of the LRA package, and are regarded 
as soft law. 270  The LRA provides that a dispute may be arbitrated only if a 
commissioner has issued a certificate of unresolved dispute. 271  Therefore, an 
arbitration proceeding has to be preceded by a failed conciliation.272 Besides a failed 
conciliation, the lapse of the prescribed 30-day period of conciliation is a sufficient 
ground to warrant or cause arbitration.273 The arbitrator is required to ensure that the 
dispute referred to arbitration is the same dispute or at least substantially the same 
as the one referred to conciliation.274 The referral must comply with the time limit, 
265 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 229.  
266 Ibid. 
267 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 117. 
268 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 125. 
269 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 428.  
270 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 361. 
271 S 136(1)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
272 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 126. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid. 
205 
                                                             
which is 90 days of the date on which the certificate was issued, 275 unless an 
application for condonation was made and granted.276 
 
4.8.1 REFERRAL, APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS AND SET-DOWN 
 
The LRA provides that a party wishing to refer a dispute for arbitration to the CCMA 
must complete and sign LRA Form 7.13, which must be served277 on the other party 
to the dispute and the CCMA. The referral document must contain a statement of the 
issue in dispute and the section of the LRA under which relief is sought.278 The 
referral document must disclose, although not in great detail, a cause of action within 
the boundaries of the CCMA. This is premised on the fact that a party cannot alter 
the stated cause of action during the course of the proceedings or amend it later, 
thereby creating a different dispute to that which was referred to conciliation.279 
 
Unlike in private arbitration, in compulsory arbitration before the CCMA disputing 
parties have little say in the appointment of the commissioner.280 It is the duty of the 
CCMA to appoint a commissioner to arbitrate the dispute.281 The LRA allows the 
same commissioner appointed by the CCMA who conciliated the dispute to be the 
arbitrator where appropriate.282 It has been argued, however, that the continuation of 
the dispute by the same commissioner may not be desirable. Thus the LRA allows 
the parties to the dispute to submit written objections within seven days of the issuing 
of the certificate of failure to conciliate, objecting to the same commissioner 
arbitrating the dispute.283 The objection must be filed with the CCMA after a copy has 
been served on the other party to the dispute.284 The objection must provide or 
suggest the appointment of another commissioner to arbitrate the dispute and may 
275 S 136(1)(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
276 CCMA rule 9 read with rule 31. 
277 Serve is defined in s 213 of the LRA 66 of 1995 and is done by hand, registered post, telegram, 
telex or telefax. See CCMA rule 6.  
278 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 127. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 149. 
281 S 136(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
282 S 136(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
283 S 136(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
284 Ibid. 
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request the CCMA to take into account their stated preference to the extent that it is 
reasonably practicably in the circumstances.285 The LRA requires that the stated 
preference must be:286 
 
• in writing; 
 
• list no more than five commissioners; 
 
• state that the request is made with the agreement of all the parties to the 
dispute; and  
 
• be submitted within 48 hours of the date of the certificate issued in terms of 
section 136 (1) of the LRA. 
 
Brand at al 287  question whether the CCMA should be bound to appoint a 
commissioner amongst names on the list of preferred commissioners submitted by 
the parties. Irrespective of this observation, the CCMA must appoint another 
commissioner to resolve the dispute through arbitration and not necessarily from the 
submitted list.  
 
A party may also request the CCMA to appoint a senior commissioner to resolve the 
dispute.288 Such an application must be made in the prescribed Form LRA 7.15. In 
considering the application for a senior commissioner, the director is required to hear 
the parties to the dispute as well as the commissioner who conciliated the dispute.289 
In doing so, the CCMA director must take into considerations the following factors:290 
 
• the nature of the question of law raised by the dispute; 
 
• the complexity of the dispute; 
285 S 136(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
286 S 136(5)(b) of the LRA of 1995. 
287 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 149. 
288 S 137(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
289 S 137(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
290 S 137(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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• whether there are conflicting arbitration awards that are relevant to the 
dispute; and 
 
• the public interest. 
 
Thereafter, the director must inform the parties of the outcome.291 The ruling is final 
and binding on the parties.292 The LRA restrains any review of the director’s decision 
until the dispute has been finally arbitrated.293 Once the CCMA is satisfied with the 
referral, the matter will be set down for arbitration.294 Thereafter, the CCMA must give 
the parties at least 21 days’ notice295 of the hearing, unless the parties have agreed 
to a shorter period.296 
 
4.8.2 CON-ARB  
 
Con-arb 297  was introduced to expedite dispute resolution in a limited range of 
disputes with the amendment of the LRA of 2002298. The new amendment provides 
for an expedited process, whereby specific disputes automatically proceed to 
arbitration if conciliation efforts fail to resolve the dispute.299 The same conciliating 
commissioner arbitrates the matter unless there is an objection on record.300 It has 
been submitted that con-arb has the benefit of saving time in that no time is lost 
between conciliation and arbitration and that the dispute resolution agency is visited 
only on one occasion, particularly where there no postponements in the matter.301 
 
291 S 137(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
292 S 137(5) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
293 S 137(6) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
294 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 142. 
295 CCMA rule 3 –states that (a) a day means calendar day; (b) the first day is excluded and the 
last day included, subject to sub-rule (2), if it falls on a Saturday, Sunday public holiday or on a 
day during the period 16 December to 7 January.  
296 CCMA rule 21. 
297 Con-arb is a hybrid system of conciliation proceeding immediately with arbitration.  
298 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 440.  
299 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 150. 
300 Jordaan et al Labour Arbitration 91.  
301 Rycroft “ Rethinking the Con-arb Procedure” (2003) ILJ 699. 
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The LRA302 empowers the CCMA to commence with arbitration immediately after 
certifying that the dispute remains unresolved in the following instances: 
 
• the dismissal of an employee for any reason relating to probation; 
 
• any unfair labour practice relating to probation; 
 
• in all unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices disputes, where no party 
objects to the matter being subjected to the con-arb procedure and at least 
seven days’ prior notice to the date of the process is given.303 
 
The CCMA rules regulating con-arb provides as follows:304 
 
• The parties to the dispute must be given at least 14 days’ notice of the date 
of the con-arb.305 
 
• The party wishing to object to the con-arb process must deliver a written 
notice to the CCMA and the other party of the objection. The objection notice 
must be delivered at least seven days prior to the date scheduled for the con-
arb. 
 
• The objection provision does not apply to a dispute concerning the dismissal 
of an employee for reasons related to probation or an unfair labour practice 
relating to probation. 
 
• Con-arb must be conducted irrespective of whether an objection has been 
lodged and a party or his or her representative fails to attend. 
 
• Where arbitration does not commence on the date stipulated on the con-arb 
notice, the CCMA is required to re-schedule the matter either in the presence 
of the parties or by using a further notice. 
302 S 191(5A) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
303 S 191(5)(a)-(c ) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
304 CCMA rule 17.  
305 CCMA rule 17(1).  
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4.8.3 ATTENDANCE AND REPRESENTATION   
 
Parties are required to attend an arbitration hearing in person unless a postponement 
of the matter has been requested and granted.306 Generally, the duty is on the 
referring party to attend because it is the party that is expected to establish and 
present its case. However, in the case of a juristic person it will be regarded to be 
present if represented by an employee or a director.307 The consequence of non-
attendance by the referring party is that the LRA permits the arbitrator to dismiss the 
matter by a written ruling.308 Where the respondent or its representative fails to 
attend, the matter may be postponed or continued in the absence of the 
respondent.309 However, where parties give compelling excuses for their absence, 
the matter should be postponed even if no formal application has been filed. 310 
Ultimately, it is the duty of the arbitrator to ensure that all interested parties have 
been adequately informed of the proceedings.311 
 
In respect to representation at arbitration it has been pointed out that there is no 
constitutional right to legal representation in relation to an administrative action.312 
However, it has been argued that, in certain cases, legal representation may be 
essential to ensure procedurally fair administrative proceedings.313 Representation in 
arbitration hearings, such as conciliation, is governed by CCMA Rule 25, which 
provides that a party may be represented at arbitration only by: 
 
• a legal practitioner (except in dismissal disputes where a party has alleged 
that the reason for dismissal relates to the employee’s conduct or capacity); 
 
306 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 143. 
307 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 134. 
308 S 138(5)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
309 S 138(5)(b)(i) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
310 S 138(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
311 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 134. 
312 Van Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 357 par 987. 
313 Hamata v Chairperson, Pensula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee (2002) ILJ 1531 
(SCA) par 8-9. The Court held that neither the common law nor the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “PAJA’) accords or recognize such right.     
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• a director or employee of that party and, if a close corporation, also a 
member thereof; 
 
• a member, office bearer or official of that party’s registered trade union or 
registered employers’ organisation.  
 
In exceptional cases, such as dismissals on account of conduct or capacity of the 
employee, legal representation is excluded in the arbitration proceedings.314 In these 
instances, legal representation may only be permitted if:315 
 
• the commissioner and all the parties consent thereto; 
 
• the commission decides that it would be unreasonable to expect, under the 
given circumstances, a particular party to appear without representation.316 
 
Consent to legal representation alone is not sufficient. The commissioner is required 
to apply his or her mind independently to an application for representation and 
therefore must exercise his or her discretion judicially. In exercising their discretion, 
commissioners must take into considerations the following factors:317 
 
• the nature of the question of law raised by the dispute; 
 
• the complexity of the dispute; 
 
• the public interest; 
 
• the comparative ability of the opposing parties or their representatives to deal 
with the dispute. 
 
314 This provision was previously regulated in terms of the repealed s 140(1) of the LRA. The LRA 
Amendment Act of 2002 gives the Governing Body of the CCMA the power to regulate legal 
representation through the CCMA rules. Rule 25 thereof provides that the principles of the 
repealed s 140(1) of the LRA still apply.  
315 CCMA rule 25(1)(c). 
316 See Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 135.  
317 CMMA rule 25(1)(c)(2)(a)and (b). 
211 
                                                             
Where no representation is sought, an arbitrator is under a duty to inform 
unrepresented applicants of the rules of evidence.318 Moreover, an arbitrator must 
inform the applicants of their right to adduce evidence personally, calling witnesses 
and cross examining the witness of the respondent and the consequences of not 
doing so.319 
 
4.8.4 ARBITRATION PROCESS  
 
The LRA asserts that every arbitrator should conduct the arbitration in a manner that 
the commissioner considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and 
quickly, but with the least possible legal formalities.320 Given this wider discretion, 
neither the LRA nor the CCMA rules offer any guidance on how arbitration should be 
conducted.321 It could be on this basis that commissioners have been directed to 
record the proceedings electronically, and preserve and safeguard documentary and 
other evidence.322 The Labour Court has held that failing to keep a record of the 
arbitration proceedings is contemptuous. 323  Subject to the discretion of the 
commissioner regarding the form of the proceedings, a party to a dispute may:324 
 
• give evidence; 
• call witnesses; 
• cross-examine the witnesses of the other party; and  
• address concluding arguments to the commissioner.  
 
In conducting arbitration hearings, arbitrating commissioners have two options or 
approaches available to them. They may choose the “adversarial” or inquisitorial 
approach, 325  which involves an arbitrator asking questions and calling for 
318 Klassen v CCMA [2005] 10 BLLR 964 (LC). 
319 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 230. 
320 S 138(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
321 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 140. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ndlovu v Mullins NO& another (1999) 20 ILJ 177 (LC). 
324 S 138(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
325 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 141. 
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documentation in an attempt to decide the matter speedily.326 Using this method, the 
commissioner descends into the arena of questioning witnesses and even cross-
examines them. 327  In accusatorial mode, the commissioner adopts a relatively 
passive stance and leaves it to the parties to conduct their respective cases, only 
intervening to seek clarity of points and making rulings on procedure.328 The choice 
of procedure largely depends on the nature of the issues before the commissioner.329 
 
The Court has pointed out that when adopting an inquisitorial approach, the 
commissioner must take control and is responsible for directing the proceedings. This 
approach includes calling for evidence and witnesses and asking relevant and 
searching questions to get to the truth.330 However, this intervention should not deny 
a party the right to cross-examine as this conduct may go beyond the latitude 
accorded to commissioners in inquisitorial proceedings.331 Given the spectrum made 
available to commissioners to expedite the proceedings with less legal formalities, 
commissioners are prohibited from “browbeating”332 parties into complying with the 
arbitration time limits. 333  Nevertheless, a commissioner is allowed to draw the 
attention of the parties to the time allocated for the hearing at its commencement.334 
Lastly, the LRA provides that commissioners may at any time suspend arbitration 
hearings and attempt to resolve disputes by conciliation.335 However, such a change 
in the process must be with consent of both parties. Should conciliation efforts fail to 
resolve the dispute, arbitration may be revived given that it was merely suspended.336 
 
  
326 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 231. 
327 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 141. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Naraindath v CCMA & others (1999) 20 ILJ 2568 (LC) par 32. 
330 Armstrong v Tee & Others (1999) 20 ILJ 2568 (LC) par 33. 
331 Ibid. 
332 See Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 142.  
333 Dairybelle (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [1999] 10 BLLR 1033 (LC). 
334 Cementation (Africa Contracts) (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2000] 5 BLLR 573 (LC). 
335 S 138(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
336 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 145. 
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4.8.5 THE ARBITRATION AWARD    
 
The LRA337 provides that at the end of an arbitration hearing, the commissioner must 
issue an award within 14 days 338  of completing the process, providing brief 
reasons339 for his or her decision. The award must be signed.340 Grogan341 submits 
that an unsigned award is not binding.342 
 
The LRA provides a framework for commissioners to make appropriate arbitration 
awards, including, but not limited to awards that give effect to collective agreements 
and the provisions and primary purpose objects of the LRA, and may include 
declaratory orders.343 Having made the award, it must be served on each party to the 
dispute,344 while the original must be filed with the Registrar of the Labour Court.345 
In writing the award, the commissioner is required to take into account any Code of 
Good Practice issued by NEDLAC that may be relevant to the matter under 
consideration.346 
 
The Court, in Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA,347 interpreted brief reasons 
required by section 138(7) of the LRA as follows- 
 
“ though desirable… it is not expected of commissioners to write well researched and 
scholarly awards. Awards must be brief and the proceedings before the commissioner 
must be dealt with expeditiously …however, failure to deal with an important facet may, 
337 S 138(7) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
338 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 115, submits that the failure to issue the award within 14 
days or extended period does not invalidate the award. See also AA Ball (Pty) Ltd v Kolisi 
[1998] 6 BLLR 560 (LC)where Judge Revelas held that issuing an award a few days late does 
not constitute a defect for review as envisaged in s 145 of the LRA. Moreover, in Free State 
Buying Association Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm v SACCAWU (1999) 3 BLLR 223 (LC)par 16. The 
Court inferred that the 14 day rule is not peremptory, but rather a guideline. This is the reason 
why s 138(8) of the LRA permits the director to extend the 14 day period within which the award 
must be issued. 
339 In Coetzee v Lebea (1999) ILJ 129 (LC), the Court held that full reasons need not be given. 
340 S 138(7)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
341 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 154. 
342 In Meyer v CCMA & Others (2002) 23 ILJ par154. The Court held that, where the award was not 
signed and there was no prospect of it ever being signed, it would be declared a nullity. 
343 S 138(9) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
344 S 138(7)(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
345 Ibid. 
346 S 138(6) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
347 [1999] 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC) par 39. 
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depending on the circumstance of the case, provide evidence that the commissioner 
did not apply his/her mind to that particular facet.” 
 
Grogan348 expands the above statement by pointing out that commissioners should 
give their awards sufficient contents to inform the parties how they arrived at a given 
conclusion. Factors and evidence taken into account should be provided where 
possible. Thus, this may require: 
 
• identification of issues in dispute and the questions that the commissioner 
was required to answer; 
 
• a synopsis of the relevant evidence; 
 
• the authority (if any) and legal principles the arbitrator applied; and 
 
• an explanation of how the conclusion was drawn from the facts and the law. 
 
Once the commissioner has issued the award, his or her mandate terminates. This 
means that he or she becomes functus officio in respect of the matter. Consequently, 
the commissioner cannot later change his or her mind and alter the award unless 
there are grounds for variation or rescission. 349  An award of compensation 
automatically accrues interest from the date of issue,350 unless the award indicates 
otherwise. However, the liability for interest terminates when the debtor makes an 
unconditional offer to pay.351 
 
4.8.6 REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR DISMISSAL AND UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE 
DISPUTES  
 
The LRA provides specific remedies to an aggrieved party to a labour dispute where 
the commissioner or the Labour Court finds that the dismissal of an employee is 
unfair. The following are the remedies available to an aggrieved employee: 
 
348 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 155. 
349 Ibid. 
350 S 143 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
351 Top v Top Rienzen CC (2006) 27 ILJ 1948 (LC). 
215 
                                                             
• An employer may be ordered to reinstate or re-employ the employee with 
effect from a date not earlier than the date of dismissal.352 
 
• The alternative is that the employer may be ordered to pay compensation to 
the employee.353 
 
Reinstatement and re-employment are the primary remedies provided by the LRA.354 
The commissioner or the Labour Court must require the employer to reinstate or re-
employee the employee unless: 
 
• the employee does not wish to be reinstated; 
 
• the circumstances surrounding the dismissal make the continuation of the 
employment relationship intolerable; 
 
• it is not reasonably practicable for the employer to reinstate the employee; or  
 
• the dismissal is unfair only because the employer did not follow a fair 
procedure. 
 
There are, however, limitations placed on compensation to guide commissioners and 
the Labour Court in determining the appropriate compensation for unfair dismissal or 
an unfair labour practice. In an unfair dismissal, where the employer failed to prove 
that the dismissal was for a fair reason or where the employer did not follow a fair 
procedure, the award for compensation must be “just and equitable”. However, 
compensation may not be more than 12 months’ remuneration on the date of 
dismissal.355 In an automatically unfair dismissal, the employee is also entitled to just 
and equitable compensation. The compensation may be equivalent to 24 months’ 
remuneration calculated at the employee’s rate of remuneration.356 Compensation for 
352 S 193(1)(a)-(c ) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
353 Ibid. 
354 S 193(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
355 S 194(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
356 S 194(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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unfair labour practice must be equally just and equitable, but not more than 12 
months’ remuneration.357 
 
The remedy for compensation stated above is in addition to and not in substitution for 
any other amount to which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective 
agreement or contract of employment.358 The terms “just and equitable” are defined 
by the LRA, but the Act does not provide a formula to calculate compensation. 
Jaarsveld 359 provides a general definition of compensation as compensation for 
something lost and to make amends for the wrongdoing. The Court has held that it is 
more akin to a delictual than a contractual claim360 and that to assist in calculating 
just and equitable compensation the employee is required to prove his or her 
losses.361 
 
The following factors have been found to be relevant and of assistance in calculating 
compensation:362 
 
• patrimonial loss that is fair and reasonable in relation to both the employer 
and the employee;363 
 
• the length of service;364 
 
• substantial redress by the employer;  
 
• conduct of the employer; and 
 
357 S 194(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
358 S 195 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
359 Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 360. 
360 Alert Employment Personnel v Leech (1993) ILJ 655 (LAC). 
361 Cohen “Exercising a Judicial Discretion – Awarding Compensation for Unfair Dismissals” (2003) 
ILJ par 741. 
362 Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 360. 
363 HM Liebowitz v Fernandes (2002) ILJ 278 (LAC) par 287.The Labour Appeal Court held that 
although patrimonial loss is relevant, it does not mean that in the absence of patrimonial loss 
that the Court would be banned from awarding compensation.       
364 Alpha Plant & Services v Simmonds (2001) ILJ 359 (LAC), the Court held that it is appropriate 
to consider length of service in determining compensation in respect of procedurally unfair 
dismissal.      
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• conduct of the employee.  
 
4.8.7 COST   
 
The repealed section 138(10) of the LRA, which now forms part of the CCMA 
rules,365 provides that a commissioner could not order cost in an arbitration award. 
The only exception to the rule is where a party, or a person who represented that 
party in the arbitration proceedings, acted in a frivolous or vexatious manner when 
proceeding with or defending the dispute in the arbitration proceedings.366 The Court 
has inferred that a matter is deemed “frivolous” if it is entirely without merit, while 
“vexatious” is where proceedings are pursued or defended solely to annoy or 
inconvenience the other party.367 
 
Given the above, commissioners are permitted to make an order as to cost in terms 
of the requirements of law and fairness, taking into account the CCMA rules. 368 
However, costs are not easily awarded by the CCMA as commissioners tend to 
consider the ongoing relationship between the employer and employee. In addition, 
the CCMA does not wish to discourage an individual employee from using the 
services of the CCMA.369 Where costs are awarded, the CCMA is limited to taxing 
cost in accordance with Schedule A of the prescribed Magistrates’ Courts tariff, 
unless the parties have agreed to a higher tariff.370 
 
4.8.8 VARIATION AND RESCISSION OF AWARDS 
 
Upon the completion of the arbitration proceedings and once the commissioner has 
made the award, the commissioner is said to have discharged his or her office and 
cannot reconsider or change the decision or outcome later. The commissioner is 
regarded to be functus officio, meaning he or she is no longer in office or officiating 
the matter and the commissioner’s responsibility regarding the case ceases to 
365 CCMA rule 39. 
366 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 156. 
367 Ibid, cited in Cronje v Bloemfontein (1997) 18 ILJ 862 (CCMA). 
368 CCMA rule 39(3). 
369 Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 361. 
370 CCMA rule 39(3). 
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exist.371 However, the commissioner may only revert to the award in circumstances 
where it has to be varied or rescinded.372 
 
The following are the statutory grounds under which the commissioner may vary or 
rescind the award: 
 
• The award was erroneously sought or made in the absence of any party 
affected by that award.373 
 
• The award is ambiguous, or contains an obvious error or omission, but only 
to the extent of that ambiguity, error or omission.374 
 
• The award was granted as a result of a mistake common to the parties to the 
proceedings.375 
 
The CCMA rules require that an application for variation or rescission must be made 
in writing within 14 days from the date that the applicant become aware of the 
arbitration award, ruling or common mistake.376 Thereafter, variation or rescission 
may be ordered by the commissioner who issued the original award or ruling, or by 
another commissioner appointed by the director of CCMA for that purpose. The 
rescission or variation may be occasioned either at the instance of the commissioner 
or on application by the affected party.377 
 
371 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 123. 
372 S 144 read with s 51(8) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
373 S 144(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995.  In Shoprite Checker (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others [2005] 8 BLLR 
816 (LC)where the Labour Court held that a party seeking to cure its own inefficiency should not 
be allowed to affect the efficiency of either the CCMA or the Labour Court which is trammeling 
under great cost to the taxpayers to operate efficiently. Moreover, in Northern Province Local 
Government Association v CCMA &Others [2001] 5 BLLR 539 (LC) par 17, the Court held that 
an application for rescission of an award granted in the absence must show “first that it has a 
bona fide case to place before the tribunal and that it had not lost interest in having its case 
heard, and secondly, its absence at the hearing has been reasonably explained”.  
374 S 144(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995.See also Day and Night Investigators cc v Ngoasheng & Others 
[2000] 4 BLLR 398 (LC), where the Court interpreted “[e]rror” to mean that the judgment does 
not reflect the intention of the judicial officer concerned and therefore that it does not refer to the 
correctness or otherwise of the decision.    
375 S 144(c) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
376 CCMA rule 32. 
377 S 144 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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4.8.9  ENFORCEMENT OF THE AWARD 
 
The LRA provides that a CCMA or council award that has been certified by the 
CCMA Director be final and binding and may be enforced as if it were an order of the 
Labour Court.378 This means that the award may be executed in the same manner as 
an order of Court. Therefore, it is unnecessary to approach the Labour Court to make 
the award an order of Court.379 The party seeking enforcement must allege that there 
is an arbitration award and that, despite the respondent’s knowledge thereof, it 
remains outstanding.380 
 
Enforcement takes various forms. For example, where the award orders 
reinstatement and not the payment of money or compensation, the party may enforce 
it by way of contempt proceedings in the Labour Court.381 A monetary award is 
enforced by a writ of execution through the sheriff service, just as a judicial order can 
be executed.382 Moreover, an award may also be made an order of the Labour Court 
and executed as a Court Judgment.383 For an award to be made an order of Court 
the application must be brought within three years of the award, otherwise it will 
prescribe in terms of the Prescription Act.384 Grogan385 submits that the “final and 
binding” nature of the award does not necessarily exempt the award from review. 
However, the launching of a review application against an award does not 
necessarily suspend its operation. The Labour Court will invariably stay the execution 
of an award on filing a review application as a stay order requires a special 
application.386 Without ruling out the possibility of the enforcement of the award being 
stayed pending the review application, the application for enforcement will normally 
378 S 143 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
379 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 160. 
380 Chiloane v Nhlumato Agricultural Project [2000] 4 BLLR 392 LC par 14. 
381 S 143(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
382 Jaarsveld et al Principle of Labour Law 361. 
383 S 158(1)(c) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
384 Prescription Act 68 of 1969.See also Mpanzama v Fedelity Guards Holdings (Pty)Ltd [2000] 12 
BLLR 1459 (LC) wherein the Court held that an award is a debt, and as such is subject to the 
Prescription Act. 
385 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 161. 
386 Ibid. 
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be set together with the review application. Where the review application fails the 
award will be enforced accordingly.387 
 
4.9 DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY BARGAINING COUNCILS   
 
A bargaining council is defined as a corporate body established by mutual agreement 
between employers or employers’ organisations and by a registered trade union or 
trade unions for the purpose of practising self-government over the sector in which 
the parties represent the interests of their respective members regarding the 
determination of conditions of employment. 388  This study demonstrates that 
bargaining councils are the statutory successors to the Industrial Councils that 
operated under the 1956 LRA and the earlier Industrial Conciliation Acts. However, 
their powers, functions and responsibilities have changed and expanded in several 
respects.389 This shows that the legislature in the post-apartheid era intended to 
retain bargaining councils, although in a different form.390 
 
Bargaining councils are established on a voluntary basis. The LRA permits one or 
more registered trade union or one or more registered employers’ organisation to 
establish a bargaining council for a sector or area. 391  The establishment is 
sanctioned by adopting a valid constitution and by obtaining registration of the 
bargaining council in terms of section 29 of the LRA.392 
 
Bargaining councils in the public sector are established for a particular department, 
with the general Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Councils 393  having the 
overall power to deal with general matters and those parts of the public sector not 
governed by their own councils.394 Notwithstanding this provision, the state may still 
be a party to any established bargaining council if it is an employer in that sector and 
387 Ibid. 
388 Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 240. 
389 Grogan Collective Labour Law 83. 
390 See Adonis v Western Cape Education Department (1998) ILJ 806 (LC). 
391 S 27(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
392 S 27(1)(a)and (b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
393 Hereinafter referred to as the “PSCBC”. 
394 Grogan Collective Labour Law 84. 
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area.395 For that purpose, any reference to a registered employers’ organisation will 
include reference to the state as a party.396 Bargaining councils can be established 
for more than one sector.397 
 
Bargaining councils earn their recognition upon registration with the Registrar of 
Labour Relations and upon approval and gazetting of its constitution.398 Bargaining 
councils must be accredited by the Governing Body of the CCMA to perform any of 
their statutory dispute resolution functions.399 The purpose of the accreditation of 
bargaining councils and private agencies is to establish that the body applying for 
accreditation conforms to acceptable standards. 400  Once accredited, 401  the 
bargaining council acquires powers and can perform the following functions:402 
 
• conclude collective agreements and enforce them; 
 
• prevent and resolve labour disputes; 
 
• perform dispute resolution functions and establish and administer a fund to 
be used for resolving disputes. 
 
Bargaining Councils can, where appropriate, appoint an accredited agency to 
perform the above functions on their behalf. 
 
The LRA requires the constitution of every registered council to provide for 
procedures to resolve disputes between the parties concerning the interpretation and 
application of the council’s constitution.403 This includes disputes between parties 
falling within the council’s registered scope and disputes between organisations and 
395 S 27(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
396 S 27(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
397 S 27(10) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
398 S 29 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
399 Ss 52 and 127 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
400 S 127 of the LRA 66 of 1995.See also Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 441. 
401 The general provisions relating to accreditation are to be found in s 128 of the LRA 66 of 1995.  
402 S 28 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
403 S 30(1)(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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their members. 404  However, the LRA does not prescribe how the council’s 
constitution or dispute resolution procedure must deal with disputes.405 Therefore, the 
LRA permits bargaining councils to establish dispute resolution procedures by 
collective agreements.406 Given this leeway, it is acknowledged that in reality most 
councils have modelled their dispute resolution procedures along the lines of the 
CCMA rules.407 
 
Bargaining councils primarily have jurisdiction over disputes arising from the parties 
falling within their registered scope. Their jurisdiction is therefore not open ended, but 
may be extended to non-parties in certain circumstances where they are accredited 
by the CCMA.408 Where the council is not accredited, non-parties may consent to the 
jurisdiction of a council.409 A bargaining council also assumes jurisdiction where a 
council’s collective agreement has been extended to non-parties by the Minister of 
Labour.410 In all other cases, disputes between non-parties to a bargaining council 
must be referred to the CCMA, including disputes arising from a party or parties who 
do not fall within the registered scope of the council.411 
 
Although the LRA permits councils to resolve most disputes concerning “matters of 
mutual interest” between the parties to a dispute, the LRA expressly reserves certain 
disputes for the CCMA.412 The following disputes must, however, be conciliated and 
arbitrated by bargaining councils:  
 
• disputes relating to the interpretation of Chapter II of the LRA regarding 
freedom of association;413 
 
404 S 30(1)(j) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
405 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 46. 
406 S 51(9) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
407 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 46. 
408 Ibid. 
409 S 51(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
410 S 32 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
411 S 51(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
412 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 46. See also ss 51(3) and 127(2) of the LRA 
for the complete list of disputes that the Bargaining Council may not adjudicate.  
413 See s 9 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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• disputes relating to matters giving rise to a strike or lock-out;414 
 
• disputes in relation to essential services;415 
 
• disputes concerning unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices;416 
 
• disputes concerning the entitlement of severance pay;417 and  
 
• disputes about unfair labour practices.418 
 
4.9.1 APPOINTMENT AND POWERS OF DESIGNATED AGENTS OF 
BARGAINING COUNCILS   
 
The Minister of Labour may, at the request of a bargaining council, appoint any 
person 419  as the designated agent of a bargaining council, who may promote, 
monitor and enforce compliance with the provisions of its collective agreements.420 A 
designated agent may be authorised to issue a compliance order requiring any 
person bound by a collective agreement to comply with its provisions within a 
specified period.421 It is submitted that these powers vested in designated agents 
allow them to act as “labour inspectors” with access to workplaces and to all 
necessary information while investigating adherence to the terms of a collective 
agreement.422 
 
The LRA provides that a council may refer any unresolved dispute regarding the 
compliance with a collective agreement to arbitration by an arbitrator.423 An arbitrator 
conducting arbitration for this purpose has the same powers as a commissioner of 
414 See s 64(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995.  
415 S 74 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
416 S 191 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
417 S 196 of the LRA 66 of 1995 as repealed by s 95 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
418 S 191 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
419 S 63 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
420 S 33(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
421 S 33(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
422 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 236. 
423 S 33A(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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the CCMA and the general provisions for arbitration proceedings apply. 424  An 
arbitrator conducting such arbitration may make an appropriate award, including:425 
 
• ordering any person to pay any amount owing in terms of a collective 
agreement; 
 
• imposing a fine for a failure to comply with a collective agreement; 
 
• charging a party an arbitration fee; 
 
• ordering a party to pay the costs of arbitration; 
 
• confirming, varying or setting aside a compliance order issued by a 
designated agent; and  
 
• making an appropriate arbitration award that gives effect to the collective 
agreement and to the provisions and primary objects of the LRA and may 
include a declaratory order. 
 
The award is final and binding and is enforced in the same manner as an award of 
the CCMA, as if it were an order of the Labour Court.426 Statutory councils have the 
same powers and functions as bargaining councils, thus this will not be discussed 
separately.  
 
4.10 PRIVATE ARBITRATION  
 
Private arbitration is governed by the provisions of the Arbitration Act.427 The parties 
to a dispute enter into an arbitration agreement to arbitrate the dispute in such a way 
424 S 33A(5) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
425 S 33A(8) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
426 S 33A(10) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
427 Act 42 of 1965. 
225 
                                                             
that the principles in the LRA are excluded or will not apply.428 In terms of the 
Arbitration Act,429 an arbitration agreement is defined to mean: 
 
“a written agreement providing for the reference to arbitration of any existing dispute or 
any future dispute relating to a matter specified in the agreement, whether an arbitrator 
is named or designated therein or not”. 
 
Private arbitration is regarded as an important form of dispute resolution as an 
alternative to litigation in a civil court.430 Once the parties to a dispute choose to 
resolve their dispute in terms of the Arbitration Act, the parties relinquish the rights 
they would have had to pursue the matter in a civil court. 431 Private arbitration 
proceedings rest on the initial agreement between the parties to the dispute.432 To 
this end, an agreement may be reached in relation to a particular dispute, or reached 
in advance by means of a provision in the contract of employment.433 The agreement 
must be in writing434 and, once reduced to writing, it is submitted that it acquires 
binding force and the parties are committed to the process and subject only to the 
right of review. Thus, they accept to be bound by the outcome.435 
 
The following are the usual terms of an arbitration agreement: 436 
 
• the name of the parties; 
 
• the name of the arbitrator; 
 
• in case of an ad hoc arbitration agreement, the issue in dispute that the 
arbitrator must determine ( referred to as the terms of reference); 
 
428 Govindjee“ Labour Dispute Resolution” 237. 
429 S 1 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
430 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 47. 
431 Ibid. 
432 S 1 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
433 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 47. 
434 S 1of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
435 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 47. 
436 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 150. 
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• provisions regarding the arbitrator’s powers, such as the remedies to be 
awarded, the power to determine the procedure to be followed, and the cost 
of award; 
 
• a statement that the dispute must be arbitrated; 
 
• who will pay for the arbitration, the venue and any interpretation and if the 
costs are to be shared between the parties, in what proportion are they to be 
shared 
 
Further provisions that may be considered include:437 
 
• whether the proceedings should be recorded; 
• who may represent the parties; 
• whether the arbitration hearing should be held in private; 
• how the arbitrator must deliver the award to the parties; 
• how soon the arbitrator must issue the award; and  
• any other appropriate terms and conditions. 
 
Against the background of private arbitration, the LAC has pointed out some of the 
dangers of resorting to private arbitration.438 In Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd v Koots NO, 
the Court confirmed that agreeing to private arbitration is a contract and that a party 
cannot opt out of it without the other party’s agreement. The implication of this 
decision is that by agreeing to private arbitration, the agreement tends to limit the 
Court’s power to interfere with an award in regard to circumstances where there were 
procedural irregularities.439 Consequently, it is asserted that the dissatisfied party will 
have difficulties in overturning a private award.440 
 
Despite the above observation noted by the Court, it is submitted that there are 
advantages in using private arbitration. First, the parties choose a preferred arbitrator 
437 Ibid. 
438 Volkswagen SA (Pty)Ltd v Koots NO [2011] 6 BLLR 561 (LAC). 
439 Govindjee  “Labour Dispute Resolution” 238. 
440 Ibid. 
227 
                                                             
and bind him or her to the terms of reference. Second, there are benefits of flexibility, 
which may result in a speedier resolution of the dispute. 441 The disadvantages, 
however, include the fact that the losing party is restricted to the very narrow grounds 
of review contained in the Arbitration Act, and cannot rely on the wider grounds for 
review provided by the LRA,442 and costs are involved.443 
 
The other consequence of private arbitration is that an arbitration agreement can only 
be terminated with the consent of all the parties to such an agreement.444 Therefore, 
where one party withdraws from arbitration the arbitrator must continue and 
determine the dispute referred to him or her.445 The agreement remains in force even 
where there is death, sequestration or liquidation of a party since such an intervening 
factor does not terminate the agreement.446 However, the Court has jurisdiction at 
any time to set aside the arbitration agreement or order that a particular dispute 
should not be arbitrated on the application of a party to an arbitration agreement, on 
good cause shown.447 
 
4.11 THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR INSPECTORATE IN LABOUR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION  
 
The BCEA448 and the EEC449 established a labour inspectorate as the first level of 
labour dispute resolution. 450  The post-1995 labour statutes demonstrated the 
decriminalisation of the enforcement of labour laws and established a rationalised 
enforcement system administered by labour inspectors. Their role has been 
transformed to persuasion rather than a punitive one.451 
 
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid. 
443 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 47. 
444 S 3(1) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
445 Bosch et al Conciliation and Arbitration 157. 
446 S 4(1) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, provides that in such cases, the arbitration proceedings 
are stayed(subject to the court order) until an executor is appointed.  
447 S 3(2) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
448 Act 75 of 1997. 
449 Act 55 of 1998. 
450 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 433. 
451 Ibid. 
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The Minister of Labour appoints any person in the public service as a labour 
inspector, to perform the functions of a labour inspector.452 Upon appointment, labour 
inspectors may promote, monitor and enforce compliance with an employment law 
by:453 
 
• advising employers and employees of their rights and obligations in terms of 
an employment law; 
 
• conducting workplace inspections; 
 
• investigating complaints made to a labour inspector; 
 
• endeavouring to secure compliance with an employment law by securing 
undertakings or issuing compliance orders; and  
 
• performing any other prescribed functions, for example ensuring compliance 
orders with provisions of the EEA. 
 
The broad structure of the functions of the labour inspector entails that an inspector 
must first seek to obtain a written undertaking from the employer to comply with the 
provision of an Act.454 Thereafter, a compliance order may be issued explaining the 
actions required to rectify the contravention.455 
 
In order to monitor and enforce compliance with an employment law, a labour 
inspector has the power, without the need for a warrant or notice, at any reasonable 
time, to enter workplaces or employment premises. 456 In the execution of these 
powers, labour inspectors have a range of mechanisms at their disposal, including 
questioning persons, inspecting documents and records and making relevant copies, 
and inspecting the premises, and are allowed to be assisted by an interpreter.457 
452 S 63(1)(a)and (b) of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
453 S 64 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
454 Ss 68(1) and (1A)(2) of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
455 S 69 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
456 S 65 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
457 S 66 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
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 A labour inspector who has reasonable grounds to believe that an employer has not 
complied with a provision of the BCEA and EEA may issue the employer concerned 
with a compliance order.458 The compliance order sets out the relevant details of the 
matter including any steps that the employer is required to take.459 An employer may 
also be fined for failure to comply with a provision of the BCEA.460 However, there 
are some statutory limitations to issue a compliance order in respect of any amount 
payable to an employee as a result of a failure to comply with a provision of the 
BCEA.461 
 
The BCEA provides the employer with recourse to the Director-General of the 
Department of Labour. An employer disputing the compliance order issued by a 
labour inspector may, within 21 days462 of receiving it, make a written representation 
to the Director-General objecting to it.463 The Director-General may, after receiving 
and considering a written representation, confirm, vary or set aside the order.464 
 
Upon receipt of the Director-General’s decision, the employer, if not content with the 
outcome, has an option, within 21 days, to appeal to the Labour Court against such 
an order. Where an appeal is noted with the Labour Court, it suspends the operation 
of the compliance order.465 In contrast, where an employer does object and does not 
comply with the order, the Director-General may apply to the Labour Court for the 
compliance order to be made an order of Court.466 
 
 
 
 
458 S 69(1) of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
459 S 69(2)(f) of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
460 S 70 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. See also Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 243.  
461 Ibid. 
462 Unless the D-G has condoned a late objection on good cause demonstrated.  
463 S 71(1) of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
464 S 71(3) of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
465 S 72 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
466 S 73 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
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4.12 THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR COURT IN LABOUR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION  
 
Other than the less formal process of labour dispute resolution created by the LRA, 
the Act establishes a Court structure for the formal litigation of disputes and for 
development of jurisprudence in labour law. 467 This court structure replaces the 
former Industrial Courts system, which was established as part of the Wiehahn 
reforms and introduced in the early 1980s to adjudicate labour disputes until 1995.468 
 
The Labour Court established under the new dispensation is a court of law and 
equity. It is the superior court of record, which has authority, inherent powers and 
standing, in relation to matters under its jurisdiction.469 The Court structure comprises 
of a Judge President, a Deputy Judge President and as many judges as the 
President considers necessary on advice of NEDLAC and in consultation with the 
Minister of Justice.470 The Labour Court judges are required to be Judges of the High 
Court or legal practitioners who must possess knowledge, experience and expertise 
in labour law.471 The LRA provides for the Labour Court to sit as a single court472 and 
may sit in separate courts as required.473 
 
4.12.1 JURISDICTION OF THE LABOUR COURT                   
 
Subject to the Constitution and unless otherwise provided for by the LRA, the Labour 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters that are to be determined by 
the Court, either in terms of the provisions of the LRA or any other law.474 The LRA, 
however, provides for the dual jurisdiction of the Labour Court and that of the High 
Court in respect to any alleged or threatened violation of any fundamental rights 
enshrined in Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution arising from employment 
and labour relations. In addition, there is concurrent jurisdiction in disputes about the 
467 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 238. 
468 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 442. 
469 S 151(1),(2)and (3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
470 S 152 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
471 S 153(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
472 S 152 (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
473 S 152(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
474 S 157(1) of the LRA 66 of 1996. 
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constitutionality of executive or administrative acts performed by the state as an 
employer and where there is an allegedly irregular application of any law for which 
the Minister of Labour is responsible.475 
 
Numerous interpretations and applications of section 157 of the LRA have generated 
conflicting views on the approach to be taken in a review application. First, there is a 
view that is inclined to give effect to the purpose of the LRA. In this context, it is 
demonstrated that labour disputes are to be adjudicated solely within the structures 
created by the LRA. Second, there is the opinion that takes the section of the Act 
should be interpreted literally. The question that arises is whether to regard only 
those matters specifically assigned to the Labour Court by the LRA as being 
excluded from the High Court’s jurisdiction. 476  These varying views have been 
subject to key judgments of the CC that are discussed below. 
 
In Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security 477 the CC pointed out that the term 
“jurisdiction” means the power or competence of a court to hear and determine an 
issue between parties. It is therefore submitted that jurisdiction is a matter that is 
determined on the basis of pleadings, which constitute the written summaries of a 
dispute before the Courts.478 In Chirwa v Transnet Limited and Others479, the CC 
emphasised the specialist nature of the Labour Court and the LRA’s aims of 
establishing a “one-stop-shop” dispute resolution structure in the labour arena. In this 
case, Ngcobo J noted that allowing a parallel jurisdiction between the Labour Court 
and the High Court would be permitting an “astute litigant” to by-pass the whole 
conciliation and dispute resolution machinery created by the LRA and as such would 
rob the Court of its need to exist.480 
 
The Court has attempted to reconcile sections 157(1) and (2) of the LRA by focusing 
on the primary objective of the LRA. Van Niekerk (2011)481 summarises the Court’s 
475 S 157(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
476 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 448. 
477 [2009] 12 BLLR 1145 (CC). 
478 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 239. 
479 [2009] 12 BLLR 97 (CC). 
480 Chirwa v Transnet Limited par 95. 
481 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 450. 
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inference as follows: that the legislature intended to avoid a multiplicity of laws and to 
eliminate overlapping and competing jurisdictions by creating a specialised set of 
forums and tribunals to deal with labour related matters. The Court therefore held 
that section 157(2) of the LRA was enacted with limited constitutional jurisdiction on 
the Labour Courts. The Court further held that the purpose was not to confer 
jurisdiction on the High Court to deal with labour and employment related disputes, 
but that it was to empower the Labour Court to deal with causes of action that arise 
from employment and labour relations and are founded on the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.482 
 
To this end, the Court483 has pointed out that section 157(2) of the LRA must be 
given a narrow meaning, while section 157(1) must be interpreted broadly. 
Consequently, the Court held that an employee alleging non-compliance with the 
provisions of the LRA must seek a remedy in the LRA. Therefore, such an employee 
cannot avoid the dispute resolution mechanism established by the LRA by alleging a 
violation of a constitutional right.484 
 
Gcaba’s case, therefore, reinforces the role of the Labour Court as the sole forum for 
the resolution of labour disputes. However, it is submitted that although the Labour 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect to matters referred in terms of the LRA, in 
disputes involving the violation or breach of a constitutional right related to 
employment and labour relations, the High Court assumes concurrent jurisdiction.485 
This means that either Court (but not both) may be approached to hear the 
dispute.486 
 
Besides the LRA provisions, the BCEA487 confers dual jurisdiction to the Labour 
Court and civil courts to hear and determine any matter concerning a contract of 
employment, irrespective of whether any basic condition of employment constitutes a 
term of that contract. It is therefore noted that the High Court and the Labour Court 
482 Chirwa v Transnet Limited par 120. 
483 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security [2009] 12 BLLR 1145 (CC). 
484 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 450.  
485 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 239. 
486 Ibid. 
487 S 77(3) of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
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have equal power to enforce common-law rights. 488 The Labour Court also has 
jurisdiction in respect of disputes that are subject to the Arbitration Act, as referenced 
in section 157(3) of the LRA. Lastly, the LRA provides that the Labour Court may not 
adjudicate disputes that must be referred to arbitration, unless the parties have 
agreed in terms of section 158(2) to arbitration by the Court, allowing the Court to act 
as arbitrator.489 
 
4.12.2 POWERS OF THE LABOUR COURT  
 
The LRA490 empowers the Labour Court to make any appropriate order, including: 
 
• granting urgent interim relief; 
• an interdict; 
• an order of specific performance; 
• a declaratory order; 
• an award of compensation; 
• an award of damages; 
• an order for costs. 
 
The Labour Court may also:  
 
• order compliance with any provisions of the LRA; 
 
• make an arbitration award or a settlement agreement an order of Court; 
 
• request the CCMA to conduct an investigation and submit a report; 
 
• determine a dispute between any registered trade union and registered  
employers’ organisation and any of its members; 
 
488 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 239. 
489 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 451. 
490 S 158 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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• condone the late filing of documents or the late referral of a dispute to the 
Court; 
 
• subject to section 145, review the performance of any function provided for in 
the LRA in terms of section 158(1)(g) on any ground that is permissible in 
law; 
 
• review any decision taken by the state as an employer; 
 
• deal with all matters necessary to perform its functions in terms of the LRA or 
any other law.  
 
4.12.3 REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 
 
As was discussed in 4.12.1 above, the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to 
review CCMA and bargaining councils’ arbitration awards.491 Moreover, the Labour 
Court may review private arbitration awards in matters that could otherwise have 
been referred for arbitration under the LRA.492 The Labour Court also has jurisdiction 
to review the actions of officials charged with performing functions under diverse 
labour legislation493 and actions by the state in its capacity as an employer. 
 
A discussion of judicial review for this purpose is important as it separates reviews 
from appeals. Grogan494 describes judicial review as a process in terms of which a 
court is called upon to determine and provide the legality and validity of the actions of 
an organ of the state or, in some cases, private bodies or individuals exercising 
statutory powers. This assertion suggests a distinction between reviews and appeals.  
 
The Court has explained the distinction as follows: that judicial review focuses on the 
process by which the ‘impugned’ administrative decision is reached, whereas 
491 S 145, read with s 157(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
492 S 145(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
493 S 158(9) of the LRA 66 of 1995; s 51(b) of the BCEA; s 77A(a) of the EEA; s 31(2) of the Skills 
Development Act, 97 of 1998.   
494 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 278. 
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appeals focus on the conclusion reached in the judgment under appeal.495 The SCA 
has illustrated the difference as follows- 
 
“In a review, the question is not whether the decision is capable of being justified... but 
whether the decision-maker properly exercised the power entrusted to him or her. The 
focus is on the process and on the way in which the decision-maker came to the 
challenged conclusion”. 
 
Consequently, it is submitted that the function of the reviewing court should be to 
determine whether the arbitrator committed an irregularity during the course of the 
proceedings, which, it is alleged, denied a party a fair hearing. Therefore, if the Court 
finds no such irregularity or error, or if it is insufficient to warrant a different 
conclusion, the decision must stand.496 In the absence of a reviewable irregularity it is 
asserted that a reviewing court may not overrule an arbitration decision on the simple 
basis of disagreeing with it.  
 
Notably, an arbitration award issued by a CCMA commissioner is not subject to an 
appeal.497 This means that an aggrieved party to an award may not have the matter 
re-heard by a higher court and the higher court may not make a decision based on 
the record of evidence led at arbitration.498 In terms of the Explanatory Memorandum 
to the LRA, it is clear that the legislature took into account the provisions of section 
1(d)(iv) of the LRA to limit the power of the Labour Court to review CCMA arbitration 
awards and to prohibit appeals against these awards. The intention was to ensure 
that labour disputes were both expeditiously and efficiently resolved.499 
 
Against this backdrop, the LRA provides that a party who alleges a defect in respect 
of arbitration proceedings under the CCMA may apply to the Labour Court for an 
order setting the award aside.500 The application for review must be filed within six 
495 Ibid. 
496 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 278. 
497 Jordaan et al Labour Arbitration 100. 
498 Ibid. 
499 Fergus “The Distinction between Appeals and Review- Defining the Limits of the Labour Court’s 
powers of Review” (2010) ILJ (31) 1557. 
500 S 145(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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weeks of the date that the arbitration award was served on the applicant, unless 
condonation has been granted for late filing.501 
 
The LRA describes the “defects” that are reviewable to include situations where 
commissioners: 
 
- committed misconduct with regard to the duties of a commissioner as 
arbitrator;502 
 
- committed gross irregularities in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings;503 
 
- exceeded their powers as arbitrators;504 
 
- an award was improperly obtained. 505 
 
The Labour Court has been granted the power to stay the enforcement of the award 
pending the discretion on review on these grounds.506 In terms of common law the 
noting of an appeal ordinarily stays the order. However, a review application does not 
501 S 145(1)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
502 Brassey Labour Relations Act (2006), A7-93 submitted that for misconduct to exist, there must 
have been some “wrongful or improper conduct” on the part of the commissioner.  In 
Narraindath v CCMA & others (2000) 21 ILJ 1151 (LC) at 1160H 1161 par 28,  the court 
described misconduct to include mishandling of the arbitration that is likely to amount to some 
substantial miscarriage of justice. The Court went further to state that the arbitrator would 
misconduct himself if he acted contrary to public policy and where the award was obtained in 
violation of natural justice principle.  The court concluded that some turpitude or at least 
impropriety on the party on the arbitrator was required. But that a bona fide mistake of law 
would not be sufficient.      
503 In Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd V CCMA & others [1997] 12 BLLR 1610 (LC) par 1613 I-
1614B. The Court held that a material contravention of the audi alteram partem rule would be 
prime example of a gross irregularity.  Furthermore, in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw 
NO & others (2000) 21 ILJ 1232 (LC), the Court noted that gross irregularity ordinarily related to 
procedural requirements such as failure to give notice of hearing, refusing the one party an 
opportunity to call evidence while extending the opportunity to the other party and excluding 
cross-examination.  
504 Brassey Labour Relations Act A7-96 states that the CCMA can only lawfully fulfill its function of 
arbitration if it has the competence and jurisdiction to do so in terms of the LRA. Further that 
prior performing their functions, the CCMA must comply with the substantive and procedural 
pre-conditions set out in the LRA.   
505 In Moloi v Euijen NO par 1377G-1380B, the Court pointed out that improper conduct include 
bribing of the arbitrator, or as result of a corrupt relationship.  
506 See s 145(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995.   
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have the same effect.507 It is required that the Labour Court’s discretion must be 
exercised judicially.508 The LRA provides wider powers to the Court in correcting the 
decision it condemns on review.509 In doing do, the Court may-  
 
- determine the dispute in a manner it considers appropriate; 
 
- make an order it considers appropriate about the procedures to be followed 
to determine the dispute.  
 
In setting aside the award, the Court will either remit the matter back to the CCMA for 
a fresh decision, giving directions whether the same or a new arbitrator must hear the 
matter.510 The Court will not simply substitute its own decision, unless in exceptional 
circumstances.511 
 
There have been vigorous debates on whether further grounds of review exist, for 
example the argument that an award has to be justifiable or rational in relation to the 
reasons given for it.512 It is argued that although a review differs from an appeal, a 
review brought under the grounds of justifiability and rationality has similar effects as 
an appeal.513 In Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO514 the Court explained that value 
judgments will be made, which inevitably involve the consideration of the merits of 
the matter in one way or another. The Court accepted that provided the judge 
determining the issue was aware that he or she entered the merits, not in order to 
substitute his or her own opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine 
whether the outcome was rationally justifiable, the process was in order.  
 
In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines515 the Constitutional Court516 held that when 
deciding whether an arbitrator’s decision should be reviewed, the Court had to ask 
507 See Grunder v Grunder 1990 (4) SA 680 (C) at 683G-H. 
508 See A v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 1989 (1) SA 849 (A) par 851 C-F.  
509 S 145(4)(a) and (b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
510 Brassey Labour Relations Act A7-98. 
511 See SA Fibre Yarn Rings Ltd v CCMA & others (2005) 26 ILJ 921 (LC). 
512 Jordaan et al Labour Arbitration 101. 
513 Ibid. 
514 [1998] 11 BLLR 1011(LAC). 
515 [2007] 28 ILJ 2405 CC. 
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itself whether the decision was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not 
reach. The Court went further to point out that there had to be a rational connection 
between the evidence led in the arbitration and the arbitrator’s decision and the 
arbitrator must not, for example, ignore relevant evidence or rely on irrelevant 
evidence in making his or her decision.517 
 
In the same matter, the CC resolved the debate of whether the CCMA performed an 
administrative action and if the PAJA provisions applied. The majority of the CC 
found that arbitration by a CCMA commissioner was an administrative action within 
the meaning of section 33 of the South African Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court 
found that the PAJA provisions did not apply to review under section 145(2) of the 
LRA.518 The Court inferred that section 145 of the LRA was a specialised provision 
that trumped the more generalised provisions of the PAJA. 
 
For these reasons, review provisions on other grounds than those listed in section 
145 of the LRA would refer to any other functions performed in terms of the LRA, 
including all rulings and decision of the CCMA, apart from arbitration awards.519 The 
power extended to decisions regarding applications for condonation, rulings on 
jurisdiction and decisions by the Registrar of Labour Relations to refuse the 
registration of a trade union or a bargaining council. This was the scope of review 
under which rationality dictated by PAJA would apply.520 
 
4.12.4 THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT (LAC)       
 
The LRA establishes521 the LAC,522 comprising of the Judge President, the Deputy 
Judge President and a number of other judges of the High Court as may be required 
516 Hereinafter referred to as “CC”. 
517 See Jordaan et al Labour Arbitration 101. 
518 Van Niekerk et al LAW@Work 448. 
519 Ibid. 
520 Ibid. 
521 S 167 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
522 Hereinafter referred to as the “LAC”. 
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for the effective functioning of the LAC.523 The judges are appointed by the President 
on the recommendation of NEDLAC and the Judicial Service Commission.524 
 
The LAC is constituted by any three judges designated by the Judge President525 
and a decision to which any two judges agree is a decision of the Court.526 The LAC 
has national jurisdiction and may perform its functions anywhere in the Republic.527 
Subject to the Constitution, the LAC may hear and determine all appeals against the 
final judgments and orders of the Labour Court and may decide any question of law 
reserved for it to decide.528 
 
The LAC may receive further evidence, remit the matter to the Labour Court with 
instructions, or confirm, amend or set aside the judgment that is subject to appeal.529 
The judgments of the LAC are binding on the Labour Court.530 Section 183 of the 
LRA provides that “subject to the Constitution and despite any other law, no further 
right of appeal lies from the LAC”. This view has been adopted by Court531 prior to 
reversing the position by the SCA532 and the CC. However, the CC has held to the 
contrary that where a matter was of a constitutional nature, the provisions of the LRA 
that gives the LAC an equal status to that of the SCA and the provisions of the 
Constitution that establish the LAC as the final Court of appeal have no application in 
matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LAC. The Court found that in a 
constitutional matter, there was a right of appeal from the LAC to the SCA.533 
 
523 S 168 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
524 S 169 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
525 S 168(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
526 S 173(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
527 S 172(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
528 S 173(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
529 S 174 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
530 S 182 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
531 Kan-Lin Fusion v Brunton & another (2000) 23 ILJ 882 LAC, wherein the Court referred to s 167 
of the LRA and concluded that there was no such right of appeal, because the Court had an 
equal authority and standing as the SCA.    
532 Hereinafter referred to as “SCA”. 
533 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town & others (2003) 24 ILJ (95) CC. 
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In NUMSA & others v Fry’s Metal (Pty) Ltd534 the Court pointed out that section 
168(3) of the South African Constitution established the SCA as the highest court of 
appeal, except in constitutional matters. The Court concluded that the South African 
Constitution vested the SCA with the power to hear appeals from the LAC both on 
constitutional and non-constitutional matters. Therefore, the provisions of the LRA 
that conferred final appellate powers on the LAC had to be read subject to the judicial 
hierarchy established by the Constitution. In respect of constitutional matters, the CC 
had jurisdiction to hear appeals from the SCA.   
 
4.13 OTHER LABOUR RELATED STATUTES  
4.13.1 THE BASIC CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ACT 75 OF 1997                     
 
The BCEA is another pillar of South Africa’s labour legislative dispensation. The Act 
provides for and stipulates pertinent conditions of employment and seeks to 
contribute to the creation of secure, equitable and harmonious working 
relationships.535 The Preamble of the BCEA proclaims that it intends to give effect to 
the right to fair labour practices referred to in section 23(1) of the Constitution by 
establishing and making provisions for the regulation of basic conditions of 
employment, thereby complying with the obligations of the Republic as a member 
state of the ILO. Moreover, the BCEA seeks to advance economic development and 
social justice by establishing and enforcing basic conditions of employment.536 
 
The BCEA establishes the threshold of basic conditions of employment that serves to 
protect all employees. It offers basic protection to employees who have little or no 
bargaining power to balance the superior economic power of their employers. 537 
Although the BCEA provides for the threshold of basic conditions of employment, it 
permits variation of its minimum standards by means of variation provisions.538 
 
The BCEA provides for numerous benefits. Chapter 1 relates to definitions and the 
purpose and application of the Act; Chapter 2 regulates working time; Chapter 3, 
534 [2005] 5 BLLR 430 (SCA). 
535 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 225. 
536 S 2 of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
537 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 65. 
538 Ss 49 and 50 of the BCEA 75 of 1995. 
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leave; Chapter 4 sets out the particulars of employment and remuneration; Chapter 5 
deals with termination of employment; Chapters 6 and 7 deal with child labour and 
forced-labour prohibition; Chapter 8 deals with sectoral determination; Chapter 9 
deals with employment condition commission; Chapter 10 deals with monitoring, 
enforcement and legal proceedings; and Chapter 11 contains general provisions.   
 
4.13.2 EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 55 OF 1998 
 
The EEA has been hailed as a landmark in South Africa’s employment history as it 
makes a meaningful contribution to re-shaping the socio-economic and political 
framework of the country.539 The EEA ensures the normalisation of the workplace, as 
well as the creation of a sense of equity and justice.540 
 
The scheme of the EEA is achieved through: 
 
• promoting equal opportunities and fair treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination; and  
 
• the duty placed on designated employers to implement employment equity 
measures to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by 
designated groups in order to ensure their equitable representation in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce. 
 
“Designated groups” means black people, women, and people with disabilities.541 
Designated employers542 refer to employers with 50 or more employees; employers 
with fewer than 50 employees, but with an annual turn-over equal to or above that of 
a small business;543 and all municipalities and organs of state.544The EEA is divided 
into two sections. The first section deals with unfair discrimination545 and the second 
539 Chap 1 of the EEA 75 of 1995. 
540 Chap 2 of the EEA 55 of 1998. 
541 S 4(2) of the EEA 55 of 1998. 
542 S 12 of the EEA 55 of 1998. 
543 See Schedule 4 to the EEA 55 of 1998. 
544 Organs of the State are defined in s239 of the South African Constitution . 
545 Chap 2 of the EEA 55 of 1998.  
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details the mechanisms instituted to prevent discrimination and promote affirmative 
action.546 
 
In Crown Chickens (Pty) t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others547 the LAC described 
the EEA as one of the critical pieces of legislation passed after 1994 aimed at 
redressing the imbalances of the past. Thus the EEA provides that unfair 
discrimination must be adjudicated by the Labour Court after a failed attempt at 
conciliation by the CCMA.548 
 
4.13.3 THE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT ACT 97 OF 1998549 
 
The SDA was enacted to address the massive skills shortage. It seeks to create an 
institutional framework to devise national, sectoral and workplace strategies to 
develop skills of the workforce by, inter alia:550 
 
• improving productivity and competitiveness; 
 
• improving the quality of life of workers, their work prospects and labour 
mobility; 
 
• promoting self-employment; and  
 
• improving social services. 
 
The Act seeks to achieve all the aforementioned through the creation of the National 
Skills Authority to oversee the implementation and realisation thereof.551 Section 33 
of the SDA criminalises the provision of false information, any attempt to obtain a 
prescribed document by false pretence, or obstructing a person acting in terms of the 
Act.      
546 Chapter 3 of the EEA 55 of 1998. 
547 [2002] 6 BLLR 493 LAC par 35. 
548 S 10(2)-(7) of the EEA 55 of 1998. However, all parties may consent to arbitration by the CCMA 
after conciliation in terms of s 10(6). 
549 Hereinafter referred to as “SDA”. 
550 Ss 1-4 of SDA 97 of 1998. 
551 S 5 of SDA 97 of 1998. 
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 4.13.4 COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND DISEASE ACT 
130 OF 1993 552 AS AMENDED BY THE COMPENSATION FOR 
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND DISEASES ACT 61 OF 1997 
 
The aim of COIDA is to provide compensation for losses due to occupational injuries 
and diseases in the workplace. COIDA applies to all employees and all casual and 
full-time employees who become ill or who are injured, disabled or killed as a result 
of a workplace accident or workplace-related diseases.553 
 
COIDA provides employees with a no-fault compensation system for injuries arising 
out of and in the course of their employment. Employees are compensated 
regardless of whether their injuries or illnesses were caused by their own, their 
employers’ or another person’s negligence.554 In these circumstances, the employee 
may not institute a simultaneous claim for damages against the employer or any 
other person for the damages suffered.555 The claim made in terms of COIDA is a 
substitute for an employee’s or dependant’s right to claim damages from the 
employer in terms of the common-law principle.556  
 
COIDA is administered by a Compensation Commissioner. Therefore the Act 
provides that a person affected or aggrieved by a decision of the Compensation 
Commissioner may lodge an appeal to the Labour Court.557 
 
4.13.5 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACT 63 OF 2001558 AS AMENDED BY 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2003          
 
The purpose of the UIF is to alleviate some of the harmful economic and social 
effects of unemployment. Unemployed beneficiaries may withdraw funds to which 
552 Hereinafter referred to as “COIDA’’. 
553 S 1 of COIDA 130 of 1993. 
554 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 254. 
555 Ibid. 
556 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 398. 
557 S 91(5) of COIDA 130 of 993. 
558 Hereinafter referred to as the “UIF”. 
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they are entitled, thereby negating the effects of unemployment. 559The Act applies to 
all employees other than those employed for less than 24 hours a month.560 
 
The UIF defines an employee as a natural person who receives remuneration or to 
whom remuneration accrues in respect of services rendered, but excludes any 
independent contractor. 561  The Act provides for the establishment of the 
unemployment insurance fund for the following benefits: 
 
- unemployment benefits; 
- illness benefits; 
- maternity benefits; 
- adoption benefits; and  
- dependants benefits. 
 
Ultimately, it is the Labour Court that has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all 
matters arising from the UIF.562 
 
4.14. CONCLUSION  
 
South Africa’s labour relations system originated with the discovery of diamonds and 
gold, which later developed into the mining sector and resulted in the industrialisation 
of the country. The sector was confronted with continuous labour unrest among the 
people of different ethnicities that made up the workforce at the time. The unending 
labour turmoil necessitated the enactment of various labour legislations, notably the 
Industrial Conciliation 11 of 1924 and the subsequent Industrial Act 28 of 1956, to 
provide for dispute resolution between the parties. However, these statutes were 
discriminatory in their application on the basis that they excluded black workers and 
only applied to white workers and workers from other races. 
 
559 Preamble of the UIF. 
560 S 3 of the UIF 63 of 2001. 
561 S 1 of the UIF 63 of 2001. 
562 S 61 of the UIF 63 of 2001. 
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The Wiehahn reforms were the watershed that gradually transformed the dualistic 
labour relations system into a unified system. These reforms further resulted in the 
launch of the Industrial Court to adjudicate unfair labour practice and disputes until 
1995. The Industrial Court system was, however, not the ideal structure to resolve 
labour disputes because of its shortcomings, which had a bearing on the success 
rate of resolving disputes. 
 
Following the attainment of full democracy in 1994, a democratic Constitution was 
adopted, which entrenches various labour rights and regulates labour relations. To 
this end, section 23 of the Constitution is dedicated to labour relations. The LRA was 
enacted to give effect to this constitutional commitment, which guarantees labour 
rights and the right to fair labour practices. The LRA established the CCMA to resolve 
labour disputes through conciliation and arbitration and replace the old Industrial 
Court system by providing more flexible, cost-effective and constructive mechanisms 
for dispute resolution. Besides the CCMA, bargaining councils are also provided for 
to complement the functions of the CCMA on a sectoral level.  
 
Arbitration awards issued by the CCMA and bargaining councils are final and binding 
and no right of appeal against them exists. However, the LRA created the Labour 
Court and the LAC with review powers over defective arbitration awards. Aside from 
the LRA there are other labour related statutes relevant to dispute resolution that 
have been discussed in this chapter. 
 
The following chapter analyses Namibia’s compliance level with international labour 
standards relevant to labour dispute resolution. This is followed by a chapter that 
compares Namibia’s labour dispute resolution system to that of South Africa. The 
final chapter addresses general conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter brings into application Chapter Two’s discussion of the ILO by 
undertaking a practical analysis of international labour standards relative to the 
Namibian labour dispute resolution system as discussed in Chapter Three. As 
illustrated in Chapter Two, the ILO has recognized the importance of meeting global 
social needs since its inception. 1 Within this context, the ILO’s overall objective 
emphasizes the promotion of social justice through the development, monitoring and 
enforcement of international labour standards. 2 In addition, according to the 
organization’s mission, the ILO aims to contribute to social justice,3 an intention of 
1 Standing “The International Labour Standards-Global Monitor” (2010) 15 New Political Economy 
309. 
2 See Preamble of the ILO Constitution.  
3 Social justice is defined as “justice exercised within a society, particularly as it is exercised by 
and among the various social classes of that society. It is based on the principle of equality and 
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goodwill that it aims to achieve through a systematic and structured set of procedures 
formulated and enacted by the organization.4 
 
Monitoring compliance with international labour standards is one of the organization’s 
mandates. This is realized by accepting reports, supervising these reports and 
requiring conformity in the application of international labour standards by designated 
supervisory committees. These committees are based on tripartite structures 
consisting of trade unions, employers’ organizations and governments.5 These are 
the same structures that develop and adopt international labour standards in the form 
of conventions or recommendations.6 On adopting a standard set by the ILC, such a 
standard becomes open for ratification by member states in terms of the Constitution 
of the ILO. Ratification, in turn, creates an obligation for a member state to adhere to 
the instrument’s terms and conditions and, consequently, to submit regular reports 
demonstrating compliance with the ratified standard. This allows for ILO intervention 
in cases of non-adherence. 7  In most cases, conventions are accompanied by 
recommendations that are less formal and non-binding, but nevertheless provide 
detailed guidance to member states regarding ethical labour practices.8 
 
According to the ILO’s website, Namibia became a member state on 3 October 1978, 
represented by the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO). At the time, 
SWAPO was in exile while fighting for the liberation of the Namibian people from 
South Africa’s colonialist rule.9 At independence on 21 March 1990, Namibia became 
a sovereign state, adopting a constitution that confirms membership to the ILO and 
the resultant adherence to international labour standards.10 Since then, Namibia has 
ratified all fundamental conventions, one priority convention and a number of 
solidarity, understands and values human rights, and recognizes dignity of every human being”.  
See Encyclopedia accessed on 20 September 2012.  
4 Lopez and Ugarte “Analysis and Critical Assessment of the Role Played by the ILO in 
Developing and Securing Core Labour Standards” (2010) Panorama Socio Economico 201.  
5 Art 1(2) of the ILO Constitution.    
6 Art 19 of the ILO Constitution.  
7 Standing “The International Labour Standards-Global Monitor” 308.   
8 Art 19(6)(d) of the ILO Constitution. 
9 Http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normle/en accessed on 09 March 2012.  
10 Art 95(d) of the Namibian Constitution.  
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technical conventions.11 By virtue of ratification the country is obliged to comply with 
the provisions of all ratified conventions and, consequently, to subject itself to the 
ILO’s established system for monitoring compliance with these ratified conventions.12 
 
In light of the above, this chapter analyses Namibia’s compliance level with ratified 
international labour standards, particularly conventions relating to labour dispute 
resolution, and un-ratified conventions that are nevertheless of application to the 
Namibian ADR system. The chapter further examines the effectiveness of the ILO’s 
methods of securing compliance with ratified standards, and concludes with a 
practical examination of Namibia’s ADR system with regard to compliance with 
international labour standards. The aim of the investigations undertaken in this 
chapter is to provide an overview of Namibia’s compliance level with international 
labour standards and to outline the measures taken by the ILO to reinforce 
compliance with these standards. 
 
5.2 THE NAMIBIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 
 
Namibia became the hundred and thirty sixth (136th) member state of the ILO on 3 
October 1978. At the time the country was politically dependent on South Africa and 
ruled under apartheid. Namibia’s admission to the ILO was the result of the United 
Nations’ termination of South Africa’s mandate over the territory and the entrustment 
of the country’s affairs to the United Nations Council of Namibia in 1967. In 1978, the 
United Nations’ Council of Namibia requested the country’s admission to the ILO as a 
full member. The Council was recognized by the ILC as Namibia’s authentic 
government through a vote, with 368 votes in favour of this arrangement with no 
opposition and only 50 abstentions.13 
 
Following Namibia’s admission to the ILO, the Wiehahn Commission (Namibia) 
recommended that the country must become a sovereign member state of the ILO on 
attaining independence and that, where possible, it must ratify, adopt and comply 
11 Ibid. 
12 Douglas, Ferguson and Klett “An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Worker Rights: 
ILO Standards US Trade Laws, Unions and NGOs” (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 275.   
13 Available on Http://www.ncbi:nm-nib.gov accessed on 19 September 2012. 
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with relevant international labour standards.14 The commission further recommended 
that Namibia must subscribe to other African organizations, such as the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC).15 
 
After gaining independence on 21 March 1990, Namibia embraced the Wiehahn 
Commission’s recommendations by adopting a constitution and labour legislation that 
addressed the country’s new image in the international world. The constitution 
asserts membership of the ILO and undertakes to comply to and act in accordance 
with international labour standards where possible.16 To that end, the Labour Act was 
enacted to, amongst other things, give operational effect to the constitutional 
commitment of the ILO. 
 
Tshosa17 notes that the Namibian Constitution adopted a positive approach towards 
international law. This view is based on a number of articles contained in the 
constitution that deal with or relate to international law. The relevant articles include 
the preamble, which declares the integrity of the Namibian nation to be “among and 
in association with the nations of the world”. Moreover, the constitution provides that 
the national territory of Namibia consists of the whole of the territory as “recognized 
by the international community through the organs of the United Nations”.18 Further, 
article 96 provides for foreign relations as follows:  
 
“to … 
(d)  foster respect for international law and treaty obligation; and  
(e) encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means”. 
 
The above provisions confirm that it was reasonable for the drafters of the Namibian 
Constitution to anchor it firmly on international law.19 Article 144 of the Constitution 
provides for the unequivocal application of international law into Namibian legislation. 
14 Wiehahn Commission-Namibia 24. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Art 95(d) of the Namibian Constitution.   
17 Tshosa “The Status of International Law in Namibian National Law - A Critical Appraisal of the 
Constitutional Strategy” (2010) 2 Namibian Law Journal 3. 
18 Tshosa “The Status of International Law in Namibian National Law - A Critical Appraisal of the 
Constitutional Strategy” 10. 
19 Tshosa “The Status of International Law in Namibian National Law - A Critical Appraisal of the 
Constitutional Strategy” 12. 
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Tshosa20 illustrates that, in this context, the term “general rule” refers to rules that are 
widely supported and accepted by the majority of states. In other words, “general 
rules” are rules that have attracted widespread support from the international 
community. This, therefore, includes international labour standards adopted and 
accepted by the wider ILO community. However, not all general rules of international 
law are part of national law; only those rules that are binding upon Namibia are 
included.21 Ultimately, all international labour standards that Namibia has ratified 
have the binding effects derived from the application of article 144 of the Constitution.  
 
Article 144 of the Namibian Constitution makes further reference to international 
agreements that are binding on Namibia and includes these in national legislation. 
This means that national institutions, such as the Labour Commissioner and the 
Labour Court in particular, may apply and enforce international treaties that are 
binding on Namibia. Similarly, applicants, such as those involved in labour disputes, 
can rely on provisions included in international treaties to approach a labour tribunal 
or court to enforce their rights.22 
 
5.3 THE RATIFICATION PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
STANDARDS BY NAMIBIA                  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two of this study, international labour standards are the 
products of ILC deliberations. These standards are developed to enhance workers’ 
job security and are regarded as international action taken to improve labour 
conditions worldwide.23 International labour standards take the form of conventions 
and recommendations. Conventions are legally binding international treaties that may 
be ratified by member states. 24 Recommendations, on the other hand, are non-
binding and cannot be ratified. Their purpose is only to equip those involved in 
20 Tshosa “The Status of International Law in Namibian National Law - A Critical Appraisal of the 
Constitutional Strategy” 13. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Tshosa “The Status of International Law in Namibian National Law - A Critical Appraisal of the 
Constitutional Strategy” 18. 
23 Motinga “Should Core Labour Standards be Imposed through International Trade Policy? An 
Assessment of the Debate on Globalization and Labour Standards” NEPRU (2002) 5. 
24 Art 19(5) of the ILO Constitution.  
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developing, formulating and reviewing labour legislation with tools to make social 
dialogue regarding labour legislation more effective.25 
 
Conventions prescribe the basic principles with which  ratifying member states must 
comply with. When a member state contemplates ratifying a standard, the country 
must follow the prescribed process leading to the ratification of standards. The 
process involves a member state submitting an adopted standard to its competent 
authority, which in most countries is the parliament or legislature. Therefore, before a 
convention becomes binding on Namibia it must first meet the requirements of article 
144 of the Constitution and, where possible, the process must take into consideration 
the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna 
Convention).26 The Vienna Convention provides that a treaty is binding on a state 
once the state has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty.27 Having done so 
would ordinarily constitute ratification for a particular convention, hence becoming 
binding.  
 
However, in Namibia the Constitution entrusts the President of the Republic of 
Namibia to “negotiate and sign international agreements and to delegate such 
powers”. 28 The negotiation and signing of international agreements by the State 
President does not in itself bring such instruments into effect as it requires the 
approval of Parliament.29 This argument is based on the provision of article 63(2)(e) 
of the Namibian Constitution, which unequivocally states that the National Assembly 
of Namibia: 
 
“…shall agree to the ratification of or accession to international agreements which have 
been negotiated and signed in terms of article 32 (3) (e) hereof”.  
 
With regard to labour related matters or instruments, the delegated powers of the 
President are vested in the Minister of Labour at the ILO level. The Minister of 
25 ILO Labour legislation guideline available on http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/dialogue  
accessed on 05March 2012. 
26 The Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties 1969 was adopted on 23 May 1969 but only 
came into force on 27 January 1980. 
27 Art 11 of the Vienna Convention 1969. 
28 Art 32(3)(e) of the Namibian Constitution.  
29 Tshosa “The Status of International Law in Namibian National Law - A Critical Appraisal of the 
Constitutional Strategy” 19.  
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Labour, with the consent of the social partners involved, must table the convention 
the country contemplates to ratify in Parliament. Once tabled in parliament and 
approved, the convention becomes binding on Namibia and the Ministry of Labour 
becomes obliged to inform the ILO of the formal ratification. 30  Negotiation and 
signature cannot bring the convention into force in Namibia; the approval of 
parliament is required.31 
 
Following ratification and the Ministry of Labour’s report thereof to the ILO, the 
Convention comes into force twelve months after registration of the second 
ratification, and for each individual member state twelve months after its ratification. 
However, some conventions contain different provisions. 32  It is only when a 
convention comes into force that it becomes binding on member states.33 Ratification 
consequently commits a country to respect the instrument’s terms and conditions and 
to submit regular reports showing compliance to them,34 and to accept investigation 
of alleged deviation or non-compliance should either become evident.35 
 
In addition to the ILO systems, constitutional and national statutory frameworks 
requiring the use of international labour standards, regional instruments of the SADC 
also promote the adoption of international standards.36 To this end, article 95 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in the SADC37 requires member states to do 
the following in order to attain the objectives of the Charter: 
 
30 Art 19(5)(d) of the ILO Constitution. 
31 Tshosa “The Status of International Law in Namibian National Law - A Critical Appraisal of the 
Constitutional Strategy” 19. 
32 Par 27 of the ILO Handbook of Procedures relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 18.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Art 22 of the ILO Constitution.   
35 Standing “The International Labour Standards-Global Monitor” 308. 
36 Olivier The End of Labour in Global Workplace Context?  A South and South African Response 
(2012) 33 (unpublished). 
37 Hereinafter referred to as the “SADC Social Charter”. 
253 
                                                             
(a) to establish a priority list of ILO conventions, which includes the core 
conventions-forming part of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work of 199838 and relevant instruments; 
 
(b) to take appropriate actions to ratify and implement relevant ILO instruments 
and, as a priority, the core conventions; and  
 
(c) to establish regional mechanisms to assist member states in complying with 
the ILO reporting system. 
 
The 1998 ILO declaration referred to in the SADC Social Charter was hailed as a 
triumph and welcomed by economic powerhouses due to the financial benefits it 
brings to ratifying developing member states.39 However, Motinga40 cautions against 
the use of the declaration for protecting trade purposes. Despite the overwhelming 
subscription to the declaration by member states, critics think little of its significance 
as it has merely a declaratory character41 that is not binding on member states and 
lacks the specific legal requirements present in a convention.42 However, undertaking 
to observe the provisions of the declaration allows member states to approach the 
ILO for assistance in realizing the principles contained therein.43 
 
Aside from the benefits derived from adhering to the declaration, ratifying 
conventions, particularly core conventions, potentially benefits member states. These 
benefits include the prevention of member states from pursuing economic self-
38 According to Clause 2 of the Declaration, member states (including Namibia) declared that, 
even if they have not ratified the convention in question, they have an obligation arising from the 
very fact of membership of the ILO to respect, promote and realize in good faith and in 
accordance with the convention, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the 
subject of those conventions. These include:  
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
(c) the effective abolishment of child labour; 
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.         
39 Standing “The International Labour Standards-Global Monitor” 313.   
40 Motinga “Should Core Labour Standards be Imposed through International Trade Policy? An 
Assessment of the Debate on Globalization and Labour Standards” 6.  
41 Standing “The International Labour Standards-Global Monitor” 313. 
42 Lopez et al “Analysis and Critical Assessment of the Role Played by the ILO in Developing and 
Securing Core Labour Standards” 201. 
43 Standing “The International Labour Standards-Global Monitor” 313.   
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interests and drafting labour law purely to protect and attract foreign investment.44 
Moreover, for developing countries, such as Namibia, ratifying conventions relating to 
core workers’ rights that are similar to those of their trading partners can result in 
increased trade. Any deviation from labour standards could impact on the trade 
volumes and competitive and comparative advantage of a given country.45 
 
Conversely, critics argue that the ratification of standards creates a cost burden on 
developing economies and creates precarious employment conditions.46 The ILO 
rejects these views, pointing out the economic benefits of ratifying international 
labour standards. These benefits, according to the ILO, include 47  a positive 
correlation with improved economic performance, growth and productivity, and the 
promotion of good governance, as these principles are regarded as efficient methods 
to prevent corruption and the misallocation of resources.48 It can be deduced that the 
international core-labour standards promoted by the 1998 declaration provides a 
remedy for world labour-market exploitation and a tool for fair income distribution, 
particularly in countries with active industrial relation practices. Thus, the application 
of international labour standards decreases unfair competition, provides security to 
industries willing to compete internationally, and facilitates the allocation of technical 
assistance and resources.49 
 
To date, Namibia has ratified eleven international labour standards, which include all 
eight fundamental conventions, one priority convention and two technical 
conventions.50 The table below illustrates these ratifications. 
 
FUNDAMENTAL CONVENTIONS  
Conventions  Date  Status  
44 Langille “The Future of the ILO Law and the ILO” (2007) 101 American Society of International 
Law 395.    
45 Motinga “Should Core Labour Standards be Imposed through International Trade Policy? An 
Assessment of the Debate on Globalization and Labour Standards” 8.   
46 Lopez et al “Analysis and Critical Assessment of the Role Played by the ILO in Developing and 
Securing Core Labour Standards” 202.   
47 ILO Rules of the Game (2005b). 
48 Valticos “Fifty Years of Standard Setting Activities Band the ILO” (2000) 3 International Labour 
Law Review 201. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Government Republic of Namibia Decent Work Country Programme (2010-2014) 12. 
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1. C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) 15 Nov 
200 
In 
force  
2. C087 - Freedom of association and protection of the Right 
to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) 
03 Jan 
1995 
In 
force  
3. C098 – Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 (No. 98)  
03 Jan 
1995 
In 
force  
4. C100 – Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 ( No. 100)    06 April 
2010 
In 
force  
5. C105 – Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 
105)  
15 Nov 
2000 
In 
force  
6. C111 – Discrimination (Employment and Occupation 
Convention, 1958 (No. 111)  
 13 Nov 
2001 
In 
force  
7. C138 – Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) 
(minimum age specified: 14 years). 
15 Nov 
2000 
In 
force  
8. C182 – Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 
(No. 182)   
15 Nov 
2000 
In 
force  
GOVERNANCE (PRIORITY)  
9. C144 – Tripartite Consultation (International Labour 
Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144)   
03 Jan 
1995 
In 
force  
TECHNICAL  
10. C150 – Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No. 
150)  
28 Jun 
1996 
In 
force  
11.  C158 – Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 
(No. 158)  
28 Jun  In 
force  
 
By virtue of having ratified the above conventions Namibia has accepted the 
intervention of the ILO’s supervisory machinery in the application of these standards. 
Consequently, the Government of the Republic of Namibia has modified its labour 
legislation51 and labour-practices system,52 in aspects ranging from technical details 
to issues of large significance, in response to the ILO’s requests on a number of 
occasions.53 
 
The ILO has undertaken a variety of technical activities aimed at assisting the 
Government of the Republic of Namibia and its social partners to fulfil their functions 
51 In this respect, the 1992 Labour Act was repealed with the assistance of the ILO and the Labour 
Act enacted to embrace the ILO concepts of ADR. See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion 
hereof.    
52 To this end, the Namibian labour legislation and practices continue to undergo modification. For 
example, the enactment of the Employment Relations Labour Amendment Act 2012 (Act 2 of 
2012);Employment Services Act No 8 of 2011; and the Labour Amendment Act 2012 (Act 2 of 
2012) took place in response to the commitment to adopt and promote sound labour relations, 
fair employment practices and the adherence to the ILO standards. See GRN Ministry of Labour 
and Social Welfare (Ministerial media statement) (26 July 2012) 3.       
53 Lopez et al “Analysis and Critical Assessment of the Role Played by the ILO in Developing and 
Securing Core Labour Standards” 204. 
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and roles in the standards-setting and supervisory system.54 This is done within the 
context of the organization’s basic aims and principles provided for in the constitution 
and the standards themselves.55 The ILO has called upon Namibia to strengthen the 
working relationship with its social partners, the National Union of Namibian Workers 
(NUNW) and Namibian Employers’ Federation (NEF), in order to ensure that the 
country’s objectives are attended to in terms of ratified standards and technical 
cooperation.56 
 
It is within this framework that the Government of the Republic of Namibia has signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the ILO and pledged to cooperate in the 
implementation of the Decent Work Country Programme.57 The ILO has made a 
commitment to provide the necessary technical support to implement the programme 
and to support Namibian tripartite constituents in an effort to raise funds for the 
financing of the programme. 58 The programme specifically identifies three priority 
areas, namely employment promotion, enhancement of social protection, and the 
strengthening of social dialogue, tripartism, and other areas of work. The 
enhancement of social protection includes two sub-priorities: mitigating the impact of 
HIV and AIDS in the workplace and the implementation of a social security 
programme.59 
 
5.4 REPORTING AND SUPERVISING THE APPLICATION OF RATIFIED 
STANDARDS IN NAMIBIA  
 
The ILO conventions and recommendations are not effective only through their 
adoption and existence. It is their implementation and regular systematic monitoring 
that makes them effective in member states.60 Partaking in the adoption of the ILO 
standard at the annual ILC, Namibia commits itself to submit such conventions, 
54 ILO Handbook of the Procedures Relation International Conventions and Recommendations 
(2006) 54.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Art 1 of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Decent Work Country Programme for 
Namibia.   
58 Art 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Decent Work Country Programme for 
Namibia.  
59 See GRN Decent Work Country Programme for Namibia (2010) 5. 
60 Http://www.leeswepston.net/supersys accessed on 25 September 2012. 
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protocols and recommendations to Parliament. 61  This is done to ensure that 
Parliament examines the instrument properly with a view to ratification.62 
 
Once Namibia ratifies an international labour standard, article 20 of the ILO 
Constitution comes into effect, imposing the obligation on the country to report 
regularly on measures taken to implement all ratified conventions as listed in section 
5.3 above. This obligation includes the duty to submit newly adopted standards to 
Parliament, and to submit reports to the ILO on the application of ratified conventions 
and measures taken to give effect to the provisions of unratified conventions.63 This 
obligation is focused particularly on the core conventions as laid out in the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. To demonstrate the 
significance of core conventions, the Declaration has developed follow-up 
mechanism that can be seen as a new kind of legal tool. Although it lacks the 
authoritative intervention equal to that of a convention, it represents a fresh approach 
to encouraging ILO member states to respect the set of core values that underpins 
the ILO’s mandate.  
 
After the ratification of a convention, Namibia is required to submit periodic reports to 
the ILO detailing the steps that the country has taken to apply the convention in 
practice. This obligation relates to core or fundamental, priority and technical 
conventions. In submitting these reports to the ILO, the Namibian Government is 
required to furnish copies of the reports to the NEF and NUMW as these are the most 
representative employers’ and workers’ organizations in Namibia.64 
 
Communicating the reports to social partners can be done prior to finalizing the 
documents in order to invite their comments, providing an opportunity to take these 
comments into account before settling the reports. Alternatively, social partners can 
direct their comments regarding the application of the ratified conventions being 
reported on to the ILO.65 This consultation is mandatory as prescribed by article 
61 ILO A Guide to International Labour Standards (2008) 254. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Art 19(5)(e) of the ILO Constitution.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid.  
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5(i)(d) of Convention No. 144. 66 This Convention has been ratified by Namibia, 
creating a duty on the government to consult social partners regarding questions 
arising out of the reports to be submitted to the ILO. 
 
Article 22 of the ILO Constitution, which requires the submission of annual reports to 
the governing body, prescribes the reporting manner and form, and prescribes the 
particulars that must be contained in the report.67 These reports are examined by the 
CEACR. Annually, usually in February, depending on the reporting circle of each 
country, letters are sent to member states requesting reports that may be due for 
submission. The letter will either request detailed or simplified reports, depending on 
which reply is due, and will be accompanied by copies of observations or direct 
requests from the CEACR. Similar copies are also sent to social partners, namely the 
NEF and NUNW in Namibia.68 
 
Reports must reach the Governing Body of the ILO between 1 June and 1 
September of the reporting period. Where persistent delays are experienced, the 
matter is referred directly to the government in order to ensure timely delivery. In 
extreme cases the matter can be addressed with government delegates at the 
annual ILC; this course of action includes an investigation into the application of 
these standards by standards specialists in the field.69 At the time of writing, six 
compliance-report requests on ratified conventions70 had been made in 2012 and 
various direct requests and observations in previous years. 71  As a result of 
outstanding requests and observations, the ILO’s Pretoria field office has been 
charged to conduct training with the government officials responsible for standards 
reporting in 2011.72 
 
66 C.144 Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976.    
67 See art 22 of the ILO Constitution.  
68 ILO Handbook of Procedures relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations par 41(a) 26.  
69 Ibid at par 41(b). 
70 These conventions includes: C029 regular report; C100 first report; C105 regular report; C138 
regular report, C144 regular report and C182 regular.   
71 Http://ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en accessed on 12 September 2012.  
72 Training conducted by Dr Chritina Holmgrem – International Labour Standards Specialist 
(interview held on 26 September 2012). 
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On receipt of a country’s report, the CEACR determines whether the report contains 
the information and documentation required in reply to any observation or direct 
request made by the CEACR or the Conference Committee. If the report is found to 
be inadequate, the CEACR does not enter into the substance of the matter, but 
immediately draws the attention of the Namibian Government to the need to reply 
appropriately and to attach all relevant legislation, statistics or other documentation at 
issue.73 
 
In terms of article 23(1) of the ILO Constitution, the Director-General is required to 
present a summary of the information and reports communicated to the office, 
including the Namibian reports in pursuance of articles 19 and 22 of the ILO 
Constitution, to the next meeting of the ILC. To this end, the ILO has established 
extensive supervisory mechanisms to oversee the implementation and application of 
international labour standards in pursuance of articles 19 and 22 of the ILO 
Constitution. These mechanisms include the routine reporting discussed above, a 
review process, and ad hoc procedures for handling complaints by workers’ or 
employers’ groups and complaints from governments regarding other governments’ 
non-compliance.74 
 
Articles 22 and 35 of the ILO Constitution impose a reporting obligation on the 
Namibian government. Failure to meet this obligation is considered an “automatic 
case”, as the member state failing in its obligation is listed in the report of the 
CEACR. Consequently, the member state is listed in the Conference Committee’s 
report relating to the sending of reports and information on international standards.75 
These are the cases that generate individual comments, or general observations, 
and direct requests by the CEACR to each country concerned.76 
 
The ILO’s supervisory system is regarded as the most developed and effective 
amongst the United Nations’ agencies. However, it has been conceded that the 
73 ILO Handbook of Procedures relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 26 par 41.  
74 Elliot “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards” 06.    
75 ILO Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference – 
Overview of Cases of Serious Failure to Meet Constitutional Obligations (2011) 105. 
76 Elliot “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards” 06.  
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system is confronted with challenges related to maintaining and improving its 
effectiveness, given the constant increase in the number of reports received. 
Similarly, the Organization’s effectiveness is continually influenced by an increase in 
the number of new member states joining it and the continued adoption of new 
conventions and recommendations.77 
 
This has led to the governing body’s adoption of the revised reporting procedure, 
initiated in the 1950s when the governing body started simplifying reporting periods 
and the formulation of supervisory comments. 78  Prior to 1958, before Namibia 
became a sovereign member state, reports from member states were due annually. 
In 1959 the reporting period was lengthened to biennial intervals. In 1976 the periodic 
reports became due every four years, except for those relating to the most important 
conventions.79 In light of these changes a number of safeguards were implemented 
to ensure that the lengthening of the reporting cycle did not weaken the effectiveness 
of the supervisory system.80 The frequency of reporting was made dependent on the 
importance and urgency of the issues raised in the previous findings of the CEACR.81 
Under this new approach, detailed reports can be called for on a yearly, two-yearly or 
five-yearly basis.82 
 
In November 2009, the Governing Body of the ILO evaluated the possibility of 
grouping conventions by subject for purposes of reporting in terms of article 22 of the 
ILO Constitution. The assessment was intended to address the rationalization of 
reporting in light of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice and Fair Globalization.83 
As a result, conventions have since been grouped by strategic objectives and 
reporting periods increased from two to three years for fundamental and governance 
conventions, while a five-year reporting period was maintained on technical 
77 ILO The Committee on the Application of Standards and the International Labour Conference 
(2011) 14. 
78 Landy Shaping a Dynamic ILO System of Regular Supervisory – The Valticos Years (2004) 13.    
79 ILO The Committee on the Application of Standards and the International Labour Conference 
14. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Landy Shaping a Dynamic ILO System of Regular Supervisory 14.   
82 Ibid. 
83 ILO The Committee on the Application of Standards and the International Labour Conference 
16. 
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conventions.84 Namibia has an obligation to submit reports every three years for the 
eight fundamental conventions ratified, which includes one governance convention. 
Reporting remains at five-year intervals for the technical conventions ratified.  
 
The governing body not only addressed the reporting problem, but also examined 
interventions that seek to strengthen follow-up procedures in cases of serious failure 
by member states to comply with their reporting and other standards-related 
obligations.85 This is based on the fact that failure by member states to provide their 
reports is seen as undermining the functioning of the supervisory system, which is 
largely dependent on the information provided by governments.86 
 
The ILO has decided that cases of serious failure to comply with the obligation to 
provide reports must be given the same attention as cases of non-compliance with 
ratified conventions. To effect this decision, the annual report of the Conference 
Committee lists specific cases of failure to comply with reporting obligations, 
namely:87 
 
• Failure to supply reports for the past two years or more on the application of 
ratified conventions. 
 
• Failure to supply first reports on the application of ratified conventions. 
 
• Failure to supply information in reply to the comments of the CEACR. 
 
• Failure to submit to the competent authority the instrument adopted by the 
conference during at least seven sessions. 
 
• Failure to supply reports for the past five years on unratified conventions and 
recommendations.      
 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid.  
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The eight sessions of the ILC held in 1926 adopted a resolution bestowing regular 
supervision responsibility on the CEACR and the Conference Committee on the 
application of standards. The CEACR meetings are held at the end of November or 
beginning of December each year.88 The Committee examines submitted reports 
from member states, including Namibia, to determine the extent to which countries’ 
labour legislation and practices conform to the ratified conventions.89 
 
Based on its findings, the CEACR prepares its own report and usually notes cases of 
progress as well as problems indentified in the implementation process. 90  The 
CEACR has various monitoring interventions at its disposal to address potential 
problems. This may include using direct requests or observations and on-the-spot 
diplomacy to assist governments in the management of difficulties related to 
compliance with ratified ILO conventions.91 
 
Observations are reserved for more serious or long-standing cases of failure to fulfil 
obligations. In these cases the CEACR can request full particulars of the non-
compliance observed. Observations expressing satisfaction over any progress made 
by governments are included by the CEACR.92 Direct requests are listed after the 
individual observations for each group of conventions. These requests are relative to 
matters of secondary importance or technical questions and are intended to seek 
clarification in order to enable the committee to make a full assessment of the nature 
of the effect given to the convention in question.93 
 
An additional (relatively new) supervisory tool, introduced by Nicolas Valticos, is 
discreet diplomacy. 94  Valticos, erstwhile Assistant Director General (Director of 
Norms), of the ILO, had justified the necessity of diplomacy when other supervisory 
88 ILO Handbook of Procedures relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 35 par 54. 
89 ILO Handbook of Procedures relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 36 par 56. 
90 Elliot “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards” 06.   
91 Landy Shaping a Dynamic ILO System of Regular Supervision (2004) 16.   
92 ILO Handbook of Procedures relating to International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations 36 par 56. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Landy Shaping a Dynamic ILO System of Regular Supervision 16.    
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efforts fail. He recognized the need to evolve from written comments and often 
controversial exchanges in the public arena during conferences, to a more relaxed 
private dialogue with the country concerned. This forum allows the country to explain 
its problems more fully while soliciting advice towards a solution at the same time.95 
In practice, it is undertaken through a visit by an ILO representative, which is either a 
staff member or an independent person with the consent of the government 
concerned, in order to address the specific problem with staff members responsible 
and to consult with national workers’ and employers’ organizations.96 
 
Landy97 points out three functions of this diplomacy-based procedure. These include 
bringing national policy in line with the requirements of ILO standards; establishing 
the facts underlying effective compliance; and providing technical assistance. 
Overall, the diplomacy procedure enhances the flexibility of operations and is 
informal, with a pragmatic approach that yields relatively rapid results.98 
 
Simpson99 holds that these procedures are part of Nicolas Valticos’s100 legacy, which 
remained intact and unchanged. For this reason, the author argues that it was 
necessary to adapt the system if it were to remain effective and maintain its 
credibility. 101  In 2002, the CEACR established a subcommittee to examine the 
working methods of the main committee, with a view to adapting the supervisory 
system. The sub-committee recommended useful changes regarding the manner of 
reporting and the rearrangement of the committee’s report by grouping conventions. 
This has simplified labour ministries’ task in relation to reporting obligations and has 
assisted in providing a review of the application of conventions in particular fields.102 
 
However, Simpson103 warns that although these changes are significant, they are 
nevertheless cosmetic. The author submits that this is due to the sub-committee’s 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Simpson Standard-setting and Supervision (2004) 69. 
100 Nicolas Valticos was Director of Norms at the ILO for 30 years (1964-1994). 
101 Simpson Standard Setting and Supervision 69. 
102 Ibid.  
103 Ibid.   
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failure to address substantive fundamental questions related to the committee’s 
ability to manage hundreds of cases of serious violations of ratified conventions by 
member states, effectively, which require the transmission of CEACR observations. 
 
5.5 ANALYSIS OF THE NAMIBIAN REPORTS IN TERMS OF ARTICLES 19 
AND 22 OF THE ILO CONSTITUTION   
 
For the purpose of this section, only those ratified conventions that are relative to the 
labour dispute resolution system adopted by Namibia are included in the analysis. 
The ILO’s position in respect of all cases of serious failure to comply with the 
obligations imposed, specifically that the failure to provide reports is to be treated in 
the same manner as cases of non-compliance with ratified conventions, is taken into 
account.  
 
In terms of compliance with articles 19 and 22 of the ILO Constitution, available 
evidence shows that Namibia’s reporting obligation with the ILO is generally good, 
particularly in respect of supplying reports on ratified conventions; supplying first 
reports on the application of ratified conventions; timely submission of adopted 
instruments to parliament; and its commitment to submit reports on unratified 
conventions.104 However, there is a significant continued failure to supply relevant 
information in reply to the comments of the CEACR on a number of conventions. One 
of these failures relates to the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize Convention of 1948 (No. 87). 
 
5.5.1 THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT 
TO ORGANIZE CONVENTION OF 1948 (NO. 87)  
 
The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention 
(Right to Organize Convention) is one of the core conventions, ratified by Namibia on 
3 January 1995 and remains in force in the country.105 This Convention provides 
workers and employers, without distinction, the right to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of furthering and defending their 
104 See Normlex Reports requested and replies to CEACR comments: Namibia available 
onhttp://www.ilo.org/dyn/mormlex/en   accessed on 12 September 2012.    
105 See Nomlex Ratifications for Namibia, available on http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en  accessed 
on 12 September 2012.   
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rights, without having to obtain prior authorization. These rights are, to a degree 
determined by national law or regulations, applicable to the armed forces and police 
service. The convention permits workers’ and employers’ organizations to formulate 
constitutions and rules; to elect representatives in full freedom; to organize 
administration and activities; and to formulate programmes. 
 
The Right to Organize Convention cautions public authorities to refrain from any 
interference that could restrict the rights conferred or impede their lawful exercise. 
Similarly, workers and employers are urged to respect the law of the land in the 
exercise of their rights. The convention asserts that ratifying member states shall 
undertake the necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and 
employers may freely exercise their right to organize. 
 
The ILO places a premium on the Right to Organize Convention as embodied in 
article 41 of the original ILO Constitution, and re-affirmed this in the Declaration of 
Philadelphia 106  and the preamble of the revised Constitution of 1946. 107  It is 
submitted that freedom of association is a cardinal principle of the ILO on the basis 
that it permits workers to pursue their economic and social interests fairly.108 The 
significance of freedom of association is manifested by the establishment and 
functioning of the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), a specialized 
supervisory body designed to deal with complaints related to freedom of association. 
To this end, the ILO recognizes freedom of association as being essential to 
sustained progress and lasting peace.109 Adams110 confirms that the primary function 
of the CFA is to oversee the implementation of the constitutional obligation of 
member states to respect and protect ILO principles regarding freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining.111 
106 See arts (I)((b) and (III)(e) of the Declaration of Philadelphia.   
107 Gravel, Du Plessis and Gernigon The Committee on Freedom of Association-Its Impact over 50 
Years (2001) 7.  
108 Fenwick Australia’s new Labour Law: An International Legal Perspective. A paper delivered at 
the Castan Centre Human Rights. Year in review conference on 2 December 2005.  Available 
onhttp//www.law.monash.edu.au/castancentre/events/2005/fenwick-paper accessed on 28 
January 2012.         
109 See the preamble to the ILO Constitution.  
110 Adams “Prospects for Labour Rights to Bargain Collectively: After BC Health Services” (2009) 
59 U.N.B.L.J. Heinonline 85.    
111 Gravel et al The Committee on Freedom of Association 7.  
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 Given the significance of the convention, all member states have committed, under 
the 1998 ILO declaration, to respect, promote and realize in good faith those 
principles contained in the declaration that recognize freedom of association and the 
right to collective bargaining. 112  Namibia has embraced this principle since the 
ratification of the convention and the adoption of the declaration. However, in respect 
of this convention the CEACR has written five direct requests and observations to the 
Namibian government regarding the supplying of relevant information in reply to the 
comments of the CEACR. These are as follows:113 
 
• The CEACR noted that the provisions of sections 77(1),(3),(4) and (5) of the 
Labour Act provides for the final decision on the determination of essential 
services to be reliant on the Minister of Labour as provided for in sections 
77(9),(12) and 78 of the Act. The Committee requested information that 
explains whether the designation of an essential service by the Minister can 
be appealed or can be referred to the Labour Court. The government referred 
the CEACR to sections 78(1) and (2) of the Labour Act that provides for 
recourse to arbitration and subsequently to the Labour Court in terms of 
section 89 of the Labour Act.   
 
• In relation to article 5 of the Convention, the CEACR took note of section 59 
of the Labour Act that guarantees trade unions and employers’ organizations 
the right to form and participate in the activities of international organizations. 
However, the Committee requested more details on whether federations of 
workers’ and employers’ organizations have the right to form confederations. 
The Namibian Government affirmed this right as provided for in both the 
Labour Act and the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.  
 
• In respect of article 2 of the convention, the CEACR observed that section 
2(2)(d) of the Labour Act excludes members of the Namibian Prison Services 
112 Diaye The Annual Review and the Promotion of the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work: Development and Initial Impact Assessment (2004) 411.   
113 These comments and reports are available on Normlex.    
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from its application, unless the Prison Service Act 17 of 1998114 provides 
otherwise. On this ground alone, the Committee requested the Namibian 
Government to undertake the necessary legislative amendments to 
guarantee the Prison Services the rights provided in the conventions. This 
observation has been recorded on more than one occasion. Government 
has, however, continually provided responses showing commitment in the 
form of engaging other stakeholders such the Ministry of Safety and Security 
and workers’ organizations on the possibility of this type of inclusion. At the 
time of writing, consultations were ongoing.  
 
• A further observation relates to the exclusion or restriction imposed by the 
Export Processing Zones (EPZ) Act 9 of 1995115 that prohibited employees in 
these zones from embarking on industrial actions. However, the exclusion 
has since been rectified by the automatic lapse of the Export Processing 
Zone Amendment Act 6 of 1996, thereby the workers in the  EPZ were 
allowed back within the scope of the Convention and the Labour Act.116 
 
The above direct request and observations are the most prominent interventions 
made by the CEACR in relation to this particular Convention and to which the 
government has responded. Continued efforts are being made to align the provisions 
of the Labour Act in question with the convention. The Namibian government is 
making a concerted effort to include the country’s Prison Services’ workers within the 
scope of the Labour Act by consulting with role players and taking factors like state 
security concerns into account. 
 
5.5.2 RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONVENTION, 
1949 (NO. 98) 
 
Namibia ratified the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 98 of 
1949 (Collective Bargaining Convention) on 03 January 1995 and it remains in 
114 Prisons Service Act No 17 of 1998.   
115 Expert Processing Zones Amendment Act, 2006. 
116 Fenwick, Kalula, Landan “Labour Law – A Southern African Perspective” in Teckle (ed) Labour 
Law and Workers Protection in Developing Countries (2010) 198.   
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force.117 Article 4 of this convention calls upon the Namibian Government, as is the 
case for all ratifying member states, to take measures appropriate to national 
conditions to “encourage and promote the full development and utilization of 
machineries for voluntary negotiation between employers’ organizations and workers’ 
organizations”. This article is intended to aid in the regulation of the terms and 
conditions of employment by means of collective bargaining. In 2010 and 2011, the 
CEACR noted that sections 64(1) and (2) of the Labour Act provide for the threshold 
requirement to become an exclusive bargaining agent. The Committee requested 
clarity in situations where no union covers more than 50 per cent of the workers and, 
in such a case, whether the minority unions in the bargaining unit enjoy collective 
rights, at least on behalf of their members. Moreover, the CEACR wanted to know 
whether minority unions enjoy collective bargaining rights in cases where there are 
no unions representing 50 per cent of the workers concerned.  
 
This observation appears to have been made repeatedly since the inception of the 
new Labour Act, and the government has failed to submit a satisfactory reply to date. 
The lack of clarity stems from section 64 of the Labour Act as it makes no reference 
to minority trade unions. This makes it seem as though minority trade unions in 
Namibia have no statutory protection to exercise collective bargaining rights in 
situations where there is no registered majority representative trade union recognized 
as an exclusive bargaining agent for the workers in the bargaining unit. This omission 
can be construed as inconsistent with the rights guaranteed to minority unions by 
Conventions 87 and 98 of the ILO and based on the interpretations of the 
Organization’s supervisory bodies.118 
 
With reference to articles 1 and 2 of the Convention relating to protection against acts 
of anti-union discrimination and interference, the CEACR noted that the Labour Act 
prohibits and sanctions acts of anti-union discrimination as well as interference by 
employers in the internal affairs of trade unions.119 The Committee noted the sections 
of the Labour Act that provide for the referral of allegations or disputes relating to 
anti-union discrimination and interference to the Labour Commissioner for arbitration 
117 Http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex accessed on 13 September 2012.  
118 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 28. 
119 Ss 6 and 50 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
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or for further referral for adjudication by the Labour Court. Based on the 
aforementioned provisions, the CEACR requested the Namibian Government to 
provide detailed information on the speed of arbitration procedures in these cases 
and any other cases arising from the provisions of this convention.  
 
The Committee further considered the provisions of section 86(5) of the Labour Act 
that provides that “unless a dispute has already been conciliated, the arbitrator must 
attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation before beginning the arbitration”. 
This section was read with section 82(10) that refers to the conciliation of interest 
disputes120 and provides for the conciliator to attempt to resolve the dispute within 30 
days of the date the Labour Commissioner received the referral of the dispute. The 
committee observed that the Labour Act does not provide clear details on the 
rapidness of the subsequent arbitration procedure, notwithstanding section 86(7)(a) 
of the Labour Act. This section gives arbitrators unlimited latitude to conduct the 
arbitration in the manner that they may consider appropriate in order to determine the 
dispute fairly and quickly. The CEACR observed that the Labour Act is ambiguous 
and does not provide sufficient details on the speed of the arbitration process. 
However, the author submits that, neither does any convention nor any 
recommendation set out specific time lines for arbitration procedures, but the 
Namibian Government has stipulated specific timelines for these procedures. 
 
Sections 70, 71 and 73 of the Labour Act are consistent with the provisions of the 
convention under discussion in that these provisions establish machineries for 
voluntary negotiations between employers’ and workers’ organizations in Namibia. 
Through these collective bargaining forums, terms and conditions of employment121 
are determined and regulated, thereby complying with the terms set out in the 
convention. Subsequently, all collective agreements in Namibia are required to 
provide for voluntary dispute procedures, including arbitration procedures, to resolve 
any dispute about the interpretation, application and enforcement of agreements.122 
 
120 See s 81 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007) for the definition of dispute of interest.   
121 S 70(3) and (4) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
122 S 73(1) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
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5.5.3 TRIPARTITE CONSULTATION (INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
STANDARDS) CONVENTION, 1976 (NO. 144) 
 
The Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention 144 of 1976 
(Tripartite Convention) was ratified by Namibia on 3 January 1995 and remains in 
force. The Convention calls for the operation of national procedures to ensure 
effective consultations between governments, employers’ and workers’ 
representatives on, amongst other things:123 
 
• questions arising from the reports to be made to the ILO on ratified 
conventions; 
 
• government replies to questionnaires concerning items on the agenda of the 
conference and government comments on the proposed text to be discussed 
by the conference; 
 
• the submission of conventions and recommendations to the competent 
authorities pursuant to article 19 of the ILO Constitution; 
 
• the re-examination of unratified conventions and recommendations; and  
 
• proposals for the denunciation of ratified conventions.  
 
The Convention requires that these consultations must be undertaken at appropriate 
intervals fixed by agreements, but at least once a year.124 Landy125 submits that it is 
a constitutional requirement that governments send copies of their reports to the 
representative organizations of workers and employers to inform them of the 
information sent to the ILO and to enable them to comment, particularly in cases 
where the CEACR had previously raised questions concerning national laws and 
practices. The consultation process allows social partners to play a more active role 
in the supervisory process in Namibia. Where this role is ignored, the ILO transmitted 
letters directly to the central workers’ and employers’ organizations, providing them 
123 Art 5 of the Convention No144. 
124 Art 5(2) of Convention No 144. 
125 Landy Shaping a Dynamic ILO System of Regular Supervision 14. 
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with background information on the reports currently due and copies of outstanding 
observations concerning their country.126 
 
Given the numerous direct requests and observations by the CEACR on selected 
conventions and other non-related ratified conventions, compliance with observations 
and requests could be enhanced with the involvement of the NEF and NUNW in 
Namibia. From 1996 to 2012, evidence suggests that the government has repeatedly 
failed to provide records relating to information on the consultations held by the 
Labour Advisory Council on matters related to international labour standards as listed 
in article 5(1) of Convention No. 144. It is clear that the representatives of the Labour 
Advisory Council are not fulfilling their supervisory role as required by this 
convention. This consultation, if effectively used, has the potential of rectifying 
Namibia’s shortcomings in respect of providing the required information on the 
application of conventions and recommendations in practice.  
 
5.5.4 LABOUR ADMINISTRATION CONVENTION, 1978 (NO. 150) 
 
This technical convention was ratified by the Namibian Government on 28 June 1996 
and remains operational. The Convention urges the Namibian Government, as a 
member state of the ILO, to secure cooperation and negotiations between public 
authorities and the most representative organizations of employers and workers, the 
NEF and NUNW respectively, within the system of labour-administration 
consultation.127 
 
In their observation the CEACR128 noted that the Labour Act established a number of 
labour institutions in terms of Chapter 9. These are the Labour Advisory Council, 
Committee for Dispute Prevention and Resolution, Essential Services Committee, 
Wages Committee, Labour Commissioner, and Labour Inspectorate. These 
structures contribute immensely to the resolution of labour disputes in Namibia. 
Given the roles they play, particularly the Labour Commissioner and the Labour 
Inspectorate, the CEACR observed that the country had not provided detailed 
126 Ibid. 
127 See full text of Convention No 150.  
128 See observation (CEACR) adopted 2011 published 101st ILC session (2012). 
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extracts on the activities of these bodies since the enactment of the Labour Act or 
any information on the practical difficulties encountered in the application in practice 
of the labour dispute-resolution system. In addition, the CEACR requested to be 
supplied with any decisions of the Labour Court involving questions of principles in 
relation to the application of this Convention.  
 
The Namibian Government has failed to lodge a satisfactory response to this 
profound observation, despite the availability of reports detailing the work of the 
Labour Commissioner and the Labour Inspectorate. Only the annual reports of the 
Labour Advisory Council have been forwarded to the ILO regularly and reports 
relating to the activities of other institutions directly involved in the labour dispute 
resolution process, such the Labour Commissioner and the Labour Inspectorate, 
have not been forwarded. 129 This fundamental failure is not consistent with the 
requirements of this Convention. In this case, dereliction of duty is the result of the 
failure of the members of staff responsible for soliciting these reports from the 
relevant offices and directorates, despite their availability.        
 
5.5.5 TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONVENTION, 1982 (NO. 158) 
 
The Termination of Employment Convention 158 of 1982 was ratified on 28 June 
1996 and has since found application in Namibia, both in terms of the repealed 
Labour Act 6 of 1992 and the current Labour Act. In terms of article 4 of the 
convention, which addresses valid reasons for the termination of employment, the 
Government of the Republic of Namibia has been requested to provide the practical 
application of section 33(1) of the Labour Act that requires valid and fair reasons for 
termination of employment. Noting the absence of definitions of these concepts in the 
Labour Act, the Committee requested copies of leading decisions rendered by both 
the Labour Commissioner and the Labour Court on the criteria for determining valid 
and fair reasons for termination of employment.130 
 
It should be noted that despite the insufficient provisions regarding the concepts of 
valid and fair reasons for dismissal as required by the Convention, there is sufficient 
129 See GRN Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare report on Convention 150 (2011). 
130 See Direct Request (CEACR) adopted 2011, published 101st Session 2012.    
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jurisprudence resulting from the interpretation of these concepts by arbitrators and 
the Labour Court. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the courts have developed 
rules and principles of law applicable to the twofold requirements of section 33(1) of 
the Labour Act. Valid reasons and fair procedures are the fundamental principles that 
employers must apply in order for dismissals to be lawful.131 The Convention further 
requires that dismissal disputes must be referred to an arbitration tribunal or the 
Labour Court. Namibia has complied with this provision by creating arbitration 
tribunals under the Labour Commissioner for the arbitration of labour disputes, 
including disputes related to alleged unfair dismissal132 and, subsequently, granting 
recourse to the Labour Court.133 Ultimately, there is compliance with the provisions of 
the convention, despite piecemeal reports submitted to the ILO. 
 
5.6 ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ILO’S METHODS OF 
SECURING COMPLIANCE WITH RATIFIED CONVENTIONS 
 
Namibia has not been in serious violation of any conventions that may have 
warranted severe actions by the ILO. The country has essentially complied with its  
reporting obligations, particularly on the core-labour conventions. However, for the 
purpose of this study, an analysis is undertaken of the effectiveness of the ILO’s 
methods of securing compliance with standards. The focus is on the sanctions 
available in case of non-compliance in order to demonstrate the consequences of a 
situation that warrants such an intervention by the ILO.   
 
In principle, the ILO develops and promotes universal labour standards in order to 
ensure that decent working conditions are created along with global economic growth 
and development. Once international labour standards are ratified by member states, 
the ILO monitors their compliance by developing reports, supervising and securing 
conformity of their application with the established committees and, where possible, 
applying appropriate sanctions and seeking remedies in situations of non-
compliance.134  
131 Parker Labour Law in Namibia 139. 
132 See Part C of the Labour Act, 2007 Arbitration of Disputes.  
133 S 89 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
134 Lopez et al “Analysis and Critical Assessment of the Role Played by the ILO in Developing and 
Securing Core Labour Standards” 200-212.    
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 The CEACR examines compliance with international labour standards through 
information gathered from the reports submitted in terms of articles 19 and 22 of the 
ILO Constitution in order to determine whether member states comply with their 
obligations.135 The purpose of such an exercise is not to assess the penalties to be 
imposed, but to make an appraisal of what the government needs in the way of 
resources, law reforms and other practical changes required to bring the country into 
compliance.136 Given the ILO’s role in monitoring member states’ compliance with 
ratified conventions, the Organization has established various structures through the 
supervisory bodies, including country missions and technical assistance to ensure 
that all ratified conventions are applicable in the legal framework of the country.137 
 
The monitoring process begins with the work of the CEACR, which delivers detailed 
reports to the annual ILC with comments on non-compliance with ILO conventions in 
specific countries. The CEACR is supplemented by the CFA, which focuses on 
complaints specifically arising from the provisions of convention 87 on the freedom of 
association. These structures serve as the ILO’s comprehensive, effective and highly 
regarded systems, established to enforce the application of labour standards world-
wide.138 These supervisory machineries are recognized as the most sophisticated 
and their scrutiny the most rigorous and least politicized of any in the United Nations 
system. 139 The systems are supported by the ILO’s unique and diverse tripartite 
structures that include governments and employers’ and workers’ organizations that 
have an equal opportunity to comment on matters.140 
 
The reporting system is based on articles 19 and 22 of the ILO Constitution, which 
empower the supervisory bodies to examine national legislation and practices with 
regard to ILO standards, and provide the backbone of the ILO’s supervisory system. 
135 Mhtml:/file//G:\Enforcement and dispute resolution alliance for responsible trade.mht. accessed 
on 15October 2012.  
136 Ibid. 
137 Verma “Global Labour Standards: Can We Get From Here to There?” (2004) 19 International 
Comparative Journal of Labour Law and Industrial Relations  4, 9.   
138 Douglas, Ferguson and Klett “An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Workers’ Rights: 
ILO Standards, US Trade Laws, Unions and NGIOs” (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 275.    
139 Hansenne “International Trade and Labour Standards: The ILO Director Speaks Out” (1996) 
135 International Labour Review 230-238. 
140 Verma “Global Labour Standards: Can We Get From Here to There?” 9.    
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Reports serve as the starting point for the regular procedure of supervision, which is 
where most of the supervisory work takes place.141 The ILO regards compliance as 
the first step towards effectiveness. However, critics argue this point, questioning 
how it can be possible to achieve compliance if the Convention has no “intrinsic 
material incentives” and if there is no regulatory enforcement body.142 Despite this 
observed shortcoming, the ILO is still responsible for managing and observing the 
standards’ continued application and promoting and strengthening their relevance.143 
 
The number of ratified conventions is one of the measures used to determine the 
ILO’s effectiveness. Another measure of effectiveness is demanding public 
explanations before international forums for flagrant non-compliance with obligations 
from countries that refuse to comply with their obligations. An equally important 
measure is the publication of violations of core-labour standards in the form of the 
Director-General of the ILO’s Global Report.144 Through these actions by the ILO, the 
general public and all applicable tripartite structures are informed of the situation in a 
given country, thereby encouraging governments to take corrective measures to 
change malpractices. 145  However, given that the supervisory bodies’ 
recommendations are not legally binding on member states, countries that do not 
align their labour systems to meet international standards are not punished for their 
violations.146 
 
Karuvilla argues that, although ratification may be a performance indicator relative to 
effectiveness, ratification alone does not necessarily translate to enforcement.147 To 
address this problem it is suggested that core-labour standards should be enforced 
141 Romano “The ILO System of Supervision and Compliance Control: A Review and Lessons for 
Multilateral Environment Agreements” (1996) 1 International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis  25.   
142 Burgermann “Mobilizing Principles of the Role of Transnational Activists in Promoting Human 
Rights and Principles” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 906.   
143 Somavia Preference Contribution in Norms Internationals du Travails (2004) x.  
144 Lopez “Analysis and Critical Assessment of the Roles Played by the ILO in Securing Core 
Labour Standards” 201.   
145 Karuvilla “International Labour Standards, Soft Regulations and National Government Roles” 
(2006) 48 Journal of Industrial Relations 41.   
146 Servais “ILO Standards of Freedom of Association and their Implementation” (1984) 123 
International Labour Review 6.  
147 Karuvilla “International Labour Standards, Soft Regulations and National Government Roles” 
205.  
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by applying sanctions.148 In the absence of well-structured enforcement measures 
within the ILO system, it has been proposed that the answer lay in the creation of a 
closer working relationship between the ILO and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), 149 where the latter would impose trade sanctions against non-compliant 
member states. Ultimately, this could prove to be more effective than mere 
voluntarism.150 
 
This proposal was rejected by many member states as social clauses cause 
protectionism, with serious consequences for global trade and investments. It has 
been argued that the inclusion of social clauses in trade agreements will also impact 
negatively the ILO’s present activities and its organizational image.151 Accordingly, it 
is submitted that basing social clauses and their application on ILO conventions and 
investigations would turn the ILO into a weapon against many developing countries 
and countries that are in transition to a market economy.152 The ILO has a duty to 
maintain the fundamental principle of universality and embrace all UN member 
states. Therefore, it cannot become instrumental in regulating which countries are 
admitted to, or excluded from, the global market.153 Doing so could incite developing 
countries to paralyse the activities of the ILO, either by leaving or threatening to leave 
the organization. Developing countries have remained members of the ILO in order 
to use their votes to prevent ILO standard-setting, particularly standards that can be 
used against them.154 
 
A closer examination of article 26 of the ILO Constitution shows that it resembles 
those provisions that are proposed for the WTO closely. However, the ILO lacks 
148 Biffl “Globalization and Core Labour Standards: Compliance Problems with ILO Convention 87 
and 98. Comparing Austria and other English-speaking Countries with EU Member States” 
(2005) 21 Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 405.   
149 Hereinafter referred to as the “WTO”. 
150 Biffl “Globalization and Core Labour Standards: Compliance Problems with ILO Convention 87 
and 98. Comparing Austria and other English-speaking Countries with EU Member States” 405. 
151 Sengenberger and Campbell International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence 
(1994) 351.   
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid.  
154 Ibid. 
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enforcement powers. 155  Article 26 was drafted with care in order to avoid the 
imposition of penalties, except as a last resort.156 
 
Other than monitoring the application of standards through publishing reports on 
violations, the ILO lacks the capacity to enforce labour standards. It is said to be 
“toothless”, making little difference in the labour practices of governments.157 For 
example, the ILO does not have the power to impose fines on non-compliant nations, 
restrict their trade or block foreign investments in their economies. 158  The 
Organization can rely only on other institutions and role players to impose sanctions, 
for example other governments denying investment guarantees, and unions and 
NGOs organizing consumer boycotts.159 In addition, article 33 of the ILO Constitution 
does not provide punitive measures, but was developed similarly to a “social clause” 
that encourages member states to take “measures of economic character” against 
other member states that are refusing to comply with the recommendations of a 
commission of the ILO.160  
 
This situation remained largely unchanged, even after the constitutional review that 
broadened the scope of article 33. It has been left to the governing body’s discretion 
to adopt actions suitable to the circumstances, including the possibility of economic 
or any other sanction.161 The provisions of article 33 of the ILO Constitution were 
applied in the Burma/Myanmar case. However, the article’s weaknesses became 
apparent as the ILO resolution on Burma did not directly impose sanctions; instead it 
allowed member states and other United Nations organizations to take appropriate 
actions. Unlike the WTO’s social clause that permits member governments to take 
action to remedy violations, the ILO does not  impose sanctions directly itself. It is left 
to other member states to determine, within a given time frame, the cost of 
enforcement they are willing to impose.162 
155 Elliot “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards” 05.   
156 Ibid. 
157 Douglas et al “An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Workers’ Rights: ILO Standards, 
US Trade Laws, Unions and NGIOs” 276. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid.  
160 ILO Report I AND II and Constitutional questions, 29th session of the ILC 1946.   
161 Elliot “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labour Standards” 05.    
162 Ibid. 
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 In the context of the above arguments, Holti 163  remarks that the presence of 
regulatory regimes in the absence of compliance is regarded as government without 
governance to such a degree that it is dysfunctional.164 
 
Other than the lack of punitive measures in case of the contravention of international 
labour standards, there are various additional factors that influence non-compliance 
with standards. These include, but are not limited to:165 the ambiguity and under-
determinacy of the convention language; limitation on the capacity of parties to carry 
out their undertaking; and the temporal dimension of the social and economic 
changes contemplated by regulatory conventions. Holti further points out that 
coercive enforcement measures could be the wrong means to induce behavioural 
change in order to improve the situation of the member state in question. 166  
Therefore calling upon the ILO to continue providing technical assistance and 
tripartite consultation rather than forcing member states to comply, as such actions 
may be questionable.167 
 
While regular supervision procedures enhance compliance with international 
obligations, the ultimate goal of this type of mechanism should be to make 
appropriate comments, as was demonstrated in the Namibian situation. The 
comments should continue to encourage dialogue and cooperation in order to assist 
governments to comply with standards, rather than allocating blame and criticism.168 
The main reason for equipping the ILO with supervisory procedures is to utilize the 
information obtained to adjust the organizational standards over time.169 
 
163 Holsti “Governance without Government: Polyarch in the Nineteenth Century-European 
International Politics” in Rosenau and Czempiel (eds) Government without Governance (1992) 
44.    
164 Ibid.    
165 Chayes and Chayes The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (1995) 22.   
166 Ibid.  
167 Romano “The ILO System of Supervision and Compliance Control: A Review and Lessons for 
Multilateral Environment Agreements” 25. 
168 Ibid.  
169 Romano “The ILO System of Supervision and Compliance Control: A Review and Lessons for 
Multilateral Environment Agreements” 26. 
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5.7 ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF THE ILO 
 
The critical aspect of enforcement and the imposition of penalties for non-compliance 
should come as a result of a democratic and open process that brings about 
predictable and consistent results. Therefore, the use of enforcement measures 
should be rare and only actioned if all other avenues available to facilitate 
compliance (direct request, observations and diplomacy) are exhausted.170 Currently, 
the ILO Constitution provides two main mechanisms for the enforcement of ratified 
conventions:171 articles 24 and 33. Article 24 empowers employers’ organizations or 
trade unions to make representation to the effect that a state has not complied with a 
convention it has ratified. Consequently, article 33 allows the governing body to 
recommend to the ILC that action be taken as may be deemed wise and expeditious 
in order to secure compliance by a member state that fails to act accordingly. 
 
Article 33 was used for the first time in the case of Myanmar, where the country’s 
government subjected its people to widespread and gross violations of basic human 
rights172 in breach of the Forced Labour Convention 29 of 1930.173 After several 
failed attempts to compel Myanmar to comply with the Convention, the ILO called on 
all member states and other international organizations to review their relations with 
Myanmar in order to ensure that they did not contribute to the use of forced labour in 
that country.174 There were a number of responses before the resolution was formally 
adopted, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund175 ceasing 
the granting of loans to Myanmar in 1988. Other governments imposed various 
measures, including the suspension of aid programmes and the withdrawal of tariff 
preferences.176 
 
170 Mhtml:file://G:\Enforcement and dispute resolution alliance for responsible trade.mht. accessed 
on 15 October 2012.  
171 Mhtml:file://G:\Enforcement and dispute resolution alliance for responsible trade.mht. accessed 
on 15 October 2012. 
172 Davies “Global Administrative Law at the ILO: The Problems of Softer Standards” unpublished. 
173 Convention No 29 of 1930.    
174 ILC (2000) Resolution Concerning the Measures Recommended by the Governing Body under 
Article 33 of the ILO Constitution on the Subject of Myanmar (88th Session).  
175 Hereinafter referred to as the “IMF”. 
176 Davies “Global Administrative Law at the ILO” 8. 
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In a case closer to home, the ILO intervened to compel Swaziland to comply with 
international labour standards. In this case, the CEACR noted several areas of 
concern with regard to the country’s Labour Code. Although the Labour Code was 
amended in 1995 in response to outside pressure, it nevertheless kept those 
provisions that repressed labour movements. 177  ILO pressure alone was not 
sufficient to influence the Swaziland Government to align its Labour Code to the 
provisions of international labour standards. As a result, the ILO called on the United 
States of America 178  to review its trade relations under Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP)179 arrangements. On this basis the United States government 
threatened to withdraw trade privileges with Swaziland. This threat led to the drafting 
and implementation of a new Labour Code with the assistance of the ILO, which was 
passed in 2000. However, Swaziland’s laws and practices conformed to GSP 
statutory requirements only after additional amendments to the Labour Code of 2000 
were made, ensuring that the country’s eligibility for GSP benefits continued.180 
 
The two measures discussed above are supplemented by the use of technical 
assistance to member states. This assistance is used as an incentive for 
governments to be more receptive to the standard-setting work of the ILO. The 
withdrawal of technical assistance has not yet been used by the ILO as a sanction for 
failure to implement international labour standards. Similar actions could have been 
taken in a number of states, but the governing body has rejected this approach.181 It 
should, however, be noted that technical assistance is only available to governments 
that request it, but this assistance is irrelevant to those countries that are not making 
any effort to comply with the ILO standards.182 
 
177 CEACR Individual observation concerning Convention No87 Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize, 1948, Swaziland: ratification 1978; published 1997. 
Available at http://www.ilo.orgaccessed on 14 October 2012.  
178 Hereinafter referred to as the “US” 
179 Hereinafter referred to as the “GSP”. 
180 Douglas et al “An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Workers’ Rights: ILO Standards, 
US Trade Laws, Unions and NGIOs” 293. 
181 Romano “The ILO System of Supervision and Compliance Control: A Review and Lessons for 
Multilateral Environment Agreements” 26. 
182 Ibid.  
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In light of these processes, it is deduced that the various ILO supervisory 
mechanisms create an administrative void in the ILO spectrum183 to the extent that 
the Organization can be regarded as a purely administrative one.184 Since the ILO 
seeks information from member states, judges that information against agreed 
standards, and, where a breach is found, takes steps to secure compliance, the 
Organization qualifies as only administrative body.185 
 
Critics argue that the purpose of the ILO conventions should be to create binding and 
enforceable international norms that should prevent member states from pursuing 
economic self-interest and compromising their labour legislation in order to protect 
and attract investments.186 On this basis, it is submitted that the ultimate goal of ILO 
standards should not be to restrain member states in the exercise of their self-
interest, but to help governments to identify their interests and achieve their 
economic aims.187 In addition, the author contends that in a social-and labour-policy 
framework, the model of law applicable is different from the criminal-law model of 
constraining self-interest. In this arena, expert legal authorities do not adjudicate 
compliance with detailed norms. Further, the focus should not be on enforcement 
and sanction, but it on education, capacity building, monitoring, learning best 
practices, resources, technical assistance, and incentives. The author further 
cautions that the ILO should not become an obstacle to the progress of member 
states, but should become a solution instead of a problem.188 
 
5.8 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND THE NAMIBIAN ADR 
SYSTEM 
 
This section analyses the extent to which ratified conventions have been applied in 
practice in Namibia as required by the ILO relative to articles 19 and 22 of its 
constitution.     
 
183 Kingsburg, Kisch and Steward “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law” (2004) 
International Institute for Law and Justice Working Paper 1.     
184 Davies Global Administrative Law at the ILO unpublished 8. 
185 Ibid.  
186 Langille “The Future of the ILO Law and the ILO” 395. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
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The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 98 of 1948 
 
In terms of articles 3 and 4 of the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, ratifying member states, are called upon to create bodies and to 
establish procedures for the settlement of labour disputes that contribute to the 
promotion of collective bargaining. The convention envisaged that conflict is 
inevitable in employment relations.189 For this reason, such bodies become catalysts 
to sound labour-relations systems, thereby providing effective and practical dispute 
settlement mechanisms to deal with the inevitable disagreements between workers 
and their employers.190 
 
However, it is noted that the ideal situation exists where parties are able to bargain 
voluntarily, without the necessity for third-party intervention.191 The Namibian Labour 
Act incorporates the provisions of this convention as it requires disputants to take all 
reasonable steps to resolve or settle the dispute before referral is sought with the 
Labour Commissioner.192 The purpose of this is to encourage negotiations between 
the parties themselves without resorting to the intervention of government-
established structures.  
 
The Examination of Grievances Recommendations Convention 130 of 1967193 
 
Although not binding in nature, this instrument urges member states to establish 
mechanisms aggrieved parties in the employment relationship may resort to in the 
event of failure to resolve their dispute. The instrument gives workers the right to 
lodge grievances if the employers’ actions are not consistent with the agreed norms 
in the collective agreement, legislative provisions, and contracts of employment or 
practices. Most employers in Namibia who have entered into formal recognition and 
procedural agreements194 have included provisions addressing grievance procedures 
189 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution in Southern Africa 11.  
190 Fashoyin Industrial Relations in Southern Africa: The Challenge of Change (1998) 43  
191 Glodman “Settlement of Disputes over Interests” in Blanpain (ed) Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations in Industrialized Economies (2007) 723.   
192 S 82(9) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
193 No 130 of 1967. 
194 See s 64 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007).  
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in their collective agreements. These provisions permit aggrieved employees to 
exhaust internal structures before approaching external institutions, such as the 
Labour Commissioner, to seek assistance for the resolution of their disputes.195 
 
In addition, the instrument makes various recommendations on the development and 
implementation of workplace-dispute resolution mechanisms. It places special 
emphasis on the importance of preventative measures-based workplace policies and 
fostering cooperation between social partners in employment decision-making 
processes that affect workers. Moreover, the instrument encourages aggrieved 
parties to seek recourse outside the workplace where internal efforts fail to yield the 
desired results. Such recourse includes conciliation and arbitration by the public 
authorities or recourse to the Labour Court.196 Effectively, Chapter 3 of the Labour 
Act deals extensively with such practices and provides for the referral of related 
disputes to the Labour Commissioner.197 
 
The ILO points out that a sound labour-relations system is dependent on the 
provision of an effective and practical dispute-settlement machinery to resolve 
disputes between workers and their employers. The envisaged dispute resolution 
machinery should allow parties to the dispute to take adequate responsibility for 
resolving their disagreement without having to resort to strikes, and procedures for 
dispute resolution should not be cumbersome.198 
 
Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation 92 of 1951 
 
This instrument recommends to member states, including Namibia, to avail 
themselves of voluntary conciliation processes to assist in the prevention and 
settlement of industrial disputes between employers and workers. The instrument 
points out that these processes should be free and expeditious and should allow the 
parties to enter into conciliation voluntarily or upon the initiation of the authority. 
Consequently, the instrument calls on the parties to the dispute to refrain from strikes 
195 De Beer Employers’ Guideline to Fair Disciplinary Actions and Procedures (2007) 44.  
196 Par 17 of R130 of 1967. 
197 See s 38 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
198 Fashoyin Industrial Relations in South Africa 43. 
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or lockouts while conciliation or arbitration is in progress, without limiting the right to 
strike.  
 
Although the instrument is persuasive in nature, with no binding legal force, the 
Labour Act has been aligned to the requirements of this instrument. In giving effect to 
this recommendation, the Act requires every collective agreement between 
employers’ and workers’ organizations to provide for mechanisms to resolve labour 
disputes that should be evoked by the parties when negotiations between them 
fail. 199  This provision, although not explicit, does not exclude the possibility of 
voluntary conciliation and arbitration. The process is voluntary in instances where 
conciliation and arbitration processes are undertaken by a mutually chosen private 
third party outside the machineries established by the government.200 As a general 
rule, disputes of interpretation, application and enforcement of the agreement as set 
out in section 73 of the Act requires arbitration or adjudication. In this case, parties 
may again provide for private arbitration in their collective agreement, therefore 
making use of the provisions of section 90 of the Labour Act, which is a voluntary 
process to be decided by the parties themselves. 
 
Despite this provision, voluntary conciliation and arbitration is not commonly used in 
Namibia on the basis that it is costly for the parties to hire a private third party instead 
of using the free service provided by the state. The government has made statutory 
or compulsory201 conciliation and arbitration available for the resolution of labour 
disputes. It is mandatory to attend compulsory conciliation meetings which may, 
where necessary, be occasioned by a subpoena202 with specific consequences for 
non-attendance.203 In compliance with the ILO instrument under discussion, no strike 
is permitted in Namibia while conciliation has not been exhausted. 204  Both 
199 See s 73 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
200 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 20. 
201 It is compulsory in the sense that parties are required to have recourse to it. This includes some 
steps of the process that are compulsory and create and obligation to attend when invited. See 
Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 24.  
202 See s 82(18)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
203 See s 83(2) of the Labour Amendment Act No. 2 of 2012 which provides “In respect of any other 
dispute referred in terms of this Act, the conciliator of the dispute may dismiss the matter if the 
party who referred the dispute fails to attend conciliation meeting”.   
204 S 75 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
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conciliation205 and arbitration processes206 are expeditious in the sense that there are 
time limits allocated to each process. The Labour Commissioner’s services are free, 
with no costs to the disputants.  
 
The Collective Bargaining Convention 154 of 1981 
 
This Convention, addressing labour-dispute resolution, calls upon Namibia as 
member state to provide for bodies and procedures for the settlement of labour 
disputes. The convention suggests that these procedures be designed in a manner 
intended to contribute to the promotion of collective bargaining. 207 Although the 
convention focuses on collective bargaining, it does not exclude the use of 
conciliation and arbitration as part of the bargaining process, particularly where such 
a process is undertaken voluntarily.208 
 
Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention 151 of 1981 
 
Although not ratified by the Namibian Government, the Convention provides that the 
settlement of disputes over terms and conditions of employment must be sought 
“through independent and impartial machinery, such as mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration established in such a manner that it ensures the confidence of the parties 
involved”. 209 The standards emphasize the independence and impartiality of the 
machineries created to resolve labour disputes. The Labour Act established a single 
institution, the Labour Commissioner, to resolve labour disputes arising from all 
employment sectors, including the public-service sector. There is no separate 
structure for isolated disputes resulting from the public sector. 
 
The convention calls for the independence of the Labour Commissioner, but, as 
discussed previously, the Labour Commissioner is an office within the Ministry of 
205 S 82(a) and (b) of the Labour Act, 2007 provides that conciliation must be concluded within 30 
days from the date of referral, unless the parties agree to a longer date.   
206 In terms of the rules of the Labour Commissioner, (Reg 20(2) arbitration must be concluded 
within 30 days of the referral and an award be made within another 30 days of concluding the 
arbitration proceedings. (Section 86(18) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007).    
207 Art 5(2)(e) of C154 of 1981. 
208 ILO Collective Dispute Resolution through Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 7.  
209 Art 8 of C151 of 1981. 
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Labour and Social Welfare, within the public-service realm. However, the office is 
independent of any influence from employers’ and workers’ organizations. Similarly, 
the personnel of the Labour Commissioner’s office (conciliators and arbitrators) are 
required to be independent and impartial in the performance of their duties.210 
 
Labour Administration Recommendation 158 of 1978 
 
The Labour Administration Recommendation requires competent bodies within the 
system of labour administration to provide conciliation and arbitration services, with 
the agreement of social partners, to address collective labour disputes. 211  The 
recommendation is a subordinate instrument of the Labour Administration 
Convention,212 ratified by Namibia. It is therefore within the scope of this Convention 
that various labour institutions, namely the Labour Advisory Council, the Committee 
for Dispute Prevention and Resolution and the Essential Services Committee, were 
established on a tripartite basis.213 
 
The Termination of Employment Convention 158 of 1982 
 
This Convention urges workers who are not content with the termination of their 
employment to appeal against such termination through a labour tribunal or a court 
established for this purpose. The Convention requires the tribunal or the court to 
examine the reasons given for the termination and the circumstances leading to the 
dismissal. Namibia has ratified this Convention, thus article 33 of the Labour Act 
gives effect to these provisions. In terms of this section, an employer is prohibited 
with or without notice from dismissing an employee “without a valid and fair reason 
and without following a fair procedure”. A dispute to that effect must be referred to 
the Labour Commissioner for arbitration in terms of sections 38(1), (2) and (3) of the 
Labour Act. As provided for in the convention, arbitration before the Labour 
Commissioner is a tribunal as contemplated in article 12(1)(a) of the Namibian 
Constitution. 
210 S 85(6) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
211 Par 10 of R158 of 1978. 
212 No 150 of 1978. 
213 See Chapter 8 and 9 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
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 However, despite this seeming compliance with the convention, the Labour Act fails 
to define valid and fair reasons for termination of employment. Although section 137 
of the Act provides for the publication of guidelines and codes of good practice to 
facilitate the proper implementation of the legislative framework,214 at the time of 
writing no code of good practice was in place. A code of good practice, such as that 
applicable in the LRA, could be helpful in guiding users in the interpretation or 
application of the Labour Act.215 
 
In Chapter Three of this study, various events were illustrated that warranted the 
need to investigate the efficiency and appropriateness of the dispute resolution 
system in terms of the Labour Act of 1992. Mediation, conciliation and adjudication in 
terms of the repealed statute became inappropriate.216 As a result, Namibia has 
since embraced the internationally recognized ILO machineries of ADR with the 
enactment of the Labour Act. This has led to the creation of conciliation and 
arbitration forums, including adjudication reserved for the Labour Court as recourse 
to appeals or reviews. 
 
5.8.1 CONCILIATION  
 
A detailed theoretical and practical application of conciliation in Namibia was 
discussed in Chapter Three of this study. The analysis that follows draws on this 
discussion in order to examine the Namibian labour dispute resolution system in 
terms of its compliance with the substantive requirements for an effective conciliation 
process. Member states are required to align their conciliation processes to these 
requirements, although they are not clearly defined by the ILO instruments discussed 
above. Conventions and recommendations refer only to establishing conciliation and 
arbitration machineries, without providing adequate details as to the exact process 
involved. However, supplementary ILO literature provides useful requirements to 
engage in a meaningful conciliation.217 A description of a number of the requirements 
214 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution 11. 
215 S 137(3) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
216 Fashoyin Industrial Relations in Southern Africa 43. 
217 Steadman Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution 20. 
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on which this study’s examination of the Namibian conciliation process is based 
follows.  
 
(a) An obligation to notify the competent authority of a labour dispute 
 
In terms of section 86(1)(b) of the Labour Act, disputes, including disputes of interest, 
must be referred218 to the Labour Commissioner within one year of the dispute 
arising. The referring party must advise or inform the other party to the dispute of 
such an action by serving the party with a copy of the referral. 219 Given these 
procedures, the provisions of the Labour Act appear to comply with the ILO 
requirement that calls for parties to inform the state of the existence of the dispute. 
 
(b) A requirement to report labour disputes to the authority, which may 
then be empowered to initiate conciliation and to require attendance of 
the parties 
 
The Labour Act requires the Labour Commissioner, after receiving a properly 
referred dispute, to appoint a conciliator220 who is required to attempt to resolve the 
dispute through conciliation.221 Thereafter all parties to the dispute are informed of 
the place, date and time of the first meeting and are required to attend in person, 
unless where a representation is permitted and a representative can attend on behalf 
of a party. It is therefore the referral that empowers the Labour Commissioner to 
institute a conciliation meeting; conciliations are not conducted at random without any 
cause of action. 
 
(c) A restriction on the choice of third party called upon to conduct the 
conciliation 
 
In compulsory conciliation under the auspices of the Labour Commissioner, parties 
have no choice in the appointment of a conciliator. It is strictly for the Labour 
Commissioner to appoint a conciliator 222  and parties may not object to the 
218 See s 82(8) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
219 Ibid.  
220 S 82(3) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
221 S 82(a), (b) and (c) of the Labour Act (Act No11 of 2007). 
222 S 82(3) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
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appointment, unless good grounds exist for such an objection. If grounds exist for an 
objection it is a jurisdictional matter to be determined in limine.  
 
(d) The requirement to participate in conciliation  
 
Section 83 of the Labour Act provides for the consequences of failing to attend a 
conciliation meeting. The Act provides that “in respect of any other dispute referred in 
terms of this Act, the conciliator of the dispute may dismiss the matter if the party who 
referred the dispute fails to attend a conciliation meeting”. In some instances 
subpoenas are used to secure the attendance of parties to a conciliation meeting.223 
This reflects the seriousness of the requirement to attend conciliation by all parties to 
the dispute. 
 
(e) The prohibition of strikes and lockout before conciliation procedures 
have been exhausted and completed 
 
The Labour Act, 2007 prohibits strikes while conciliation is in progress and before it is 
finalized.224 Strikes are permissible only once the entire conciliation process has 
been completed and the conciliator has issued a certificate of non-resolution of the 
dispute. 225 Once such a certificate has been issued the parties are required to 
comply with the requirements outlined in section 74 of the Labour Act. Strikes that do 
not pursue this route are declared unprotected and unlawful. 
 
(f) An obligation to adhere to an agreement concluded during a 
conciliation meeting  
 
This is one of the labour dispute resolution system’s most serious challenges as the 
Labour Act does not contain any provision relating to a settlement agreement 
resulting from a conciliation meeting. Consequently, there is no provision in the Act 
requiring parties to adhere to the terms of the settlement agreement. The only related 
provision is found in the Labour General Regulations.226 The applicable regulation 
provides that “if parties resolve their dispute during the conciliation process, the 
223 S 82(18)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
224 S 75 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
225 S 82(15) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
226 Regulation 18(3).    
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conciliator must issue a certificate of resolved dispute on Form LC24”. The form 
supplements the regulation by proclaiming that “the parties have reached a full and 
final settlement”. Therefore, the absence of a statutory provision holding the parties 
to the terms of the settlement agreement reached in a conciliation meeting and the 
failure to provide for consequence of non-compliance are contributing factors to the 
wide-spread non-compliance with settlement agreements in Namibia.  
 
(g) In cases of rights disputes, the requirement to have undergone 
conciliation before the dispute can be referred to a labour tribunal 
 
Arbitration conducted through the Labour Commissioner’s office is considered a 
labour tribunal for the purpose of resolving labour disputes,227 as contemplated in the 
Namibian Constitution. 228 In this context, it is a peremptory requirement that all 
disputes of rights must first attempt to be resolved through conciliation and, if that 
process is unsuccessful, arbitration must commence.229 The only exception to this 
rule is where a party alleges the infringement of fundamental rights and protections 
within the scope of the Labour Act and Chapter 3 of the Namibian Constitution. In 
such an instance a party may approach the Labour Court directly for the enforcement 
of that right or protection or for other appropriate relief.230 
 
5.8.2 ARBITRATION  
 
This section draws on the preceding discussions of arbitration in order to inform the 
examination of the rapidity of the process as raised by the ILO. ILO instruments, 
particularly the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, require the 
process to be expeditious and to be completed within a given time limit as may be 
prescribed by national law or regulation.231 
 
227 S 85(1) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
228 Art 12(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution.  
229 S 85(5) and (6) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
230 S 7(5) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
231 Par 3 of R92 of 1951. 
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Labour arbitration in Namibia is limited by delays. For example, a dismissal dispute 
must be referred to the Labour Commissioner within six months of its occurrence.232 
Thereafter, arbitration must be held within 30 days of the referral or any longer period 
agreed to in writing by the parties.233 Once this period has elapsed, the Labour Act 
requires the arbitrator to issue the award within 30 days of concluding the 
arbitration.234 The process usually takes up to eight months to complete. However, 
where there are postponements the process may take longer than the prescribed 
time limit. These delays are attributed to the parties themselves and, as such, negate 
the possibility of the speedy resolution of labour disputes.235 A thorough comparative 
analysis with regard to the CCMA system is carried out in the following chapter of this 
thesis. 
 
5.9 EFFICIENCY OF THE LABOUR COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE IN TERMS 
OF ILO REQUIREMENTS  
 
The ILO asserts that in order for state machinery such as the Labour Commissioner 
to operate effectively, particularly in labour dispute prevention and resolution, the 
system must be able to display the following procedural and substantive qualities:236 
 
• Legitimacy 
The legitimacy requirement contemplates a labour dispute resolution system, such as 
that of the Labour Commissioner, to operate as a product of the consent of the 
parties whose interests are at stake. This requirement further indicates that the 
substantive standards to be applied should satisfy public interest norms and 
expectations. The Namibian ADR system is a product of wider consultation between 
social partners, developed by a tripartite task team that was assisted by ILO experts. 
The final ADR system was adopted only after extensive consultation with and 
deliberation between social partners and all stakeholders in Namibia. As such, it is 
submitted that the system is legitimate and in compliance with this ILO requirement. 
 
232 S 86(2)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
233 Rule 20(2) of the Labour Commissioner.   
234 S 86(18) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
235 Simpson Labour Dispute Resolution 62. 
236 Thompson Dispute Prevention and Resolution in Public Service Labour Relations 45. 
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• Scope  
Under this requirement, the labour dispute resolution system is urged to cater for the 
full range of interests and rights disputes of concerned parties. The ADR system 
must be able to attend to all issues that give rise to conflict in the workplace. Relative 
to this requirement, all kinds of labour disputes, such as rights and interest disputes 
as defined in the Labour Act, are catered for by the Labour Commissioner. For a 
dispute to fall under the system, it must fall within the parameters of the definitions 
provided in sections 81 and 84 of the Labour Act and must result from an 
employment relationship. 
 
• Power 
Ideally, the system must be able to bring the full portfolio of ADR processes to bear, 
from mediation to arbitration and everything in between, as may be appropriate to the 
resolution of the issue at hand. The Namibian labour dispute resolution system has  
embraced the ADR process of conciliation fully, which includes mediation and 
arbitration processes as defined in the Labour Act. Adjudication is reserved purely as 
recourse for appeal, review and limited other circumstances, such as disputes 
infringing on fundamental rights.  
 
• Independence 
The facilitators, mediators and arbitrators of any conflict resolution scheme and any 
organization utilizing them must be seen to be manifestly independent and without 
any conflict of interest in relation to the parties or subject matter. The appointment of 
neutral facilitators, mediators and arbitrators must be the product of either general or 
specific consent. To this end, the Labour Act requires arbitrators, although appointed 
in terms of the Public Service Act as public servants, to be independent and impartial 
in the performance of their statutory duties.237 However, situations where there could 
be a perceived conflict of interest in disputes arising from the public sector, especially 
where the arbitrator may be a beneficiary of the outcome, raise questions. Where a 
dispute over the determination of terms and conditions of employment arises in the 
public sector and most cases involving government, the matter would ordinarily be 
237 S 85(6) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
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arbitrated by a part-time arbitrator who is not in the employment of government.238 
This action negates the perceived conflict of interest.  
 
• Professionalism 
While dispute resolution styles may vary according to personalities and individual 
strengths, the users of services are entitled services with providers who work under 
an ethically sound governance structure, have experience and are competent in the 
field. In this respect, the Labour Act239 makes provision for a code of ethics for 
conciliators and arbitrators appointed in terms of sections 82 and 85. Further, 
although there is no specified qualification, the Act requires conciliators and 
arbitrators to have related qualifications.240 In Namibia, the appointment requirement 
to become a conciliator or arbitrator is a Diploma and/or Post-Graduate Diploma in 
Labour Dispute Resolution attained at any recognized institution of higher learning. 
This qualification must be coupled with relevant experience. Any deviation or breach 
of the code of ethics is reasonable cause for the Minister of Labour to withdraw the 
appointment of an arbitrator.241 However, the nature of these deviations or breaches 
of conduct is not defined in the Labour Act, 2007. 
 
• Coordination and integration 
The dispute resolution process should be compatible with the wider system of 
workplace regulation and agreement-making applicable to or adopted by the parties. 
The statutory or private dispute resolution system should ideally complement, but in 
any event not undermine, these wider systems. 242  As indicated previously, the 
Labour Act encourages voluntary conciliation methods and sets clear perimeters for 
private arbitration. The purpose of these voluntarily dispute resolution machineries is 
to complement the compulsory mechanism made available by the state through the 
Labour Commissioner’s office. However, private mechanisms involve costs, whereas 
238 Interview held with the Labour Commissioner 3 October 2012, in Windhoek. Notes available 
with the author.  
239 S 100(iii) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
240 S 100(iv) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
241 S 84(9) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
242 Thompson “Dispute Resolution in the Workplace: Public Issues, Private Trouble” (2007) 9 (8) 
ADR Bulletin141.   
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the Labour Commissioner’s services are free, making the latter the preferred public 
choice. 
 
There is a further requirement relating to the labour dispute resolution institution itself 
and its personnel. The ILO points out that to enhance the institution’s personnel 
acceptability and credibility, the role players, such as conciliators and arbitrators, 
should be appointed through a bipartite or tripartite consultative process involving the 
state, employers’ organizations and trade unions.243 In Namibia, the Committee for 
Dispute Prevention and Resolution 244  is a tripartite sub-structure of the Labour 
Advisory Council. In terms of sections 82 and 85 of the Labour Act, this structure is 
charged with, among other things, the responsibility for making appointment 
recommendations to the Labour Advisory Council by examining the qualifications and 
experience of candidates applying for vacant posts as conciliators and arbitrators. In 
turn, the Labour Advisory Council approves and makes further recommendations to 
the Minister of Labour, who finally appoints officials in terms of the Public Service Act. 
Generally, to be eligible to perform conciliation and arbitration services, the 
appointment must be approved by these structures. Where these procedures have 
not been followed, a member of staff employed in the office of the Labour 
Commissioner may not perform any statutory conciliation and arbitration services. 
 
The Labour Commissioner and Deputy Labour Commissioner are appointed by the 
Minister of Labour245 in terms of the provisions of the Public Service Act. Social 
partners have no role or influence in their appointment. The Act prescribes that the 
two officials must be competent to perform the functions of a conciliator and 
arbitrator. Therefore, this does not rule out the possibility of candidates being 
appointed as conciliators and arbitrators through the normal process of the tripartite 
structures described above at an earlier stage. They must possess the qualifications 
and experience required to be appointed as conciliators or arbitrators, although they 
do not specifically need to be able to perform conciliation and arbitration functions. 
 
243 Ibid. 
244 See s 100 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
245 S 120 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
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While there is no specified qualification for arbitrators and conciliators, the ILO 
recognizes the importance for conciliators and arbitrators to be trained in the process 
of conciliation and arbitration.246 To this end, the first training in conciliation and 
arbitration was conducted in 2001; courses were offered by the University of 
Namibia, University of Cape Town and National University of Lesotho, with Namibia 
as host and ILO-Swiss sponsorship. The University of Namibia has since taken over 
the project and offers a certificate as a foundation course and a diploma programme 
in labour dispute resolution. In addition to attaining these qualifications, the ILO 
further requires of conciliators and arbitrators to possess adequate knowledge of the 
legal and economic framework within which the dispute takes place; the industry 
situation; detailed background information of disputes; and personal qualities such as 
impartiality, integrity, sincerity and patience. 247  These requirements have been 
adequately provided for in the Labour Act. As a result, the appointment of conciliators 
and arbitrators complies with the requirements proposed by the ILO. 
 
Lastly, the ILO calls on governments to ensure that senior staff heading the labour 
dispute resolution institutions, such as the Labour Commissioner in Namibia, must 
possess the required qualifications, for example legal qualifications in the case of 
judges, to be eligible for appointment. The ILO points out that this practice 
strengthens the independence and authority of the institution.   
 
5.10  CONCLUSION 
 
Namibia became a member state of the ILO as early as 3 October 1978, represented 
by SWAPO while the organization was in exile and fighting for the liberation of the 
Namibian people. At independence on 21 March 1990, the country became a 
sovereign state, adopting a democratic constitution. The constitution assumed a 
positive approach towards international law, thereby asserting the incorporation of 
and adherence to the international labour standards of the ILO. Consequently, 
Namibia has ratified eleven international labour standards, ranging from the core 
246 ILO Labour legislation guidelines available on http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/dialogue 
accessed on 06 March 2012. 
247 Ibid. 
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conventions extensively promoted by the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work to priority and technical conventions. 
 
The ratification of international labour standards creates an obligation for Namibia to 
submit periodic reports reflecting the application in practice of the ILO instruments 
discussed in this chapter, consequently accepting to be supervised by the ILO 
supervisory machineries that influence the country’s labour legislation and practices. 
Namibia appears to be successful in terms of its reporting obligation, but there are a 
number of areas that require improvement in order to comply fully with the standards, 
particularly those aspects relating to the supply of information in reply to the 
comments of the CEACR. Aside from these problems, the country has successfully 
complied with the requirements of articles 19 and 22 of the ILO Constitution. 
 
The ILO’s supervisory machineries have been criticized for their lack of punitive and 
other appropriate sanction measures for non-compliant member states. This is a 
result of the ILO’s lack of enforcement measures other than the potential inclusion of 
the social clauses of the WTO in labour standards, which the governing body and 
many member states have objected against. Compliance is, therefore, dependent on 
goodwill by member states. In extreme cases, such as in the case of Myanmar, the 
vague provision of article 33 of the ILO Constitution was enacted by calling on 
member states to take “measures of economic character” against Myanmar for its 
persistent refusal to comply with international labour standards relating to forced 
labour. 
 
Ultimately, Namibia has codified the ILO ADR system asserted by the ILO 
conventions. With the enactment of the Labour Act, conciliation and arbitration have 
been fully implemented in Namibia, with adjudication reserved for appeals and review 
cases. However, the new ADR system faces a number of challenges that are 
addressed in detail in the next chapter. The following chapter features a comparison 
of the Namibian ADR system with the South African ADR system. 
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“The use of the comparative method requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, 
but also of its social, and above all, its political context. The use of comparative law for 
practical purposes becomes an abuse only if it is informed by a legalistic spirit, which 
ignores this context of the law.”1 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In Namibia and South Africa respectively, there are social partners2 with common 
and divergent short and long-term interests. These divergent interests must be 
accommodated and reconciled and this process is the subject of labour law and 
1 Blanpain Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 17. 
2 Social partners are the workers’ and employers’ organisations in terms of the ILO classification.  
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industrial relations. However, the processes employed in Namibia and South Africa 
vary.3 
 
The purpose of this comparative chapter is to highlight and explain the differences 
between and similarities of the two respective countries’ labour dispute resolution 
systems.4 This comparative approach brings to bear two schools of thought, the first 
being the convergence school, and the second the divergence school.5 The 
convergence school holds that the influence of industrialisation gradually brings the 
labour relations systems of various countries closer to one another. The divergence 
school, on the other hand, maintains that labour relations are sub-systems of political 
systems and manifestations of prevailing social and economic conditions. Chapter 
Three of this study demonstrates the evolution of labour legislation in Namibia, which 
moved away from colonial or apartheid labour legislation and developed its own post-
independence labour dispute resolution system in light of the country’s 
developmental needs. The new system is further influenced by the ILO and South 
African labour law.  
 
This chapter provides a more extensive investigation of Namibia and South Africa’s 
labour dispute resolution systems. This entails a dualistic approach, namely6 a 
theoretical analysis of both the law and practices of each country in order to set them 
side-by-side and, in doing so, noting the similarities and differences. Moreover, the 
chapter explains those similarities and differences and identifies trends and overall 
developments that are manifested in Namibia and South Africa.  
 
To carry out the comparative study described above, the author establishes how the 
ADR system is applied and how it functions in practice.7 This approach provides a 
panoramic view of the different ways in which similar problems are addressed in the 
3 Blanpain Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 17. 
4 Schregle “Comparative Industrial Relations: Pitfalls and Potential” (1981) International Labour 
Review 27. 
5 Finnemore et al Contemporary Labour Relations 5. 
6 Valticos “Comparative Law and the ILO” (1977) Comparative Labour Law Review 274. 
7 Blanpain Comparative Labour Lawand Industrial Relations 24. 
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countries under discussion and how Namibia’s ADR system relates to that of South 
Africa.8 
 
Despite the above, it should not be taken for granted that systems and institutions 
are transplantable9 as it is argued that any attempt to do so may entail a wish of 
rejection. The reason for this view is premised on the basis that Namibia and South 
Africa are not identical; there are distinct differences in certain areas, such as 
economic development. However, the differences between the systems do not mean 
that Namibia cannot adopt solutions that have proved successful in South Africa or 
vice versa, and therefore a degree of transferability can be accepted. 
 
Undertaking a study of this magnitude requires the author to demonstrate knowledge 
about general labour law and an insight into the countries’ histories, cultural and 
political systems, and the prevailing values of the societies under study in order to 
understand the essential details of the labour dispute resolution system. This is 
discussed in Chapters Three and Four of this study, which form the basis for the 
comparison undertaken here. 
 
On closer analysis, the South African post-apartheid labour regime has had a 
profound impact on labour law within the Southern African region. It has been the 
catalyst for a great number of reforms in SADC countries, particularly in the area of 
labour dispute resolution.10 This holds true for Namibia’s Labour Act, 2007, which 
has established specialised institutions, such as the Labour Commissioner, to 
promote the use of conciliation and arbitration as the primary mechanisms for the 
prevention and resolution of labour disputes. The Labour Court system was 
established for adjudication as a last resort. 
 
In this context, this chapter compares Namibia’s labour dispute resolution system to 
that of South Africa, with a view to finding solutions to problems confronting the 
Namibian ADR system. 
 
8 Blanpain Comparative Labour Lawand Industrial Relations 25. 
9 Blanpain Comparative Labour Lawand Industrial Relations 29. 
10 Benjamin The Challenges of Labour Law Reform in South Africa 255. 
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6.2 HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE  
 
A study of the historical development of Namibian and South African labour relations 
contributes to a greater understanding of the present labour dispute resolution 
system by showing how it has evolved.11 The development of the respective 
countries’ labour relations systems are discussed in more detail in Chapters Three 
(3.2) and Four (4.2). It is demonstrated in these two chapters that the development of 
labour relations was mainly determined by the historical position of black workers, 
taking into account that workers of different races played important roles in the 
prevailing labour relations systems of the era. These dual labour relations systems 
fuelled conflicts in the workplace.12 
 
For the purposes of this section, the historical development of these two countries 
are not discussed in detail, but an overview of the similarities and differences that 
prevailed in Namibia and South Africa leading to the enactment of post-
independence labour dispute resolution systems is supplied.  
 
The Union of South Africa was established in 1910 by an Act of the British 
Parliament.13 South West Africa, now Namibia, was entrusted to the Union of South 
Africa as a Class C mandate on 17 December 1920. This was done in terms of the 
Peace Treaty of Versailles and article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.14 
As illustrated in Chapter Three, it was under this mandate that the South African 
government exercised full powers of administration and legislation over Namibia.  
 
In South Africa, the first significant labour legislation to be enacted was the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924. This statute comprehensively established mechanisms for 
labour dispute resolution. Although the Industrial Conciliation Act was of national 
application, it was applicable only to white workers, thereby excluding African or 
black employees from its application. Despite the statute’s primary focus on labour 
dispute resolution, the creation of racial separation was its dominant feature. 
11 Ferreira “The CCMA: Its Effectiveness in Dispute Resolution in Labour Relations” (2004) 23 
Politeia 73. 
12 Ferreira “The CCMA: Its Effectiveness in Dispute Resolution in Labour Relations” 74. 
13 Benjamin The Challenges of Labour Law Reform in South Africa 240. 
14 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 19. 
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 In Namibia, the Master and Servants Proclamation 24 of 1920 was the first labour 
legislation to be promulgated. The statute was enacted to regulate the relative rights 
and duties of masters and their servants. Although the Master and Servants 
Proclamation applied to African workers, unlike its South African counterpart, it failed 
to create comparative mechanisms for labour dispute resolution. Instead, it 
established criminal sanctions in the form of fines and imprisonment for black 
workers who failed to comply with any condition of their employment.15 At the time, 
recourse to the existing courts was the only option for all labour related 
contraventions that carried criminal penalties.16 
 
The key difference between the Master and Servants Proclamation and the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of South Africa is that the latter created industrial councils and 
conciliation boards for conciliation of interest disputes, while rights disputes were 
referred to the ordinary courts.17 The Master and Servants Proclamation failed to do 
the same, but created criminal courts to punish contraventions of the labour laws. 
The differences between these two statutes stem from the fact that they were tailored 
to suit the type of workforce that the countries had at the time. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act applied to the white workforce, mainly those in the mining sector, and 
it was inappropriate to convict and punish workers for contraventions of the Act. 
Nevertheless, the Industrial Conciliation Act underwent several reforms. The statute 
was first amended in 1937 and again in 1956. It was the 1956 version of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act that created the system of industrial tribunals to arbitrate 
disputes, although limited to job reservation disputes for white employees and those 
of foreign origin.18 
 
In Namibia, the Vagrancy Proclamation 25 of 1920 supplemented the Master and 
Servants Proclamation by legalising and facilitating forced labour mechanisms in the 
Police Zones. The statute contemplated restriction or suppression of trespass, 
idleness and vagrancy, and restricted indigenous black people to homelands unless 
15 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 135. 
16 Fenwick Labour Law Reform in Namibia 321. 
17 Bhorat, Pauw and Mncube Understanding the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Dispute 
Resolution System in South Africa: An Analysis of the CCMA (2007) 15. 
18 Ibid. 
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they could prove to the authorities that they had employment or other means of 
support, thereby excluding them from the resources in the Police Zones.19 In South 
Africa, the Apartheid government enacted the Native Law Amendment Act20 that 
equally restricted the movement of Africans in the country, extending influx control 
laws to include African women who were excluded in the original statute.21 Another 
separate statute, the Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act22 was enacted as an 
alternative for black workers to industrial councils, which were applicable only to 
white workers, thus creating a separate dispensation for black workers.23 The Native 
Labour Settlement Dispute Act introduced what was labelled a circumscribed system 
of consultative committees based on plant workers’ committees, regional labour 
committees and central native labour boards.24 
 
In Namibia, the Native Proclamation 56 of 1951 typified the extensive segregation 
approach by regulating the ingress of natives into and their residence in Police 
Zones. Unlike its South African equivalent, this statute failed to provide for helpful 
labour dispute resolution mechanisms aside from creating recourse to the Native 
Commissioner. The Commissioner was empowered by the statute to investigate a 
labour complaint and to declare the employment agreement void, consequently 
ordering the removal of the African worker.25 
 
In 1952 the Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance26 was enacted in Namibia 
and was seen as the first comprehensive labour legislation regulating collective 
labour relations in the country. However, despite its significance at face value, the 
statute was mainly about labour relations amongst white workers, like South Africa’s 
Industrial Conciliation Act. It was equally discriminatory in that it excluded from its 
application farm workers and domestic servants, roles filled predominantly by black 
workers.27 Moreover, although the Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance 
19 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 6. 
20 Act No54 of 1952.  
21 Godfrey et al Collective Labour Law in South Africa 52. 
22 Act No 48 of 1953. 
23 Godfrey et al Collective Labour Law in South Africa 52. 
24 Ss 3, 4 and 7 of the Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act 48 of 1953. 
25 ILO Labour and Discrimination in Namibia 59. 
26 No 35 of 1952. 
27 S 2(2) of the Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance No 35 of 1952.   
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provided for the registration of trade unions and employers’ organisations, African 
workers were not allowed to register any workers’ organisations or unions, 
consequently excluding them from making use of the available dispute settlement 
machineries of conciliation and ordinary courts for the determination of their 
disputes.28 As discussed in Chapter Three, this statute remained in force until 31 
October 1992, three years after Namibia’s independence. The reasons for the 
protracted application of this colonial statute are discussed in Chapter Three (3.8).  
 
In South Africa, the Industrial Conciliation Act29 reinforced the racial divide and 
created a new model of industrial tribunal, with vested powers to investigate and 
arbitrate disputes referred to it by the industrial councils or conciliation boards.30 In 
Namibia and South Africa respectively, the prevailing labour relations systems of the 
era owed much to an unjust and repressive political dispensation that increasingly 
relied on force to maintain stability.  
 
The continued tendency of the Apartheid government to entrench repressive laws led 
to resistance, for example, the formation of the Ovamboland People’s Organisation 
(OPO) and, eventually, SWAPO in Namibia. These organisations aimed to fight, 
amongst other things, the draconian labour conditions imposed on Namibian 
workers. In addition, the country experienced waves of strikes, the most devastating 
of which was the 1972 national strike aimed at resisting and/or boycotting the 
contract labour system.31 South Africa experienced a similar increase in political 
militancy on the part of the black population, propelled by the black trade unions, the 
African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and a number of 
student movements.32 
 
Following the 1972 national strike in Namibia,33 the government enacted various 
fragmented pieces of labour legislation intended to address the individual needs of 
28 Van Rooyen Portfolio of Partnership 155. 
29 No 28 of 1956. 
30 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining in South Africa 55. 
31 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 22. 
32 Godfrey et al Labour Relations in South Africa 43.  
33 A massive amount of literature relating to the 1972 strike in Namibia is available online.  
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selected homelands. These included the Ovambo Labour Enactment,34 Kavango 
Labour Act,35 and the Labour Enactment Act36 for the Eastern Caprivi. This was an 
attempt to introduce self-governance. In South Africa the dualistic labour relations 
system become unbearable and started affecting the international investment image 
of South Africa.37 Consequently, the government was forced to appoint the Wiehahn 
Commission of Inquiry to rationalise existing labour legislation and to eliminate 
bottlenecks experienced in the labour relations system.38 Chapter Four (4.2.4) 
provides a detailed account of this commission.  
 
The commission made numerous recommendations to the government, but the 
government did not immediately implement all the recommendations, sceptically 
making piecemeal changes instead. Some significant outcomes of the commission 
included the amendment and renaming of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 to 
the Labour Relations Act of 1956. The amendment introduced the concept of unfair 
labour practice and replaced industrial tribunals with the Industrial Court for the 
adjudication of unfair labour practices.39 
 
In Namibia, it was the enactment of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act40 that 
introduced wider ranging protective provisions in respect of conditions of 
employment. The Act also repealed all the homelands’ tailor-made labour legislation. 
Given the limited participation of black workers in the Wages and Industrial 
Conciliation Ordinance, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act was passed as an 
urgent remedial measure to ameliorate the prevailing situation, without necessarily 
amending the Industrial Conciliation Ordinance.41 
 
Despite this seemingly interventional innovation, the situation continued to be 
unbearable for the government, forcing it to come to the realisation that the existing 
34 No 6 of 1972. 
35 No 2 of 1974. 
36 No 3 of 1973. 
37 Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 77. 
38 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 34. 
39 Ibid.  
40 No 12 of 1986. 
41 Wiehahn Report - Namibia 29. 
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structures and systems were no longer capable of handling and resolving labour 
disputes, which were rapidly becoming part of the Namibian system. This led to the 
appointment of the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Professor Nicholas 
Wiehahn who chaired the South African commission of 1977. However, in Namibia 
the commission had a different composition and mandate. Chapter Three (3.5) 
provides a detailed account of the Wiehahn Commission in Namibia.  
 
The Wiehahn Commission was appointed in 1987, three years before Namibia 
attained her independence, and reported its work on 2 February 1989, a year before 
the country’s independence. The commission was tasked to examine the relevance 
and adequacy of existing labour legislation and to recommend the necessary 
adjustments that would address the needs of the changing times.42 Amongst the 
most important findings of the commission is the finding that the Namibian labour 
relations system lagged behind that of South Africa, on whose legislation most, if not 
all, of the system was based. Consequently, the commission recommended, 
amongst other things, that the five internationally recognised labour dispute 
settlement procedures, namely negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and 
adjudication, be afforded full recognition in Namibia’s new labour relations 
legislation.43 As in South Africa, the commission’s recommendations were 
implemented in part in the 1992 Act, with the majority only coming to realisation with 
the implementation of the Labour Act of 2007.  
 
6.3 COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR LAW PROVISIONS 
 
At independence in 1990 Namibia adopted a constitution that guarantees the 
protection of basic labour rights, as well as other rights that have a bearing on 
government policy in regulating labour rights.44 In this respect, the Namibian 
Constitution guarantees fundamental freedoms, including freedom of association and 
the freedom to form and join trade unions.45 These freedoms extend to include the 
right to withhold labour without being exposed to criminal penalties. In addition, 
42 Wiehahn Report- Namibia (ii). 
43 Wiehahn Report-Namibia 117-118. 
44 Fenwick Labour Law Reform in Namibia 327. 
45 Art 21(1)(e) of the Namibian Constitution. 
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Chapter 11 of the Constitution provides for the Principles of State Policy. In terms 
thereof, article 95 obliges the state to promote the welfare of the people of Namibia 
by adopting policies aimed at, amongst others, active encouragement of the 
formation of independent trade unions to protect workers’ rights and interest, and to 
promote sound labour relations and fair labour practices. 
 
In South Africa, the Government of National Unity, on assuming power, undertook 
comprehensive labour law reforms to give effect to various constitutionally 
entrenched labour rights and to regulate all the facets of the labour relationship. The 
intention was to create an environment free from conflict, which is conducive to and 
promotes harmonious labour relations.46 The core of South Africa’s democracy lies in 
the Bill of Rights, wherein a variety of rights is enshrined for all South-Africans. As in 
Namibia, these rights include the right to fair labour practices, freedom of association, 
collective bargaining and the right to strike.47 However, it is argued that the right to 
fair labour practice was not novel in the new South Africa, but had its origin in the 
equity jurisprudence developed by the Industrial Court.48 
 
In South Africa, following the adoption a democratic constitution that enshrines labour 
rights, the negotiated Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 was enacted to replace the 
1956 Labour Relations Act (LRA). The new LRA gives effect to the Constitution, 
given that one of its principal objectives is to promote an effective and efficient labour 
dispute resolution system.49 The ultimate goal was to overcome the lengthy delays 
caused by labour disputes, save costs related to disputes, reduce the incidences of 
industrial actions, which characterised the apartheid era, and change the labour 
relations system from a confrontation-based system to a cooperation-based one.50 
To strengthen this perception, in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Randaw51 the Labour 
Court inferred that the resolution of labour disputes in terms of the 1956 LRA, 
particularly unfair dismissal disputes, was complex, inefficient, protracted, expensive 
46 Venter et al Labour Relations in South Africa 179. 
47 S 23 of the South African Constitution No 108 of 1996. 
48 De Waal et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 4th ed (2001) 390. 
49 S 1(d)iv of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
50 Bhorat et al An Analysis of the CCMA 8. 
51 (2000) 21 ILJ 1232 LC. 
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and highly legalistic. The same view was expressed in Pep Stores (Pty) Ltd v Laka 
No and Others,52 where Mlambo J commented as follows: 
 
“the process…from the date of dismissal through conciliation to determination was very 
dilatory. On the average, matters took up to two years, and sometimes more, to be 
finalized by the Industrial Court. However, because there was a general appeal 
provision, the majority of the Industrial Court determinations were taken on appeal to 
the Labour Appeal Court and this necessitated a further waiting period. One was faced 
with the prospects of disputes taking not less than three years to be finalized after 
appeal. If there was any appeal, to the then Appellant Division, the waiting period was 
considerably longer.” 
 
The same sentiments are relevant in Namibia in relation to the efficiency and 
operation of the District Labour Courts and appeals to the Labour Court. Thus, social 
partners collectively agreed to repeal the 1992 Act and replace it with the current 
Labour Act, 2007, which envisages an easily accessible, simple, quick and user-
friendly Act that is sufficiently flexible to deal with various types of disputes by 
creating an independent (in its functionaries), legitimate and impartial system of 
labour dispute resolution.53 The Labour Act, 2007 was passed to give effect to the 
constitutional commitment to promote and maintain the welfare of the people of 
Namibia, as proclaimed in Chapter 11 of the Constitution. The Act gives effect to this 
commitment through the promotion of sound labour relations and fair employment 
practices.54 In a similar vein, the Labour Act, 2007 contemplates the systematic 
prevention and resolution of labour disputes to be achieved through the established 
labour dispute resolution institutions discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
 
In South Africa, certain secondary objectives are achieved while fulfilling the purpose 
of the LRA as set out in section 1 of the Act. Brassey55 points out that one of these 
secondary objectives is the decriminalisation of labour law. This objective has its 
origin in the brief given to the drafting committee and is further contained in the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA. The Explanatory Memorandum makes it clear 
that the use of criminal law to enforce labour law and collective agreements violates 
international standards. Under this guidance, criminal sanctions in the LRA have 
52 (1998) 19 ILJ 1534 LC par 1539. 
53 LaRRi Labour Rights Report in Namibia 10. 
54 See Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.  
55 Brassey Commentary on the Labour Relations Act A1-4. 
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been replaced by self-regulation and enforcement through private law interventions, 
such as statutory arbitration, private arbitration and adjudication by the Labour 
Court.56 
 
In Namibia, both the repealed Labour Act of 1992 and the current Labour Act, 2007 
contains criminal provisions for the contravention of or failure to comply with various 
provisions of the Act.57 This is despite the Wiehahn Report-Namibia having 
established that there were serious problems relating to the prosecution of offenders 
under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1986. This situation clearly 
indicated the need to decriminalise labour law transgressions and to have such 
matters dealt with in a specialised court instead.58 The Wiehahn Report-Namibia 
recommended, for the purpose of the envisaged new labour dispensation, that any 
contravention of or failure to comply with the provisions of labour law be 
decriminalised and, instead, such contraventions be largely declared as unfair labour 
practices to fall under the jurisdiction of the proposed Labour Court. Despite this 
advice, the drafters of both the 1992 Act and the Labour Act, 2007 ignored this 
recommendation and allowed the inclusion of criminal provisions in the Act, adopted 
from the apartheid dispensation.  
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Act and the Labour Act, 2007 fall short of 
any explanation for such an inclusion. Criminal provisions in the Labour Act have 
proven impracticable and cumbersome to enforce. From the author’s personal 
experience,59 the Namibian Police and prosecutors have serious difficulties in 
enforcing and prosecuting labour related criminal cases reported by labour 
inspectors.  
 
  
56 Ibid.  
57 See Musukubili A Comparative Study of the Namibian Dispute Resolution (2.5.13) for a detailed 
illustration of all criminal provisions in the Labour Act, 2007. 
58 Wiehahn Report- Namibia 34. 
59 This comes from my experience in my position as Deputy Director of Labour Services. Many 
cases country wide, ranging from child labour to failure to comply with compliance orders, have 
not been prosecuted to date, despite being reported a number of years ago.    
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6.4 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE LABOUR COMMISSIONER AND THE 
CCMA 
 
The Labour Act, 2007 and the LRA both emphasise the quick and cost effective 
resolution of conflicts and disputes. The Labour Commissioner in Namibia and the 
CCMA in South Africa have been entrusted to promote and provide the framework for 
the effective and efficient resolution of labour disputes. The overall goal is to 
overcome the bottlenecks of the old systems, which included lengthy delays, and 
reducing the incidence of industrial actions, which were attributes of the apartheid 
dispensation, with the hope of moving from confrontation to cooperation.60 
 
The Labour Act, 2007 makes provision for the appointment of the Labour 
Commissioner,61 as well as the establishment of other labour dispute resolution 
institutions, such as the Labour Inspectorate62 and the Labour Court.63 In South 
Africa, the LRA created the CCMA64 as well as the dual level of the court systems.65 
The two institutions, the Labour Commissioner and the CCMA, takeover the roles 
played by the conciliation boards and District Labour Courts in Namibia and 
conciliation boards and the Industrial Court system in South Africa. They both bring 
about democratic solutions to conflicts, which are now resolved through 
communication and reaching agreements. In this new arena, the battleground is even 
and parties to a labour dispute are given the opportunity to see their dispute dealt 
with in a faster way, in a friendlier environment and with anticipated quicker results.66 
The emphasis is now on ADR through conciliation and arbitration, reserving the court 
system as a final option when all other attempts have failed to yield the desired 
outcome.67 
 
60 Bhorat et al An Analysis of the CCMA 8. 
61 Ss 120 and 121 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
62 Ss 124 and 125 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
63 Ss 115,116 and 117 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
64 S 112 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
65 See ss 151 and 167 of the LRA 66 of 1995.  
66 Ferreira “The CCMA: Its Effectiveness in Dispute Resolution in Labour Relations” 78. 
67 Ibid.   
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In Namibia, the Labour Commissioner is the head of the office responsible for labour 
dispute prevention and resolution.68 The Labour Commissioner is an individual 
appointed by the Minister of Labour in terms of the Public Service Act.69 The Labour 
Commissioner, although the Act refers to an individual, is an office with its domicile 
within the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. Consequently, all staff members, 
including conciliators and arbitrators, are government employees, thus creating a 
perception of a lack of independence. 
 
In South Africa, the LRA created the CCMA as an autonomous statutory body70 with 
legal personality or, in other words, as a juristic person.71 This is absent in Namibian 
legislation. However, although the CCMA is an independent institution, it is largely 
funded by the state, thereby creating doubts over its complete independence. There 
are no costs involved for referring a dispute to the Labour Commissioner or the 
CCMA. The Labour Commissioner assumes responsibility for conciliation and 
arbitration by virtue of his appointment and is obliged to report to the Minister of 
Labour on the activities of the office.72 It appears that the Committee for Dispute 
Prevention and Resolution, a tripartite structure,73 may exercise some level of 
supervision in the form of reviewing the performance of dispute resolution by the 
Labour Commissioner on a regular basis for the purpose reporting to the Labour 
Advisory Council.74 
 
In South Africa, the LRA clearly states that the CCMA is independent of the state, 
political parties, trade unions and employers’ organisations.75 It is governed by a 
governing body comprising of social partners representing organised labour, 
organised business and the state.76 
 
68 S 120 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
69 S 1 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11of 2007). 
70 S 113(2)(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
71 S 112 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
72 S 121(b)(e) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007).  
73 See s 101 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
74 S 100 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
75 S 113 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
76 S 116 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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The Committee for Dispute Prevention and Resolution in Namibia and the Governing 
Body in South Africa are more or less on par in terms of their functionaries and 
representative composition. Unlike the Director of the CCMA, who is a member of the 
governing body by virtue of his appointment, the Labour Commissioner is neither a 
member nor sits in on the meetings of the Committee for Dispute Prevention and 
Resolution. The CCMA director is appointed by the governing body based on his or 
her skills and experience, automatically holds the office of a senior commissioner77 
and is the equivalent of the Labour Commissioner in Namibia. The two heads of 
these offices are charged with the responsibility to manage the activities of their 
institutions, including supervising the performance of their staff. 
 
In Namibia, conciliators and arbitrators are the equivalent of the commissioners of 
the CCMA. Conciliators, arbitrators and commissioners are appointed either on a full-
time or part-time basis.78 However, unlike the CCMA commissioners who are 
appointed by the governing body, conciliators and arbitrators in Namibia are 
appointed by the Minister of Labour on the recommendation of the Committee for 
Dispute Prevention and Resolution. Full-time conciliators and arbitrators in Namibia 
hold designated portfolios in terms of the public service hierarchy. They are either 
junior conciliators or arbitrators, or chiefs or principals, depending on their level of 
appointment in the public service. Namibian labour legislation does not make 
provision for convening arbitrators, unlike full-time senior commissioners in the 
CCMA who are tasked with monitoring and are responsible, together with the 
registrar, for the allocation of cases in their jurisdictional provinces.79 
 
In Namibia, it is incumbent on the Labour Commissioner alone to allocate cases to 
conciliators and arbitrators to resolve referred disputes.80 However, the allocation is 
optional as he may choose to either allocate a case or conciliate and arbitrate it 
himself.81 The Labour Commissioner’s functions may, however, be delegated to any 
individual employed in the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. For this reason, this 
study investigates methods of improving the Labour Commissioner’s service delivery 
77 S 118(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
78 See ss 82(2) and 85(4) of the Labour Act, 2007 and s 117 of the LRA 66 of 1995.  
79 Van Rensburg Participation and Progress 10-10. 
80 See ss 82(3) and 85(5) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007).  
81 S 121(c) and (d) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
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through the delegation of powers and functions to regional principal conciliators and 
arbitrators. 
 
Independence and impartiality are the key attributes required of arbitrators and 
CCMA commissioners in the execution of their functions.82 Although Brassey83 
argues that the CCMA is largely funded by the taxpayers, making it partially 
independent, it is not the funding that determines the independence of the CCMA, 
but rather the fact that it is run by an autonomous governing body. The Explanatory 
Memorandum to the LRA explains independence of the state to mean, “that save as 
otherwise provided under the LRA,84 the decision of the CCMA should not be in any 
way fettered or controlled by the Minister of Labour or any other State official”. This is 
the essence of independence: being free from any political influence in decision-
making. 
 
In Namibia, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Act, 2007, states that full-
time arbitrators will be public servants. Therefore, section 2 of the Public Service 
Act85 refers to the role of the public service as “prompt execution of government 
policy and directive”. To this end, reference was made to the Mostert case (without 
any citation), where the Court held that magistrates who were then public servants 
were obliged to execute government policies and directives that infringed upon their 
independence as judicial officers. The Explanatory Memorandum further refers to 
section 85(5) of the Labour Act that addresses this potential constitutional problem by 
guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of arbitrators despite any other law, 
including section 2 of the Public Service Act by implication. However, to address the 
independence of judicial officers, magistrates are no longer public servants and are 
now employed under the Magistrates’ Commission, an independent commission 
funded by the state. Since the inception of the Labour Act, 2007, arbitrators have 
taken over the functions performed by magistrates in the District Labour Courts, but 
in a different fashion. 
 
82 See s 85(6) of the Labour Act, 2007 and s 117(2)(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
83 Brassey Commentary on the Labour Relations Act A1-2.  
84 S 114(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
85 Act No13 of 1995. 
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It is evident from their respective statutes that the functions of the Labour 
Commissioner and the CCMA are similar in nature. Their paramount functions 
include the conciliation and arbitration of labour disputes, and providing training in 
respect of dispute prevention and resolution. See Chapters Three (3.14) and Four 
(4.7) for a full description of these functions.   
 
6.5 CONCILIATION OF LABOUR DISPUTES  
 
The principles of conciliation discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four, which 
include mediation in disputes, conducting fact-finding and making an advisory award 
if it enhances the settlement of the dispute, are similar in Namibian and South African 
systems. In Namibia, the original Act had a determination provision permitting 
conciliators to determine disputes at conciliation meetings.86 The Labour Court has 
since ruled that conciliation is not a court within the meaning of article 12(1) of the 
Namibian Constitution. Consequently, Damaseb JP inferred that conciliation 
proceedings lack the trappings of a court or tribunal. Therefore, it is merely an 
avenue to resolve labour disputes where the conciliator does not have the 
competence to make a legally binding award against any party to a conciliation 
meeting.87 
 
South Africa holds the same view: that a conciliating commissioner has no 
adjudicative or decision-making power and consequently has no power to make a 
final and binding award.88 As is now the position in Namibia, the conciliating 
commissioner’s function is limited solely to assisting the parties to settle their dispute 
without exerting force on them.89 
 
  
86 See s 3 of the Labour Amendment Act, 2 of 2007.  
87 Purity Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao par 29. 
88 Govindjee Labour Dispute Resolution 223. 
89 Grogan Workplace Law 444. 
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6.5.1 REFERRAL  
 
In Namibia, the dispute must be referred to the Labour Commissioner on Form LC 21 
after serving copies on the other party to the dispute.90 This is similar to the South 
African process where the referring party must complete and sign LRA Form 7:1 and 
serve copies of the referral document on the other party to the dispute.91 In both 
respects, proof of service is required on filing the referral with the Labour 
Commissioner or with the CCMA. The difference, however, is that in Namibia the 
proof of service must be commissioned by the Namibian Police.  
 
In Namibia, collective bargaining disputes, commonly known as interest disputes, 
must be referred to the Labour Commissioner within one year after the dispute 
arose.92 In South Africa, 30 days is required for dismissal disputes, while the 
prescribed time for acting on unfair labour practice disputes is 90 days.93 
Discrimination disputes must be referred within six months of the dispute arising.94 
 
After proper referral has been made, the Labour Act, 2007 and the LRA contain 
relatively similar provisions requiring the dispute to be conciliated within 30 days of 
the referral unless the parties have agreed to extend the period.95 
 
6.5.2 ATTENDANCE AND REPRESENTATION 
 
In Namibia and South Arica, all the parties to a properly referred dispute are required 
to attend the conciliation meeting in person unless they have instructed permitted 
representatives to appear on their behalf. Where the parties do not appear, the 
conciliator96 in Namibia or the commissioner in South Africa97 has the discretion to 
dismiss the matter, postpone it or continue in the absence of the defaulting party. In 
90 S 82(7) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
91 CCMA Rule 4(1). 
92 S 82(8) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
93 S 191 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
94 S 10(2) of the EEA 55 of 1998. 
95 See ss 133(1) and 135(1) and (2) of the LRA 66 of 1995 and see also ss 82(10)(a) and (b) of 
the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007).  
96 See s 83 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
97 CCMA rule 10. 
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Namibia, prior to the Labour Amendment Act 2 of 2012, the conciliator was 
empowered to determine the matter. This concept of determination had no 
descriptive meaning, leaving it to conciliators to assume an arbitral role, thereby 
making binding decisions at this meeting. In the wake of the Purity Manganese (Pty) 
Ltd v Tjeripo Katzao decision, this provision has been deleted from the Act. 
 
In Namibia and South Africa respectively, conciliators and commissioners have wider 
powers, although seldom used, to subpoena any person to give evidence, to 
administer an oath and to question a witness. In Namibia, failure to comply with 
requests made by the conciliator constitutes a criminal offence and the offender may 
be liable for a fine not exceeding N$10,000, may be imprisoned, or both.98 In South 
Africa, conciliators’ duties extend to inspecting documents and entering premises. 
However, parties cannot be held criminally liable for failure to comply with the wishes 
of conciliators.  
 
Criminal liability resulting from failure to take an oath and giving evidence at a 
conciliation meeting could conceivably lead to an environment that fails to promote 
the voluntary settlement of collective bargaining (interest) disputes. The Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Labour Act does not provide any reason for such an intervention 
at the conciliation stage of a dispute. The intention of such a provision is unclear 
given that parties may have recourse to industrial action in case of non-settlement or 
may refer their dispute to arbitration by agreement.  
 
In respect of representation at conciliation meetings the LRA and Labour Act, 2007 
place limitations on representation to those officials authorised only by these 
statutes.99 In Namibia, legal representation and assistance from other undefined 
individuals100 is permitted by agreement of the parties and on the discretion of the 
conciliator, having considered various factors. In South Africa, no legal 
representation, including labour consultants or paralegals, is permitted at conciliation 
98 S 82(18) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
99 See ss 135(4) Schedule 7 Item 27 of the LRA 66 of 1995, now read with CCMA rule 25. In 
Namibia, see s 82(12) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007).  
100 S 82(13)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
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level.101 These individuals are excluded in the South African context as allowing legal 
representation at conciliation meetings turns proceedings legalistic and the process 
becomes expensive for ordinary parties to the dispute.102 
 
6.5.3 CERTIFICATE OF OUTCOME AND ENFORCEMENT      
 
The Labour Act, 2007103 and the LRA104 require the conciliator and the commissioner 
to issue a certificate of outcome at the conclusion of the conciliation meeting. In both 
cases, the certificate must state whether the dispute has been resolved or remains 
unresolved. Where the dispute is resolved, the conciliator or the commissioner may 
draft the settlement agreement or may leave it to the parties to do so. The settlement 
agreement must be signed by both parties to the dispute, thereby becoming binding 
on them. A signed agreement effectively becomes sufficient evidence of settlement 
of a dispute that a party had the right to refer to arbitration105 or the Labour Court.106 
 
Once reduced to writing and signed by the parties, both in the South African and 
Namibian systems, the agreement becomes proof of full and final settlement of the 
dispute properly referred to the Labour Commissioner or the CCMA. Where a 
certificate of non-resolution of the dispute is issued and in the absence of an 
agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration, such a deadlock outcome satisfies the 
condition for legitimate industrial action.107 However, where the parties agree to refer 
the dispute to arbitration they forfeit their right to industrial action. 
 
In South Africa, a settlement agreement may be converted to an arbitration award by 
agreement of the parties or on application by a party,108 thereby acquiring the 
enforcement status of a usual arbitration award. Moreover, the parties may apply to 
the Labour Court for the settlement agreement to be made an order of the court.109 In 
101 CCMA Rule 25.  
102 Van Jaarsveld et al Principles of Labour Law 353. 
103 S 82(15) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
104 Ss 64(1)(a)(i), 135(5)(a) and 136(1)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
105 See ss 82(16) of the Labour Act, 2007 and ss 136(1) and 191(5)(b) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
106 See also Govindjee Labour Dispute Resolution 225.   
107 See ss 64(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995 and s 74(1)(c) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007).  
108 S 142A of the LRA 66 of 1996. 
109 S 158(1)(c) of the LRA 66 of 1996. 
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Namibia, the Labour Act, 2007 makes no provision for converting a settlement 
agreement to an award. However, the parties may apply to the Labour Court for the 
settlement agreement to be made an order of the court.110 
 
A further comparison shows that in South Africa, the issue of non-enforceability of 
settlement agreements, which appeared to have haunted the CCMA during its 
inception stage, has finally been resolved by the 2002 amendment to the LRA. In 
terms of that amendment, a settlement agreement can now be converted into an 
arbitration award in terms of section 142A, which gives it legally binding effects as if it 
were an arbitration award. 
 
By contrasts, in Namibia, the Labour Act, 2007 does not make explicit provisions for 
the status of settlement agreements reached at conciliation. Unlike its predecessor  
the repealed 1992 Act, where settlement agreement were statutory binding and had 
the force of law.111As a result, some parties agree to settle labour matters for the 
purposes of getting the matter out of their way only to fail to comply. This normally 
happens to frustrate the other party. To make matters worse, settlement agreements 
do not qualify as decisions and consequently cannot be enforced by Labour 
Inspectors. In essence, therefore, settlement agreements are meaningless, 
especially where one of the parties (usually the respondent) defies it for lack of 
punitive measures.112 
 
6.6 ARBITRATION OF LABOUR DISPUTES  
 
Chapters Two, Three and Four of this study clearly demonstrate that the arbitration 
process involves the settling of a labour dispute using an impartial third party. 
However, unlike conciliation where the third party plays a facilitative role to help the 
parties find common ground, an arbitrator settles the dispute by making a final and 
binding decision. This process is similar in form, content, and procedure in Namibia 
and South Africa. 
110 S 117(1)(h) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No.11 of 2007). 
111  See s 68 of the 1992 Act. 
112  IInane The efficacy of settlement agreements made under the Labour Act 11 of 2007: A 
dissertation submitted in the partial fulfillment of the requirements of Bachelor of Laws Degree 
(2012) 22. 
318 
                                                             
 In both respects, arbitrators and commissioners are given the carte blanche to 
conduct arbitration proceedings in the manner that they consider appropriate. The 
reason for the wider scope provided is to determine the dispute fairly and quickly, 
thereby dealing with the substantial merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal 
formalities.113 These provisions are the same in Namibia and South Africa. This 
suggests that, since the LRA was enacted in 1995, Namibia copied these provisions 
from the LRA verbatim. The Labour Act, 2007 was promulgated in 2007, having been 
initially drafted with the help of experts from South Africa. 
 
Beyond this scope given to arbitrators and commissioners in arbitration, the Labour 
Act, 2007 and the LRA do not provide any further details or guidance on how to 
conduct arbitration.114 Instead, it is secondary literature and the courts that have 
developed useful guidelines for the application of labour law.115 
 
6.6.1. REFERRAL, SET DOWN AND APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS AND 
COMMISSIONERS  
 
In Namibia, referral of disputes to arbitration is done in the same manner as referrals 
to conciliation. The referring party is required to complete Form LC 21, providing the 
required details pertaining to the dispute and the provision of the Labour Act that 
gave rise to the dispute. The duty is on the referring party to serve a copy of the 
referral to the opposing party to the dispute before filing the referral with the Labour 
Commissioner. Dismissal disputes in Namibia must be referred within six months 
from the date on which action arose.116 In South Africa, a dismissal dispute must be 
referred to the CCMA within 30 days of dismissal or of final date of dismissal.117 
While the LRA118 creates a possibility for late referral of disputes for good cause 
shown, the Labour Act, 2007 does not provide for such a possibility, save for the 
113 See s 86(7)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007) and s 138(1) of the LRA 66 
of 1995. 
114 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 140. 
115 See for example in South Africa, Nairaindath v CCMA & others (2000) 21 ILJ (LC) and in 
Namibia, Roads Contractors Company v Nambahu par 32.  
116 S 86(2)(a) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
117 S 191(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
118 S 191(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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rules of the Labour Commissioner.119 This provision in the rules of the Labour 
Commissioner appears to be in conflict with a recent Labour Court judgment.120 The 
Court held that if a dispute is referred to the Labour Commissioner after the expiry of 
the six-month period, the referral is out of time and, in fact, prescribed in terms of 
section 82 of the Labour Act, 2007. Consequently, the Court concluded that the 
Labour Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute because doing so 
was equal to acting ultra vires. In this case, the Court did not refer to the possibility 
for condonation created by the rules of the Labour Commissioner, which is absent in 
the enabling statute. One can only assume that this failure is the result of the omitted 
condonation provision in the Labour Act, 2007. 
 
In Namibia, set-down of a dispute takes place only if the Labour Commissioner is 
satisfied with the referral.121 This provision is similar to the provision in the LRA of 
South Africa.122 Thereafter, the Labour Commissioner will give the parties at least 14 
days’ notice123 of the date of the arbitration hearing, while in South Africa the parties 
are entitled to at least 21 days’ notice.124 
 
In Namibia, parties have little say, if any, in the appointment of an arbitrator. It is the 
sole function of the Labour Commissioner, except where delegated,125 to appoint an 
arbitrator.126 In South Africa, it is the responsibility of the CCMA to appoint an 
arbitrator, except where there is an objection to the conciliation – arbitration (con-arb) 
process, in which case parties may give input regarding the proposed arbitrator.  
 
6.6.2 CONCILIATION-ARBITRATION  
 
In Namibia, con-arb was introduced with the enactment of the current Labour Act, 
2007. In terms of the Act, all disputes referred to the Labour Commissioner must first 
119 Rule 10 read with rule 28 of the rules of the Labour Commissioner.  
120 Standard Bank Namibia v Mouton par 9. 
121 S 86(3) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
122 See Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 129.  
123 Rule 15 of the Rules of the Labour Commissioner. 
124 CCMA rule 21. 
125 S 122 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
126 S 85(5) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No11 of 2007). 
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go through the conciliation process before being referred for arbitration. The only 
exception to this provision is in instances where the dispute was already conciliated. 
A practical example of this is in interest disputes where the parties agree to refer 
such a dispute to arbitration after a failed attempt at conciliation.127 Section 85(5) of 
the Labour Act, 2007 reads: 
 
“unless the dispute has already been conciliated, the arbitrator must attempt to resolve 
the dispute through conciliation before beginning the arbitration” 
 
For the above reason, the Labour Court128 held that it is a requirement that the same 
arbitrator must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation and only if that 
process fails to produce the desired results, arbitration will commence. The Court 
further held that any argument against con-arb holds no merits and must be rejected.  
 
In South Africa, con-arb is a relatively new phenomenon that was introduced with the 
2002 LRA Amendments. It was intended to expedite the resolution of a certain limited 
range of disputes following its exclusion from the original Act. This provision allows 
specific disputes to proceed automatically to arbitration where conciliation efforts 
prove futile.129 As in Namibia, the appointed arbitrating commissioner may be the 
same commissioner who attempted to resolve the dispute through conciliation. This 
is optional and not peremptory as in Namibia, thus allowing the parties to the dispute 
the opportunity to object to the same commissioner acting as an arbitrator.130 
However, it is submitted that whatever the merits of the objection may be, the 
commissioner should not withdraw from the arbitration on the request of the parties 
unless there are convincing grounds for a recusal.131 To reinforce this argument, the 
Court has held that, once a commissioner is appointed to hear the matter, he has an 
obligation to discharge and comply with his duties without any fear or favour.132 The 
same principle is applied in Namibia. There is no provision for parties to object to the 
con-arb process being conducted by the same arbitrator. Where such an objection is 
raised, the arbitrator is required to rule it in limine and proceed with the arbitration.  
127 S 82(16) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
128 Old Mutual Life Assurance Company Namibia Limited v Linda Schultz parr 15 and 16.   
129 Brand et al Labour Dispute Resolution 260. 
130 S 136(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
131 Brassey Commentary on the LRA A7-51. 
132 SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson 2000 (3) SA 705 CC at 713 par 11. 
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 Con-arb procedures automatically apply to the following types of dispute without 
having to inform the parties of the CCMA’s intention to follow this process:133 
 
(a) the dismissal of an employee for reasons relating to probation; 
 
(b) an unfair labour practice relating to probation; and  
 
(c) any other dismissal or unfair labour practice dispute if none of the parties 
object to con-arb.  
 
The CCMA is required to give the parties at least 14 days’ notice of the date of the 
con-arb. If they wish to object, parties may file a written objection no less than seven 
days prior to the scheduled date of the con-arb meeting.134 
 
6.6.3 ATTENDANCE AND REPRESENTATION   
 
Generally, all parties are required to attend arbitration hearings in person, unless a 
postponement was applied for and granted; this principle applies in both Namibia and 
South Africa. Representation in Namibia is governed by the same principles 
applicable at conciliation discussed in 6.6.2 above. Whereas legal representation in 
Namibia is by agreement of the parties and at the discretion of the arbitrators, legal 
representation is permitted by CCMA rule 25(1)(b) on condition that such a legal 
practitioner is admitted to practice as an advocate or attorney in the Republic of 
South Africa. However, legal representation is not automatic in disputes relating to 
the conduct or capacity of the employee.135 In such disputes, the consent of the 
parties and the properly applied discretion of the commissioner are required.  
 
 
 
 
133 S 191(5A) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
134 CCMA rule 17. 
135 CCMA rule 25(2)(b). 
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6.6.4 ARBITRATION AWARD  
 
The Labour Act, 2007 prescribes the arbitrator to issue an award within 30 days of 
the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings. The award must set out brief reasons 
for the decision made and must be signed by the arbitrator.136 This provision is the 
same in South Africa, but the award must be made within 14 days.137 This difference 
is significant as the Namibian system allows arbitrators adequate time to produce 
high quality, informed awards, while at the CCMA the constrained time factor may, to 
a certain extent, compromise the quality of the award. 
 
However, In South Africa, the LRA has provided remedial measures where an award 
may be issued beyond the prescribed time limit. The reason for such a provision is 
that the issuing of the award is seen as directory and not peremptory.138 To this end, 
the CCMA director may, on good cause shown by the commissioner, extend the 
period within which the award is issued by the commissioner.139 Namibia has no 
provision for the extension of an award, but it is likely that where there is a justified 
extension, this can be a reason to nullify the proceedings at review. There have been 
instances where awards were not issued within the prescribed time, but this is an 
exception to the norm. 
 
In making awards, commissioners and arbitrators in Namibia are given the scope 
within which they should make their decisions. In the case of the CCMA, the following 
awards may be issued: 
 
An award:140 
 
(a) that gives effect to any collective agreement; 
(b) that gives effect to the provisions and primary objective of the Act; and  
(c) that includes or is in the form of a declaratory order. 
 
136 S 86(18) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
137 See s 138(7) of the LRA 66 of 1995.  
138 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 154. 
139 S 138(8) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
140 S 138(9) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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Unlike the above abstract provisions of the LRA, the Labour Act, 2007 in Namibia 
provides for a wider scope within which an appropriate award may be issued. These 
include:141 
 
(a) an interdict, which may be an interim or a final prohibitory or mandatory 
interdict, or as may be sought on urgent basis;142 
 
(b) an order directing performance to remedy a wrong; 
 
(c) an order of reinstatement of an employee; 
 
(d) an award of compensation; and  
 
(e) an order of cost, although rarely awarded, which applies if a party or a person 
who represented that party in the arbitration proceedings acted in a frivolous 
and vexatious manner.143 
 
The cost order is similar in South Africa, although the statutory provision contained in 
section 138(10) of the LRA has been repealed and this is now regulated by CCMA 
rule 39. 
 
In Namibia and South Africa respectively, monetary compensation awards 
automatically accrue interest from the date of the award, unless the arbitrator rules 
otherwise. The interest is premised on a similar enabling statute, the Prescribed 
Rates of Interest Act.144 In South Africa, the liability for interest ends when the debtor 
makes an unconditional offer to pay,145 while in Namibia the interest accumulates 
from the date of judgment or award to the date of payment.146 
 
141 S 86(16) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
142 Parker Labour Law in Namibia 186. The author provides a useful argument of the nature of 
interdicts capable of being made by arbitrators.   
143 S 86(16) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007).  
144 Act No 55 of 1975. 
145 Top v Top Reisen CC (2006) 27 ILJ 1948 LC. 
146 See JB Cooling and Refrigeration CC v Kasho Kavendjua par 32.  
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In South Africa, the arbitration award becomes final and binding unless such an 
award is advisory, whereas in Namibia the award is only said to be binding on the 
parties, but not final, as the Labour Act makes no provision for this action. In South 
Africa, the CCMA director certifies the award, thereby making it enforceable.147 
Alternatively, it may be filed with the Labour Court and consequently become an 
order of the Court, earning the same status of enforcement as any other court order. 
In Namibia, the Labour Commissioner does not certify the award, however it accrues 
binding status immediately at issue. For this reason, any affected party or the Labour 
Commissioner, at his discretion, may file the award with the Labour Court, thereby 
making it an order of the Court.  
 
6.6.5 REINSTATEMENT AND COMPENSATION AWARDS 
 
In South Africa, reinstatement or re-employment is the primary remedy provided by 
the LRA. The Act requires arbitrators or the Labour Court to first order reinstatement 
or re-employment where an unfair dismissal decision is reached. The only exception 
is where the employee does not wish to be reinstated, the circumstances surrounding 
the dismissal makes the continued employment relationship intolerable, and several 
other factors.148 In Namibia, there is no preference; however, reinstatement or re-
employment is preferred over compensation. 
 
Parker149 provides a detailed explanation of the difference between re-employment 
and reinstatement. The author points out that reinstatement means putting the 
employee back in the same position he held before the dismissal.150 In TransNamib 
Holdings Ltd v Engelbrecht,151 the Supreme Court has provided yet another clear 
distinction between reinstatement and re-employment, where the former relates to 
returning to an identical job, while the latter relates to returning to a similar job that is 
comparable to the position the employee held prior to the dismissal. However, the 
147 S 143(1) and (3) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
148 S 193 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
149 Parker Labour Law in Namibia (2012) 88-193. 
150 See Parker Labour Law in Namibia 188 citing the of Chegetu Municipality v Manjora 1997 (1) 
SA 662 (ZSC) and the English Case of Powel Duffryn Ltd v Rhodes (1946) 1 ALL ER 666. 
151 2005 NR 372 (SC) at D. 
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Court cautioned that the reinstatement order must be exercised judicially, whether by 
an arbitrator or by a court.152 
 
In South Africa, where compensation is awarded, the LRA places a limitation on 
compensation to guide commissioners or the Labour Court.153 In this respect, the 
LRA provides as follows: 
 
- in an unfair dismissal, where the employer failed to prove the fair reason for 
dismissal or where a fair procedure was not followed, the award of 
compensation must be just and equitable. However, it may not be more than 
12 months’ remuneration on the date of dismissal;  
 
- automatically unfair dismissal also requires just and equitable compensation 
equivalent to 24 months’ remuneration, calculated at the employee’s rate of 
remuneration; 
 
- the award in the case of unfair labour practice is equal to not more than 12 
months’ remuneration.  
 
In all the above respects, the compensation award is additional to any other benefits 
the employee is entitled to in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of 
employment. It does not substitute any other entitlements.154 In Namibia, severance 
pay in lieu of unfair dismissal is equally not a substitute to any other benefits that the 
employee is entitled to.155 
 
In Namibia, section 86(15)(e) of the Labour Act, 2007 empowers the arbitrator to 
make an award of compensation. Unlike in South Africa, the compensation provision 
in Namibia does not go beyond the mere issuing of the award. The Labour Act, 2007 
therefore does not provide any guideline to give effect to the meaning of section 
152 Pupkewitz Holding (Pty) Ltd v Petrus Mutamuka and others Case No LCA 47/2007 (reportable). 
153 S 194 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
154 S 195 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
155 Ss 35(1) and (5) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
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86(15) of the Act. At the implementation stages of the Labour Act, 2007 this caused 
serious inconsistencies in awarding compensation for unfair dismissal.   
 
In the absence of the statutory provision thereto, the Namibian Labour Court has 
developed a tremendous body of guidelines, which were probably unknown to some 
arbitrators at the commencement of the Labour Act. In Pupkewitz & Son (Pty ) Ltd v 
Kankar156 the Court interpreted and applied the provisions of section 46(1)(a)(iii) of 
the repealed 1992 Act. The Court held that in calculating the amount of 
compensation payable to an employee dismissed unfairly, considerations must be 
made for the loss suffered or the amount the dismissed employee would have been 
paid had he not been dismissed. Parker157 splits this judgment into two categories. 
First, that compensation should be an amount equal to the remuneration that the 
employee would have been paid had he not been dismissed. Second, an amount 
equal to any losses a dismissed employee suffered resulting from the dismissal. 
Parker submits that there is no reason why such categorisation of compensation 
cannot apply to compensation under the Labour Act, 2007.  
 
In Pupkewitz Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Petrus Mutanuka &others,158 Parker J held that the 
calculation of compensation must be related to a determined period and the amount 
easily ascertainable. The Court awarded compensation of various amounts equal to 
the remuneration of the respondents at the time of dismissal, but over varying 
periods.159 
 
Effectively, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect and given the role 
of the Court in interpreting legislation, thereby creating clear meaning of the statute, 
this Court judgment now acts as a guide to arbitrators in Namibia. However, the 
judgment does not place any limitation on, but rather requires compensation for, the 
requisite losses suffered, irrespective of how long it took to resolve the dispute. 
 
156 1997 NR 70. 
157 Parker Labour Law in Namibia 195. 
158 Case NoLCA 47/2007(reportable).  
159 Pupkweitz Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Petrus Mutanuka & others par 21.   
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The Court further stated that where compensation of an equivalent to losses suffered 
is considered, it is not necessary for an employee to lead evidence to establish the 
amount involved. However, where compensation includes losses of certain benefits, 
such as medical aid, the employee must lead evidence to establish the losses 
involved.160 
 
6.7 THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR INSPECTORATE IN LABOUR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
 
Internationally, the work of labour inspectors is governed by the Labour Inspection 
Convention.161In terms of this convention, the Labour Inspectorate is responsible for 
making the arrangements required for ensuring that employers and workers comply 
with labour laws and regulations. Compliance with labour laws is secured through 
interventions, such as informing and educating workers and employers on the 
contents of labour law and regulations, advising parties on how to comply with legal 
requirements, enforcing labour law as may be appropriate and reporting on the 
various details and shortcomings in the law and its application.162 
 
It should be pointed out that neither Namibia nor South Africa has ratified the Labour 
Inspection Convention. Nevertheless, Namibia and South Africa have undoubtedly 
modelled their Labour Inspectorate terms of reference, or frameworks, on this 
convention. For the purpose of this section, the role of the Labour Inspectorate in 
dispute resolution and enforcement of arbitration awards is investigated instead of its 
overall role. 
 
In Namibia, the Labour Inspectorate is seen as one of the means to prevent labour 
disputes, to improve working conditions and to protect workers. The Labour 
Inspectorate emphasises compliance and cooperation rather than strict enforcement 
and penalties.163 Further, industrial disputes can be taken directly to the Labour 
Inspectorate as the first step in dispute resolution. Labour inspectors are empowered 
160 Pep Stores (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd v Lyambo and others 2001 NR 211 LCat 223F.  
161 81 of 1947. 
162 Heron and Van Noord National Strategy on Labour Dispute Prevention and Settlement 17. 
163 See Preamble to the Namibian National Labour Inspection Policy (GRN) Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare.  
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by the Labour Act, 2007 to assist any person in resolving a labour complaint.164 In 
doing so, they must endeavour to resolve the complaint or dispute. They may only 
refer the dispute to the Labour Commissioner for formal conciliation and arbitration if 
their intervention fails.165 In South Africa, besides promoting, monitoring and 
enforcing compliance with employment law,166 labour inspectors may investigate 
complaints made to them.167 The use of compliance orders168 in cases of non-
compliance is but one of the extreme forms of intervention provided for in labour 
legislation; a similar provision exists in Namibian labour law. Therefore, labour 
inspectors in South Africa play a minor role, if any, in labour dispute resolution. 
 
It is argued that although labour inspectors may perform mediation services as in 
Namibia, this mediation could be perceived as tainting the formal conciliation process 
and could add an element of confusion to the matter as parties receive a mixture of 
mediation and law enforcement.169 This could be one of the reasons why South 
Africa chooses to limit its Labour Inspectorate services to labour law monitoring and 
enforcement rather than active involvement in labour dispute resolution. 
 
However, there are mixed international views on whether labour inspectors must be 
involved in labour dispute resolution.170 The Labour Inspection Recommendation171 
suggests that the function of labour inspectors should not include conciliation or 
arbitration. This is the result of conciliation and inspection being seen as incompatible 
with the main functions and obligations of labour inspectors, particularly where they 
must be seen by the parties to be impartial in the exercise of their duties.172 This 
contradiction is further exacerbated by the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) 
Recommendation,173 which recognises the possibility of labour inspectors acting as 
conciliators, at least on a temporary basis.  
164 S 125(2)(i) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007).  
165 S 125(ii) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
166 S 64(1) of the BCEA 75 of 1997.  
167 S 64(1)(c) of the BCEA 75 of 1997. 
168 See 69 of the BCEA 75 of 1997 and see also s 126 of the Namibian Labour Act, 2007. 
169 Heron et al National Strategy on Labour Dispute Prevention Settlement 18.  
170 Von Richthofen Labour Inspection: A Guide to the Profession (2004) 32. 
171 No 81 of 1947. 
172 Von Richhofen Labour Inspection: A Guide to the Profession 32. 
173 No 133 of 1969. 
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 Heron174 provides what seems to be the ideal solution to the problem. The author 
points out that the greatest contribution of the Labour Inspectorate to labour dispute 
prevention and resolution springs from improved inspection work. Labour inspectors’ 
visits at workplaces should focus on risk enterprises where there are common 
workers’ complaints. By doing so, they could solve many of the labour problems on 
the spot, thereby preventing complaints arising in the first place and limiting or 
minimising the need for conciliation through the Labour Commissioner or the 
CCMA.175 
 
6.8 ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 
 
Section 3 of the Labour Inspection Convention reads: 
 
“to secure the enforcement of the legal provisions relating to the conditions of work and 
the protection of workers while engaged in their work, such provisions relating to hours 
of work … and other connected matters, in so far as such provisions are enforceable 
by labour inspectors”. 
 
The ILO has interpreted the above provision to include, apart from enforcing labour 
legislation, the enforcement of arbitration awards and collective agreements that 
have the force of law.176 
 
Given this ILO provision, the Namibian Labour Act, 2007177 empowers labour 
inspectors to enforce arbitration awards. In terms of section 90 of the Labour Act, 
2007, parties to an arbitration award may to apply to a labour inspector to enforce an 
award. Upon receipt of an application, the inspector must take the necessary steps to 
enforce the award, including the institution of execution proceedings on behalf of that 
person. In South Africa, labour inspectors do not play any role in the enforcement of 
arbitration awards.  
 
174 Heron et al National Strategy on Labour Dispute Prevention and Settlement 18. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Von Richthofen Labour Inspection: A Guide to the Profession 32. 
177 S 125(2)(g) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
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The Labour Inspectorate in Namibia, with the assistance of the Government Attorney, 
has developed operational forms to enforce arbitration awards. In a case of failure to 
voluntarily comply with the award and after the award has been made an order of 
court, the applicant must inform the labour inspector that there is an arbitration award 
and that, despite the respondent’s knowledge thereof, it remains outstanding.178 
Thereafter, the labour inspector takes the appropriate actions required to enforce the 
award. Enforcement interventions include, in the case of a compensation award, 
instructing the Deputy Sherriff to obtain a writ of execution and, in the case of a 
reinstatement award, instructing the Government Attorney to file for contempt of court 
proceedings in the Labour Court. Essentially, the government takes the responsibility 
of ensuring that arbitration awards are properly enforced and fully complied with at no 
cost to the applicants. In South Africa, while the methods of enforcement are similar, 
the Government Attorney plays no role in the enforcement of arbitration awards. 
 
The writ of execution intervention in Namibia has proven to work and yields results. 
This is because the Deputy Sheriff is willing to execute most writs obtained, based on 
payment by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. However, enforcing 
reinstatement awards after obtaining judgment for contempt of court remains one of 
the greatest challenges to the enforcement of arbitration awards in Namibia. 
Consequently, employees with reinstatement awards are left in the dark, causing 
them to lose confidence in the dispute resolution system. At the time of writing, no 
such application had ever been brought before the Labour Court. The Government 
Attorney attributes this to the technical nature of and cumbersome process involved 
in securing conviction. This is one of the major factors addressed in the conclusion 
and recommendations section of this thesis and an improved mechanism for the 
enforcement of reinstatement orders is suggested.  
 
6.9 VARIATION AND RESCISSION               
 
Variation and rescission was discussed in Chapters Three (3.7.6) and Four (4.8.8). 
From those discussions, it is apparent in the provisions of the Labour Act, 2007 and 
LRA that variation and rescission are similar in content and substance, and in the 
178 Chiloane v Nhlumato Agricultural Project [2000] 4 BLLR 392 LC par 14. 
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procedure for seeking rescission of the decision made. Given these similarities, it is 
not appropriate to continue to compare the provisions thereto.  
 
6.10 BARGAINING COUNCILS 
 
South African bargaining councils have their origin in the industrial councils that 
operated under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, which underwent numerous 
amendments, including the 1937 and 1956 versions, in an attempt to improve the 
Act’s operational efficiency. Against this backdrop, the LRA has given recognition to 
bargaining councils in the new South Africa. They are formed on a voluntary basis by 
registered trade unions and registered employers’ organisations for given sectors or 
areas.179 Namibia has no similar provisions for bargaining councils. However, some 
industries, such as the security, construction and farming sectors, have formed 
“sectoral bargaining forums”. Although they are not recognised in legislation, these 
forums operate within the scope of sections 64 and 70 of the Labour Act, 2007 by 
implication and, as a result, are recognised by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare. In Namibia and South Africa, industry bargaining forums and bargaining 
councils respectively have the same ultimate goals, namely defining and 
implementing conditions of employment in a given sector.180 
 
Governing councils in South Africa are required to develop a constitution and register 
it with the Registrar at the Department of Labour. Thereafter, they may be accredited 
by the governing body of the CCMA to perform any of its statutory dispute resolution 
functions.181 In Namibia, no accreditation is required from any of the recognised 
tripartite bodies. All that is required from the industry bargaining forum is to inform the 
Ministry of Labour, which in most cases chairs the meetings of these forums as an 
independent third party.  
 
These industry bargaining forums in Namibia and bargaining councils in South Africa 
have the power to set minimum employment standards, such as guidelines relating to 
pension and other funds. To give effect to these conditions of employment, industry 
179 S 27 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
180 Brassey Commentary on the LRA A3-61.   
181 S 29 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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bargaining forums and bargaining councils have the authority to enter into and sign 
collective agreements, which are binding on the parties, and on request and in 
certain instances may be extended to non-parties by the Minister of Labour.182 Non-
parties may also voluntarily consent to the jurisdiction of the bargaining council, 
hence becoming bound by the collective agreement. The resultant collective 
agreements have the force of law once gazetted, thereby being policed by the parties 
themselves or by their appointed agents. In Namibia, labour inspectors and the 
parties to collective agreements play an enforcement role. 
 
The LRA in South Africa permits bargaining councils to establish dispute resolution 
procedures for resolving disputes arising from collective agreements.183 In Namibia, 
the Labour Act, 2007 requires every collective agreement, including those resulting 
from industry bargaining forums, to provide for a dispute resolution procedure to 
resolve any dispute about the interpretation, application or enforcement of the 
collective agreement.184 For the lack of a better alternative, most bargaining councils 
in South Africa have modelled their dispute resolution procedures on the CCMA 
rules.  
 
Industry bargaining forums in Namibia do not perform labour dispute resolution 
functions, except for referring deadlocked disputes to the statutory established 
dispute resolution machineries or to private arbitration. In South Africa, bargaining 
councils have arbitrating powers where they have been accredited, or they may 
appoint an accredited agency to perform those functions on their behalf. However, 
their dispute resolution powers are limited to matters of mutual interest specified in 
section 51, as read with section 28(1)(d), of the LRA. For this reason, other disputes 
are reserved for the CCMA.  
 
Overall, bargaining councils in South Africa promote self-governance or self-
regulation, are autonomous, and complement the work of the CCMA. Although 
182 Grogan Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution 46. See also s 71 of the Labour Act, 2007. 
(Act No 11 of 2007.  
183 S 51(9) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
184 S 73(1) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
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Namibia is a developing country with few industries, a similar model could clear the 
backlog of cases in the Labour Commissioner’s office if given statutory recognition.  
 
6.11 PRIVATE ARBITRATION  
 
Private arbitration is provided for in Namibia in terms of section 91 of the Labour Act, 
2007 as an alternative and voluntary process in place of the compulsory arbitration 
made available by the state. In Namibia and South Africa respectively, private 
arbitration is regulated by the same law, the Arbitration Act.185 The form and process 
of private arbitration is similar in both countries and premised on the arbitration 
agreement concluded by the parties to resolve their dispute. On this basis, the 
principles of private arbitration exclude the dictates of the Labour Act, 2007 and the 
LRA.186 
 
There are, however, differences in terms of popularity and usage of private 
arbitration, given its advantages and disadvantages. In Namibia, for example, private 
arbitration is seldom used due to the absence of a properly established and 
recognised private dispute settlement institution such as Tokiso Dispute Settlement 
in South Africa. Tokiso Dispute Settlement offers comprehensive ADR services that 
are said to be cost effective and user friendly, with legally enforceable outcomes.187 
Namibia does not have an equivalent. Until such time that an alternative institution to 
the Labour Commissioner is established in Namibia, little can be said about private 
arbitration in the country.  
 
Chapters Three (3.18) and Four (4.10) of this thesis provide a more complete 
description of the provisions of private arbitration in Namibia and South Africa 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
185 Act No 42 of 1965. 
186 Govindjee Labour Dispute Resolution 237.   
187 See Tokiso 2009 25 Part 6 Employment Law (advertorial page).   
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6.12 THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR COURTS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
In Namibia, the Labour Act, 2007 provides for the continuation of the Labour Court, 
created in terms of the repealed 1992 Labour Act,188 as a division of the High Court. 
Essentially, there has been no change to the structure and function of the Labour 
Court. Judges are assigned by the Judge President and are drawn from the ranks of 
judges serving in the High Court, either on a permanent basis or in acting capacities. 
In South Africa, the LRA establishes the Labour Court as a court of law and equity. It 
is a superior court of record with authority, inherent powers and standing in relation to 
matters under its jurisdiction, equal to a provisional division of the Supreme Court.189 
Unlike in Namibia, the Labour Court of South Africa has a dedicated Judge President 
and Deputy Judge President who are judges of the Supreme Court,190 while many 
other judges of the Labour Court must be judges of the High Court.191 There is a 
similar requirement in Namibia. 
 
In Namibia and South Africa respectively, the Labour Court is established as an 
avenue for the formal litigation of labour disputes and the development of 
jurisprudence in labour law.192 It is evident that Namibia has no separate dedicated 
Labour Court as exists in South Africa. The High Court sits as a Labour Court when 
determining labour related matters. It is therefore argued that such arrangements or 
practices tend to compromise labour issues, as they require specialisation and 
arbiters vested with specialised skills to handle specialised labour disputes.193 
 
In South Africa, Labour Court judges are specialist judges drawn from the legal 
profession and appointed on the advice of the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC) in consultation with the Minister of Justice.194 They are 
appointed because of their professional experience in and knowledge of labour 
188 S 115 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
189 S 151(1)-(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
190 S 153(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
191 S 153(6) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
192 Govindjee “Labour Dispute Resolution” 238. 
193 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution 14. 
194 S 152 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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law.195 The Labour Advisory Council in Namibia plays no role in the appointment of 
Judges of the Labour Court, although it was the recommendation of the Taskteam 
that developed the Labour Act, 2007 that the council should play a role. The 
appointment of judges in Namibia is at the discretion of the President of the Republic 
of Namibia on recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.196 
 
In terms of jurisdiction, the Labour Court in Namibia, although a division of the High 
Court, has exclusive jurisdiction to determine appeals and reviews, which are 
separate functions dedicated to this Court only.197 Chapter Three (3.20.1) provides a 
detailed jurisdictional discussion of the Labour Court in Namibia. In South Africa, the 
Labour Court also has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters under its 
jurisdiction, in terms of either the LRA or any other enabling law. However, the LRA 
provides for dual jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the High Court, a situation that 
does not exist in Namibia. This dual jurisdiction is in respect to fundamental rights 
enshrined in Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution, arising from employment 
and labour relations.198 Disputes of fundamental rights are adjudicated solely by the 
sitting Labour Court in Namibia and this responsibility is not shared with the High 
Court, although essentially the same Judges of the High Court presides over these 
matters.199 Besides the Labour Court in South Africa, the LRA provides an appeal tier 
to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC).200 The LAC has its own structure, and hears and 
determines all appeals against final judgments and final orders of the Labour Court. It 
has the power to decide any question of law reserved for it to decide.201 Namibia has 
no similar structure save for the Supreme Court, which is the final arbiter in all 
matters resulting from the Labour Court. 
 
 
 
 
195 S 153(6) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
196 Art 82 of the Namibian Constitution.  
197 S 117 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
198 S 157(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
199 S 7 of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
200 S 167 of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
201 S 173(1) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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6.12.1 APPEALS AGAINST ARBITRATION AWARDS   
 
Generally, appeals are associated with lengthy bureaucratic processes and delays. 
Nevertheless, Namibia has adopted an approach for appeals against arbitration 
awards, a practice that is absent in South Africa. The Namibian Labour Court is 
empowered to adjudicate appeals against arbitration awards.202 The purpose of this 
is to give effect to the constitutional right to a fair trial and includes arbitration 
hearings on the premise that arbitration is a tribunal for the purpose of resolving 
disputes as contemplated in terms of article 12(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution. In 
South Africa, the Constitutional Court (CC) has held that arbitration by the CCMA is 
an administrative action within the meaning of section 33 of the Constitution. 
However, the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(PAJA) do not apply to the reviews contemplated in section 145(2) of the LRA.203 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Act, 2007 provides that section 89(10) 
of the Act was devised to strengthen the power conferred on the Labour Court when 
setting aside the award of the arbitrator by empowering the Court to:  
 
(a) in case of an appeal, determine the dispute in the manner it considers 
appropriate; 
 
(b) refer it back to the arbitrator or direct that a new arbitrator be designated; or  
 
(c) make an appropriate order. 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum recognises the fact that arbitration is between the 
employer and trade union or employee directly involved in the dispute and that the 
decision of the arbitrator may be subject to appeal or review in the Labour Court. 
However, the Labour Court has held that if the discretion at the arbitration 
proceedings has been exercised on judicial grounds and for sound reasons that are 
without bias or caprice or the application of a wrong principle, the Labour Court will 
be very slow to intervene and substitute its decision. The Court requires the appellant 
202 S 117(1)(a)(ii) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
203 See Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines.  
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to show that the arbitration is wrong and that the decision ought to have been in his 
favour.204 
 
In South Africa, no appeal is allowed on the premise that common law appeals 
ordinarily stay the enforcement of an award, whereas a review application does not 
have the same effect,205 therefore allowing review only on limited grounds.206 The 
review approach of the Labour Court in South Africa is relative to the Namibian 
approach. The LRA provides wider powers to the Labour Court to correct the 
decision it condemns on review. In doing so, the Court may- 
 
- determine the dispute in a manner it considers appropriate; and  
 
- make an order it considers appropriate about the procedures to be followed 
to determine the dispute. 
 
An approach similar to that of Namibia is applicable in South Africa, where the Court 
held that it would not simply substitute its decision, unless exceptional circumstances 
exist.207 In setting aside the award, the Court exercises its discretion to remit the 
matter to the CCMA for a fresh decision, giving direction whether the same or a new 
arbitrator must hear it.208 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA clearly shows the intention of the 
legislature, which was to limit the power of the Labour Court to review only CCMA 
arbitration awards, thus prohibiting appeals against such awards, which was a 
practice condemned by the 1956 LRA.209 Fergus (2010)210 submits that in excluding 
204 Pupkewitz Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Petrus Mutanuka others par 14, see also Edgars Stores v Olivier 
and another.  
205 See Gruder v Gruder 1990 (4) SA 680 (CC) at 683 G-H. 
206 See for example Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines par 245 and Carephone v Marcus NO 
par 25. 
207 See SA Fibre Yarn Rings Ltd v CCMA & others.  
208 Brassey Labour Relations Act A7-9.  
209 Fergus “The Distinction Between Appeals and Review- Defining the Limits of the Labour Court’s 
Power to Review” (2010) 31 Industrial Law Journal 1556 p 1571. 
210 Ibid.  
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appeal provision from the LRA, the legislature sought to ensure that labour disputes 
were both expeditiously and efficiently resolved.  
 
In terms of common law, appeals generally tend to suspend the effects of awards. 
However, with this in mind, the Namibian Labour Act, 2007 adopted a progressive, 
different approach to mitigate such effects. As discussed in Chapter Three, the noting 
or filing of an appeal application does not necessarily suspend the effect of the 
arbitration award.211 The party seeking to suspend the binding effects of the 
arbitration award must apply for a separate stay order.212 However, the Court has 
held that before a stay order is granted, the applicant must have filed a bona fide 
appeal application as a requirement to stay the award. The application allows the 
Court to examine the prospect of success of such an appeal and not to permit a stay 
application as a delay tactic.213 
 
South Africa has the same practice, where the Labour Court has been vested with 
the power to stay the enforcement of the award pending their discretion on review.214 
Similarly, where the launching of a review application against the award does not 
suspend its operation, the Labour Court will invariably stay the execution of the 
award. The Court requires a special application to that effect,215 comparable to the 
process of obtaining a stay order in Namibia. 
 
An appeal to the Labour Court, as contemplated in the Labour Act, 2007, is an 
appeal premised on the record of proceedings limited to the evidence and 
information that was before the tribunal of first instance and is not a re-hearing in its 
true meaning of the words.216 This is different in South Africa, where, for instance, an 
aggrieved party to an award may not have the matter reheard by the Labour Court 
and the Court may not make a decision based on the evidence led at arbitration.217 
An appeal to the Labour Court in Namibia is limited to the question of law alone, 
211 S 89(6)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
212 S 89(7) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
213 Hardap Regional Council v Sankwasa James Sankwasa par 7.  
214 See s 145(3) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
215 See Olivier v University of Venda (2003) 24 ILJ 208 LC.  
216 Pupkewitz Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Petrus Mutanuka & others par 14.  
217 Fergus “The Distinction Between Appeals and Review- Defining the Limits of the Labour Court’s 
Power to Review” 1558.  
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without considering any additional factors. It is thus a requirement when filing an 
appeal to specify the ground of the appeal as the ground may not be changed or 
reconstructed later.218 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in South Africa has recently expressed great 
concern regarding the grounds for review, where Murphy AJA expressly stated that 
he could not imagine how many decisions have been wrong, but upheld as 
reasonable. The Court further stated that the ground for review based on 
reasonableness leaves aside the moral hazard of a message to commissioners that 
there is no need for them to get their decisions right. They may believe that acting 
reasonable is enough, despite the possibility of commissioners arriving at wrong 
decisions based on wrong facts. In the Court’s view, this is caused by not taking full 
or proper account of material evidence and errors in the application of the law, 
therefore failing to reach a legitimate decision because of not having properly applied 
their minds to the issues at hand and denying the parties a fair trial in the process.219 
The Court further pointed out that the hypothetical reward from limiting intervention to 
reviews based on reasonableness or rationality is dubious. On the contrary, the Court 
risks reducing the final adjudication of labour disputes to an exercise in semantics in 
pursuit of a perceived socially expedient advantage that is at best illusory. Moreover, 
the SCA referred to its experience in adjudicating reviews of awards issued in terms 
of the LRA and the controversy surrounding this as a demonstration of the 
requirement of substantive reasonableness, which is necessary to deal with 
obviously wrong awards.220 
 
Based on the concerns expressed and the doubts about the reasonableness of 
review grounds, the judge calls upon social partners and the legislature to rethink this 
process and argues that justice for all concerned might be better served if the relief 
against awards was to take the form of an appeal rather than a review. He finds the 
protection granted by a narrower basis for intervention, in all likelihood, a fanciful 
chimera,221 a situation Namibia sought to prevent by permitting appeals based on the 
218 Shoprite Namibia (Pty) Ltd v Fautino Moses Paulo & others par 3. 
219 Andre Herloldt v Nedbank Case No: DA 20/2010(20 May 2012) par 55. 
220 Ibid.  
221 Andre Herlodt v Nedbank par 56. 
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question of law and fact. However, this is contrary to the ILO’s call not to subject the 
arbitration awards to appeal. 
 
6.12.2 COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 
 
Detailed descriptive review provisions in Namibia and South Africa are discussed in 
Chapters Three (3.20.3) and Four (4.12.3) of this study. However, for this part of the 
study a further process and contextual comparative analysis of the review procedure 
is undertaken. 
 
In order to provide a better understanding of the review, this section explains the 
difference between the appeal and review processes. Hoexter222 provides a useful 
distinction between appeals and reviews. The author asserts that in an appeal, the 
Court hearing the matter is obliged to consider the merits of the matter before it and 
to conclude whether or not the decision of the tribunal or court a quo was right or 
wrong. In contrast, a review does not ordinarily entertain the merits of the decision. 
The Court is instead required to investigate the manner in which the decision was 
reached and whether the appropriate procedure leading to the decision was 
followed.223 
 
The difference described above is supported by the court’s decision in Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investments Co v Johannesburg Town Council224 Wherein  Innes CJ 
remarked as follows: an appellant approaches the Court based upon a record of the 
case in an inferior court and by that record he is bound. He cannot take advantage of 
any fact or circumstance that does not appear upon the record or cannot be deduced 
from it. In a review, litigants relies on irregularities that do not necessarily have to 
appear on the record. The judge concluded by stating that the applicant can be 
permitted to make an affidavit to bring the factors upon which he relies to the notice 
of the Labour or Supreme Court. The same view was expressed by the Labour Court 
in Namibia in Ellen Louw v the Chairperson of the District Labour Court and JP 
222 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2011) 65.  
223 Fergus “The Distinction Between Appeals and Review- Defining the Limits of the Labour Court’s 
Power to Review” 1557. 
224 1903 TS 111 par 114. 
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Snyman & Partners (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd.225 Hoff AJ pointed out that in a review, the 
parties are allowed to travel outside of the restricted records to bring extrinsic 
evidence to light to prove the irregularity or illegality alleged.  
 
The Namibian Labour Court therefore accepts that in a review application, the Court 
only concerns itself with the lawfulness of the decision brought to its attention, 
without necessarily examining legality and fairness, which are elements examined in 
an appeal. The Court inferred that review relates to the conduct of the proceedings 
and not the result thereof.226 Parker227 notes that, should the reviewing court be 
permitted to go into the merits of the decision, it would be equal to substituting itself 
for the person or body to whom or to which the legislature has given the power to 
make the decision in question or where the statute has so granted such power of 
intervention. 
 
In the case of Chief Constable of North Police v North Wales Police v Evans,228 cited 
in Justice Parker’s authoritative writing on labour law in Namibia, the Court held that 
the purpose of review proceedings is to ensure that the individual receives fair 
treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected. Therefore, the purpose is 
not to substitute the opinion of the judiciary or of the individual judges (arbitrators in 
this case) for that of the authority constituted by law to decide the matter in question. 
However, Willis229 points out that the only exception to substitution is where the 
enabling statute expressly permits the court to substitute its decision for that of the 
body or tribunal at issue in review proceedings.    
 
The above clearly demonstrates that in a review, unlike in an appeal, the court’s 
powers are limited. Although it may set aside230 the decision of the tribunal of the first 
instance (the CCMA and the Labour Commissioner respectively), it would generally 
not substitute its own decision for the tribunal a quo in the absence of such a 
225 Case No LCA 27/1998 par 11 (reportable). 
226 S v Bushebi 1998 239 NR SC. 
227 Parker Labour Law in Namibia 206. 
228 (1982) 1 WLR 115 at 1160.  
229 Willis Administrative Law and the British American Act (1939) 53.   
230 See s 145(4) of the LRA 66 of 1995, see also s 89(10) of the Labour Act, 2007.   
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statutory provision.231 For this reason, the Namibian Labour Act, 2007 obliges the 
Labour Court to refer the matter back to the arbitrator or to direct that a new arbitrator 
be designated232 to rehear the matter afresh, or with specific directives to the 
procedure to be followed to re-determine the dispute.233 The Labour Act, 2007 
seemingly does not permit the Labour Court to substitute its decision in a review 
application. This is somewhat different in South Africa, where the LRA permits the 
Labour Court, by discretion, to determine the dispute in a manner it considers 
appropriate.234 From an analytical perspective, such a determination could include 
substituting the original decision with that of its own or, alternatively, to exercise a 
similar provision as in Namibia, where the Court may be at liberty to refer the matter 
to the CCMA for a re-hearing with an appropriate directive to be followed.235 It would 
logically appear that South Africa’s LRA has infused the appeal element of 
determination into the review, whereas determination is a factor for appeal only and 
has no place in a review in Namibia. The reasonableness and otherwise lawfulness 
of the decision of the commissioner is examined equally in the review proceeding in 
South Africa. 
 
Having established this difference between review and appeal processes, the focus 
now shifts to the legislative provision that endows the Labour Court with exclusive 
jurisdiction to review arbitration awards.236 In South Africa, the Labour Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to review CCMA arbitration awards, including those of the 
bargaining councils. On the other hand, section 117 of the Namibian Labour Act, 
2007 extends to include other decisions, such as those made by the Minister of 
Labour, the Permanent Secretary of Labour, the Labour Commissioner or any other 
body or official in the exercise of powers conferred by the Labour Act. In comparison, 
in terms of section 157(1) of South Africa’s LRA, the Labour Court’s jurisdiction is 
distinctly reserved for all other decisions that may be reviewed, with the exception of 
arbitration awards.  
231 Fergus “The Distinction Between Appeals and Review- Defining the Limits of the Labour Court’s 
Power to Review” 1558. 
232 S 89(10)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
233 S 89(10)(c) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
234 S 145(4)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1996. 
235 Fergus “The Distinction Between Appeals and Review- Defining the Limits of the Labour Court’s 
Power to Review” 1559. 
236 S 117(1)(b)(i) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
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 Given the Namibian Labour Court’s jurisdiction to review arbitral awards, section 
89(4) of the Labour Act, 2007 permits an aggrieved party to an arbitration award who 
alleges a defect in the arbitration proceedings to apply to the Labour Court for an 
order reviewing and setting aside the award. This provision is similar to that provided 
for in section 145(1) of the LRA of South Africa. The application for review in terms of 
the Labour Act must be made within 30 days after the award was served on the party 
challenging the award, unless the defect alleges corruption, in which case the 
application must be made within six weeks of discovery thereof.237 In South Africa, 
the application for review must be brought within six weeks of the date the award was 
served on the party. This also applies to corruption allegations, where such an 
application must be noted within the same period after discovery of the offence.238 
 
In South Africa, the LRA explicitly addresses condonation provisions for late filing of 
review applications. These include situations where, for instance, there are good 
reasons advanced for such an application and condonation may be granted by the 
Labour Court.239 In Namibia, in terms of section 89(3) of the Labour Act, 2007, 
condonation may only be considered in the late noting of an appeal on good cause 
shown. The author submits that this does not include review applications. The 
Explanatory Memorandum fails to provide any reason for such an omission, thus 
leaving it to the Labour Court to decline any late noting of review applications. 
 
Section 89(5) of the Labour Act, 2007 describes the defects referred to in section 
89(4) of the Act to mean instances where the arbitrator has: 
 
(i) committed misconduct in relation to the duties of an arbitrator; 
(ii) committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration; 
(iii) the arbitrator exceeded his or her power; and 
(iv) the award has been obtained improperly. 
 
237 S 89(4)(a)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007). 
238 S 145(1)(a) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
239 S 145(1A) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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These defects may give rise to a review application of an arbitration award in 
Namibia. They are effectively the same grounds of review provided for in section 
33(1) of the Arbitration Act of 1965, which endows the Labour Court with the power to 
review and set aside a defective arbitration award.240 These are the same 
substantive defects described by the LRA as the grounds for reviewing and setting 
aside a commissioner’s award.241 
 
As these defects were only listed in Chapter Three of this study, they are described 
in detail below.  
 
(a) Misconduct, referred to in section 89(5)(a)(i) of the Labour Act, 2007, relates 
to the arbitrator’s duties, for example wrongful or improper conduct, which 
could include a dishonest act or any act or omission involving moral improbity 
on the part of the arbitrator. Any proof thereof becomes a requisite for setting 
aside the award.242 
 
(b) Gross irregularity, referred to in section 89(5)(a)(ii) of the Labour Act, 2007, 
will exist where the arbitrator breached the rule of natural justice by depriving 
the aggrieved party of a fair hearing. The rules of natural justice includes the 
audi alteram partem rule related to hearing both parties; the rule that the one 
who decides the matter must not be biased by deciding his own case; and 
the recently developed rule that justice should not only be done, but should 
also be prevalent and without any doubt be seen to be done.243 The Labour 
Act, 2007 requires the irregularity to be gross in nature or the Court will not 
interfere with the decision of an arbitrator, unless prejudice against a party 
can be established.244 
 
240 Parker Labour Law in Namibia 211. 
241 S 145(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
242 Parker Labour Law in Namibia 212. 
243 Meyer v Law Society, Transvaal 1978 (2) SA 209at par 212H cited in Parker Labour Law in 
Namibia 213. 
244 Parker Labour Law in Namibia 213. 
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(c) Exceeding power, referred to in section 89(5)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007, 
requires the arbitrator to restrict himself to the dispute brought before him. He 
is not permitted to raise or decide issues outside his scope.245 
 
(d) Defective proceedings are the result of a defect based on the award having 
been obtained improperly, for example through corruption, fraud or bribery. 
 
It is submitted that the above list is exhaustive, due to the definition of “defect” where 
the Labour Act, 2007 used the term “means”.246 This argument is premised on the 
fact that the legislature intended the meaning to be complete and therefore no part of 
the intended meaning is left out.247 To this end, the Labour Court has held that in a 
review application, it is not for the arbitrator to justify his conduct, but for the applicant 
to satisfy the Court that good grounds exist to review the award made by the 
arbitrator.248 Ultimately, the Court concluded that to succeed with a review 
application, each ground raised must establish a defined defect listed in section 89(5) 
of the Labour Act, 2007.  
 
In South Africa, the LRA also defines the ground for review using the term 
“means”.249 For the reasons advanced above, the position in South Africa is 
undoubtedly the same since the grounds for review are limited to the defects listed in 
section 145(2) of the Act. It has been submitted that section 145 has been devised 
especially for arbitration review above any other statutory provisions in the LRA or 
any other statute, such as PAJA.250 Brassey submits that section 145 of the LRA is 
the sole basis of the review of arbitration awards and, therefore, that any other 
ground falling outside of it must be brought under section 158(1)(e) of the LRA. 
However, in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines, the CC pointed out that section 
145 of the LRA extends an invitation to scrutinise the process by which the results of 
arbitration proceedings were achieved, thereby enabling the Labour Court to 
intervene if the commissioner’s conduct is found wanting. As a result, the Court 
245 Parker Labour Law in Namibia 214. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Thornton Legislative Drafting (1987) 175. 
248 Atlantic Chicken Company (Pty) Ltd v Philip Mwandingi NO and another par 5.  
249 S 142(2) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
250 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 448.  
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remarked that reasonableness may not be irrelevant in the enquiry and that it may be 
relevant to both the process and outcome.251 
 
Myburgh252 extends the above arguments by suggesting that section 145 of the LRA 
requires commissioners’ decisions to fall within the “band of reasonableness”, which 
he submits does not preclude the Court from scrutinising the process in terms of 
which the decision was made. Such scrutiny includes situations where the 
commissioner fails to consider material evidence or has considered irrelevant 
evidence, or that the commissioner committed some form of gross misconduct in the 
process of review, thereby prejudicing the other party. In these instances, the 
commissioner’s award may qualify to be set aside irrespective of the result of the 
proceedings or whether the result can be justified based on the record of the 
proceedings.253 
 
In Namibia, the examination of reasonableness may be a factor for consideration in 
an appeal rather than in a review application. Implied inclusion in South Africa could 
be attributed to the limited mechanisms available to attack an adverse arbitration 
award, given the limited scope of the review process and no other alternative, such 
as an appeal provision. This could be the reason why, in South Africa, the Labour 
Court ventures into the substance of the review application. 
 
A closer examination of section 145 of the LRA clearly shows that review 
proceedings must be conducted both effectively and expeditiously.254 This is not 
explicit stated in the Namibian Labour Act, 2007. However, labour legislation drafters 
have cautioned that the need for expedience in labour dispute resolution should not 
be allowed to overshadow the importance of labour disputes being reasonably and 
fairly resolved.255 In Namibia, the court process is not expedient, with labour matters 
taking three to four years to be finalised. 
 
251 Brassey The Labour Relations Act A1-7. 
252 Myburg “Determining and Reviewing Sanctions after Sidumo” (2010) 31 ILJ 16.    
253 Ibid.  
254 See s 1(d)(iv) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
255 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the LRA parr 318-9.  
347 
                                                             
The purpose of review proceedings, as set out in the LRA and the Labour Act, is to 
give consideration to and balance the constitutional right to just administrative action 
associated with the doctrine of separation of power, which must be observed.256 
 
6.13 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter clearly demonstrates that Namibia’s labour legislation has been heavily 
reliant on that of South Africa since colonial times, as Namibia was under the 
mandate of South Africa during that period. As a result, any labour legislation that 
was enacted in the country was designed to serve South African interests. This is 
evident from the provision of statutes, such as the Industrial Conciliation Act of South 
Africa and the Industrial Conciliation Act of Namibia, which were exclusively 
applicable to white employees and excluded indigenous citizens from their 
application. In South Africa, the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry significantly 
changed labour policy by affording black trade unions rights comparable to those of 
their white counterparts and prompting the creation of the industrial courts system to 
adjudicate disputes related to unfair labour practices.  
 
In Namibia, Professor Wiehahn also chaired a commission that investigated the state 
of affairs regarding labour legislation. The commission recommended the enactment 
of labour law that embraces internationally recognised dispute resolution machineries 
of conciliation, arbitration and adjudication by the Labour Court.  
 
At independence, Namibia and South Africa as sovereign states adopted democratic 
constitutions that guarantee basic labour rights, and enacted labour legislation to give 
effect thereto. The first Namibian Labour Act of 1992 was later repealed, paving the 
way for the current Labour Act of 2007. In South Africa, the negotiated LRA 
continues to be adapted to suit the needs of society. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated some similarities and differences in the two countries’ 
labour dispute resolution systems. It is clear that Namibia and South Africa both use 
conciliation, arbitration and adjudication, but significant differences exist in the 
256 Fergus “The Distinction Between Appeals and Review- Defining the Limits of the Labour Court’s 
Power to Review” 1573. 
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processes of the countries’ ADR systems. This means that both countries can learn 
from each other. The next chapter of this study addresses the differences in the 
countries’ ADR systems and the systems that could be adopted across the border, 
and provides proposals and recommendations for the resolution of the problems 
identified. 
349 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 350 
7.2 Summary of the findings ......................................................................................... 352 
7.3 Recommendations for implementation ................................................................... 364 
 7.3.1 Recommendations for complying with international labour standards and 
  implementing legal remedies to improve enforcement of and compliance 
  with international standards ........................................................................ 365 
 7.3.2 What can Namibia learn from South Africa with a view to strengthening and 
  improving the country’s labour dispute resolution system? .......................... 366 
7.4 General conclusions ............................................................................................... 372 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis has examined the Namibian labour dispute resolution system by 
undertaking a comparative analysis of international labour standards and the South 
African labour dispute resolution system. The author submits that the provision of a 
proactive and expeditious dispute resolution system helps to resolve labour disputes 
in the most effective and efficient manner, without necessarily having to resort to the 
courts. The ultimate goal is to ensure that the legal framework regulating the labour 
dispute resolution system assures the users of ADR of its credibility, thereby creating 
confidence and enabling them to trust the system. Ideally, disputes should be 
resolved at conciliation level, resulting in the minority of disputes being referred to 
arbitration or the Labour Court. However, it has been established that there are gaps 
between the legal framework regulating labour dispute resolution and the application 
of laws and regulations in practice, making the attainment of effective and efficient 
labour dispute resolution difficult. For this reason, several remedial interventions are 
proposed that look to the future and the continued provision of fast, effective and 
user-friendly ADR services.  
 
Chapter One places the thesis topic in perspective by outlining the general overview 
of the study. This chapter starts with the background of the study; rationale; 
statement of the problem; research questions; aims and objectives; methodology; 
research motivation and the justification for study. It sets out the adoption of the ADR 
system based on the ILO model, which has elements of voluntarism, informality, 
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accessibility and the speedy resolution of labour disputes premised on international 
labour standards. 
 
Chapter Two investigates the general background leading to the formation of the ILO 
and the creation and application of international labour standards in member states, 
with particular focus on Namibia. Further, the chapter provides a detailed account of 
the ILO envisaged ADR system, the member states’ obligations arising from the 
ratification of labour standards, and supervision of, enforcement of, and compliance 
with labour standards. This chapter outlined an overview of ADR systems and 
structures created in terms of international standards put in place to guide member 
states. 
 
Chapters Three and Four examine the nature and statutory provisions of the 
Namibian and South African labour dispute resolution systems. These chapters 
demonstrate the use of ADR systems of conciliation and arbitration in the two 
respective countries. The main concept put forward in these chapters is that Namibia 
and South Africa moved away from the old labour dispensation that was 
characterised by high legal costs, prolonged legal actions and low settlement rates, 
to a relatively new ILO ADR system characterised by conciliation and arbitration 
procedures. Both countries have created institutions intended to effectively deal with 
labour disputes in an economical and expeditious manner. 
 
Chapter Five examines Namibia’s compliance with and enforcement of ratified 
international labour standards. This chapter demonstrates that Namibia became a 
member state of the ILO before its independence. The chapter further submits that 
Namibia has ratified numerous ILO conventions not limited to labour dispute 
resolution, thereby assuming the obligation to submit periodic reports to the ILO for 
supervision of the country’s compliance with the standards in practice. In addition, 
the chapter highlights that although Namibia may be seen as complying substantively 
with its obligations, there are still shortfalls that require improvement to bring the 
country into full compliance with international labour standards. This relates to, 
amongst other things, the timely supply of informed reports to the ILO. It is further 
submitted that although the ILO has well established supervisory machineries to 
monitor and supervise compliance with standards, the organisation does not have 
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any established statutory sanctions and punitive mechanisms in place to deal with 
non-compliance with ratified standards, except those that depend on the goodwill of 
member states and rely on threats for the withdrawal of technical support and 
suspension of other international aid in order to compel compliance by member 
states. 
 
Chapter Six provides a more extensive examination of Namibia and South Africa’s 
labour dispute resolution systems. An analysis of the respective countries’ labour law 
theories and practices was undertaken by setting the two respective systems side by 
side and examining their similarities and differences. Significant similarities and 
differences in the respective systems were discovered, making it clear that Namibia 
can learn from South African best practices. 
 
The pertinent issue addressed in this concluding chapter is closing these gaps and 
suggesting measures that need to be taken to improve the provision of an effective 
and efficient labour dispute resolution system. The chapter provides suggestions and 
recommendations intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Namibian labour dispute resolution system. This is preceded by a summary of the 
earlier findings of this thesis.   
 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
 
The aim of this study is to determine whether Namibia’s ADR system complies with 
international labour standards. Namibia become the hundred and thirty sixth member 
state of the ILO and, at independence, the country formally affirmed its ILO 
membership and undertook to comply with international labour standards. Eleven 
binding ILO conventions have been ratified by Namibia to date and the country 
consequently made a commitment to comply with the obligations arising from these 
ratifications. 
 
This study has established that Namibia generally complies with most of the ratified 
international labour standards, particularly the core labour standards. However, the 
ILO has expressed dissatisfaction regarding various aspects of Namibia’s 
compliance and has made a number of direct requests and observations premised 
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on articles 19 and 22 of the ILO Constitution. In this respect, the study has 
established the country’s persistent failure to supply the required relevant information 
in response to the comments of the ILO’s CEACR. The most significant failure relates 
to non-compliance with the Freedom of Association and Right to Organize 
Convention.1 This convention embodies the cardinal principles of the ILO as it relates 
to the rights of workers to fairly pursue their economic and social interests. Given the 
importance of the convention, the study has ascertained that the ILO has questioned 
the Minister of Labour’s sole determination of essential service disputes without 
explicitly providing for subsequent appeal procedures. The study further shows that 
the ILO noted with concern that the Labour Act, 2007 does not provide sufficient 
details on whether federations of workers and employers’ organisations have the 
right to form confederations. Most importantly, the study has also shown that the ILO 
has been very critical regarding Namibia’s Labour Act on the basis that it excludes 
the Namibian Prison Services from its application and this is in contravention of 
article 2 of the Freedom of Association Convention. 
 
The study further reveals that the ILO’s CEACR observed that section 64(1)(2) of the 
Namibian Labour Act, 2007, while providing for the threshold of 50 per cent 
membership to acquire exclusive bargaining agents status, does not provide for the 
representative rights of minority trade unions that do not have the prescribed 50 per 
cent membership. Therefore, it is submitted that minority trade unions in Namibia 
have no statutory rights to exercise collective bargaining rights; this is irrespective of 
the absence of a registered majority trade union at a given workplace. This omission 
is inconsistent with the rights guaranteed to minority unions and their rights to strike, 
as provided for by Conventions 87 and 98 and based on the interpretation of the ILO 
supervisory bodies.2 However,  the thesis argues that Freedom of Association and 
Right to Organize Convention itself does not explicitly provide for collective 
bargaining rights for minority trade unions.  
 
The study has further highlighted the ILO’s CEACR observation of section 86(7)(a) of 
the Labour Act, 2007, which empowers arbitrators to conduct arbitration in the 
manner they consider appropriate in order to determine disputes fairly and quickly. 
1 No 87 of 1948. 
2 Van Niekerk et al Law@Work 28. 
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The CEACR found that the Act does not provide any details on the rapidness of the 
arbitration procedure. Despite this observation, the study submits that there is no ILO 
standard that specifically addresses the rapidness of arbitration hearings, except for 
the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 3  which calls for an 
undefined expeditious process of arbitration in a very vague and abstract terms.  
 
In addition, this study found that the Government of the Republic of Namibia, 
particularly the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, has failed in its obligation, 
despite several requests, to submit proof of consultative meetings held with social 
partners on reports submitted to the ILO. The ILO observed that this practice has 
denied social partners their active role in the supervision process of ratified 
standards. Non-consultation with social partners is in conflict with article 5(1) of the 
Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standard) Convention 4  that requires 
tripartite consultation to be held at appropriate intervals on reports to be submitted to 
the ILO.  
 
It has further been established that section 33 of the Labour Act, 2007 fails to provide 
detailed requirements of valid and fair reasons for the termination of employment as 
required by article 4 of the Termination of Employment Convention.5 South Africa has 
promulgated a code of good practice to assist in the interpretation of these concepts. 
Namibia has yet to develop similar codes of good practice in order to fully comply 
with this convention.  
 
It was also found that the ILO does not have any firmly grounded statutory 
enforcement mechanisms in place and lacks the statutory power to impose penalties 
for member states’ non-compliance with international standards. Given this vacuum, 
some attempts have been made to integrate social clauses in trade agreements of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to aid in the facilitation of trade sanctions for 
non-compliance with international labour standards. However, these attempts have 
been rejected by ILO constituents on the basis that this practice affects global trade. 
The author agrees with the view that this lack of enforcement ability makes the ILO 
3 No 92 of 1952. 
4 No 144 of 1976. 
5 No 158 of 1982. 
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ineffective in changing the labour practices of governments. 6 The ILO has been 
equated to a government without governance, making the organisation increasingly 
dysfunctional. 
 
It is submitted that the ultimate goal of the ILO’s labour standards should not be to 
restrain member states in the exercise of self interest, but, instead, should be to help 
governments, such as that of Namibia, to identify their self-interests and achieve 
these interests. The study further suggests that the ILO must begin to develop 
formulas that incorporate enforcement and sanctions for non-compliance. However, it 
is recommended that priority be given to educating member states and that capacity 
building, monitoring, leaning best practices, technical assistance, and incentives for 
goodwill compliance be included in the process. For this reason, it is submitted that 
the ILO should not be an obstacle to the progress of member states and that the 
organization should become a solution rather than a problem.  
 
Besides an analysis of Namibia’s compliance with international labour standards, the 
second specific objective of this thesis is to analyse the Namibian labour dispute 
resolution system and compare it to South Africa’s ADR system. The ultimate goal is 
to establish the positive attributes of the South African ADR system that Namibia can 
learn from, with a view to strengthening and improving the country’s labour dispute 
resolution system.  
 
The study established that, prior to Namibian independence in 1990, the country was 
administered by South Africa as a C mandate in terms of the Peace Treaty of 
Versailles and article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.7 At the time, the 
mandate empowered the South African government to exercise full administrative 
and legislative power over South West Africa, now Namibia. The study revealed that 
the SWAPO-led government brought about the demise of South Africa’s colonial 
occupation of Namibia, led by Sam Shafishuna Nujoma, who later became the first 
President of the Republic of Namibia.  
 
6 Douglas et al  “An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Workers’ Rights: ILO Standards, 
US Trade Laws, Unions and NGIOs” 276.  
7 Bauer Labour and Democracy in Namibia 19. 
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During South Africa’s occupation of Namibia the country had no comprehensive 
labour legislation in place. However, as South West Africa was seen as South 
Africa’s fifth province, it is submitted that most laws that were passed in South Africa 
were immediately duplicated in Namibia, or closely resembled those of South Africa. 
In this respect, the study identified the Namibian Master and Servants Proclamation,8 
with similar provisions to the Industrial Conciliation Act9 in South Africa, and the 
Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance,10 comparative to the South African 
Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956, which were both discriminatory to African 
workers. The Wiehahn Commission brought about significant changes to the labour 
relations system in South Africa, prior to the country’s first democratic elections in 
1994. A similar commission, led by Professor Wiehahn, was constituted shortly 
before Namibia’s independence and was tasked with investigating labour matters in 
the country. The study revealed that the Wiehahn commission’s recommendations 
were gradually implemented, with the first changes brought about by the enactment 
of the post-independence Labour Act of 1992 and later changes implemented 
through the current Labour Act of 2007. 
 
The author applauds Namibia and South Africa for adopting constitutions that 
guarantee the protection of basic labour rights and for undertaking labour reforms to 
give effect to these constitutionally entrenched labour rights, with the aim of 
regulating all facets of labour relationships. To this end, Namibia enacted the Labour 
Act of 1992, which later become inadequate in resolving labour disputes, leading to 
the passing of the current Labour Act of 2007. It is suggested that this Act 
substantially altered labour law in Namibia and created a new framework for the 
resolution of labour disputes. From the evidence presented in the study it is clear that 
the changes made to the machinery for the resolution of labour disputes reflects a 
consensus that its predecessors, as set out in the 1992 Act, were not working 
effectively. 11  The Labour Act of 2007 shifted the emphasis to conciliation and 
arbitration by the Labour Commissioner. Given the backdrop of the repealed 1992 
Act, the study found the new approach non-confrontational and based on user-
8 No 24 of 1920. 
9 No 11 of 1924. 
10 No 35 of 1952. 
11 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 39. 
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friendly procedures that suit the parties to labour disputes, instead of adversarial, 
court-based methods.12 
 
The changes in the Namibian labour dispute resolution system resemble that of 
South Africa, where the negotiated LRA of 1995 was enacted to replace the 1956 
LRA. The study affirms that the LRA was enacted to promote, among other things, an 
effective and efficient labour dispute resolution system. 13  It was expected to 
overcome the problems faced by its predecessor.  
 
The South African LRA has decriminalised labour law by removing the use of criminal 
law to enforce labour law and collective agreements. It is submitted that the inclusion 
of criminal provisions in labour legislation violates international labour standards. 
Having moved away from criminal sanctions to enforce labour laws, South Africa 
adopted an approach of self-regulation and enforcement through private law 
interventions, such as statutory arbitration, private arbitration and adjudication by the 
Labour Court.14 In Namibia, despite the Wiehahn Commission’s recommendations to 
decriminalise labour law contraventions, the drafters of both the 1992 Act and the 
Labour Act of 2007 ignored these recommendations and permitted the inclusion of 
criminal sanctions in labour legislation. The Namibian Police and prosecutors 
experience serious difficulties in ensuring the successful prosecution and conviction 
of offenders due to the complexity of related charges. Consequently, the author 
contends that there is no purpose in the inclusion of such criminal provisions, given 
the very low rate of success (if any) in bringing offenders before criminal courts. 
 
The Labour Commissioner’s office and the CCMA are comparable institutions 
created by the respective countries’ labour legislation to promote and provide the 
framework for the effective and efficient resolution of labour disputes. It is argued that 
the Labour Commissioner is an individual civil servant, appointed by the Minister of 
Labour, and includes conciliators and arbitrators in his office. As a result, social 
partners have very little input with regard to decisions made in the appointment of the 
Labour Commissioner, conciliators and arbitrators, save for playing an advisory role 
12 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 40. 
13 S (1)(d)(iv) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
14 Brassey Commentary on the Labour Relations Act A1-4. 
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in establishing the terms of conciliators and arbitrators’ qualifications. In South Africa, 
there is a clear difference in that the CCMA is established as an autonomous 
statutory body with legal personality. The director and commissioners are appointed 
by the governing council of the CCMA. The CCMA is, without a doubt, independent 
of the state, political parties, trade unions and employers’ organisations. This is not 
the case in Namibia, despite recommendations from the Taskforce responsible for 
drafting the Labour Act that the Labour Commissioner be independent of the state. 
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that the Namibian Labour Act places a great 
deal of emphasis on the independence and impartiality of the Labour Commissioner 
and all arbitrators in the performance of their function, despite their appointment as 
civil servants. 
 
It has been established that the LRA adopted the ADR systems of conciliation and 
arbitration and created the Labour Court as last resort in dispute resolution. It is clear 
that Namibia followed South Africa’s example with the enactment of the Labour Act, 
2007 and that the current Namibian labour dispute resolution system has been 
“borrowed or transplanted” from South Africa.15 However, minor differences do exist. 
 
Although the principles of conciliation are similar in both countries, the original 
Labour Act of 2007 empowered conciliators to determine labour disputes at 
conciliation level. This created the perception that conciliation meetings had similar 
trappings to a court or tribunal, which produces binding awards. The Namibian 
Labour Court has since condemned this provision and practice by pointing out that 
conciliation is simply an avenue to resolve labour disputes without necessarily having 
to make legally binding awards against any party to a dispute.16 This provision has 
since been altered by the Labour Amendment Act No. 2 of 2012. In South Africa, 
since the inception of conciliation, commissioners have no binding determination 
powers at conciliation level.  
 
It has further been established that there are practical differences between Namibian 
and South African ADR systems in terms of referral timelines for interest and rights 
disputes. In Namibia, interest disputes are referred to the Labour Commissioner 
15 Fenwick Labour Law in Namibia 45. 
16 Purity Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Tjeripo par 29.  
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within one year, while rights disputes, such as dismissals, are referred within six 
months from the date the cause of action arose. In South Africa, dismissal disputes 
must be referred within 30 days, while unfair labour practice and discrimination 
disputes must be referred to the CCMA within six months of the dispute arising. 
Interestingly, it was found that there is a statutory provision for condonation for late 
referral on good cause shown in South Africa, while there is no such provision in the 
Labour Act in Namibia, save for the provision in the Rules of the Labour 
Commissioner. The Labour Court in Namibia has stressed that a dispute referred 
after the expiry of the six-month period is out of time and, consequently, prescribed in 
terms of section 82 of the Labour Act. The author submits that the absence of 
condonation provisions in the enabling statute, if challenged in the Labour Court, 
could  render condonation provisions in the Rules of the Labour Commissioner null.     
 
It has further been established that representation is limited to the parties at 
conciliation meetings, as stated in the LRA and the Labour Act, 2007. In South Africa, 
legal representatives, including consultants, are not permitted at conciliation level. In 
Namibia, legal representation and consultants are permitted on the agreement of the 
parties to the dispute and at the discretion of the conciliator. Accordingly, the author 
contends that legal representation at conciliation turns the proceedings legalistic and 
expensive for ordinary parties to the dispute and, therefore, has the effect of negating 
a speedy and simplified labour dispute resolution system.  
 
It was further found that the Labour Act, 2007 has not created any mechanism for 
enforcing settlement agreements resulting from conciliation. The only remedy is to 
approach the Labour Court to make the settlement an order of Court. The author 
submits that this causes parties to enter into settlement agreements without the bona 
fide intention to resolve the dispute, knowing full well that there is no provision in the 
Labour Act compelling them to do so. Consequently, many settlement agreements 
remain in abeyance in Namibia. Namibia can learn from South Africa, which has a 
provision permitting the parties to approach the CCMA in order to convert a 
settlement agreement to an arbitration award, thereby acquiring the enforcement 
status of a usual arbitration award.17 
17 S 142A of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
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 The differences between the Namibian conciliation-arbitration (con-arb) process and 
that of South Africa are noted. In Namibia, con-arb was implemented with the 
enactment of the Labour Act, 2007 and directs that all disputes must go through a 
conciliation process before arbitration is sought. There are only two exceptions to this 
provision: disputes of fundamental rights in terms of section 7 of the Labour Act, 
2007, which may be taken directly to the Labour Court, and cases where the dispute 
was already conciliated, for instance in collective bargaining disputes where the 
parties have agreed to refer the matter to arbitration. In South Africa, con-arb is a 
relatively new intervention applicable to a limited range of disputes. Only specific 
disputes described in Chapter Six (6.6.2) are permitted to make use of the con-arb 
process. 
 
In a similar vein, parties to the con-arb process have the statutory privilege of 
objecting to the process; the same does not apply under Namibian labour law. These 
statutory privileges have resulted in a number of objections being raised about the 
con-arb process, creating a major challenge for the CCMA as parties seem to object 
to the process for no apparent reasons, possibly only to frustrate the other party’s 
attempt to a speedy resolution of the dispute. Similarly, the author contends that 
while the effectiveness of a dispute resolution system depends substantially on its 
legitimacy, this attribute should not be compromised for efficiency. Focusing on the 
speed of con-arb proceedings could, in some cases, lead to the rapid settling of 
disputes and possible superficial settlements that fail to address the underlying 
causes of conflict or the real needs of the parties.18 
 
The study ascertained that an arbitration award must be issued within 30 days of the 
conclusion of an arbitration hearing by arbitrators in Namibia and within 14 days by 
CCMA commissioners in South Africa. In both cases the award is final and binding 
and automatically earns interests. However, in South Africa, the liability for interest 
ends when the debtor makes an unconditional offer to pay.19 This is a result of the 
Labour Court’s20 finding that an award is a debt and, as such, is subject to the 
18 Bhorat et al An Analysis of the CCMA 33.  
19 See Top v Top Reisen CC (2006) 27 ILJ 1948 LC. 
20 See Mpanzama v Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd [2000] 12 BLLR 1459 (LC). 
360 
                                                             
Prescription Act No. 68 of 1969. In contrast, in Namibia, the interest accumulates 
from the date of judgment or award to the date of payment and does not prescribe.21 
 
The Director of the CCMA has the statutory power to certify the award, thereby 
making it enforceable immediately. In Namibia, the Labour Commissioner has no 
such powers. It is for the parties or the Labour Commissioner at his/ her own instance  
to approach the Labour Court to make the award an order of Court, consequently 
becoming enforceable. It is submitted that this creates further delays in Namibia 
when compared to the immediate enforcement of awards in South Africa, where 
approaching the Court is an alternative rather than the first recourse.  
 
It has been established that despite the prescriptive instruction by the Labour Act, 
2007 for statutory arbitration and the Labour Courts to take into account the code of 
good practice when deciding cases that come before them, at the time of writing 
Namibia had not developed and made available codes of good practice on a range of 
issues, including dispute resolution. The study asserts that the codes of good 
practice, if promulgated, will facilitate proper implementation of the legislative 
framework and give users guidance on labour law and dispute resolution. Codes of 
good practice play a significant educational function and serve as an important 
dispute prevention aid.22 
 
It has also been shown that, in South Africa, the LRA provides clear guidelines for 
awarding compensation where, for instance, reinstatement is not a feasible option. 
For this reason, the LRA places limitations on the awarding of compensation by 
commissioners and the Labour Court, as discussed in Chapter 6 (6.6.5). In Namibia, 
the Labour Act fails to provide similar guidelines on awarding compensation and, as 
such, unjustified compensation awards have been made by arbitrators in the Labour 
Commissioners’ office. This has created varying opinions as to the permissible limit 
of compensation awards. The study found that the Namibian Labour Court has not 
been very helpful neither in this respect. The Court has only stated that 
compensation should be equal to the amount of loss suffered or the amount of 
remuneration the employee would have been paid had he not been dismissed. 
21 JB Cooling and Refrigeration CC v Kasho Kavendjua par 32.  
22 Thompson Dispute Prevention and Resolution 33. 
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Clearly, this leaves it up to the arbitrator to award compensation from the date of 
dismissal to the date of the award, irrespective of the time that has elapsed. This 
equally applies to the Labour Court itself, where the amount of time it takes to finalise 
the matter is not taken into account. In most cases, this has led to arbitrators issuing 
vague arbitration awards that fail to specify the amount of and the time frame for 
compensation, making it effectively impossible to enforce them or for labour 
inspectors to obtain writs of execution. 
 
Two methods of enforcing arbitration awards have been illustrated: compensation 
awards are enforced by a writ of execution, while reinstatement is enforced by filing 
for contempt of court proceedings. In Namibia, the duty to enforce arbitration awards 
lies with labour inspectors who instruct the Deputy Sheriff to obtain a writ of 
execution. Contempt of court, on the other hand, is instituted by the Government 
Attorney on behalf of the labour inspector. This study shows that, in South Africa, 
labour inspectors play no role in the enforcement of arbitration awards. It is left to the 
parties themselves to pursue the enforcement at their own cost. This, for obvious 
reasons, may be unattainable for the ordinary party who may not be able to meet the 
costs involved. However, despite the involvement of the Government Attorney in the 
enforcement of reinstatement awards in Namibia, very little, if anything, has been 
achieved. At the time of writing, no contempt of court case had ever been brought 
before the Court, with reinstatement awards that have not been complied with piling 
up in the offices of the Government Attorney, where staff continuously promise labour 
inspectors that they intend to bring these applications before the Labour Court. This 
has led to a loss of confidence in the system by persons with unenforced 
reinstatement awards. 
 
It has been found that the bargaining council system in South Africa complements 
the work of the CCMA, thereby reducing the organisation’s case load and backlog. In 
Namibia, there are no statutorily recognised bargaining council systems, but industry 
bargaining forums are prevalent. This is a progressive innovation initiated by the 
parties themselves, which operate on a purely voluntary basis. In the industries 
where bargaining forums exist, such as security, construction and farming, they have 
proven to be useful in terms of determining collective conditions of employment and 
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setting of minimum standards of employment, such as minimum wages. However, 
they have no statutory power to resolve labour disputes. 
 
The study has demonstrated that private arbitration is an alternative method of 
voluntary dispute resolution available to disputants in terms of the Arbitration Act No. 
42 of 1965. The author asserts that private arbitration in Namibia and South Africa is 
done in the same manner and premised on the same Arbitration Act. The study 
submits that there are, however, no properly established and recognised private 
arbitration institutions in Namibia, such as Tokiso Dispute Resolution in South Africa. 
Therefore, parties have a limited choice in Namibia, except for agreeing on using the 
services of individuals practicing as labour consultants. 
 
The private arbitration system plays a valuable complementary role in labour dispute 
resolution as it has the potential to offer parties alternative adaptive and attuned 
formulas. It contributes benefits such as privacy, informality, speed, and focus on 
substance rather than form. This makes private arbitration cost effective even where 
it is not publicly subsidised; 23  disadvantages of this system are discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four. 
 
Aside from available ADR machineries, the Namibian Labour Act, 2007 and the LRA 
of South Africa established Labour Courts in both countries, and the Labour Appeal 
Court in South Africa, as avenues for formal litigation and for the development of 
jurisprudence in labour law.24 In South Africa, the Labour Court is separate from the 
High Court, although it has, in certain disputes, parallel jurisdiction. Dedicated judges 
who specialise in labour law preside over the Court. In contrast, Namibia’s Labour 
Court is a division of the High Court and has no dedicated specialist judges. Any 
judge of the High Court can be appointed to preside over a labour matter while sitting 
as a Labour Court judge. The author argues that this practice or system tends to 
compromise labour issues as they require specialisation and arbiters vested with 
specialised skills to effectively handle disputes.25 
 
23 Thompson Dispute Prevention and Resolution 46. 
24 Govindjee Labour Dispute Resolution 238. 
25 Khabo Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution 14. 
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The study has shown that, in Namibia, the Labour Act permits appeal against 
arbitration awards on limited grounds, namely on any question of law, on a question 
of fact, or on a combination of these.26 Appeal is permitted on the basis of article 
12(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, as 
arbitration is considered a tribunal for the purpose of resolving labour disputes. The 
study shows that, in South Africa, the CCMA is an administrative body as defined in 
section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. However, the 
provisions of PAJA do not apply for the purpose of review. Review applications are 
therefore limited to the grounds listed in section 145 of the LRA. Clearly, there is no 
right of appeal against an arbitration award in the South African system, in contrast to 
Namibia where an aggrieved party has the choice to either appeal against or apply 
for review of the arbitration proceedings. Inherent delays in finalising disputes are 
prevalent in both the South African and Namibian court systems, negating the 
ultimate objective of labour legislation, which sought to ensure that labour disputes 
are resolved expeditiously and in an efficient manner. The author argues that these 
delays are caused by the lack of statutory established timelines within which labour 
disputes must be finalised by the Labour Court, particularly where the enforcement of 
the award is stayed. Therefore, it is submitted that this has an adverse effect on the 
beneficiary of the award, particularly where the affected party continues to suffer the 
effects unemployment.  
 
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION  
 
“It always seem impossible until it’s done” – Nelson Mandela. 
 
In the light of the general findings of this study, the following recommendations are 
made.  
 
  
26 S 89(1)(a)(b) of the Labour Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2007).  
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7.3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMPLYING WITH INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTING LEGAL REMEDIES TO 
IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
 
It is recommended that within the scope of Namibia’s constitutional commitment to 
adhere to and act in accordance with international conventions and 
recommendations, the Government of the Republic of Namibia, particularly the 
Ministry of Labour and Social welfare, should study Chapter Five of this thesis as this 
section highlights numerous bottlenecks in the country’s efforts to fully comply with 
ratified international labour standards, particularly those relating to labour dispute 
resolution. The study identifies persistent failures to supply relevant information and 
action in accordance with the comments of CEACR. It is therefore proposed that a 
ministerial reporting committee be established to oversee other offices, directorates 
and divisions in an effort to strengthen the reporting capacity of these sections. The 
suggested reporting committee must communicate its work to the Labour Advisory 
Councils for their input before finally submitting reports to the ILO. Doing so will lead 
to full compliance with the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) 
Convention No. 144 of 1976. 
 
The Government of the Republic of Namibia has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the ILO to assist the country in realising its obligations arising 
from ratified conventions. Through this agreement, entitled “The Decent Work 
Country Programme”, the author recommends that government must continue to 
seek technical assistance and assistance with capacity building to allow the reporting 
committee to enhance its understanding of the application of conventions in order to 
ensure the timely and satisfactory submission of the required reports to the ILO.  
 
Social partners, such as NUNW and NEF, have equal obligations in the monitoring 
and supervising of compliance with international standards in Namibia. Instead of 
waiting on government or the ILO to furnish them with copies of reports, they must be 
pro-active and inquisitive in establishing whether government complied with its ILO 
obligations in a timely manner. They too require capacity building assistance to 
enable them to properly monitor the process of reporting on and compliance with ILO 
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obligations. Ultimately, this course of action will save the country from appearing 
before the CEACR to explain the persistent failure to submit the required information.  
 
Freedom of association is a cardinal principle of the ILO on the basis that it permits 
workers to fairly pursue their economic and social interests. As highlighted 
previously, the Labour Act, 2007 excludes the Namibian Prison Services from its 
application. The author submits that this exclusion contravenes the important ILO 
Freedom of Association and Protection to Organize Convention and recommends 
that policy-makers take note of this contravention. Although national security must be 
taken into consideration, urgent and concerted efforts are needed to amend the 
Labour Act, 2007 to include the Namibian Prison Services in its scope.  
 
Namibia can learn from South Africa, where armed forces are permitted to associate 
for purposes of collective bargaining. In this respect, a study of the SA National 
Defense Union v Minister of Defense and Another is helpful as the Court made 
specific reference to article 2 of Convention 87, which permits workers and 
employers, without distinction, to have the right to establish and join organisations of 
their own choosing without prior authorisation. The Court ruled that article 9 of the 
convention guarantees armed forces these rights to a certain extent. This case could 
be persuasive in addressing the plight of the Namibian Prison Services. 
 
In a similar vein, it is recommended that the Labour Act, 2007 must recognise 
minority trade unions for the purposes of collective bargaining, particularly in 
instances where there is no majority trade union representation. Doing so will ensure 
that the country complies with Conventions 87 and 98 on Collective Bargaining and 
the rights of minority trade unions to strike. A mechanism establishing a reasonable 
threshold, such as sufficient representation, can be adopted as it has proven to be 
effective in South Africa. 
 
7.3.2 WHAT CAN NAMIBIA LEARN FROM SOUTH AFRICA WITH A VIEW TO 
STRENGTHENING AND IMPROVING THE COUNTRY’S LABOUR 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM? 
 
In the interest of resolving labour disputes efficiently and effectively, the author 
recommends an adjustment to the process of arbitration in Namibia, specifically 
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through unambiguously defined parameters as to what constitutes fair and quick 
determination of disputes, although international labour standards also fail to provide 
useful timelines for arbitration. The current 30-day period applicable in the 
conciliation process and provided for in the rules of the Labour Commissioner should  
include arbitration proceedings. A time-bound system that does not take effect only at 
the conclusion of the arbitration, but that operates from the effective time of referral of 
the dispute is required. Arbitration should not be allowed to lengthen disputes 
unnecessarily; its ultimate purpose of achieving quicker, fairer and equitable results 
must be ensured. 
 
The author further recommends that section 33 of the Labour Act, 2007 be 
broadened to provide for a detailed meaning of the requirements for valid and fair 
reasons of dismissal instead of purely relying on jurisprudence created by the Labour 
Court. Alternatively, it is time that the Labour Advisory Council finalises the long 
awaited previously drafted guidelines and codes of good practice to be issued by the 
Minister of Labour. These guidelines are essential for the proper administration of the 
Labour Act, including dispute prevention and resolution, by the Labour Commissioner 
and users of the Labour Commissioner’s services. Namibia can also learn from South 
Africa in this respect; in order to facilitate the proper implementation of the LRA and 
to give users guidance on labour law, the country promulgated codes of good 
practice related to a variety of labour related issues as an annexure to the LRA.  
 
The Labour Act, 2007 contains a number of provisions that may be fairly perceived to 
have been borrowed or transplanted from South African labour law, but, unlike South 
Africa, Namibia did not decriminalise this branch of law. The criminal provisions in the 
Labour Act, 2007 have proven fruitless and difficult to enforce, thus time has come to 
reconsider such provisions.  
 
The author additionally proposes that, given the recommendations of the drafting 
Taskforce team that had the wisdom to recommend that the Labour Commissioner 
be an independent institution outside of the Ministry of Labour, the time is ripe for 
policy makers to consider having the Labour Commissioner’s office as an 
independent institution similar to the CCMA in South Africa. This is the prevailing 
trend in most SADC countries; for example, Lesotho has the Directorate of Dispute 
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Prevention and Resolution (DDPR), established under the Labour Code 
(Amendment) 2000, and Swaziland has the Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
Commission (CMAC). Making the Labour Commissioner’s office independent will 
restore users of the system’s confidence in it, particularly where government disputes 
are involved. 
 
The author recommends that given the requirement to simplify procedures for dispute 
resolution, the current technical and cumbersome referral procedures are not as 
envisaged and that certain aspects, for example the requirement to have proof of 
service that has been commissioned by the Namibian Police accompanying the 
referral, be removed. The police have no role in facilitating the resolution of labour 
disputes and the Labour Commissioner must be able accept proof of service based 
only on the proof outlined in the rules. Referral documents are accepted in South 
Africa without the involvement of the police. 
 
In respect of the referral of labour disputes to the Labour Commissioner, the author 
recommends that an amendment be made to the Labour Act to include a provision 
similar to that in South Africa’s LRA in respect of condonation for good cause shown. 
Although it appears that condonation is provided for in the Rules of the Labour 
Commissioner, there is no provision made in the Labour Act. The same applies to 
condonation in respect of review before the Labour Court. Condonation is only 
permitted in appeal applications, while the Labour Act omits the possibility of 
condonation in a review application. In South Africa, condonation is allowed in review 
proceedings on the grounds listed in Rule 9 of the CCMA. The same grounds for 
condonation can be applied in Namibia.  
 
The author recommends that the sole powers of the Labour Commissioner to assign 
disputes be relaxed in terms of section 122 of the Labour Act, 2007. The 
Commissioner should exercise his powers of delegation to regional control arbitrators 
to allow them to designate disputes to conciliators and arbitrators within their regions 
in an attempt to improve efficiency, as is done by the senior convening 
commissioners of the CCMA. 
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The author strongly recommends that legal representation, including consultants, be 
excluded at conciliation meetings. This representation turns the meeting into a 
legalistic arena, thereby prejudicing a party appearing without legal representation 
and becoming expensive for ordinary disputants, denying them an even playing field. 
This has proven to work very well in South Africa, where legal representation and 
consultants are not permitted at these meetings. 
 
Settlement agreements resulting from conciliation meetings have no expressed force 
of law in Namibia, and no statutory established mechanisms exist to enforce them. 
South Africa has adapted its system by creating a provision in the LRA that permits 
any party to the settlement agreement to apply to the CCMA to have the agreement 
converted to an arbitration award. Given the widespread non-compliance with 
settlement agreements in Namibia, social partners and policy makers are called upon 
to consider an amendment to this effect. The author proposes that a provision similar 
to section 142A of the LRA be included in the Labour Act. This will allow arbitration 
agreements to be enforced in the same manner as ordinary awards in terms of 
section 90 of the Labour Act, 2007. Moreover, arbitration settlements may be 
reinforced by the Labour Court in terms of section 117(1)(f) of the Labour Act, 2007. 
 
Given the current delays in making awards enforceable, the author recommends an 
amendment to section 87 of the Labour Act, which currently provides for the parties 
or the Labour Commissioner to file the award with the Court, thereby making it 
enforceable. In South Africa, the Director of the CCMA has statutory powers to certify 
the award, making it immediately final and binding and enforceable as if it is an order 
of court. The author suggests the same approach be adopted in Namibia to reduce 
the backlog experienced at the Labour Court and to do away with the current unclear 
procedure of filing arbitration awards for the purpose of enforcement. 
 
The author recommends that in the absence of guidelines and a code of good 
practice, section 86(14)(e) of the Labour Act, 2007, which provides for the awarding 
of compensation, be broadened to set out parameters for awarding compensation. 
This will eliminate the inconsistencies currently experienced in the system, where 
arbitrators have carte blanche and can award unlimited compensation using their 
discretion rather than defined guidelines. In this case, using a similar model of 
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limitation on compensation as set out in section 194 of the LRA will suffice in guiding 
arbitrators and the Labour Court to award just and equitable compensation.  
 
The author recommends that the current sectoral or industry bargaining forums be 
given statutory recognition in order to operate in the same manner as the bargaining 
councils established by the South African LRA, despite the difference in industries. 
This will reduce the Office of the Labour Commissioner’s workload and allow staff to 
deal with issues such as resolving labour disputes between parties that arise from 
collective agreements concluded in the forums and the establishment of minimum 
wages. 
 
The author appreciates the speed in resolving labour disputes through private 
arbitration as parties voluntarily enter into arbitration agreements. Given the 
recognition of private arbitration in the Labour Act, 2007, the author suggests that 
labour trained persons should consider establishing formal private arbitration 
institutions in Namibia, similar to Tokiso Dispute Settlement in South Africa, to serve 
as an alternative to the statutory system provided.  
 
The author recognises the essential role played by the Labour Court in Namibia to 
bring about an end to labour disputes where ADR proves futile and proposes that 
social partners and policy makers refer to the recommendations of the task team that 
suggested the establishment of an independent and dedicated Labour Court, staffed 
by specialist labour judges. This will negate the perception that the Labour Court is 
subordinate to the High Court and will do away with compromising labour dispute 
resolution. South Africa and other SADC member states, such as Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland, and Botswana, have dedicated Labour and /or Industrial Courts. 
 
Further, the author recommends that the Judge President of the Labour Court, in the 
interest of resolving labour disputes expeditiously as required by the ILO standards, 
sets timelines within which labour disputes must be concluded by the Court. The 
current delays have proven to have adverse effects on the parties, including where 
reinstatement has to be considered as a dismissed employee would long have been 
replaced by the time the dispute is resolved.  
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The Labour Act, 2007 emphasises the systematic prevention and resolution of labour 
disputes. This can be achieved by the Labour Commissioner and the Labour 
Inspectorate embarking on sensitisation and training initiatives aimed at satisfying the 
objectives of the Labour Act and raising awareness on harmonious labour relations in 
workplaces. By doing so, many labour problems can be solved on the spot, thereby 
preventing complaints arising and limiting or minimising the need for conciliation and 
arbitration by the Labour Commissioner.  
 
The author also recommends that labour inspectors be excluded from the general 
conciliation and arbitration process. They should rather be allowed to focus on their 
core mandate of conducting workplace inspections with a focus on risk enterprises 
where there are persistent common workers’ complaints. 
 
Similarly, the author proposes that labour inspectors involved in the enforcement of 
arbitration awards be given the proper training in respect of the court system. Given 
the failure of the current enforcement system, the author further recommends that a 
clear, unambiguous standard operating procedure be developed, in consultation with 
the Government Attorney and the Registrar of the Labour Court, to facilitate the 
effective enforcement of arbitration awards. This should include timeframes from the 
time the award is filed with the Labour Court, the enforcement by labour inspectors 
and cover all steps until the matter is finalised. Moreover, where practically possible, 
the standard operating procedure must be gazetted to be recognised by the law. 
 
Ultimately, the author recommends the handing down and publication of ADR 
decisions as is the case with the CCMA awards, to constitute valuable public good by 
disseminating information about what can be done and cannot lawfully be done.     
 
Overall, based on the aforementioned findings and recommendations, it is strongly 
recommended to study and consider the positive attributes of the South African ADR 
system with a view to strengthening and improving Namibia’s labour dispute 
resolution system. 
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7.4  GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study presents ADR as a method of conflict resolution that differs from the 
traditional methods of adjudication and litigation. ADR institutions have been created 
to facilitate this, specifically the Labour Commissioner in Namibia and the CCMA in 
South Africa. The Labour Act, 2007 and the LRA have been enacted as legal 
frameworks through which labour disputes can be resolved. This includes the use of 
conciliation, with only a few disputes going to arbitration or, as a last resort, to the 
Labour Court. These institutions have been mandated to promote and implement 
effective strategies for dispute prevention and resolution. However, the author 
submits that both the Labour Commissioner and CCMA seem to be failing to 
successfully realise these objectives. The basis for this view is the number of cases 
that appear before the Labour Courts for final adjudication.  
 
As the primary sources of this study, a premium was placed upon the provisions of 
the Labour Act, 2007 and the LRA, legislation that envisages the quick and cost-
effective resolution of conflicts and disputes. The Labour Commissioner and the 
CCMA are the drivers of this objective, which must be addressed through 
interventions such as communication and the reaching of agreements. Ideally, ADR 
should have moved disputes away from the court-based system, which was used in 
the past as a battle ground where labour wars were fought. However, the author 
contends that ADR is not as effective as envisaged; disputes are not dealt with in a 
faster way or in a friendly environment, and ADR systems consequently fail to deliver 
the expected quick results. This has created a perception that the courts are the only 
avenue available to finalise labour disputes. This perception undermines the purpose 
of the Labour Commissioner. 
 
The study has demonstrated that disputes should be resolved as quickly and 
informally as possible, with little or no procedural technicalities, and without allowing 
them to drag on indefinitely, offering immediate solutions instead. This is far from the 
reality of the situation. In contrast, although the Labour Act, 2007 and the South 
African LRA have brought statutory dispute resolution within the reach of the ordinary 
worker, these Acts may have compounded the problems relating to dispute resolution 
in the respective countries. The author feels that these statutes have created 
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sophisticated systems of dispute resolution in which most role players are seen as 
failing to operate as a result of the complex and technical processes of dealing with 
disputes. 
 
It was further deduced that given all the bottlenecks in the ADR systems, it has 
caused a new type of adversarialism in the employment relationship based on rights, 
rules and powers mostly sourced from guidelines in the labour statutes that prescribe 
the norms for dealing with conflict in the workplace. The technical nature of conflict 
resolution in the workplace, the inability of the parties involved to handle disputes at 
that level and the adversarial nature of the prevailing employment relationship are but 
some of the reasons leading to the high rate of referrals to and subsequent problems 
experienced by the CCMA and the Labour Commissioner.  
 
The author suggests that the labour dispute resolution system in Namibia is not 
strictly time bound and therefore not responsive to business and trade unions’ 
(employees’) needs and expectations. The involvement of legal practitioners at the 
conciliation level makes the system expensive, complicated and therefore ineffective. 
The outcomes are neither quick nor fair or equitable. As a result, the author submits 
that there has merely been a change in emphasis, from the former judicial system or 
cumbersome process of conciliation boards to the new ADR system. The system has 
proven to fail to resolve labour disputes in the most effective manner without having 
to resort to the Labour Court. 
 
Consequently, the author has made the above recommendations, which, if 
implemented, will not only treat the symptoms, but also the causes of workplace 
conflict and remedy the deteriorating, ineffective labour dispute resolution system.  
 
Given the above, the author does not claim to address all the problems in the labour 
dispute resolution systems of the two countries. The study’s limitations were pointed 
out in Chapter One; the topic was examined from a legal theoretical and practical 
perspective limited to the literature available and the personal experience of the 
author. The thesis did not intend to address those aspects that are beyond the scope 
of the study and further research of the system may be necessary as the system 
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continues to develop. Such study will complement this thesis in order to give a 
holistic solution to the problems experienced in the ADR systems of both countries. 
 
A further limitation encountered in this study was the lack of adequate academic 
literature in Namibia that clearly explains what an efficient and effective labour 
dispute resolution system is and what it constitutes. This limitation did not, however, 
pose a serious problem given the availability of abundant resources on the subject in 
South Africa and internationally. 
 
It is hoped that the outcome and results of this research will raise awareness with the 
policy makers in Namibia and equip them with knowledge that is helpful in improving 
the labour dispute resolution system in the country. In a similar vein, it is expected 
that the research will sensitise social partners, arbitrators and all other users of the 
ADR system in Namibia. The absence of a similar study in Namibia makes this study 
unique and significant to labour law scholars internationally, particularly in the SADC 
countries, and labour law practitioners, due to its comparative content. This study has 
created new knowledge on the topic, which may be further expanded by aspiring 
labour law researchers in Namibia or elsewhere. 
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